Just Annexation

Fabre defends a human rights‐focused cosmopolitan theory of peace. One would expect that, given this view, she would be in favour of human rights‐promoting annexations by liberal states. However, she distances herself from this view, adopting the common‐sense view that annexing states ‘act ultra vires’. I argue that her core cosmopolitan view motivates a different and, in principle, much more positive view of four types of annexations. In the course of defending this view, I take a critical look at her appeal to perverse moral incentives and the notion of a cosmopolitan ethos.     

Losing claims of rights

Conclusion I have contended that acting on some principle and complaining when others act in accordance with the same principle in similar circumstances is morally improper. By wrongdoing one forfeits the right to claim the right (s)he disregards in interacting with others. This is not equivalent to a view that one's acting in a certain way justifies others acting in that way, i.e. that by wrongdoing one forfeits rights (s)he disregards in interacting with others. It may still be morally improper to treat malfeasors in the same way they treat us but, I have argued, they cannot themselves claim a right not to be treated in that way.This analysis of the right to claim rights can help explain the change in moral status of wrongdoers in two important ways. First, if there are some non-forfeitable human rights, the loss of moral standing of one who disregards those rights in others can be explained. Second, and perhaps potentially more important, if having a right implies the right holder's being justified in claiming it, we have a basis for saying all human rights are forfeitable.This second position would require a tightening of the link between the right to X and the ancillary right to claim the right to X. I have not undertaken that burden here. Instead, I argued that the loss of the right to claim is, itself, a significant loss.     

The Right Wrong-Makers

Right- and wrong-making features (“moral grounds”) are widely believed to play important normative roles, e.g. in morally apt or virtuous motivation. This paper argues that moral grounds have been systematically misidentified. Canonical statements of our moral theories tend to summarize, rather than directly state, the full range of moral grounds posited by the theory. Further work is required to “unpack” a theory’s criterion of rightness and identify the features that are of ground-level moral significance. As a result, it is not actually true that maximizing value is the fundamental right-making feature even for maximizing consequentialists. Focusing on the simple example of utilitarianism, I show how careful attention to the ground level can drastically influence how we think about our moral theories.     

Against Pogge's ‘Cosmopolitanism’

Thomas Pogge labels the idea that each person owes each other person equal respect and concern ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ and correctly states that it is a ‘non‐starter’. He offers as an allegedly more convincing cosmopolitan alternative his ‘social justice cosmopolitanism’. I shall argue that this alternative fails for pretty much the same reasons that ‘ethical cosmopolitanism’ fails. In addition, I will show that Pogge's definition of cosmopolitanism is misleading, since it actually applies to ethical cosmopolitanism and not to social justice cosmopolitanism. This means that cosmopolitanism as defined by Pogge is wrong in the light of his own arguments and that Pogge is not even a cosmopolitan in the sense of his own definition. I will further show that he is also not a cosmopolitan if cosmopolitanism is defined as a philosophical position involving the claim that state borders have no fundamental moral significance.     

Is there a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities?

Samuel Scheffler has recently argued that some relationships are non-instrumentally valuable; that such relationships give rise to “underived” special responsibilities; that there is a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities; and that we must consequently strike a balance between the two. We argue that there is no such tension and propose an alternative approach to the relation between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities. First, while some relationships are non-instrumentally valuable, no relationship is unconditionally valuable. Second, whether such relationships give rise to special responsibilities is conditional on those relationships not violating certain moral constraints. Third, these moral constraints arise from within cosmopolitan egalitarianism itself. Thus the value of relationships and the special responsibilities to which they give rise arise within the parameters of cosmopolitan egalitarianism itself. The real tension is not between cosmopolitan equality and special responsibilities, but between special responsibilities and the various general duties that arise from the recognition, demanded by cosmopolitan egalitarianism, of a multiplicity of other basic goods. Indeed, even the recognition of special relationships itself gives rise to general duties that may condition and/or weigh against putative special responsibilities.

