The computational account of belief

Fodor and others who think that scientific, computational psychology will vindicate commonsense belief-desire psychology have maintained that belief can be identified with the explicit storage of a token with appropriate content. I review and develop problems for the explicit storage view and show that a more plausible account identifies belief with the disposition to use a token with appropriate content in explicit reasoning and planning processes and as a basis for action. I argue that this type of inner disposition account will also apply to most other common sense attitudes. The result is a realism about commonsense belief-desire psychology that is more modest than Fodor's: While such inner dispositions probably do exist, these states will probably not be the main focus of scientific psychological theories.     

Explaining Emotions

Emotions and cognition are inextricably intertwined. Feelings influence thoughts and actions, which in turn can give rise to new emotional reactions. We claim that people infer emotional states in others using commonsense psychological theories of the interactions among emotions, cognition, and action. We present a situation calculus theory of emotion elicitation representing knowledge underlying commonsense causal reasoning involving emotions, and show how the theory can be used to construct explanations for emotional states. The method for constructing explanations is based on the notion of abduction. This method has been implemented in a computer program called AbMaL. The results of computational experiments using AbMaL to construct explanations of examples based on cases taken from a diary study of emotions indicate that the abductive approach to explanatory reasoning about emotions offers significant advantages. We found that the majority of the diary study examples cannot be explained using deduction alone, but they can be explained by making abjuctive inferences. These inferences provide useful information relevant to emotional states.     

On the Dynamic Logic of Agency and Action

We present a Hilbert style axiomatization and an equational theory for reasoning about actions and capabilities. We introduce two novel features in the language of propositional dynamic logic, converse as backwards modality and abstract processes specified by preconditions and effects, written as ${\varphi \Rightarrow \psi}$ and first explored in our recent paper (Hartonas, Log J IGPL Oxf Univ Press, 2012), where a Gentzen-style sequent calculus was introduced. The system has two very natural interpretations, one based on the familiar relational semantics and the other based on type semantics, where action terms are interpreted as types of actions (sets of binary relations). We show that the proof systems do not distinguish between the two kinds of semantics, by completeness arguments. Converse as backwards modality together with action types allow us to produce a new purely equational axiomatization of Dynamic Algebras, where iteration is axiomatized independently of box and where the fixpoint and Segerberg induction axioms are derivable. The system also includes capabilities operators and our results provide then a finitary Hilbert-style axiomatization and a decidable system for reasoning about agent capabilities, missing in the KARO framework.     

A dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for intentions and information changes in strategic games

In this paper I present a dynamic-epistemic hybrid logic for reasoning about information and intention changes in situations of strategic interaction. I provide a complete axiomatization for this logic, and then use it to study intentions-based transformations of decision problems.     

Agency: Let's mind what's fundamental1

The standard event-causal theory of action says that an intentional action is caused in the right way by the right mental states. This view requires reductionism about agency. The causal role of the agent must be nothing over and above the causal contribution of the relevant mental event-causal processes. But commonsense finds this reductive solution to the “agent-mind problem”, the problem of explaining the relationship between agents and the mind, incredible. Where did the agent go? This paper suggests that this challenge against event-causal reductionism is importantly related to debates about fundamentality. It also suggests that extant event-causal answers to the agent-mind problem, ones that suggest that part of an agent's mind can stand proxy for the agent herself, fail against the challenge. It sketches an alternative reductive view that appeals to entity grounding. This view resolves the commonsense challenge and promises to be theoretically fruitful with respect to other longstanding problems with the event-casual view. The paper concludes with a burden-shifting argument against emergentist agent-causal theories and non-reductive event-causal theories of agency.     

Beyond subgoaling: A dynamic knowledge generation framework for creative problem solving in cognitive architectures

In this paper we propose a computational framework aimed at extending the problem solving capabilities of cognitive artificial agents through the introduction of a novel, goal-directed, dynamic knowledge generation mechanism obtained via a non monotonic reasoning procedure. In particular, the proposed framework relies on the assumption that certain classes of problems cannot be solved by simply learning or injecting new external knowledge in the declarative memory of a cognitive artificial agent but, on the other hand, require a mechanism for the automatic and creative re-framing, or re-formulation, of the available knowledge. We show how such mechanism can be obtained trough a framework of dynamic knowledge generation that is able to tackle the problem of commonsense concept combination. In addition, we show how such a framework can be employed in the field of cognitive architectures in order to overcome situations like the impasse in SOAR by extending the possible options of its subgoaling procedures.     

Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics

We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mechanisms. The present study extends the previous research by assessing both performance and response times on quintessential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those reporting more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors than did believers. This finding remained significant after controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive first impressions. Implications for using additional processing measures, such as response time, to investigate individual differences in cognitive style are discussed.     

