经验现象学心理学:乔治对胡塞尔现象学的继承与发展

美国现象学心理学家阿米多·乔治基于科学和心理学视角所提出的经验现象学心理学是对胡塞尔现象学的继承和发展。这表现为:在批判对象上,从胡塞尔的反二元论细化为反自然科学心理学;在出发点和基本原则上,将胡塞尔的生活世界、意向性、还原等概念从超验层面放置到经验层面;在研究方法上,从胡塞尔的描述还原过程转向具体的描述现象学心理学方法。本质上,乔治的经验现象学心理学与胡塞尔的现象学一脉相承,不仅完美地展示了后者的基本原理,更在具体概念和操作应用上充实且超越了后者。     

罗尔斯和康德思想渊源重探

从思想传记的角度看,对康德哲学的反思塑造了罗尔斯政治哲学的形成、转向和终局。学界对罗尔斯和康德思想渊源论题主要有“貌合神离说”和“近而远之说”两种观点,前者认为罗尔斯前期对其正义理论的康德式阐释是基于对康德的误读,后者认为罗尔斯后期政治理论致力于疏离康德学说。借鉴学界对康德实践哲学的新近研究会发现,“貌合神离说”误解了康德的道德心理学,而“近而远之说”则误解了康德法权论与其伦理学的关系。澄清这些误解之后会发现,罗尔斯和康德的思想实际上是一种渐近关系,即“行合趋同”。     

潘菽心理学思想的后经验主义蕴含

今年是中国心理学泰斗,理论心理学奠基人潘菽先生诞辰110周年。纪念潘菽先生,意味着继承和发扬潘菽先生的心理学思想。从后经验主义理论心理学的视角来看,潘菽先生的心理学思想仍然具有当代性和启发性,特别是在强调理论对经验研究的优先地位、强调理论对经验现实的建构作用、强调理论的实践品性、强调理论的历史性向度,以及强调理论研究的中国心理学归宿等方面,显示出卓越的远见。     

道德心理学的哲学思考--论心理学与伦理学的会通与融合

道德心理学把规范伦理学与实证心理学在哲学层面上结合起来,为理解人的道德行为提供了一种新的视角。伦理学与心理学的这种融合具体体现为：个人同一性与道德行为必须在心理上保持一致,才能形成真正的道德同一性,因此,美德有其独特的气质和情绪心理学机制。道德是在社会生活中形成的,处理好道德的社会关系是培养良好美德的基础。道德既有理性的层面,也有非理性的层面,培养和确立人的内在理性是成为道德人的心理学基础。基于心理学对道德生活的重要性,一种以心理学为基础的美德伦理学正在出现。     

重新发现屈尔佩:二重心理学思想的演进轨迹与启示

屈尔佩二重心理学思想旨在调和冯特的内容心理学与布伦塔诺的意动心理学,是心理学史上第一次整合心理学自然科学取向与人文科学取向的尝试。文章基于对屈尔佩二重心理学思想演进轨迹的具体分析,尝试厘清其与内容心理学体系之间的继承关系与改良缘由,探究其走近意动心理学的理论动因。最后,从主要贡献和局限两方面来重新发现屈尔佩二重心理学思想的意义与启示。     

康德是道德内在主义者吗

内在主义和外在主义之间的争论是当前道德心理学讨论中的热点问题.这一争论的核心是如何理解在某个行动中理性、意志和欲望所起的作用,以及这三种心理状态与行动者之间的关系.康德式内在主义理论需要给出一种论证来弥合理性和动机之间的裂痕.康德实践哲学实际上是围绕欲求能力(Begehrungsverm(o)gon)的两种规定根据而展开的.在康德的动机体系中,理性或道德性与欲求能力之间的裂痕实际上已经通过敬畏(Achtung)这种先天情感得到了合理的安置.     

