Does it all go together when it goes? The nineteenth Bartlett memorial lecture

As groups of people age, the differences in the cognitive abilities of the most and least able become more extreme. This increase in between-individual variance is accompanied by an increase in within-individual variance: the difference between individuals' levels of performance on their best and least well retained skills. The implications of increasing between-individual variance are discussed in terms of the range of different factors that may affect cognitive ageing. Increases in within-individual variance are discussed in terms of differences betweeen “fluid” and “crystallized” abilities. The usefulness of this distinction and its functional implications are questioned. The hypothesis that age-related declines in “fluid” abilities are best modelled in terms of declines in a single factor is evaluated. Evidence is presented of disparate rates of decline, even of “fluid” cognitive abilities, such as performance on IQ tests, ability on information-processing tasks, and efficiency on memory tasks. Data from large-scale cross-sectional studies suggests that cognitive skills do not “all go together when they go”, but that there may, rather, be characteristic patterns, or syndromes, of cognitive ageing.     

An artificial intelligent counter

This article, using a counter as an example, explores a novel approach in constructing a cognitive system. The system is a paired memory system of “left and right brain” consisting of a number of memory units. The “left brain” is dedicated to the cognitive process of symbols, and the “right brain” to the representation of the symbols. The left and right subsystems are connected by bundles of internal communication signals. The paired memory system can learn facts and generalize concepts. Its cognitive capability is realized through the communication among these memory units at different cognitive levels within the system. The key claims in this paper are supported by empirical findings and theoretical principles. An AI counter is built and demonstrated in terms of concept learning and responding.     

Ecocultural bias in culture-specific intelligence tests in an ecologically diverse culture: The Philippines

In an ecologically diverse society (the Philippines), measurement equivalence across ecological settings was investigated with two culture-specific intelligence tests. Comparative reliability and factor analyses indicated that the tests (one for preschoolers, one for adults) were measuring the same ability dimensions equally reliably within each setting. Across settings, however, delta-plot analyses revealed considerable bias at the item level in tests of crystallized abilities, and the preschool tests tended to favor children from the setting where the tests were developed. The results are interpreted in terms of an ecocultural framework in which group differences in intellectual performance can reflect not only actual ability differences but differences in practice with, and exposure to, particular environmental stimuli and/or cognitive skills. The study demonstrates: (a) the need, particularly in ecologically diverse and segmented societies, to inspect tests for item bias; (b) the difficulty of culturally “equating” cognitive measures, even for very similar cultural subgroups who differ primarily in ecological setting.     

Cognitive Load and the Equality Heuristic: A Two-Stage Model of Resource Overconsumption in Small Groups

Two studies were conducted to test a two-stage model of the psychological mechanisms underlying the overconsumption of scarce resources in small groups. The model proposes that members of groups sharing resources first anchor their consumption choices on an “equal-division” heuristic and then, given sufficient cognitive capacity, adjust their choices in a self-serving direction. The results from both studies support the model. The first study found that when faced with a common resource pool almost all group members expressed thoughts regarding equality; however, individuals with sufficient cognitive capacity requested more from the pool and expressed more task-relevant thoughts than individuals lacking the necessary cognitive resources. The second study provided additional support for the two-stage model by demonstrating that group members' cognitions occur in the order predicted by the model and by demonstrating that an individual difference, social value orientation, affects thought processes only when individuals are not experiencing high cognitive loads. Implications are discussed.     

