道德自我调节对亲社会行为和违规行为的影响

本文通过两个研究探讨道德自我调节对亲社会行为和违规行为的影响。研究一中,被试随机分为三组,分别抄写“正性特质词语”“负性特质词语”或“中性词语”,并回忆自己所经历的与关键词有关的事情。启动完成后,考察其捐助行为。结果发现,正性特质启动组被试愿意捐助的数目显著高于负性特质和中性词语启动组。研究二用同样的方法改变被试的道德自我知觉,然后对被试的作弊行为进行了考察。结果发现,正性特质启动组的作弊严重程度显著低于中性词语启动组,负性特质启动组的作弊发生率和作弊严重程度显著低于中性词语启动组。本研究表明,道德自我调节过程不一定遵循负反馈机制：虽然“道德净化效应”在本研究中得到了部分验证,但是我们的实验结果不符合“道德许可效应”的预期。     

道德心理许可研究述评

道德心理许可是指既往的道德行为让人觉得可以表达或做出可能会损害自己道德名誉的态度或行为。给予许可与被许可行为既可属于相同领域, 也可属于不同领域, 甚至观察者有时也会给予行为者以道德心理许可。道德信誉和道德证书是产生道德心理许可的两条独立路径。重要的个人认同和避免虚伪这两个因素可能阻碍许可的发生。未来还需要厘清自我许可与他人许可之间的关系, 验证道德信誉和道德证书模型的一些基本假设, 探讨道德心理许可的积极效应。     

两种道德自我调节机制下的道德行为

道德自我调节指个体根据道德自我, 从事(不从事)道德行为和不道德行为。道德自我分为状态道德自我(道德自我知觉)和特质道德自我(道德认同)。道德自我调节的负反馈机制, 指个体依据道德自我知觉, 保持道德行为的波动性, 它包含道德许可效应和道德清洁效应; 正反馈机制, 指个体依据道德认同, 保持道德行为的一致性。解释水平理论整合了正负反馈机制, 两种道德行为。未来研究需探讨公我、个体差异对道德自我调节机制的影响。     

绿色消费的许可效应：绿色让我们更不道德？

绿色消费属于道德范畴,消费者在助推绿色社会发展中的作用日益受到重视。然而,绿色消费会降低指定性道德约束或增强禁止性道德选择,消费者会变得不再绿色甚至自私(如享乐、撒谎或偷窃),这便是绿色消费的许可效应。从时间维度上来说,绿色消费许可效应的产生包括启动效应-绿色消费-许可效应三个阶段。有关该效应的理论解释是道德自我调节。从根本上来说,化解该效应需要消费者养成绿色生活方式,它包括两个路径：一方面,从绿色行为到绿色自我,抽象化表征行为,将绿色行为与自我概念相连接,采用自下而上加工方式实现;另一方面,从绿色自我到绿色行为,基于价值观-行为一致性原则,会促进个体产生更多绿色消费以及节俭和利他,采用的是自上而下加工。文章最后指出未来一些研究方向。     

中文阅读过程中字形快速启动的眼动研究

以字形相似的汉字为启动字,探讨字形信息激活在汉字识别中的时间进程。实验1采用命名任务考察三种启动时间条件下是否存在字形启动效应,结果发现当启动时间为35ms时,出现稳定的字形启动效应。实验2采用眼动记录法考察阅读过程中的快速启动,结果在三种启动时间条件下均未发现显著的启动效应。     

恋人概念威胁启动削弱自我和恋人面孔优势效应:来自眼动研究的证据

采用眼动记录技术和恋人概念威胁启动范式探讨自我和恋人面孔优势效应的产生和维持过程。结果发现:与概念非威胁启动条件下相比,概念威胁启动条件下,被试搜索恋人面孔时的兴趣区个数和搜索自我面孔时的平均眼跳次数与搜索陌生人面孔时比差异变得不显著;恋人面孔与陌生人面孔在兴趣区内总注视时间上的差异变得不显著。结果表明,自我与恋人面孔存在注意的优先捕获和维持优势,恋人概念的威胁启动会减少对恋人的关注,证明了建立恋人的积极概念是恋人面孔优势效应产生和维持的重要原因。     

预期性、词频和笔画数对中文词汇识别影响的眼动研究

预期性是阅读研究领域中的一个热点问题,但关于预期性发生作用的加工阶段问题缺少实证考察和解释(Huettig, 2015)。本研究采用眼动追踪技术,通过对预期性和词频、预期性和笔画数在词汇识别过程中是否存在交互作用进行考察,以探讨预期性效应对词汇识别产生影响的加工阶段。结果显示,预期性和词频、预期性和笔画数之间均不存在交互作用,由此表明,预期性、词频和笔画数均独立地对中文文本阅读中的词汇识别产生显著的影响,该结果符合E-Z读者模型的研究假设。     