Supposition and representation in human reasoning

We report the results of three experiments designed to assess the role of suppositions in human reasoning. Theories of reasoning based on formal rules propose that the ability to make suppositions is central to deductive reasoning. Our first experiment compared two types of problem that could be solved by a suppositional strategy. Our results showed no difference in difficulty between problems requiring affirmative or negative suppositions and very low logical solution rates throughout. Further analysis of the error data showed a pattern of responses, which suggested that participants reason from a superficial representation of the premises in these arguments and this drives their choice of conclusion. Our second experiment employed a different set of suppositional problems but with extremely similar proofs in terms of the rules applied and number of inferential steps required. As predicted by our interpretation of reasoning strategies employed in Experiment 1, logical performance was very much higher on these problems. Our third experiment showed that problems that could be solved by constructing an initial representation of the premises were easier than problems in which this representation was not sufficient. This effect was independent of the suppositional structure of the problems. We discuss the implications of this research for theories of reasoning based on mental models and inference rules.     

Abstract Planning and Perceptual Chunks: Elements of Expertise in Geometry

We present a new model of skilled performance in geometry proof problem solving called the Diagram Configuration model (DC). While previous models plan proofs in a step-by-step fashion, we observed that experts plan at a more abstract level: They focus on the key steps and skip the less important ones. DC models this abstract planning behavior by parsing geometry problem diagrams into perceptual chunks, called diagram configurations, which cue relevant schematic knowledge. We provide verbal protocol evidence that DC's schemas correspond with the step-skipping inferences experts make in their initial planning. We compare DC with other models of geometry expertise and then, in the final section, we discuss more general implications of our research. DC's reasoning has important similarities with Larkin's (1988) display-based reasoning approach and Johnson-Laird's (1983) mental model approach. DC's perceptually based schemas are a step towards a unified explanation of (1) experts' superior problem-solving effectiveness, (2) experts' superior problem-state memory, and (3) experts' ability, in certain domains, to solve relatively simple problems by pure forward inferencing. We also argue that the particular and efficient knowledge organization of DC challenges current theories of skill acquisition as it presents an end-state of learning that is difficult to explain within such theories. Finally, we discuss the implications of DC for geometry instruction.     

Validation of psychoanalytic theories: Towards a conceptualization of references

The authors discuss criteria for the validation of psychoanalytic theories and develop a heuristic and normative model of the references needed for this. Their core question in this paper is: can psychoanalytic theories be validated exclusively from within psychoanalytic theory (internal validation), or are references to sources of knowledge other than psychoanalysis also necessary (external validation)? They discuss aspects of the classic truth criteria correspondence and coherence, both from the point of view of contemporary psychoanalysis and of contemporary philosophy of science. The authors present arguments for both external and internal validation. Internal validation has to deal with the problems of subjectivity of observations and circularity of reasoning, external validation with the problem of relevance. They recommend a critical attitude towards psychoanalytic theories, which, by carefully scrutinizing weak points and invalidating observations in the theories, reduces the risk of wishful thinking. The authors conclude by sketching a heuristic model of validation. This model combines correspondence and coherence with internal and external validation into a four‐leaf model for references for the process of validating psychoanalytic theories.     

Inhibitory control interacts with core knowledge in toddlers’ manual search for an occluded object

Core knowledge theories advocate the primacy of fundamental principles that constrain cognitive development from early infancy. However, there is concern that core knowledge of object properties does not constrain older preschoolers’ reasoning during manual search. Here we address in detail both failure and success on two well-established search measures that require reasoning about solidity. We show that poor performance arises from an inability to engage the appropriate search strategy rather than a simple failure of core knowledge. Moreover, we demonstrate that successful search is positively correlated with inhibitory control. We believe that toddlers’ manual search for an occluded object reflects a general capacity to deploy inhibition so that search behaviour can be guided by core knowledge.     

Moral dilemmas and nonmonotonic logic

Conclusion From a philosophical standpoint, the work presented here is based on van Fraassen [26]. The bulk of that paper is organized around a series of arguments against the assumption, built into standard deontic logic, that moral dilemmas are impossible; and van Fraassen only briefly sketches his alternative approach. His paper ends with the conclusion that the problem of possibly irresolvable moral conflict reveals serious flaws in the philosophical and semantic foundations of orthodox deontic logic, but also suggests a rich set of new problems and methods for such logic. My goal has been to suggest that some of these methods might be found in current research on nonmonotonic reasoning, and that some of the problems may have been confronted there as well.I have shown that nonmonotonic logics provide a natural framework for reasoning about moral dilemmas, perhaps even more useful than the ordinary modal framework, and that the issues surrounding the treatment of exceptional information within these logics run parallel to some of the problems posed by conditional oughts. However, there is also another way in which deontic logic might benefit from a connection to nonmonotonic reasoning. A familiar criticism among ethicists of work in deontic logic is that it is too abstract, and too far removed from the kind of problems confronted by real agents in moral deliberation. It must be said that similar criticisms of abstraction and irrelevance are often lodged against work in nonmonotonic reasoning by more practically minded researchers in artificial intelligence; but here, at least, the criticisms are taken seriously. Nonmonotonic logic aims at a qualitative account of commonsense reasoning, which can be used to relate planning and action to defeasible goals and beliefs; and at least some of the theories developed in this area have been tested in realistic situations. By linking the subject of deontic logic to this research, it may be possible also to relate the idealized study of moral reasoning typical of the field to a more robust treatment of practical deliberation.     