从神性到理性——康德对基督教"道德金律"的批判

康德为道德寻求客观依据而确立的道德律令,继承了基督教传统道德金律的律法、普世、上帝等观念。但是康德并非简单地蹈袭了基督教文化传统。他要为具有普遍性价值的道德律找到一个新的更为可靠的基础,这就是人的理性。因而,他从理性角度赋予了这种基督教传统文化思想以新的时代意义。这种新的解释具有现代科学理性及人文性特征,从而对后世学者在道德问题上的探寻产生了深远的影响。     

库恩的后达尔文式康德主义中的心理学方法论探析

库恩的后达尔文式康德主义主要是一种方法论,对当今的心理学发展具有重要意义。它为文化人类学方法在心理学中的运用与发展奠定了理论基础,为重新审视心理学知识和学科发展提供了一个新视角,促进了多元文化等心理学取向形成与发展和解释学方法的扶正,加强了普遍联系观和整体化或系统化方法在心理学中的地位,有助于心理学哲学研究的兴起,为理论心理学的复兴打开了方便之门。     

论威廉詹姆斯的心理学科学观

威廉?詹姆斯（William James, 1842-1910）被誉为“美国心理学之父”,他强烈反对当时学院派实验心理学家的小心理学观,在心理学史上第一次对他以前的心理学思想进行了整合,建构了一种整合的心理学科学观。他认为心理学既具有自然科学的性质,又具有人文科学的性质,这种科学观坚持心理学的人学性质,是一种“大心理学观”。詹姆斯的心理学科学观是解决当前心理学问题不可或缺的思想资源,对当前心理学研究工作具有重要的借鉴意义。     

基督教“道德金律”与康德的道德律令

康德为道德寻求客观依据而确立的"道德律令"继承了基督教传统"道德金律"的普世性、律法及上帝观念,同时又从实践理性角度赋予了这种基督教传统文化思想以新的时代意义。这种新的解释具有现代科学理性及人文性特征,从而对后之学者在道德问题上的探寻有着深远的影响。     

Kant on justification in transcendental philosophy

Kant's claim that the justification of transcendental philosophy is a priori is puzzling because it should be consistent with (1) his general restriction on the justification of knowledge, that intuitions must play a role in the justification of all nondegenerate knowledge, with (2) the implausibility of a priori intuitions being the only ones on which transcendental philosophy is founded, and with (3) his professed view that transcendental philosophy is not analytic. I argue that this puzzle can be solved, that according to Kant transcendental philosophy is justified a priori in the sense that the only empirical information required for its justification can be derived from any possible human experience. Transcendental justification does not rely on any more particular or special observations or experiments. Philip Kitcher's general account of apriority in Kant captures this aspect of a priori knowledge. Nevertheless, I argue that Kitcher's account goes wrong in the link it specifies between apriority and certainty.     

HUMANITY AS AN OBJECT OF RESPECT: IMMANUEL KANT'S ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH AND THE FOUNDATION FOR MORALITY

The article deals with Kant's understanding of personhood and autonomy. It highlights the connection of autonomy and human dignity within Kant's appreciation of morality, and indicates how his distinction between the empirical and transcendental spheres enables Kant to extend dignity even to humans who are not actually autonomous. Turning to contemporary approaches within ethics that refer to Kant but omit this transcendental framework, it defends the necessity of a trans‐empirical frame within the Kantian system and hints at consequences for bioethics. It concludes that Kant works with neither an absolutist notion of freedom in terms of solipsistic autarky, nor an empirical freedom and autonomy that begin and end at certain points of time.     

海德格尔对康德伦理学的批判

相对于康德的其他主要著作而言,海德格尔对于康德第二批判持有一种特殊的看法。他没有直接去探讨它,这实际上隐含着对于它的一种彻底的思考和批判。由于康德伦理学的根本概念是应当,康德把接受了古希腊以来人是理性的动物这个关于人的定义,海德格尔把康德伦理学看作是西方形而上学自身发展线条的一个基本环节,是柏拉图主义理念学说发展进程中一个特殊的点。人的本质的干瘪化也是人道主义最终走向主体主义的根本原因,康德的自由意志和道德律只是这种人道主义思考的必然后果。     

The Role of Reflection in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

There are two prevailing interpretations of the status which Kant accorded his claims in the Critique of Pure Reason: 1) he is analyzing our concepts of cognition and experience; 2) he is making empirical claims about our cognitive faculties. I argue for a third alternative: on Kant's account, all cognition consists in a reflective consciousness of our cognitive faculties, and in critique we analyze the content of this consciousness. Since Strawson raises a famous charge of incoherence against such a position, I begin by showing that this charge is misplaced.     

