Group Size Effects on Risk Perception: A Test of Several Hypotheses

Yamaguchi (1998) found that people perceived a lower level of risk in a group than when they were alone, despite the fact that being in a group did not reduce the objective level of risk. Three experiments were conducted to examine several potential explanations for this effect. Experiment 1 replicated the group size effect in self-perception as well as the perception of the risk level of others. Results did not support the interdependence hypothesis and the affiliation hypothesis. Experiments 2 and 3 tested a hypothesis based on the availability heuristic. The group size effect was reduced or nullified when the target of risk judgment was associated with risk-seeking behavior or when an accident, in which many people died, was made salient.     

Cognitive Heuristics and AIDS Risk Assessment Among Physicians1

Physicians (N= 331) reported perceived risk of HIV exposure, worry about on-the-job HIV exposure, and experience with patients who test seropositive for the HIV. In addition, the use of the availability heuristic was examined by responses to questions about talking and reading about AIDS, and the use of the simulation heuristic was examined by responses to questions about imagining oneself being exposed to HIV on the job. Simulation of the HIV-exposure experience related significantly to perceived risk (p < .001), even after variance attributable to actual experience and use of the availability heuristic was taken into account. Availability of AIDS information related marginally to perceived risk after variance attributable to actual experience and use of the simulation heuristic was taken into account. Simulation related strongly with worry about on-the-job exposure (p < .001), and availability was not significantly related to worry after variance associated with simulation and experience with AIDS was removed. Implications of these results for physician training are discussed.     

Risk Taking in Decision Making for Others Versus the Self1

In two studies, we examined people's level of risk taking when making monetary decisions for other people rather than for themselves. Experiment 1 examined the role of regret in these situations; results show that regret concerns led to increased risk avoidance both when participants made decisions for other people as well as when making decisions for themselves. Experiment 2 tested whether skill tasks would lead to greater risk avoidance when the decision was for another person versus for oneself. This hypothesis was not supported, although men were more risk seeking than were women in both situations. Taken together, these studies suggest that many of the findings from risk research on individual decision making regarding financial situations generalize to decision making for others.     

EMG activity as a function of the performer's focus of attention

In previous studies of attentional focus effects, investigators have measured performance outcome. Here, however, the authors used electromyography (EMG) to determine whether difference between external and internal foci would also be manifested at the neuromuscular level. In 2 experiments, participants (N=11, Experiment 1; N=12, Experiment 2) performed biceps curls while focusing on the movements of the curl bar (external focus) or on their arms (internal focus). In Experiment 1, movements were performed faster under external than under internal focus conditions. Also, integrated EMG (iEMG) activity was reduced when performers adopted an external focus. In Experiment 2, movement time was controlled through the use of a metronome, and iEMG activity was again reduced under external focus conditions. Those findings are in line with the constrained action hypothesis (G. Wulf, N. McNevin, & C. H. Shea, 2001), according to which an external focus promotes the use of more automatic control processes.     

Emotion,Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk‐taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (“lottery risk”) and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (“person‐based risk”). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two‐person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real‐money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk‐averse than angry participants in lottery‐risk tasks. However—the key result of this study—fearful participants were substantially less risk‐averse than angry participants in a two‐person task involving person‐based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery‐type risk. Risk‐taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk‐taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk‐averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person‐based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk‐taking or risk‐avoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Change in perceptual form attenuates the use of the fluency heuristic in recognition

Four experiments (total N=295) were conducted to determine whether within-modality changes in perceptual form between the study and the test phases of an experiment would moderate the role of the fluency heuristic in recognition memory. Experiment 1 showed that a change from pictures to words reduced the role of fluency in recognition memory. In Experiment 2, the same result was found using counterfeit study lists that supposedly consisted of pictures or words. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that changes in the font used to present the study and test words also attenuated the contribution of fluency to the recognition decision when font change was manipulated between subjects, but not within subjects. Results suggest that the fluency heuristic is subject to metacognitive control, since participants' attributions of perceptual fluency depend on the perceived usefulness of fluency as a cue to recognition.     