Positive Rights and the Cosmopolitan Community: A Rights-Centered Foundation for Global Ethics

The recent transnational wave of destruction that was caused by the earthquake-induced tsunamis in South East Asia has raised the issue of global justice in terms of the rights of victims to expect aid relief and the moral responsibility of the rest of the world to provide it. In this paper I will discuss the issue of global ethics in terms of positive rights that people have to assistance from others when they cannot provide such assistance themselves. The main object of the paper is to demonstrate that positive rights are universal and global in scope and cannot therefore be restricted by any national, religious, cultural or other social boundaries. Such rights provide a rational and ethical foundation for global justice that is cosmopolitan. The argument for the position offered in the paper will be broadly based on the moral philosophy of Alan Gewirth.1 1. The sources referred to in this paper with regard to Gewith's moral philosophy will, in the main, be: Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) and Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). For ease of reference, Reason and Morality will be referred to in the body of the paper as RM and Community of Rights as CR.      

Moral conflict and the logic of rights

The paper proposes a revised logic of rights in order to accommodate moral conflict. There are often said to be two rival philosophical accounts of rights with respect to moral conflict. Specificationists about rights insist that rights cannot conflict, since they reflect overall deontic conclusions. Generalists instead argue that rights reflect pro tanto constraints on behaviour. After offering an overview of the debate between generalists and specificationists with respect to rights, I outline the challenge of developing a logic of rights-reasoning that is compatible with generalism. I then proceed to offer a new logical framework, which utilizes a simple non-monotonic logic of practical reasoning. Both generalist and specificationist interpretations of the logic are explored. The revised logic shows that traditional characterizations of the debate between specificationists and generalists obscure other relevant philosophical positions.

     

Moral rights: Conflicts and valid claims

Most of us have certain intuitions about moral rights, at least partially captured by the ideas that: (A) rights carry special weight in moral argument; (B) persons retain their rights even when they are legitimately infringed; although (C) rights undoubtedly do conflict with one another, and are sometimes overridden as well by nonrights considerations. I show that Dworkin's remarks about rights allow us to affirm (A), (B), and (C), yet those remarks are extremely vague. I then argue that Feinberg's more comprehensive and precise theory, designed to do justice to all three theses, cannot assure us of (A), that rights are not merely one consideration to be weighed in the balance with heterogeneous others. I show how Feinberg accepts (C) despite being drawn toward an alternative absolutist theory of rights and commits himself to (B) through his rejection of prima facie rights. But his promising distinction between recognition and enforcement of a right, which helps give some sense to (B) despite its tension with (C), undermines the force of rights in moral argument apparently intended by (A). We thus learn that Feinberg's and Dworkin's accounts of rights are incompatible, though each is correct in important ways. Contrasting their views allows us to clarify the implications and consistency of alternative theses about rights, one step toward meeting the challenge of developing a theory which shows more adequately how respect for rights is to be combined with other intuitions about rights and their relation to other values.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1986 Pacific Division American Philosophical Association Meetings. Partial support for this research was provided by a Research Fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. I am grateful for that funding and am indebted to Earl Conee, Leon Galis, Jean Hampton, Peter Markie, Rex Martin, Terrance McConnell, James Nickel, Laurence Thomas and especially George Sher and Judith Thomson for insightful comments on drafts of this paper.     

Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment

ABSTRACT

Morality primarily serves social-relational functions. However, little research in moral psychology investigates how relational factors impact moral judgment, and a theoretically grounded approach to such investigations is lacking. We used Relational Models Theory and Moral Foundations Theory to explore how varying actor-victim relationships impacts judgment of different types of moral violations. Across three studies, using a diverse range of moral violations and varying the experimental design, relational context substantially influenced third-party judgment of moral violations, and typically independent of several factors strongly associated with moral judgment. Results lend novel but mixed support to Relationship Regulation Theory and provide some novel implications for Moral Foundations Theory. These studies highlight the importance of relational factors in moral psychology and provide guidelines for exploring how relational factors might shape moral judgment.     

