How Could There Be True Causal Claims Without There Being Special Causal Facts in the World?

Some philosophers of physics recently expressed their skepticism about causation (Norton 2003b, 2007). However, this is not new. The view that causation does not refer to any ontological category perhaps can be attributed to Hume, Kant and Russell. On the other hand, some philosophers (Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe) view causation as a physical process and some others (Cartwright) view causation as making claims about capacities possessed by objects. The issue about the ontological status of causal claims involves issues concerning the ontological status of capacity, modality and dispositional claims. In this paper, my goal is to show that without engaging metaphysical debates about the ontological status of causal claims, it can be shown that we can objectively assign truth values to these statements. I argue that for causal claims to be objective we don't need to postulate the existence of special facts (specific to causal claims) in addition to ordinary physical facts described by physical theories. This, I think, is enough to justify the usefulness of this concept in certain branches (may be all) of science. Once this is achieved, there is no need to engage in unnecessary metaphysical debates. So, even if advanced physical theories don't mention this notion, causal reasoning can still be important in understanding the world not in the sense that science discovers special ontological category called causation but in the sense that we come to know certain facts about the world.     

Understanding causation

Synthese - In Part I of ‘Causality and Determination” (CD), Anscombe writes that (1) we understand causality through understanding specific causal expressions, (2) efficient causation...     

Process causality and asymmetry

Process theories of causality seek to explicate causality as a property of individual causal processes. This paper examines the capacity of such theories to account for the asymmetry of causation. Three types of theories of asymmetry are discussed; the subjective, the temporal, and the physical, the third of these being the preferred approach. Asymmetric features of the world, namely the entropic and Kaon arrows, are considered as possible sources of causal asymmetry and a physical theory of asymmetry is subsequently developed with special reference to the questions of objectivity and backwards causation.An earlier draft of this paper was read at the A.A.P. conference at the University of Sydney, June, 1990. The author would like to thank Peter Menzies and Huw Price for their helpful comments.     

The Ontology of Causal Process Theories

There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of ??causal process?? does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe??s theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon??s Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair??s phsyicalist reduction of causation.     

Reducing Causality to Transmission

The idea that causation can be reduced to transmission of an amount of some conserved quantity between events is spelled out and defended against important objections. Transmission is understood as a symmetrical relation of copresence in two distinct events. The actual asymmetry of causality has its origin in the asymmetrical character of certain irreversible physical processes and then spreads through the causal net. This conception is compatible with the possibility of backwards causation and with a causal theory of time. Genidentity, the persistence of concrete objects, can be given an explanation in causal terms. The transmission theory is shown to escape difficulties faced by two important alternative theories of causation: Salmon's (1984) Mark Transmission Theory and Dowe's (1992a) Conserved Quantities Theory.     

THE METAPHYSICS OF DOWNWARD CAUSATION: REDISCOVERING THE FORMAL CAUSE

The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find it difficult to prove that higher‐order properties can be causally significant without violating the causal laws that operate at lower physical levels. They also face the problem of circularity and incoherence in their explanation. In our article we show that these problems can be overcome only if DC is understood in terms of formal rather than physical (efficient) causality. This breakdown of causal monism in science opens a way to the retrieval of the fourfold Aristotelian notion of causality.     

The Soul is Alive and Well: Non-reductive Physicalism and Emergent Mental Properties

Non-reductive physicalism denies the soul's existence, arguing that cognitive functions emerge from evolutionary processes. Focusing on Nancey Murphy, this paper argues that non-reductive physicalism has an inadequate conception of causality. Murphy defends downward causation, but like many modern and postmodern philosophers, she pays insufficient attention to the metaphysics of causality. Drawing on Thomistic philosophy, this article maintains that lower-level entities like neurotransmitters lack the causal power necessary to produce higher-level cognitive operations. In defending emergence, Murphy performs a metaphysical sleight-of-hand through which cognitive powers inexplicably appear. The paper ends by urging contemporary thinkers to develop richer metaphysical understandings of causality, and to use them to enhance the dialogue between religion and science.     

Causality in medicine: Towards a theory and terminology

One of the cornerstones of modern medicine is the search for what causes diseases to develop. A conception of multifactorial disease causes has emerged over the years. Theories of disease causation, however, have not quite been developed in accordance with this view. It is the purpose of this paper to provide a fundamental explication of aspects of causation relevant for discussing causes of disease. The first part of the analysis will discuss discrimination between singular and general causality. Singular causality, as in the specific patient, is a relation between a concrete sequence of causally linked events. General causation, e.g. as in disease etiology, means various categories of causal relations between event types. The paper introduces the concept of a reference case serving as a source for causal inference, reaching beyond the concept of general causality. The second part of the analysis provides exemplification of a theory of causation suitable for discussing singular causation. The chain of events that induce a disease state can be identified as effective causal complexes, each complex composed of nonredundant components, which separately contribute to the effect of the complex, without the individual component being necessary or sufficient in itself to produce the effect. In the third part of the analysis the theory is elaborated further. Causes, defined as nonredundant components, can furthermore be differentiated according to their avoidability, according to theories about human error or by the potential of eradication. Multifactorial models of disease creates a need for systematic approaches to causal factors. The paper proposes a taxonomical terminology that serves this purpose.     

