论道德评价中的几个基本理论问题

道德评价是人们依据一定社会的道德价值标准,通过社会舆论和内心信念对他人或自己的思想和行为进行善恶价值判断,以表明褒贬态度的道德活动。道德评价所形成的社会舆论直接作用于行为主体的思想和行为活动,对行为主体的道德行为选择将产生非常重要的影响。如何科学、客观地对人们的行为活动予以道德评判,必须澄清几个基本的理论问题:一是关于道德评价的标准问题;二是关于道德评价的依据问题;三是关于道德评价的权重问题;四是关于道德评价的方法问题。     

两种道德自我调节机制下的道德行为

道德自我调节指个体根据道德自我, 从事(不从事)道德行为和不道德行为。道德自我分为状态道德自我(道德自我知觉)和特质道德自我(道德认同)。道德自我调节的负反馈机制, 指个体依据道德自我知觉, 保持道德行为的波动性, 它包含道德许可效应和道德清洁效应; 正反馈机制, 指个体依据道德认同, 保持道德行为的一致性。解释水平理论整合了正负反馈机制, 两种道德行为。未来研究需探讨公我、个体差异对道德自我调节机制的影响。     

"Moral Agent"是""道德代理人"吗?——一个伦理学概念辨析

道德代理人一词是国内环境伦理学界对西方伦理学概念moral agent的翻译,但此译法不妥之处有三:(1)moral agent是西方伦理学的基本术语,是指具有自我意识,能够进行道德认识、道德判断、道德选择和道德行为并承担道德责任的道德行为体,无代理之意;(2)西方非人类中心主义环境伦理学家主张moral agent包括人和部分高等动物,故moral agent不能译为道德代理人;(3)道德行为体(moral agent)与道德关怀对象之间的关系不是代理关系。     

公共物品困境中惩罚的形式与作用

公共物品困境中对惩罚的操纵表明：惩罚搭便车可以维持群体内的合作行为。早期研究表明, 惩罚的设置有助于建立社会合作规范, 有代价惩罚、利他惩罚和第三方惩罚等惩罚形式为间接互惠提供了合理的解释。随着实证研究的进一步深入, 惩罚表现出新的形式, 如自私惩罚和反社会惩罚, 被惩罚者的威胁报复将使合作者不再继续惩罚搭便车行为, 导致合作行为的减少直至消失。正当性理论、道德情感理论和文化基因协同进化理论表明惩罚的存在具有一定的必要性和价值, 惩罚的作用存在框架效应。本文介绍了一些有关的中介变量, 如利他、信任、声誉、文化、期望等, 可以对惩罚作用的积极面和破坏性予以适当的解释, 也为合作的心理机制研究提供新的视角。     

少年儿童道德行为动机特征的心理分析

目的和方法少年儿童的行为,由于其道德动机不同,就会具有不同的道德意义。要給少年儿童的行为以正确的道德評价,就应当洞察他們行为的道德动机。在儿童道德行为的心理特征的研究中,有很多是由研究者編拟一些故事,其中叙述某些有具体內容的道德行为,叫儿童判断或評价,从而揭示他們某种道德行为的心理特征。由研究者提供的道德故事,对儿童来說,是一种假設的行为情境,而不是他們实际的行为     

道德关怀范围的持续扩展——从非人类动物到无生命的机器人

人类道德进步的历史就是道德关怀的范围不断扩展的历史。环境伦理学的重要理论贡献是,区分了道德行为体与道德承受体,把道德承受体的范围扩展到了人类物种之外的自在物。当代机器人伦理学接过环境伦理学扩展道德关怀的接力棒,不仅把道德承受体的范围从自然存在物扩展到了作为人工制品的机器人,还把道德行为体的范围扩展到了具有道德功能的社会机器人。随着道德关怀范围的扩展,出现了三种不同类型的道德行为体和五类不同的道德承受体。为了应对伦理共同体成员的增加所带来的伦理挑战,需要建构具有拓展主义、非人类中心主义、后科学主义与全球主义性质的新型伦理文化。     

道德情绪的特点、发展及其对行为的影响

道德情绪是在个体根据社会规范或行为准则对行为进行评价时所产生的情绪,可以根据不同的标准进行划分;道德情绪中的自我意识情绪需要自我意识和自我评价等过程的参与,其发展也受众多内外因素的影响;道德情绪具有重要的社会功能,行为和神经科学层面的研究都表明道德情绪对于个体的道德行为及相关因素有重要影响;不同的道德情绪对行为的影响存在差异,且现有的相关研究结果仍存在争议;未来研究应该加强关于道德情绪对道德行为影响的内在机制及脑科学研究,同时还应较多关注道德情绪及道德行为在较小儿童上的发展及实际应用。     

论市场经济与道德的关系

论市场经济与道德的关系玉淑芹在《哲学研究》（１９９５年第２期）上撰文,针对有的学者否定市场经济行为与道德行为之间的联系;道德的本质特征是自律性和超功利性、而市场经济的重要特点是他律性和功利性;市场经济行为是非道德行为,不能作道德评价,无须道德调节等观...     

