确立与社会主义市场经济相适应的价值取向

确立与社会主义市场经济相适应的价值取向马全江在发展社会主义市场经济的过程中,由于经济体制的转型和利益关系的调整,出现了反映不同利益主体的价值取向。大力加强社会主义思想道德建设,确立与社会主义市场经济相适应的价值取向,已经成为实践向我们提出的迫切需要解...     

论主流意识形态对道德建设的引导作用--我国新时期道德构建应以社会主义荣辱观为核心

社会主义市场经济需要与之相适应的道德水准,但社会主义市场经济本身并不必然带来与之相适应的道德体系,与经济转型和社会转型相伴随的社会思潮的多元化,在一定程度上模糊了道德体系的核心价值标准,使人们的荣辱观在某些方面背离了社会主义市场经济发展的方向,从而在很大程度上阻碍了社会主义市场经济的健康发展.社会主义荣辱观的提出,为强化主流意识形态的影响力,及时构建适应社会主义市场经济要求的道德体系提供了核心价值标准,具有重大意义.     

南传佛教中国化当代实践路径初探

新时代宗教中国化是习近平总书记于2015年5月18日在中央统战工作会议上提出的。他指出:"积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应,必须坚持中国化方向。"2016年4月22日,习近平总书记在全国宗教工作会议上进一步提出:"积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应,一个重要的任务就是支持我国宗教坚持中国化方向。"     

社会主义市场经济条件下的道德体系建设

在发展社会主义市场经济的新的时代条件下 ,更好地坚持和发展社会主义道德体系 ,无疑日益成为我国道德建设领域的一个十分紧迫的现实课题。这一道德体系的建设 ,应当着眼于经济体制的变革与道德生活的变化 ,将坚持和发展辩证地统一起来 ,尤其要大力建设市场道德 ,从而努力与社会主义市场经济的发展相适应     

试论“以德治国”思想的理论内涵

江泽民同志在全国宣传部长会议上明确提出了“以德治国”的战略决策 ,强调“我们在建设有中国特色社会主义 ,发展社会主义市场经济的过程中 ,要坚持不懈地加强社会主义法制建设 ,依法治国 ,同时也要坚持不懈地加强社会主义道德建设 ,以德治国”。在今年 3月的九届全国人大四次会议和全国政协九届四次会议上江泽民同志再次强调了这一思想。“以德治国”战略决策的提出 ,把道德建设提到了治国方略的高度 ,是以江泽民同志为核心的党的第三代领导集体对我们党和政府治理国家基本方略的完善和创新。“以德治国”方略深刻总结了古今中外治国经验 ,…     

论社会主义初级阶段道德建设的特殊性

社会主义初级阶段的道德建设 ,既不能完全照搬马克思主义经典作家关于社会主义道德和共产主义道德的论述 ,也不能沿用过去曾经倡导但效果并不明显的非社会主义市场经济条件下的社会主义道德和共产主义道德。必须从社会主义初级阶段的现实出发 ,努力探索与社会主义市场经济相适应的社会主义道德和共产主义道德。做到这一点 ,至少必须考虑社会主义初级阶段生产关系、经济体制、道德结构、道德主体和国际环境的特殊性 ,必须从构建新的思想道德基本框架和建设社会主义思想道德体系这两个方面开展工作     

论以德治国的时代性

十六大报告在论述文化建设任务时 ,提出要切实加强思想道德建设 ,依法治国和以德治国相辅相成。要建立与社会主义市场经济相适应、与社会主义法律规范相协调、与中华民族传统美德相承接的社会主义思想体系。这些重要论述表明我们党对以德治国方略的认识进一步深化 ,更加明确了以德治国在内容、实践主体、实践方式和追求目标等方面所具有的时代性。以德治国内容的时代性以德治国是根据中国当代社会发展的实际和对社会发展规律的把握而提出的 ,其内容有着与中国历史上的德治以及西方国家政治伦理完全不同的内涵。以德治国中的“德” ,既继承了…     

李瑞环同全国宗教团体领导人举行迎春座谈

代表江泽民总书记向全国宗教团体领导人、全国宗教界朋友和广大信教群众致以节日祝贺强调要不折不扣地贯彻宗教信仰自由政策 ,坚持不懈地引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应　　本报北京 1月 31日讯　新华社记者尹鸿祝、本报记者武卫政报道 :中共中央政治局常委、全国政协主席李瑞环今天邀请全国宗教团体领导人到中南海举行迎春座谈。李瑞环强调 ,要不折不扣地贯彻宗教信仰自由政策 ,坚持不懈地引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应。李瑞环首先代表江泽民总书记向全国宗教团体领导人、全国宗教界朋友和广大信教群众致以节日的祝贺。他说 ,过去的一年 ,…     

吉林省宗教工作会议召开景俊海强调积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应为建设社会主义现代化新吉林作出应有贡献北大核心

6月17日,吉林省宗教工作会议在长春召开.省委书记景俊海出席会议并讲话.他强调,要深入贯彻习近平总书记关于宗教工作的重要论述,认真落实全国宗教工作会议精神,完整、准确、全面贯彻新时代党的宗教工作理论和方针政策,始终坚持我国宗教中国化方向,坚持独立自主自办原则,坚持以"导"的理念做好宗教工作,积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应,为建设社会主义现代化新吉林作出应有贡献.     

继承和发扬伊斯兰教中国化方向的优良传统

<正>2015年,习近平总书记在中央统战工作会议上首次提出:"积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应,必须坚持我国宗教中国化方向。"2016年,习总书记在全国宗教工作会议上进一步深刻全面地阐释了这一论述,为我国各宗教坚持中国化方向,积极主动与社会主义社会相适应指明了方向。习总书记在讲话中指出,坚持我国宗教中国化方向,必须坚持用社     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation

I criticize an important argument of Michael Smith, from his recent book The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's argument, if sound, would undermine one form of moral externalism – that which insists that moral judgements only contingently motivate their authors. Smith claims that externalists must view good agents as always prompted by the motive of duty, and that possession of such a motive impugns the goodness of the agent. I argue (i) that externalists do not (ordinarily) need to assign moral agents such as a motive, and (ii) that possession of this motive, when properly understood, is morally admirable.     

Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth

People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.