Why do we think? Consequences of regarding thinking as behavior

Cognitive psychologists have made significant progress in explaining how people think. However, relatively little time and energy have been invested in understanding why we think--the factors that make us start or stop thinking, choose and change strategies and solutions. Such questions are linked to motivation and to discriminative and reinforcing stimuli. In this article, the idea that studying thinking as a form of behavior closely connected to antecedent stimuli and consequences leads to potentially important questions that are not presently being studied in the field of cognitive psychology. This is not an argument for reverting to behaviorism--rather, the argument is made that integrating a behavioral perspective on thinking would enrich cognitive psychology.     

Adolescent Egocentrism and the Illusion of Transparency: Are Adolescents as Egocentric as we Might Think?

The illusion of transparency, or people’s tendency to believe their thoughts and feelings as more apparent to others than they actually are, was used to investigate adolescent egocentrism. Contrary to previous research demonstrating heightened adolescent egocentrism, adolescents exhibited similar levels of egocentrism to adults. In experiment 1, 13-14 year-olds and adult participants both truthfully described and lied about a series of pictures. Both adolescent and adult liars indicated that they were more confident that other participants would know when they were lying, than other participants actually indicated. In experiment 2, 13-14 year-olds, 15-16 year-olds and adult participants read to an audience. The illusion of transparency effect manifested itself differently according to gender: Female participants indicating that they looked more nervous than audiences thought, whilst male participants indicating that they were more entertaining than audiences thought. Results were interpreted using simulation theory, and suggested that adolescents might not be as egocentric as previously thought.     

Are sales as we know it dying … or merely transforming?

The world of sales research continues to transform as we move more into the world of social media. This article briefly examines a historical examination of sales research by decade and then presents a model of sales research needs going forward based on how social media is being implemented by selling and buying organizations. The model assumes that the selling process is incorporated within a social media world and elements within the model include the salesperson and sales center, the buyer and buying center, the use of artificial intelligence, the teleselling unit, the interaction between marketing and sales departments, and the methods of selling. Discussion follows the model, focusing on how social media is being used among and between units in the selling process. The discussion unfolds on three key parts of the sales equation: (1) the sales organization, (2) the buying organization, and (3) the interaction between marketing and selling departments. Research questions follow each of the three discussion sections.     

Ought we to require emotional capacity as part of decisional competence?

The preceding commentary by Louis Charland suggests that traditional cognitive views of decision-making competence err in not taking into account patients' emotional capacities. Examined closely, however, Charland's argument fails to escape the cognitive bias that he condemns. However, there may be stronger arguments for broadening the focus of competence assessment to include emotional capacities, centering on the ways in which emotions aid humans in processing information. Before emotional capacities are added to the list of functions essential for decisional competence, though, the feasibility and utility of such a reorientation must be demonstrated.     

Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment

One popular justification for punishment is the just deserts rationale: A person deserves punishment proportionate to the moral wrong committed. A competing justification is the deterrence rationale: Punishing an offender reduces the frequency and likelihood of future offenses. The authors examined the motivation underlying laypeople's use of punishment for prototypical wrongs. Study 1 (N = 336) revealed high sensitivity to factors uniquely associated with the just deserts perspective (e.g., offense seriousness, moral trespass) and insensitivity to factors associated with deterrence (e.g., likelihood of detection, offense frequency). Study 2 (N = 329) confirmed the proposed model through structural equation modeling (SEM). Study 3 (N = 351) revealed that despite strongly stated preferences for deterrence theory, individual sentencing decisions seemed driven exclusively by just deserts concerns.     

Do others judge us as harshly as we think? Overestimating the impact of our failures, shortcomings, and mishaps

When people suffer an embarrassing blunder, social mishap, or public failure, they often feel that their image has been severely tarnished in the eyes of others. Four studies demonstrate that these fears are commonly exaggerated. Actors who imagined committing one of several social blunders (Study 1), who experienced a public intellectual failure (Studies 2 and 3), or who were described in an embarrassing way (Study 4) anticipated being judged more harshly by others than they actually were. These exaggerated fears were produced, in part, by the actors' tendency to be inordinately focused on their misfortunes and by their resulting failure to consider the wider range of situational factors that tend to moderate onlookers' impressions. Discussion focuses on additional mechanisms that may contribute to overly pessimistic expectations as well as the role of such expectations in producing unnecessary social anxiety.     

Why do we help? World change orientation as an antecedent of prosocial action

World change orientation refers to the extent to which one individual attributes his or her prosocial action to the function of making the world a better place. In Study 1, we developed a scale to measure this world change orientation [world change scale (WCS)] and to analyze its theoretical structure as a distinctive motivational orientation. In Study 2, participants were presented with a situation of need and subsequently given an unexpected opportunity to get involved in prosocial behavior. We then tested the hypothesis that degree of involvement is predicted by WCS when the situation is framed in terms of improving the welfare of the world, but by empathic concern when the situation is framed in terms of improving the welfare of a concrete victim. The results of both studies suggest that WCS refers to a distinct motivational orientation, which affects prosocial behavior above and beyond other motives. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is our absence as conspicuous as we think? Overestimating the salience and impact of one’s absence from a group

This research provides evidence that people overestimate the salience to others of their own absence from a group. Although individuals regard the removal of someone else from a group to be less salient than the addition of that person, they regard their own removal as every bit as salient as their addition (Study 1). Those absent from a group also expect their absence to be salient in the eyes of others, overestimating the extent to which their absence will be noticed by others (Study 2), and rating their absence as having had a larger impact on the group’s subsequent functioning than others do (Study 3). Discussion focuses on individuals’ assessments of their absence as an example of a broader egocentrism in social judgment.     