5～14岁儿童对亲社会行为认知的研究

问题的提出道德教育的成效在很大程度上取决于教育内容是否符合儿童的道德认知发展水平。柯尔伯格的道德发展阶段理论虽然为确定儿童道德认知水平提供了一个基本构架,但不能具体反映儿童对各种道德现象的认知水平。因而,要深入了解儿童道德认知规律,必须对各种具体的道德认知现象进行研究。亲社会行为是道德行为的一种,儿童对亲社会行为的认知涉及道德评价、道德动机等方面。了解儿童对亲社会行为的认知特点,有助于我们解释许多儿童道德行为的机制,也可以为教育工作引导儿童开展合作、分享、援助等多种形式的亲社会行为提供依据。     

道德层次论与人生境界说

不同的人有不同的人生境界,同一个体,其在不同阶段,由于觉解程度不同,所呈现的人生境界也不尽一致。对处于不同人生境界的个体而言,其对道德行为的践行则有所不同,由此出现道德冷漠、道德顾虑、道德恐惧以及道德自由诸种道德行为。不同道德行为,多是一种偶在性表现,既不是个体一成不变的定行,亦非某一群体集体行为的表征。每一种道德行为的出现,都有其相应的内因外缘,剖析诸类非正常道德行为出现的缘由,以期提出对治之方,这是学者的使命,亦是社会之所寄。     

Children's conscience and self-regulation

We focus on children's conscience, an inner guiding system responsible for the gradual emergence and maintenance of self-regulation. Drawing from our research program that has encompassed three large longitudinal studies cumulatively covering the first 6 years of life, we discuss two major components of conscience: moral emotions (guilt, discomfort following transgressions) and moral conduct compatible with rules and standards. We discuss the organization of young children's conscience, focusing on relations between moral emotions and moral conduct, and the development of conscience, focusing on its early form: the child's eager, willing stance toward parental socialization. We also review research on two major sets of influences that predict individual differences in moral emotions and moral conduct: biologically based temperament and socialization in the family. We discuss two inhibitory systems of temperament-fearfulness and effortful control-and several features of socialization, including the style of parental discipline and the quality of the parent-child relationship. Early conscience is an important early personality system, coherently organized, relatively stable over time, and subject to individual differences that emerge as a result of a complex interplay between children's temperamental individuality and socialization in the family.     

The Relation between Sovereignty and Guilt in Nietzsche's Genealogy

This paper interprets the relation between sovereignty and guilt in Nietzsche's Genealogy. I argue that, contrary to received opinion, Nietzsche was not opposed to the moral concept of guilt. I analyse Nietzsche's account of the emergence of the guilty conscience out of a pre‐moral bad conscience. Drawing attention to Nietzsche's references to many different forms of conscience and analogizing to his account of punishment, I propose that we distinguish between the enduring and the fluid elements of a ‘conscience’, defining the enduring element as the practice of forming self‐conceptions. I show that for Nietzsche, the moralization of the bad conscience results from mixing it with the material concepts of guilt and duty, a process effected by prehistoric religious institutions by way of the concept of god. This moralization furnishes a new conception of oneself as a responsible agent and holds the promise of sovereignty by giving us a freedom unknown to other creatures, but at the price of our becoming subject to moral guilt. According to Nietzsche, however, the very forces that made it possible have spoiled this promise and, under the pressures of the ascetic ideal, a harmful notion of responsibility understood in terms of sin now dominates our lives. Thus, to fully realize our sovereignty, we must liberate ourselves from this sinful conscience.     

Primordial Moral Awareness: Levinas,Conscience, and the Unavoidable Call to Responsibility

The phenomenon of conscience as articulated in Roman Catholic moral theology has at least three dimensions: a fundamental and universal call to moral goodness; the search for moral truth; and a commitment to act in a particular way. Recent moral theology has tended to focus on the latter two dimensions, but there has been a strong call from Thomas Ryan for attention to the first dimension of conscience, especially its constitution in ‘horizontal relationality’. In this article I respond to Ryan's call, and demonstrate that the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas can show how the experience of conscience is constituted in horizontal relationality, as well as that it supports an understanding of conscience as a universal call to responsibility. Correlatively, and perhaps more significantly, the introduction of Levinas’ philosophy into the discussion of conscience sheds light on a significant aspect of this call to moral responsibility. This highlights that the Roman Catholic understanding of conscience has ethical consequences for theology more broadly considered (as well as the other academic disciplines) in terms of understanding why it is impossible to set aside considerations of responsibility in the search for truth.     