Testing for developmental continuity or discontinuity: Class inclusion and reversal shifts

Often the data in cognitive development consist of continuous cross-sectional increases in the proportion of children who respond in one of two ways to a diagnostic task. Such developmental trends are, however, ambiguous with reference to the course of individual, longitudinal development because they could be the result of either saltatory or gradual ontogenetic change. The present research tested a nonlongitudinal procedure for discriminating between these two alternatives. This procedure involves the administration of several equivalent versions of the diagnostic task at weekly intervals to children within a given age level in order to obtain a frequency distribution of the number of “successes” produced by each child. A bimodal distribution is interpreted as indicating saltatory ontogenetic change, while a unimodal distribution is taken to indicate gradual change. This method was applied to Piaget's class-inclusion problem and to the optional-shift task by administering four versions of each task to a range of different age-level samples. The optional-shift task produced clearly unimodal, bell-shaped distributions at all tested age levels, results which were interpreted to indicate a gradual ontogenetic increase in the probability of making reversal shifts. On the other hand, the frequency distributions for the class-inclusion task, at the appropriate age levels, were distinctly bimodal, and therefore consistent with a discontinuous ontogenetic transition. The capacity of the repeated-measures method to produce reliable within-task results and to differentiate between tasks was thus demonstrated.     

Temperamental profiles and linguistic development: Differences in the quality of linguistic production in relation to temperament in children of 28 months

The temperamental constellations that can be found in the infant population may influence the development trajectories of single domains of knowledge, such as that relative to language. The main objective of this study is to identify temperamental profiles to which one associates different levels of linguistic competence and to identify the profile associated with the highest risk for language acquisition. The temperamental characteristics of a sample of 106 children of 28 months attending day-care centres were surveyed and three temperamental profiles were highlighted: a profile typical of the Italian population which grouped most of the children; another made up of easily distractible and not very persistent children, who show a poor capacity to modulate motor activity and finally, the third with children inhibited in new situations. A comparison of the three groups on the basis of the level of linguistic competence revealed important differences regarding certain indices such as the vocabulary size and composition: in particular, the group of “inattentive” children has a more “immature” vocabulary composition, characterised by the presence of more primitive components of the lexical repertory.     

Spontaneous versus Controlled Influences of Stimulus-Based Affect on Choice Behavior

This article identifies two routes through which affect and cognitions arising from a stimulus can influence choices: a “lower order” route, where choices are influenced through automatic affective processes, and a “higher order” route, where choices are influenced through more controlled affective or consequence-related cognitive processes. Across three experiments the extent of deliberation, mental preoccupation, and the nature of exposure to the stimuli were manipulated to identify conditions under which lower order affect, higher order affect, or higher order cognitions impact choices. Respondents chose between two alternatives: one that was associated with more intense positive affect but less favorable cognitions (e.g., chocolate cake), and one that was associated with less intense positive affect but more favorable cognitions (e.g., fruit salad). Findings suggest that when the individual makes the decision quickly and is mentally preoccupied while making the decision, choices are driven by lower order affect. When the individual deliberates on the decision without being mentally preoccupied and the affect-laden option is in full view while the decision is being deliberated upon, choices are driven by higher order affect. In both cases, the affect-laden option (e.g. chocolate cake) is selected. In all other situations, choices are driven by higher order consequence-related cognitions and the alternative that is superior on the cognitive dimension (e.g. fruit salad) is selected. It is suggested that the effects of affective reactions on choice occur through the activation of appetitive (i.e., gratification-seeking) goals.     

Reliability, Distribution, and Validity of Age-Related Cognitive Deficits in the Morris Water Maze

In the present study, F-344 rats throughout 1.5 to 26 months of age were tested in the reference memory version, a moving-platform repeated acquisition version, and in a cued platform version of the Morris water maze. The results suggest that: (1) performance in the water maze declines continuously, beginning at the earliest age, and very closely fits a linear function; (2) there are robust, reliable differences between individuals in terms of their performance in the Morris water maze, but chronological age accounts for only a fraction of the variance between individuals; (3) there is no evidence of a bimodal distribution among aged rats—there is no distinct subgroup of individuals that performs so poorly that they are qualitatively different from the majority of the population, and distinctions between “impaired” and “unimpaired” subjects must be based on arbitrary criteria that may not be consistent from one study to the next; (4) age-related deficits in the Morris water maze may not be restricted to learning and memory, but may also include deficits in attention, the ability to process spatial information, and/or the ability to develop efficient spatial search strategies; and (5) swim distance is the most appropriate measure of cognitive function in the Morris water maze, but the relationship between this measure and other measures of noncognitive function make it clear that swim distance may not be a pure measure of cognitive function. Although the Morris water maze remains a valuable preclinical test with better validity and specificity than many other behavioral tests, measures of performance in the Morris water maze should not be considered synonymous with cognitive function.     