In search of counter-examples: Deductive rationality in human reasoning

Dual-process theories come in many forms. They draw on the distinction between associative, heuristic, tacit, intuitive, or implicit processes (System 1) and rule-based, analytic, explicit processes (System 2). We present the results of contextual manipulations that have a bearing on the supposed primacy of System 1 (Stanovich & West, 2000). Experiment 1 showed that people who evaluated logically valid or invalid conditional inferences under a timing constraint (N=56), showed a smaller effect of logical validity than did people who were not placed under a timing constraint (N= 44). Experiment 2 similarly showed that stressing the logical constraint that only inferences that follow necessarily are to be endorsed (N = 36) increased the size of the validity effect, as compared to that of participants (N=33) given the standard instruction to make "logical" inferences. These findings concur with the thesis in dual-processing frameworks that "Rationality-2 processes" (Evans & Over, 1996), "test procedures" (Chater & Oaksford, 1999), or "conclusion validation processes" (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Schroyens, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2001) serve to override the results of System 1 processes.     

The effort heuristic

The research presented here suggests that effort is used as a heuristic for quality. Participants rating a poem (Experiment 1), a painting (Experiment 2), or a suit of armor (Experiment 3) provided higher ratings of quality, value, and liking for the work the more time and effort they thought it took to produce. Experiment 3 showed that the use of the effort heuristic, as with all heuristics, is moderated by ambiguity: Participants were more influenced by effort when the quality of the object being evaluated was difficult to ascertain. Discussion centers on the implications of the effort heuristic for everyday judgment and decision-making.     

Risk attitude in small timesaving decisions

Four experiments are presented that explore situations in which a decision maker has to rely on personal experience in an attempt to minimize delays. Experiment 1 shows that risk-attitude in these timesaving decisions is similar to risk-attitude in money-related decisions from experience: A risky prospect is more attractive than a safer prospect with the same expected value only when it leads to a better outcome most of the time. Experiment 2 highlights a boundary condition: It suggests that a difficulty in ranking the relevant delays moves behavior toward random choice. Experiments 3 and 4 show that when actions must be taken during the delay (thereby helping compare delays), this increases the similarity of timesaving decisions to money-related decisions. In these settings the results reflect an increase in risk aversion with experience. The relationship of the results to the study of non-human time-related decisions, human money-related decisions and human time perception is discussed.     

整合模型还是占优启发式模型? 从齐当别模型视角进行的检验

实验从齐当别模型的视角,通过对决策过程反应时的考察分别对以累积预期理论(cumulative prospect theory)为代表的整合模型和启发式模型家族的重要成员--占优启发式模型(priority heuristic)--进行检验。结果表明,决策过程反应时并未随着占优启发式模型所假定的决策步骤的增加而变慢;也未随着选项之间整体值差值的变大而变快;模糊决策过程的反应时反而快于风险决策过程的反应时。无论是以累积预期理论为代表的整合模型还是占优启发式模型均不能满意地描述和解释人们的实际决策过程,而齐当别模型则能解释大部分实验结果。文章建议多角度、多指标探讨人们的决策过程,检验、修改、完善,以及建立新的启发式模型或决策过程模型(process model),以增进对人们如何进行风险决策的理解。     

Mood and the reliance on the ease of retrieval heuristic

Four studies investigate the relationship between individuals' mood and their reliance on the ease retrieval heuristic. Happy participants were consistently more likely to rely on the ease of retrieval heuristic, whereas sad participants were more likely to rely on the activated content. Additional analyses indicate that this pattern is not due to a differential recall (Experiment 2) and that happy participants ceased to rely on the ease of retrieval when the diagnosticity of this information was called into question (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 shows that reliance on the ease of retrieval heuristic resulted in faster judgments than reliance on content, with the former but not the latter being a function of the amount of activated information.     