内隐和外显道德评价的比较研究——来自眼动的证据

为探索内隐道德直觉和外显道德推理在道德评价中的差异及其内在机制,此研究将道德图片内容限定在伤害/关心维度,同时考虑道德效价以及情绪唤醒度,利用眼动追踪技术,考察内隐和外显道德任务中,道德直觉和道德推理的眼动轨迹及其加工过程差异。眼动结果发现,外显和内隐任务中个体均对低唤醒道德图片的首次注视时间更短,对低唤醒不道德图片总注视时间更长; 内隐任务和外显任务早期自动化加工阶段的平均凝视时间无显著差异; 内隐任务中,对不道德图片比对道德图片晚期平均凝视时间更长,瞳孔直径在中晚期时显著增加。此研究结果提示无论是道德直觉过程还是道德推理过程都是意识和无意识之间的相互作用,但是道德直觉过程的加工可能存在时间上的滞后性。     

阅读水平和阅读任务对英语词频效应的影响:来自非熟练汉-英双语者的眼动证据

利用眼动仪记录非熟练汉-英双语者阅读包含高频词或低频词的英语句子时的眼动轨迹,探讨不同阅读水平和不同阅读任务对词频效应的影响。采用2(阅读水平:高、低)×2(阅读任务:自然阅读、校对阅读)×2(目标词词频:高、低)混合实验设计。结果发现:(1)高水平组和低水平组都表现出显著的词频效应和阅读任务差异,即低水平组的词频效应更为明显,而高水平组的阅读任务差异更为明显;(2)不同阅读任务均表现出显著的词频效应,但校对阅读的词频效应更为明显。这表明,阅读水平和阅读任务均会影响英语阅读的词频效应,而高水平组被试在英语阅读中的认知灵活性更强。     

共产主义信念对道德认知的影响及认知机制

基于五个实验研究联合使用单类内隐联想范式与概念启动范式,探讨了共产主义信念与道德认知的关系及其认知机制。结果显示:(1)共产主义信念与道德在概念层面具有相容性;(2)在阈上、阈下水平启动共产主义信念均能够显著促进道德概念判断;(3)共产主义信念促进道德判断的启动效应呈现累积趋势,符合证据累积模型,而在词汇决定任务下未出现概念的扩散激活效应,不符合扩散激活模型。系列研究表明,新时代中国特色社会主义背景下,共产主义信念与道德认知产生了显著地关联,共产主义信念启动能够促进道德判断,且共产主义信念促进道德判断的启动效应并不是发生在语义层面,而是知觉层面。     

Perceptions of Religious Hypocrisy: When Moral Claims Exceed Moral Action

In this study, we investigated perceptions of hypocrisy among Christian and non-Christian individuals. Specifically, participants (N = 121) were asked to evaluate people of different religious orientations in terms of perceptions of both claimed morality, actual behavior, and general hypocrisy. Across all designations, perceptions of moral hypocrisy were determined to be greater to the extent that moral claims exceeded actual behavior. Among non-Christian participants, perceptions of hypocrisy were highest with respect to “devout” and “evangelical” Christian targets. In contrast, among Christian participants, the highest ratings of hypocrisy were reserved for “casual” Christians (i.e., Christians who do not incorporate their faith into their daily life). Our findings have both theoretical implications regarding the nature of religious hypocrisy perceptions, as well as real-world implications for understanding inter-faith perceptions and interactions.     

A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: 1. One's blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent's wrongdoing. 3. One is warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the wrongdoing. 4. The target's wrongdoing is some of “one's business”. These conditions are often proposed as both conditions on one and the same thing, and as marking fundamentally different ways of “losing standing”. Here I call these claims into question. First, I claim that conditions (3) and (4) are simply conditions on different things than are conditions (1) and (2). Second, I argue that condition (2) reduces to condition (1): when “involvement” removes someone's standing to blame, it does so only by indicating something further about that agent, viz., that he or she lacks commitment to the values that condemn the wrongdoer's action. The result: after we clarify the nature of the non‐hypocrisy condition, we will have a unified account of moral standing to blame. Issues also discussed: whether standing can ever be regained, the relationship between standing and our “moral fragility”, the difference between mere inconsistency and hypocrisy, and whether a condition of standing might be derived from deeper facts about the “equality of persons”.     

Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia

The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of hypocrisy can be described either as cases of deception or as cases of akrasia. If this analysis correct, then I suggest further that the moral status of all instances of hypocrisy must be reduced either to the moral blameworthiness of deception or to the moral blameworthiness of akrasia. There can be no unified account of the moral wrongness of “hypocrisy” that holds across the disjunction.     