Cognition and aided speech recognition in noise: Specific role for cognitive factors following nine-week experience with adjusted compression settings in hearing aids

The working memory model for Ease of Language Understanding (ELU) proposes that language understanding under taxing conditions is related to explicit cognitive capacity. We refer to this as the mismatch hypothesis, since phonological representations based on the processing of speech under established conditions may not be accessed so readily when input conditions change and a match becomes problematic. Then, cognitive capacity requirements may differ from those used for processing speech hitherto. In the present study, we tested this hypothesis by investigating the relationship between aided speech recognition in noise and cognitive capacity in experienced hearing aid users when there was either a match or mismatch between processed speech input and established phonological representations. The settings in the existing digital hearing aids of the participants were adjusted to one of two different compression settings which processed the speech signal in qualitatively different ways ("fast" or "slow"). Testing took place after a 9-week period of experience with the new setting. Speech recognition was tested under different noise conditions and with match or mismatch (i.e. alternative compression setting) manipulations of the input signal. Individual cognitive capacity was measured using a reading span test and a letter monitoring test. Reading span, a reliable measure of explicit cognitive capacity, predicted speech recognition performance under mismatch conditions when processed input was incongruent with recently established phonological representations, due to the specific hearing aid setting. Cognitive measures were not main predictors of performance under match conditions. These findings are in line with the ELU model.     

Cognitive and projective measures of differentiation and their relationship to empathy

The present investigation compared cognitive and projective methods of assessing “differentiation,” Witkin's Embedded Figures Test (EFT) and Blatt's Concept of the Object Scale (COS), and reexamined expectations concerning the relationship between level of differentiation and capacity for empathy. Whether lesser or greater differentiation would promote empathy was of specific interest. Two forms of empathy were investigated, an “affective” form assessed by the Mehrabian Empathy Scale and a “cognitive” form assessed by the Hogan Empathy Scale. Expected sex differences in differentiation and empathy were also investigated. Results demonstrated consonance between COS and EFT measures of differentiation within the male sample only (p < .05). Individuals classified by EFT as relatively less differentiated (“field dependent”) produced more part object responses (p < .02) and those classified as more differentiated (“field independent”) showed a trend toward more whole object responses (p < .10) on the COS. Associations between measures of differentiation and empathy reached significance or showed trends in the male group only. Men with relatively lesser differentiation on the EFT (“field dependent”) showed greater “affective empathy” (p < .10) and men with greater differentiation on the COS showed greater “cognitive” empathy (p < .05). Women demonstrated higher levels of “affective” empathy than men (p < .001).     

Measuring Cognitive Aptitude Using Unobtrusive Knowledge Tests: A New Survey Technology

Five knowledge tests and one implicit-reasoning task were developed to be: (1) exceptionally short, (2) correlated with general cognitive aptitude, (3) unobtrusive, i.e., appear similar to attitudinal survey items as opposed to maximal performance measures, and (4) without formally “correct” answers. The intent was to design scales that could be administered in non-proctored environments to directly measure general cognitive aptitude while avoiding the possibility that participants could use references to provide “good” answers. The five knowledge tests used a Likert format to assess knowledge in verbal and practical domains, and were scored by computing distances between examinee and reference ratings. The implicit-reasoning task appeared to be a series completion “game” that required a dichotomous response. The scales were administered to 288 Air Force recruits and were validated against the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). Individual unobtrusive knowledge scales and ASVAB tests were substantially correlated with sample correlations ranging to .39 and population correlation estimates to .66 after correcting for range restriction. Two sets of factor scores, which were separately derived from the unobtrusive test battery and the ASVAB, were highly correlated in our sample, .54, yielding a population correlation of .80 after correcting for range restriction. This technology is important because few paper- or Internet-based surveys, and virtually no mail-based surveys accurately measure general cognitive aptitude, while many of these surveys address important social issues and commercial questions that could be better understood given an unobtrusive but accurate estimate of general cognitive aptitude.     