Toddlers' responsive imitation predicts preschool-age conscience

Imitation has long been considered a mechanism for the development of conscience. Despite the central role of imitation in theories of moral internalization, the prediction from imitation to moral behavior has not been tested using an individual differences approach. In a longitudinal design, we examined whether individual differences in toddlers' responsive imitation predict preschool-age conscience. Mothers modeled actions for their children to imitate, and both matching behavior and motivation were observed at 14 and 22 months of age. We also measured preschool conscience by observing children's internalized conduct and guilt at ages 33 and 45 months. Imitation measures consistently predicted conscience variables. These relations were strengthened by aggregation across measures and times of assessment. Motivation and matching behavior each contributed independent variance in predicting preschool-age conscience. Results are consistent with the claim that responsive imitation reflects a general receptive stance to parents' guidance, and with both neopsychoanalytic and social cognitive views of imitation's importance in early moral development.     

Modern Moral Conscience

ABSTRACT

The article challenges the individualism and neutrality of modern moral conscience. It looks to the history of the concept to excavate an older tradition that takes conscience to be social and morally responsive, while arguing that dominant contemporary justifications of conscience in terms of integrity are inadequate without reintroducing these social and moral traits. This prompts a rethinking of the nature and value of conscience: first, by demonstrating that a morally-responsive conscience is neither a contradiction in terms nor a political absurdity; second, by suggesting how a morally-responsive conscience can be informed by the social world without being a mere proxy for social power or moribund tradition.     

How individual was conscience in the early-modern period? Observations on the development of Catholic moral theology

This article investigates how the notion of individual conscience has to be understood within the early-modern development of Catholic moral theology. It highlights that 16th-century Catholic theologians continued to understand conscience mainly in Thomist terms as a rational judgment. Yet they also came to investigate more deeply questions of intention and individual circumstances that might interfere with the perfect execution of moral reasoning. Particular emphasis is given to the question of probabilism and whether this new method of analyzing moral agency provided a stepping stone towards a more individualized conception of conscience, as some intellectual historians have contended. The article argues that whilst probabilism sharpened the awareness for problems of conscience, this development cannot be disconnected from the culture of counsel of conscience, inscribed into the fundamentally Thomist definition of it.     

CONSCIENCE, CASUISTRY, AND MORAL DECISION: SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES*

The body of this paper is devoted to tracing out some aspects of the development of the idea of conscience in the Church of England in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Surely, it may seem, a subject of limited interest to the readers of this journal! Yet I hope they will find otherwise. I chose to describe this phase of the history of conscience in the West because it illustrates a decisive shift in ideas about conscience which has occurred in many Western cultures besides England's: the belief that the individual ought in many cases to seek the aid of others in forming his moral judgments gives way to the belief that he ought to be self-reliant in such matters. A knowledge of this shift can advance the philosophical understanding of the idea of conscience and the work to be done in the comparative study of conscience 'East'and 'West.'     

The conscience debate: resources for rapprochement from the problem’s perceived source

This article critically evaluates the conception of conscience underlying the debate about the proper place and role of conscience in the clinical encounter. It suggests that recovering a conception of conscience rooted in the Catholic moral tradition could offer resources for moving the debate past an unproductive assertion of conflicting rights, namely, physicians’ rights to conscience versus patients’ rights to socially and legally sanctioned medical interventions. It proposes that conscience is a necessary component of the moral life in general and a necessary resource for maintaining a coherent sense of moral agency. It demonstrates that an earlier and intellectually richer conception of conscience, in contrast with common contemporary formulations, makes the judgments of conscience accountable to reason, open to critique, and protected from becoming a bastion for bigotry, idiosyncrasy, and personal bias.

ARE ANIMALS MORAL? A THEOLOGICAL APPRAISAL OF THE EVOLUTION OF VICE AND VIRTUE

I discuss controversial claims about the status of non‐human animals as moral beings in relation to philosophical claims to the contrary. I address questions about the ontology of animals rather than ethical approaches as to how humans need to treat other animals through notions of, for example, animal rights. I explore the evolutionary origins of behavior that can be considered vices or virtues and suggest that Thomas Aquinas is closer to Darwin's view on nonhuman animals than we might suppose. An appreciation of the complexity of the emotional lives of social animals and their cooperative behaviors in light of the work of animal ethologists such as Frans de Waal and Marc Bekoff suggests that social animals can be considered moral in their own terms. I discuss the charge of anthropomorphism, drawing on the work of archaeologist Steven Mithen, and consider arguments for the evolution of conscience in the work of anthropologist Christopher Boehm. Only the biological basis for the development of conscience and religion has evolved in nonhuman animals, and this should not be confused with sophisticated moral systems of analysis or particular religious beliefs found in the human community.     

Curiosity as an Agent of Conscience

Public outcry against social outrages in our nation in the past few years have called for solutions that suggest that we as a nation believe that by strengthening the observational and punishing components of the superego of the American Psyche we can successfully overthrow our moral failings. By using data in regard to Adolph Eichman and other Nazis as clinical examples, it is suggested that the problem of our moral failings resides not in a deficient superego (a refluent moral agent) but in the insufficient development of conscience (a reflective consciousness). The roles that curiosity and impeded curiosity take in the development of morality are shown to be central to an understanding of how conscience differs from superego.