Discursive Construction of Political Categories and Moral Fields: God Versus Rights and Access in a Reproductive Health Legislative Debate

Using a discursive lens, we argue that politicians rhetorically construct categories, storylines, and moral fields. We further claim that such discursive products are action‐oriented toward gaining popular support in a public sphere that is politically fault lined along similar moral orders. As a case in point, we analyze speeches delivered during congressional voting on a Reproductive Health bill (RH bill). Employing a mixed methods strategy, we first implement a quantitative lexical analysis of frequently used words, followed by a qualitative detection of cohering storylines on both sides of the debate. Results show that oppositionists mark their speeches with a deployment of the word God, while bill supporters use the word access conspicuously. One storyline claims that The RH bill stands against God, while the other purports that The RH bill advocates rights and access. Although both storylines assert moral righteousness, they invoke two different moral orders backed by power blocs and the public at large. The God story appeals to a Catholic discourse and the moral order loudly supported by the politically powerful Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines. The rights/access narrative references a liberal morality frame maintained by social liberals and Philippine President Aquino. We end our paper by introducing the idea of an intrastate discursive lens to analyze moral fields constructed by politicians, oriented toward winning support from the public at large.     

Subsistence Needs,Human Rights,and Imperfect Duties

I address the usefulness of thinking about a human right to subsistence within conceptions of human rights grounded in ordinary moral reasoning. I argue that that natural rights should be understood as rights in rem, with their dynamism constrained by the requirements of justification and their scope constrained by the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty. I then suggest that many of the most pressing demands which the moral significance of subsistence needs create are plausibly imperfect duties, and so cannot correlate to a natural right to subsistence. This restricts the helpfulness of a human right to subsistence in our reasoning about what we owe to others.     

Sources of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism: Basedow,Rousseau, and Cosmopolitan Education

The goal of this essay is to analyse the influence of Johann Bernhard Basedow and Rousseau on Kant’s cosmopolitanism and concept of cosmopolitan education. It argues that both Basedow and Kant defined cosmopolitan education as non-denominational moral formation or Bildung, encompassing—in different forms—a thin version of moral religion following the core tenets of Christianity. Kant’s encounter with Basedow and the Philanthropinum in Dessau helps to understand the development of Kant’s concept of cosmopolitanism and educational theory ‘in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’. Rousseau’s role is more complex: he clearly influenced Kant; he is usually considered a precursor of modern nationalism and national education; and recent studies have stressed the cosmopolitan dimension of his educational programme. I claim that the dilemma of education according to Rousseau is that one has to choose between education of homme or education of citoyen, and that there is no way to avoid or go beyond this stark alternative. Kant’s reinterpretation of Rousseau is favourable and creative and has found many followers up to the present, but is misleading, as he ignores the dilemma and imposes his own conception of cosmopolitanism, of cosmopolitan education and of (possible) progress in history on Rousseau while claiming that this was actually Rousseau’s message.     

Keeping Out Extremists: Refugees,Would-Be Immigrants,and Ideological Exclusion

Many people want to live in liberal democracies because they are liberal and democratic. Yet it would be mistaken, indeed naïve, to assume that this applies to all would-be residents. Just as some inhabitants of liberal democracies oppose one or more fundamental liberal-democratic values and principles (e.g. the rule of law, freedoms of conscience and speech, rights to private property and to political participation), so there are foreign would-be residents who do so, who might include individuals with e.g. Jihadist, Neo-Nazi, and radical anarchist views. Proceeding on the assumption that there exists no unconditional moral right to immigrate, this article asks whether it is ever morally permissible for liberal democracies to deny residence to nonnationals based on evidence that they personally hold extremist views. I argue that this is sometimes the case. Specifically, my contention is that even if we adopt a cosmopolitan perspective on which states are not allowed to prioritise the interests of their own citizens and residents over those of foreign nonresidents, there are two conditions under which such exclusions are justified even when refugees are being refused admission (although, as I suggest, states might be morally required in such cases to admit other refugees instead).     

Needs and Rights not needs versus rights: expanding Hamilton's conception of politics to include negative rights

Abstract

Hamilton's argument for a political philosophy of needs moves from a critique of rights, more specifically the 'rights-preferences couple', as inappropriate foundation for liberal political theory and practice. While acknowledging some role for rights in a needs-based polity, Hamilton says nothing about what this role might be, and follows Geuss in criticising rights as neither philosophically special nor politically useful. This conclusion would be problematic, for certain rights, Marshall's 'rights from the state' or negative rights, are consistent with the 'state of needs' that Hamilton identifies. Moreover, rights from the s'tate' are better suited than needs to address the problem of oppressive state authority precisely because of their deontological character and legal institutionalisation. Today most politics in liberal democracies is less about conflict and more about co-operation between state and citizen, and so perhaps Hamilton is right to emphasise needs over rights, but there is still a role for a negative rights when conflict emerges. Indeed, negative rights together with needs could constitute a conceptual couple well suited to realising freedom and equality under liberal-democratic conditions.     