Preschoolers’ Distributive Justice When They Distribute Few Total Rewards in a Third‐Party Task

Five‐year‐old children were presented with a story in which one character made three origami stars and another made nine. Then the participants were asked to distribute small rewards to each character (“Three” or “Four” candies), and were told to use all the candies (“All” instruction), or that “You can leave some candies, if you don't want to use all the candies (‘Partial’ instruction).” In Study 1, almost all children distributed the candies equally (Four). Some participants (28.1%) refused the All instruction for Three, and then equally distributed the candies. They conducted equality allocations in three or all four of the conditions, giving a ratio for “Thorough Egalitarians” of 20–30%. Study 2 used looking‐time measures to assess participants’ judgment. Children looked longer at the amounts of production of two characters in condition Three than in condition Four. Allocation patterns were almost identical to Study 1, but the condition “Partial‐Three” results were not reproduced. The paper discusses the types of egalitarian behavior and the associated production and reward quantities observed.     

The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy

Hypocrisy is widely thought to be morally objectionable in a way that undermines the hypocrite’s moral standing to blame others. To wit, we seem to intuitively accept the “Nonhypocrisy Condition:” R has the standing to blame S for some violation of a moral norm N only if R’s blaming S is not hypocritical. This claim has been the subject of intensifying philosophical investigation in recent years. However, we can only understand why hypocrisy is morally objectionable and has an effect on standing to blame if we can correctly characterize hypocrisy itself. Unfortunately, some recent discussions fail to do this, which fatally undermines subsequent arguments concerning the effect of hypocrisy on the standing to blame. This paper’s central aim is to develop and defend a better account of hypocrisy. The hope is that with such an account in hand, we can explain and perhaps justify our moral aversion to hypocrisy in general as well as the Nonhypocrisy Condition in particular.     

洗掉不愉快的经历，留住幸福的时刻——回忆情绪事件对人们清洗/保留倾向的影响

基于道德与清洗的联系,我们假设,人们可能在经历非道德范畴的负效价事件后也会引发出“清洗”的倾向,而在经历正效价事件后则会引发“保留”的倾向。三个实验来验证这个假设,结果表明,被试在回忆道德或非道德范畴的负效价事件时,都会更多地选择具有清洗功能的物品,表现出“清除”负效价事件的倾向;相反,被试回忆正效价事件时,则会倾向选择具有保留功能的物品,表现出将正效价事件“保留”的倾向。     

宽以待己，严于律人：道德伪善的双加工机制研究

道德伪善是指个体对同一道德违规行为进行评判时,对自己宽松而对他人严苛的现象。双加工理论认为道德伪善是个体对自身道德违规行为有意识辩护以维护道德自我形象的结果。为此,本研究通过两个行为实验考察直觉思维和分析思维对道德伪善的影响。结果发现,分析性思维可易化道德伪善,直觉性思维无此作用。实验果支持道德伪善的双加工机制模型,道德自利性行为并非自动化的反应,需要认知努力和分析推理的参与。     

Respect in Mengzi as a Concern-based Construal: How It Is Different from Desire and Behavioral Disposition

Previous scholars seem to assume that Mengzi’s 孟子 four sprouts are more or less homogeneous in nature, and the four sprouts are often viewed as some sort of desires for or instinctive inclinations toward virtues or virtuous acts. For example, Angus Graham interprets sìduān 四端 as “incipient moral impulses” to do what is morally good or right, or “spontaneous inclinations” toward virtues or moral good. However, this view is incompatible with the recently proposed more sound views that regard Mengzi’s four sprouts as a particular type of emotions or feelings having some “cognitive” or “rational” aspects. In this essay I develop this new approach to Mengzi’s four sprouts, and specifically argue that respect in Mengzi should be considered neither as a moral desire nor as a behavioral tendency to do deferential acts but as some sort of ethical sensibility that is responsive to the relevant features of a worthy person.     

道德虚伪：一种机会主义的适应策略

道德虚伪在个体层面是指人们言行不一, 在人际层面是指人们持有双重标准。心理学家通常从道德动机、认知失调以及精神分析的角度考察道德虚伪。诱发道德虚伪通常会促使个体做出跟他们公开承诺相一致的行为。作为一种机会主义的适应策略, 道德虚伪可能起源于群体适应情境下的自我谋利需要, 带有欺骗他人和自欺的特点。除了情绪、权力等因素之外, 未来研究需要考察自恋、羞耻、社会操纵能力、情商、文化因素对道德虚伪的影响。     

陌生他人在场及其行为对个体道德伪善的影响

道德伪善既有印象管理或欺人的一面, 也有自欺的一面。道德伪善的影响因素众多, 而人际层面的影响因素则少有研究。本研究采用实验的方法, 以大学生为被试, 设置捐款情境, 探讨单个陌生他人在场及其真善/伪善行为能否抑制个体的道德伪善。结果表明：陌生他人单纯在场或做出伪善行为都不能抑制捐款情境中个体的道德伪善, 而在场陌生他人的真善行为可以有效抑制捐款情境中个体的道德伪善。