Correlation between inspection time and psychometric abilities: A personal interpretation

More than 25 years of research suggests that the measure inspection time (IT) does capture low-level aspects of cognitive functioning that contribute to human intelligence. However, recent evidence does not support earlier claims that IT estimates the speed of a single mechanism like “sampling input” or “apprehension.” Rather, together with other tasks that employ pattern backward masking to limit the duration for which information is available for processing, IT is probably sensitive both to focused attentional capacities to detect organization and change under severe time constraints and to decision processes, ongoing beyond mask onset, that monitor responding. Among normal young adults, IT is correlated with the broad psychometric factor Gs (“speediness”). This mediates correlation with general intelligence. In this group, IT is not correlated with Gf. However, whether this outcome generalizes to samples of persons with an intellectual disability, to young children, or to elderly persons is not yet known. Psychological processes underpinning IT are currently only speculatively defined, but it should prove possible to unravel these by experimentation. To this end, backward masking procedures are arguably more theoretically tractable than reaction time tasks because they reduce the impact of higher-level cognitive strategies on performance. On this basis, IT may hold promise as a means for developing partial explanations for intelligence in psychological terms. However, whether this is realized depends on identifying the psychological functions that support IT.     

“Consistency” and “contradiction” in the development of gender role characteristics

There is currently an increasing amount of theoretical and empirical work arguing that stereotyped sex role behavior is maladaptive in our culture and that “androgyny” or “sex role transcendence” is a preferred mode of being. The latter, however, seems to require individual inconsistency and self-contradiction in behaviors and attitudes (since the individual is both active and passive, both independent and dependent, etc.). Theories of cognitive consistency maintain that individuals avoid self-contradiction and inconsistency, and therefore that androgyny runs counter to important motivational principles. This article examines this issue in some detail, and concludes that theories of cognitive dissonance and consistency reflect particular socio-cultural conditions rather than universal motivation principles. There is nothing inherently uncomfortable or “inconsistent” about androgyny and sex role transcendence.     

Performance structures: A psycholinguistic and linguistic appraisal

Two lines of research—one in psycholinguistics and one in linguistics—are combined to deal with a long-standing problem in both fields: why the “performance structures” of sentences (structures based on experimental data, such as pausing and parsing values) are not fully accountable for by linguistic theories of phrase structure. Two psycholinguistic algorithms that have been used to predict these structures are described and their limitations are examined. A third algorithm, based on the prosodic structures of sentences is then proposed and shown to be a far better predictor of performance structures. It is argued that the experimental data reflect aspects of the linguistic cognitive capacity, and that, in turn, linguistic theory can offer an illuminating account of the data. The prosodic model is shown to have a wider domain of application than temporal organization per se, accounting for parsing judgments as well as pausing performance, and reflecting aspects of syntactic and semantic structure as well as purely prosodic structure. Finally, the algorithm is discussed in light of language processing.     