The Moral Significance of Birth

Does birth make a difference to the moral rights of the fetus /infant? Should it make a difference to its legal rights? Most contemporary philosophers believe that birth cannot make a difference to moral rights. If this is true, then it becomes difficult to justify either a moral or a legal distinction between late abortion and infanticide. I argue that the view that birth is irrelevant to moral rights rests upon two highly questionable assumptions about the theoretical foundations of moral rights. If we reject these assumptions, then we are free to take account of the contrasting biological and social relationships that make even relatively late abortion morally different from infanticide.     

The Utopianism of Hamilton's State of Needs: on rights,deliberation, and the nature of politics

Abstract

This article explores the role and conception of politics in Lawrence Hamilton's The Political Philosophy of Needs (Cambridge, 2003), including his critique of the 'rights-preference couple' and of rights in general; his critique of deliberation; and his view regarding the role of political philosophy. It argues that his theory rests on a remarkably high epistemic, moral and political confidence in the state, or rather in what states might be capable of becoming; equally, it rests on an underexplored understanding of the nature of politics itself. The article also criticizes Hamilton's approach to needs by comparing it to the needs approach of Wiggins and the capabilities approach of Alkire, arguing that the difference is not as great as Hamilton believes. Finally, it is suggested that Hamilton needs additional elements to his argument to show how a state of needs could be psychologically and politically self-sustaining.     

Human rights and ethnic attitudes in Spain: The role of cognitive, social status, and individual difference factors

Cognitive, individual differences, and intergroup contact factors were examined in the formation of attitudes about human rights and ethnic bias in two studies conducted in Spain. A 7‐item scale measuring knowledge about human rights laws in Spain and the European Union was used in both studies. Participants were university students enrolled at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. In study one, participant (n = 127) knowledge about human rights laws, intergroup contact, Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and Gough's Prejudice/Tolerance (Pr/To) scale were examined in relationship to bias towards Gitanos. Findings revealed that knowledge about human rights and social status variables (gender and age) were not significant predictors of Gitano bias, whereas Pr/To, RWA, and contact were all (R² = .28) significant predictors of bias against Gitanos. Findings provided cross‐cultural replication (Dunbar & Simonova, in press) of the relationship of Pr/To and RWA to Gitano bias. In study two, participant (n = 100) knowledge and feelings (measured on a three‐item semantic differential scale) about human rights laws, Pr/To, and RWA were examined in relation to strategies influencing peer attitudes about human rights on the Raven Social Influence Inventory (RSII) scale. Findings indicated that knowledge about human rights laws were correlated (r = .47, p < .001) with positive feelings about these laws. Results of a hierarchical regression analysis, controlling for knowledge about human rights laws and participants' social status, found that the Prejudice/Tolerance scale and feelings about human rights were related with both hard (R² = .11) and soft (R² = .08) social influence strategies influencing peer human rights attitudes on the RSII. Men and higher‐scoring participants on Pr/To both employed more hard social influence strategies. Findings indicate that while knowledge of human rights laws is unrelated to ethnic bias, more accurate knowledge is correlated to more positive feelings about laws meant to protect the rights of ethnic minorities.     

Cosmopolitan Pacifism

In this paper I argue that cosmopolitanism prohibits war and requires a global approach to criminal justice. My argument proceeds by drawing out some implications of the core cosmopolitan intuition that every human being has a moral status which constrains how they may be treated. In the first part of this paper, I describe cosmopolitanism. In the second part, Cosmopolitanism and War, I analyse violence, consider the standards cosmopolitanism sets for its justification, and argue that war fails to meet them. In the third part, Cosmopolitanism and Criminal Justice, I argue that cosmopolitanism implies a moral obligation to deal justly with human wrongdoing wherever it occurs. Cosmopolitan pacifism follows: war is prohibited, and a consistent global criminal justice system is required. In the fourth part, Why No Cosmopolitan Pacifists?, I consider why cosmopolitans tend not to identify as pacifists, and in the final part, Objections, I discuss some objections.