Horwich on meaning and use

Paul Horwich claims that theories of meaning ought to accommodate the commonsense intuition that meanings play a part in explaining the use of words. Further, he argues that the view that best does so is that according to which the meaning of a word is constituted by a disposition to accept, in some circumstances, sentences in which it features. I argue that if meanings are construed thus, they will in fact fail to explain the use of words. I also argue that if we insist, as Horwich does, on the commonsense assumption that meanings are a species of entity, all versions of the view that meaning is constituted by our dispositions to use words will have to be rejected. I do not, however, claim that such theories ought to be rejected. My point is that they are incompatible with the requirements of commonsense. Further, I suggest that it is premature to impose such requirements on theories of meaning.     

ALTERNATIVE AXIOMATICS AND COMPLEXITY OF DELIBERATIVE STIT THEORIES

We propose two alternatives to Xu’s axiomatization of Chellas’s STIT. The first one simplifies its presentation, and also provides an alternative axiomatization of the deliberative STIT. The second one starts from the idea that the historic necessity operator can be defined as an abbreviation of operators of agency, and can thus be eliminated from the logic of Chellas’s STIT. The second axiomatization also allows us to establish that the problem of deciding the satisfiability of a STIT formula without temporal operators is NP-complete in the single-agent case, and is NEXPTIME-complete in the multiagent case, both for the deliberative and Chellas’s STIT.     

To What Extent Do Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas Affect Performance on Wason's Selection Task?

Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) most persuasive evidence for pragmatic reasoning schema theory has been the finding that an abstract permission version of Wason's selection task yields higher rates of solution than a nonpragmatic control. Experiment 1 presented two problem sets, one modelled after Cheng and Holyoak's abstract permission problem, which is relativley rich in extraneous features, and one after Wason's, relatively impoverished, standard problem. Each problem set varied type of rule (permission, obligation, or nonpragmatic) and task type (to reason from or about a rule). Results revealed that enriched problems were solved more often than impoverished ones, that reasoning-from problems were solved more often than reasoning-about problems, and that there was a beneficial interaction between enriching features and the permission rule. Experiment 2 demonstrated that although explicit negatives were crucial for solution of reasoning-from permission problems, they played no role in solution of enriched nonpragmatic-rule problems. Experiment 3 provided a replication of the enriched reasoning-from permission problem, again revealed no beneficial effect for obligation-rule problems, and further revealed no influence of instructions to provide brief written justifications. We argue that the results show that the scope of pragmatic reasoning schema theory needs to be narrowed, that although a permission rule does have an effect, an obligation rule does not, and that some beneficial task features are independent of anything explained by pragmatic reasoning schema theory.     

Problems in the Theory of Democratic Authority

This paper identifies strands of reasoning underlying several theories of democratic authority. It shows why each of them fails to adequately explain or justify it. Yet, it does not claim (per philosophical anarchism) that democratic authority cannot be justified. Furthermore, it sketches an argument for a perspective on the justification of democratic authority that would effectively respond to three problems not resolved by alternative theories—the problem of the expert, the problem of specificity, and the problem of deference. Successfully resolving these problems is at least evidence for the viability of a justification of democratic authority. This perspective integrates procedural concerns with those about the quality of democratic outcomes. It shows that democratic authority, if there is such a thing, requires reliable democratic procedures as the only sort citizens could rationally accept.     

On Using Ethical Theories to Teach Engineering Ethics

Many engineering ethics classes and textbooks introduce theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism (and most others draw from these theories without mentioning them explicitly). Yet using ethical theories to teach engineering ethics is not devoid of difficulty. First, their status is unclear (should one pick a single theory or use them all? does it make a difference?) Also, textbooks generally assume or fallaciously ‘prove’ that egoism (or even simply accounting for one’s interests) is wrong. Further, the drawbacks of ethical theories are underestimated and the theories are also otherwise misrepresented to make them more suitable for engineering ethics as the authors construe it, viz. the ‘moral reasoning’ process. Stating in what various theories disagree would allow the students to frame the problem more productively in terms of motive–consequence or society–individual dichotomies rather than in terms of Kant–utilitarian.