Setiya on reasons and causes

Setiya [2013. “Causality in Action”. Analysis Reviews, 73 (3): pp. 512–525] recently gave a novel argument in favor of a causal theory of acting for a reason. He presents three principles relating acting for a reason to psychological states of the agent and uses them to test theories of acting for a reason: theories cannot explain the necessary truth of the conditionals are to be rejected. Surveying a number of alternatives, he finds that only a causal-psychological theory passes this test, that, thus, it must be correct, and that there must be a solution to the problem of deviant causation. Setiya's challenge is forceful, but he does not establish his conclusion. The anticausalist can at this point reverse it: since deviant causation is intractable, some noncausal theory must be able to meet his challenge. This reversal has teeth: Setiya underestimates both the challenges that causal theories face and the resources available to the anticausalist to address his challenge.     

From mutual manipulation to cognitive extension: challenges and implications

This paper examines the application of the mutual manipulability criterion as a way to demarcate constituents of cognitive systems from resources having a mere causal influence on cognitive systems. In particular, it is argued that on at least one interpretation of the mutual manipulability criterion, the criterion is inadequate because the criterion is conceptualized as identifying synchronic dependence between higher and lower ‘levels’ in mechanisms. It is argued that there is a second articulation of the mutual manipulability criterion available, and that it should be preferred for at least two reasons. The first is that the criterion of mutual manipulability is an instance of continuous reciprocal causation. The second is that it has implications for how to understand this distinction between causation and constitution. It is shown that when considering dynamic systems, continuous reciprocal causation - ubiquitous in dynamical systems - is a form of constitutive causality, which entails that causal factors may, in the right circumstances, by genuine constitutive factors of cognition. This notion of constitutive causality lends support to conceiving of the mutual manipulability criterion as a genuine demarcation principle in the debate over the boundaries of mind.     

The Agency Theory of Causality,Anthropomorphism, and Simultaneity

The purpose of this article is to examine two important issues concerning the agency theory of causality: the charge of anthropomorphism and the relation of simultaneous causation. After a brief outline of the agency theory, sections 2–4 contain the refutation of the three main forms in which the charge of anthropomorphism is to be found in the literature. It will appear that it is necessary to distinguish between the subjective and the objective aspect of the concept of causation. This will lead, in section 5, to contrast two kinds of anthropomorphism, one which has been rightly rejected by modern science and one which is fully compatible with the objective reality of the causal processes. Finally, section 6 will apply the preceding considerations to simultaneous causation. On the one hand, in a basic sense, there can be no simultaneous causal relations. On the other hand, simultaneous causation arises when we consider the natural change by abstracting from the agent and from her/his projects of intervention in reality.     

Human agency in social cognitive theory

The present article examines the nature and function of human agency within the conceptual model of triadic reciprocal causation. In analyzing the operation of human agency in this interactional causal structure, social cognitive theory accords a central role to cognitive, vicarious, self-reflective, and self-regulatory processes. The issues addressed concern the psychological mechanisms through which personal agency is exercised, the hierarchical structure of self-regulatory systems, eschewal of the dichotomous construal of self as agent and self as object, and the properties of a nondualistic but nonreductional conception of human agency. The relation of agent causality to the fundamental issues of freedom and determinism is also analyzed.     

How Probabilistic Causation Can Account for the Use of Mechanistic Evidence

In a recent article in this journal, Federica Russo and Jon Williamson argue that an analysis of causality in terms of probabilistic relationships does not do justice to the use of mechanistic evidence to support causal claims. I will present Ronald Giere’s theory of probabilistic causation, and show that it can account for the use of mechanistic evidence (both in the health sciences—on which Russo and Williamson focus—and elsewhere). I also review some other probabilistic theories of causation (of Suppes, Eells, and Humphreys) and show that they cannot account for the use of mechanistic evidence. I argue that these theories are also inferior to Giere’s theory in other respects.     

How to Be a Humean Interventionist

This paper aims to provide Humean metaphysics for the interventionist theory of causation. This is done by appealing to the hierarchical picture of causal relations as being realized by mechanisms, which in turn are identified with lower‐level causal structures. The modal content of invariances at the lowest level of this hierarchy, at which mechanisms are reduced to strict natural laws, is then explained in terms of projectivism based on the best‐system view of laws.     

The Epistemic/Ontic Divide

A number of philosophers think that, while we cannot explain how the mind is physical, we can know that it is physical, nonetheless. That is, they accept both the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical and ontological physicalism. I argue that this position is unstable. Among other things, I argue that once one accepts the explanatory gap, the main argument for ontological physicalism, the argument from causation, looses its force. For if one takes physicaVnonphysical causation and ontological physicalism to be equally mysterious, as physicalists who accept the explanatory gap are inclined to do, there is little justification for accepting ontological physicalism rather than rejecting the causal closure of the physical.     

Al-Ghazali's Use of the Terms “Necessity” and “Habit” in his Theory of Natural Causality

The present article aims at analyzing the terms “necessity” (Al-darura) and “habit” (al-āda) in al-Ghazali's (1058?–?1111) theory of natural causality (Al-Sbābiah al-Tabī'īa) by answering the following question: Why does Al-Ghazali use term “habit” and negation of “necessity” with regard to natural Causality? Al-Ghazali denies causal necessity that links cause and effect since this relationship does not draw on logical rules that make it necessary. This, however, does not mean that he denies the existence of a causal relationship between things, as he recognizes its existence. He, however, denies the necessity of that relationship, as he claims that the source of causal necessity stems from a psychological emotion rather than from being inherent in things themselves. Al-Ghazali also attempts to base causal necessity on “habit” by claiming that the similarity of event A as cause and event B as effect stems from observation, repetition and the sequencing of natural phenomena. Al-Ghazali, then, endeavors to prove that science is based on expectation and assumption that draws on observation, the senses, and repetition and does not consider it as constant and absolute.