On A Semantic Interpretation Of Kant's Concept Of Number

What is central to the progression of a sequence is the idea of succession, which is fundamentally a temporal notion. In Kant's ontology numbers are not objects but rules (schemata) for representing the magnitude of a quantum. The magnitude of a discrete quantum 11...11 is determined by a counting procedure, an operation which can be understood as a mapping from the ordinals to the cardinals. All empirical models for numbers isomorphic to 11...11 must conform to the transcendental determination of time-order. Kant's transcendental model for number entails a procedural semantics in which the semantic value of the number-concept is defined in terms of temporal procedures. A number is constructible if and only if it can be schematized in a procedural form. This representability condition explains how an arbitrarily large number is representable and why Kant thinks that arithmetical statements are synthetic and not analytic.     

Pre´cis of Heidegger,Language, and World-disclosure

It is argued that Heidegger should be seen as something of a Kantian Idealist. Like Kant, Heidegger distinguishes two standpoints (transcendental and empirical) which we can occupy when we ask the question whether natural things depend on us. He agrees with Kant that from the empirical or human standpoint we are justified in saying that natural things do not depend on us. But in contrast with Kant, Heidegger argues that from the transcendental standpoint we can say neither that natural things do depend on us, nor that they do not. His reasons for saying this, however, represent an attempt to rework both Kant's temporal idealism and his temporal interpretation of the concept of an object (which shows up in Heidegger as a temporal interpretation of being). Heidegger suggests that Kant was led astray into a transcendental idealism about natural entities, because he did not understand the implications of transcendental idealism about being.     

再论梁漱溟心理学思想

该文从心理发生的动力、身心关系的活动机理、知识构成的方法、心理发展的条件、心理保健方法和学习心理学思想等六个方面历史地、系统地论述和评析了梁漱溟先生的心理学思想,并从多角度阐述了他对我国早期心理学发展的贡献,以期确立他在我国近代心理学史上的地位和全面认识梁漱溟先生。     

另一种声音：现代新儒学与中国人文主义心理学

与西方心理学以科学主义为主体的“由下至上”的研究思路不同,中国传统心理学探究走的是“由上至下”的研究路线,即从心理及精神层面最高端入手,强调心理的道德与理性层面,故其实质是人文主义的。现代新儒学作为人文主义心理学研究典范,具有心理学研究“另一种声音”的独特价值与意义。现代新儒学研究背景及思路的展开,呈现出以传统心理学思想为深厚根基的中国近代心理学的独特个性与自信。这是现代新儒学对中国心理学的最大贡献     

The Metaphysical Expositions of Space and Time

The direct proof of transcendental idealism, in the Transcendental Aesthetic of Kant's First Critique, has borne the brunt of enormous criticism. Much of this criticism has arisen from a confusion regarding the epistemological nature of the arguments Kant proposes with the alleged ontological conclusions he draws. In this paper I attempt to deflect this species of criticism. I concentrate my analysis on the Metaphysical Expositions of Space and Time. I argue that the argument form of the Metaphysical Expositions is that of disjunctive syllogism and that Kant's primary target of attack is that of Leibnizian relativism. I provide a detailed analysis and reconstruction of the arguments of the Metaphysical Expositions, defending Kant against various claims of argumentative invalidity and incoherence. I conclude by identifying what can properly be inferred regarding the ontological nature of space and time, given my reconstructions of the arguments, and by suggesting the manner in which Kant can deflect objections from the other major proponent of transcendental realism, namely, Newtonian absolutism.