Choice-supportive source monitoring: do our decisions seem better to us as we age?

Participants were given several 2-option choices and then asked to review how they felt about their decisions, to review the details of their decisions, or to do an unrelated task. When later asked to attribute features to the previous options, in each condition older adults (64-83 years) attributed significantly more positive and fewer negative features to their chosen options than to foregone options. Younger adults' (18-22 years) attributions were as choice-supportive as those of older adults in the affective review condition but were less so in the other conditions. The age difference was present even when older and younger adults were equated for source identification and recognition accuracy. This study suggests that as people age, their tendency to distort memory in favor of the options they chose increases. In addition, it suggests that affectively reviewing choices increases younger adults' tendency toward choice-supportive memory.     

The Youth Ministry Mission Trip as Global Tourism: Are we OK with this?

Abstract : This article explores the rise of the short‐term mission trip in youth ministry. It argues that this escalation has much to do with transformations of globalization. This reality requires that the mission trip confront the conundrum of dealing with dichotomies between its service and its tourist activities. By exploring the work of sociologist Zygmunt Bauman we see why we face such dichotomies. The article concludes by providing some theological thoughts connected to Karl Barth's theology of the word that might help us move past these tensions between global service and global tourism.     

Parents as primary clients of the school psychologist or why is it we are here?

Psychological service delivery programs are increasingly becoming associated with a host of new divergent functions. One of the prerequisites for diversification in types of services offered is a clear understanding of client identification. Ultimately, when one considers parents as consumers of psychological services, when legal and ethical dilemmas in school-based practice arise, and when accountability issues loom large—a view of parents as primary clients emerges. The author discusses the rationale behind this position, offers supportive evidence for the parent as client orientation, and suggests how school psychology will have to be reshaped over the coming years in order to embrace this view.     

SAD as a mathematical assistant—how should we go from here to there?

The System for Automated Deduction (SAD) is developed in the framework of the Evidence Algorithm research project and is intended for automated processing of mathematical texts. The SAD system works on three levels of reasoning: (a) the level of text presentation where proofs are written in a formal natural-like language for subsequent verification; (b) the level of foreground reasoning where a particular theorem proving problem is simplified and decomposed; (c) the level of background deduction where exhaustive combinatorial inference search in classical first-order logic is applied to prove end subgoals.

We present an overview of SAD describing the ideas behind the project, the system's design, and the process of problem formalization in the fashion of SAD. We show that the choice of classical first-order logic as the background logic of SAD is not too restrictive. For example, we can handle binders like Σ or lim without resort to second order or to a full-powered set theory. We illustrate our approach with a series of examples, in particular, with the classical problem .     

Must we measure what we mean?

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are (at least sometimes) engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success.     

Impulsivity as a precedent factor for problematic Internet use: How can we be sure?

Previous research has suggested that problematic Internet use (PIU) is associated with impulse control disorder. Although researchers have suggested that impulsivity is a risk factor for PIU, the literature lacks longitudinal evidence on the relationship between impulsivity and PIU. We aimed to use a cross‐lagged analytic framework to identify temporal order effects and hypothesised that impulsivity was the precedent factor for PIU. In a panel sample of college students (N = 367), trait impulsivity and PIU were measured in the spring of freshman year and in their junior year. The measures included a self‐developed PIU Scale and the revised Impulsiveness Scale based on Barratt's concept. We found that “non‐planning impulsivity” was not associated with PIU. The “motor impulsivity” subfactor was thus adopted in the cross‐lagged model. The results suggest that motor impulsivity and PIU were stable across time. Motor impulsivity at Time 1 positively predicted PIU at Time 2, but PIU at Time 1 did not predict motor impulsivity at Time 2. A further investigation using gender as a moderator found a gender difference in the temporal relationship. Because motor impulsivity is a risk factor for PIU, potential prevention strategies based on this result are suggested.     

Are we born and do we die?

The stranglehold on our imagination by the mind-body dualisms that permeate the culture is such that most people seem to suppose that "body" and "soul" name distinct and separable entities. Resisting such dualisms in favour of an old-fashioned Aristotelean view of the soul as the form of the body, this essay considers two questions: do human parents produce human beings, and do human beings die? The doctrine of the special creation of the individual soul seems to require us to answer the first question in the negative because, according to this doctrine, parents only produce matter for the God-given soul to form. As to the second, many people seem to suppose that human beings do not die, only their bodies do. Arguing against the view that immortality is a natural property of human minds, the essay suggests (with the help of Joseph Ratzinger) that, whether we speak of "immortality" or of "resurrection", life from death is neither nature, nor achievement, but gift.     

Do we conceptualize every color we consciously discriminate?

Mandik understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of nondemonstrative concepts for those colors and so does not pose a threat to conceptualism. But even if Mandik has shown that we deploy such concepts in these experimental conditions, there are cases of conscious states that discriminate colors but do not involve concepts of those colors. Mandik's arguments sustain only a theory in the vicinity of conceptualism: The view that we possess concepts for every color we can discriminate consciously, but need not deploy those concepts in every conscious act of color discrimination.