The Word Association Implications Test

Three experiments (N = 144 college students) tested and documented the relationship between incidental learning of diagnostic schemata with performance on the Word Association Implications Test (WAIT). Moreover, Experiment 1 showed that instruction in diagnostic cues did not improve WAIT scores, although an incentive did. Experiment 2 supported the "developing schemata" concept by showing that subjects need to interpret WAIT protocols before they can generate possible diagnostic clues. Experiment 3 showed that inductive reasoning and viewing the task as more play- and game-like (vs. work- and test-like) predicted WAIT scores over and above the influence of incidental learning of schemata, in sum, results suggest that an heuristic discovery-oriented approach is most successful in learning "to read between the lines" of word associations. Discussion addresses the value of heuristic versus algorithmic approaches to the learning of personality assessment.     

Cognitive Biases in Playing the Lottery: Estimating the Odds and Choosing the Numbers

Three experiments were conducted to examine the operation of the representativeness and anchoring and adjustment heuristics in lottery play. Subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 indicated their chances of winning a lottery with an objective probability of 1 in 10. Consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, subjects (in both experiments) perceived their chances of winning to be greater when the lottery was based on a single event than when it was based on a disjunctive event. Subjects in these two experiments also selected numbers to play in a pick-3 (Experiment 1) or pick-4 (Experiment 2) lottery. Consistent with the representativeness heuristic, subjects in Experiment 2 demonstrated a preference for numbers without repeating digits. This also occurred in Experiment 3 wherein the numbers actually played in the Indiana daily Pick-3 lottery were examined.     

The Word Association Implications Test

Three experiments (N = 144 college students) tested and documented the relationship between incidental learning of diagnostic schemata with performance on the Word Association Implications Test (WAIT). Moreover, Experiment 1 showed that instruction in diagnostic cues did not improve WAIT scores, although an incentive did. Experiment 2 supported the "developing schemata" concept by showing that subjects need to interpret WAIT protocols before they can generate possible diagnostic clues. Experiment 3 showed that inductive reasoning and viewing the task as more play- and game-like (vs. work- and test-like) predicted WAIT scores over and above the influence of incidental learning of schemata, in sum, results suggest that an heuristic discovery-oriented approach is most successful in learning "to read between the lines" of word associations. Discussion addresses the value of heuristic versus algorithmic approaches to the learning of personality assessment.     

简单非一致:以再认启发式使用为例

再认启发式理论认为人们仅依赖再认做出决策。以两项高低不同再认预测力(效度)的任务为材料,选取初中生(N=138,M=14.1岁)和成年大学生(N=136,M=19.3岁)被试,探讨再认启发式使用特征。使用层级多项式加工树模型对数据进行分析,结果显示:(1)初中生较大学生认识的材料数更少或运用知识比较的正确率更低;(2)再认启发式使用存在被试异质性;(3)初中生再认启发式的使用低于大学生。结论:知识表现出随年龄增长的趋势,再认启发式的使用存在较大的个体差异和群体差异,决策时初中生相比大学生会更少依赖再认线索。     

The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic‐analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater's processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiments 1–3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we found support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent.     

Concave utility,transaction costs,and risk in measuring discounting of delayed rewards

Research has consistently found that the decline in the present values of delayed rewards as delay increases is better fit by hyperbolic than by exponential delay-discounting functions. However, concave utility, transaction costs, and risk each could produce hyperbolic-looking data, even when the underlying discounting function is exponential. In Experiments 1 (N = 45) and 2 (N = 103), participants placed bids indicating their present values of real future monetary rewards in computer-based 2nd-price auctions. Both experiments suggest that utility is not sufficiently concave to account for the superior fit of hyperbolic functions. Experiment 2 provided no evidence that the effects of transaction costs and risk are large enough to account for the superior fit of hyperbolic functions.     

The Cognitive Processes Underlying Risky Choice

In this article, we tested two concepts of decision making: expected utility theory and heuristic choice. In Experiment 1, we applied think‐aloud protocols to investigate violations of expected utility theory. In Experiments 2 to 4, we introduced a new process‐tracing method—called predict‐aloud protocols—that has advantages over previously suggested research methods. Results show the following: (i) people examine information between rather than within gambles; (ii) the priority heuristic emerges as the most frequently used strategy when problems are difficult; and (iii) people check for similarity when problems are easy. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.