The twelfth Bartlett memorial lecture: The role of single neurons in the psychology of perception

I feel deeply honoured by your invitation to give the Bartlett lecture, and am especially glad to do so in Holland, the home of so many distinguished psychologists of sensation and perception. And there is a third reason why it has given me much pleasure, for Sir Frederick Bartlett was one of those who had an important influence on the direction of my career some 40 years ago. I had to decide whether to spend my last year at Cambridge reading psychology or physiology, so I attended a short course of introductory lectures he gave in July. About half a dozen of us sat on upright wooden chairs circled around him as he sat in an armchair, smiling benignly. The first thing he did was to tell us to close our notebooks, for he was not going to say anything that would help us to pass any exams. And I believe the very last words of his last lecture were, “So you see it is all very difficult”. I was very glad he said that, for I had in fact found it all very heavy going: my brain seemed always to be lost in clouds of uncertainty when “remembering”, “thinking”, or “perceiving” were mentioned, because there was no conceptual framework for these processes except the words themselves and others spun around them. What I was looking for were the definable quantities of physics, chemistry and even physiology, these I could handle conceptually in their geometric and functional interactions, whereas I always find a purely verbal argument about abstractions difficult to follow and impossible to believe. So this lack of any nonverbal conceptual framework was very painful.

There was one phrase I think I recall him using that particularly aroused my interest-“the effort after meaning”; intuitively this seemed to be very important, but however much effort I made the meaning never quite emerged. I had almost decided that my mistrust of words made me unsuited to a career in psychology, but all the same I put my problem about “physiology or psychology” directly to Bartlett. After finding out that I was mainly interested in problems of sensation and perception, he said he thought that E. D. Adrian's research over the last 20 years had made more difference to that subject than any results obtained from within psychology itself.     

Conceptual models and task representation in using a command language

In most cases, there is no direct correspondence between the objectives that users of an interactive device may be led to formulate and the commands that enable them to attain those objectives. In order to set up what Young (1981) calls a “mapping” between the “task and action arenas”, users must (1) reorganize their objectives in order to adapt them to the capabilities of the device and (2) if necessary, combine several commands to reach a given objective. In doing so, they are assumed to rely on a “conceptual model” of the device, a notion whose cognitive status remains to be clarified. In this article, the editing keys of the MS/DOS operating system are taken as an example and described according to two different conceptual models. The links between the task and action arenas, in these two conceptual models and in a third one called the “mixed model”, are analysed in detail. Finally, the performance of three groups of subjects, while editing a line of text, are compared. All three of the dependent variables analysed are shown to vary according to how the objective is assumed to be formulated in the three conceptual models. Some hypotheses are presented concerning the cognitive mechanisms involved in such a situation.     

The Role of Excess Cognitive Capacity in the Relationship Between Job Characteristics and Cognitive Task Engagement

A model is presented in which two categories of individual differences, differences related to task capacity and differences related to task motivation, are proposed to influence the relationship between task characteristics and cognitive task engagement. It is proposed that task characteristics will interact with the performer’s task capacity to influence the excess cognitive capacity available to the task performer. To the degree one’s capabilities meet or exceed the demands of the job, excess cognitive capacity is more likely. The relationship between excess cognitive capacity and cognitive task engagement is then moderated by factors influencing one’s task motivation, and by cognitive and physical interventions if the excess capacity is actively utilized in a safe manner. If the excess cognitive capacity is safely utilized, or if task motivation is high, cognitive task engagement is more likely. Implications of the model for human resource management are discussed.     

The place of social intelligence in a taxonomy of cognitive abilities

Studies have yielded inconsistent results regarding the place of social intelligence in a taxonomy of cognitive abilities. An investigation is described in which measures of social behaviors obtained from interviews were related to a wide variety of cognitive variables. Significant relations were rare. It is suggested that the question to be posed is not the simple one of the place of social intelligence in the cognitive domain but rather one of the relationships of the elements of two large taxonomic systems. A Taxonomy of social intelligence would provide a set of definitions procedures that would improve efforts to replicate and build on previous research. More important would be the heuristic value of a structural representation of “social intelligence” based on theoretical relationships involving environmental, physiological, and genetic as well as psychological factors. Development of a taxonomy of situations would facilitate the study of interactions involving performance and environmental conditions.