法律的道德审视的可能性

法律与道德的关系问题是个亘古常新的问题.在法律的领域内道德的位置何在,对法律的道德审视何以可能?这是建构法伦理学要思考的基础性问题.对这一问题的解答既是解决法律与道德冲突的需要,也是解答法律的合法性的重要参照.     

道德与法律之和谐解——道德与法律关系的三维解读

在历史维度上,中西方在道德与法律关系上经历了不同模式,中国表现出德法合于礼、以德为主、强德弱法,而西方则体现为德法分设、以法为主、强法弱德。在逻辑维度上,道德与法律同时存在,但作用于人的行为方式却有明显界分,两者之间是对立统一的辩证关系,道德构成了法律正当性的基础,法律是实现道德之治的必由之途。在规范维度上,道德和法律交替至上,在立法阶段道德为上,法律服从于道德。在执法和司法阶段法律为上,法律成为首要的判断标准,道德仅是法律的辅助。在立法、执法及司法之后阶段,道德取得最终的评价地位。道德与法律是可以互相协调的,通过制度建设使二者达到平衡与和谐,在道德涵养法律的同时,以法律促进道德的普适。     

哈特法律与道德的关系论

边沁基于功利主义的立场,从普遍主义的观点提出实然法与应然法相分离的观点,这一观点成为当代法学家哈特的出发点,哈特强调无论任何法律,法律就是法律而不是道德。然而,哈特等法律实证主义者确实把法律看成是与道德相分离而没有关联的吗?实际上,哈特一方面强调法律与道德在存在形态上的分离,但同时也认为这两者之间有重合之处。如果人们过于夸大这两者的区分,就会导致无论是对于法律还是对于道德都有害的观点。     

论道德的法律支持及其限度

道德与法律是两个有着广泛而深刻联系的社会规范系统。它们相互作用,彼此支持,维持着社会的生存和发展。在现实的层面上这已是不争的事实。理论上所要讨论的是法律与道德的关系的性质判断、道德与法律互动的内在机理、法律作用于道德的方式及其限度。一、历史上道德与法律关系的论争道德与法律是否存在必然的逻辑联系,这是道德与法律关系中的一个核心问题。对这个问题的讨论主要在西方的法哲学领域,而在伦理学领域一般都对此作肯定的回答。西方影响最大的自然法学和实证法学正是由于对此问题的不同回答而成为彼此对立的两种法学理论。自然法…     

论法律道德化——兼析法律与道德之间的价值秩序

辨析法律与道德之间的关系问题,几乎是讨论法律道德化、法律伦理学这样的话题的前置条件。默认并预设法律与道德彼此不同,是引出法律道德化问题的逻辑要求。正是因为法律与道德彼此不同,才需要用法律道德化、法律伦理学这样的概念将法律与道德关联起来,并对法律展开道德批判。然而,法律与道德之间的区别又不可以扩大化,法律与道德处于一个关系链条中,彼此只有一条看不见的分界线。也正是在这个关系链条中,可以见出道德相比于法律,具有明显的价值优先性。因此,法律应该道德化,而不是道德应该法律化。     

评中国思想家对道德与法律之关系的探索

儒家礼法合一论的真义是对“善法”的追求 ,对“恶法”的否定。因为善法体现了儒家的道德精神 ,反映了一种人道主义的价值取向 ,而恶法则是反人道的。墨家强调“法不仁不可以为法” ,其真实的意思是不道德的法律不是真正的法律 ,与儒家的礼法合一论有相似之处。法家主张“法虽不善犹善于无法” ,从而否定了法律的道德基础和价值根据。今天 ,我们在立法中贯彻道德的法律化取向需要谨慎从事 :一是注意把那些体现时代精神、合乎社会潮流的道德予以法律化 ,不能把落伍于时代的道德法律化 ;二是切忌把过高的道德义务转化为法律义务。必须认识到 ,应该法律化的道德只是“底线道德” ,而高层次的道德是不宜法律化的 ,否则就是强人所难。     

富勒的法律与道德的关系学说

在20世纪60年代,西方法理学界曾就法律与道德的关系有过论战,英国牛津大学法理学教授赫伯特·哈特发表了《法律的概念》一书,形成新分析法学派,另一方是以美国啥佛大学法理学教授富勒为代表,他发表了《法律的道德性》一书批判对方,成为新自然法学派在美国的重要代表人物。     

试论慎到法思想中的道德因素

慎到法思想中对"公"的追求与西方自然法思想相类似。他认为道德与法律在一定程度上并不冲突,如果违反了道德,成文法就不具有法律效力,即恶法非法。从肯定道德的角度分析,慎到认为"法虽不善,犹愈于无法"的实质应该是现实法律虽然与道德相违背和对立,但是也比无法可依的状态要好,也就是不善之法即"恶法犹愈于无法"。虽然是恶法,但因其也是"法",不能因为其不符合道德就否定其有效性,这与其所展现的在一定程度上肯定道德的自然法倾向并不矛盾,他是为了确立法律的至上性。另一方面慎到认为法律制度的建构应以自为之心作为其人性论基础,将制度建构在美好道德之上是不切实际的幻想。虽然未彻底否定道德的价值,但认为法律同道德相比具有客观性和公平性,这其实也是对道德持怀疑和不信任态度。他认为如果二者冲突,法律要高于道德,道德让位于法律。慎到法思想为我们今日制定法律时应如何更好地处理道德与法律的关系,避免步入泛道德主义和道德虚无主义的错误提供了有益的参考和借鉴。     

道德法律化正当性的法哲学分析

正如约翰.罗尔斯所言:法律与道德的主题提出了许多不同的问题,而道德的法律强制、法律制度的道德基础则是其中的重要问题。[1]在我国,表面上看道德法律化正当性的确证在学界的主流观点中已通论达识,好像无须多论,实则道德法律化的语义含义及其正当性理据,仍有细论之必要。一道德法律化疏正“道德法律化”的术语,尽管在学界及日常生活中是一个被普遍使用的概念,但其内涵仍需廓清。从目前学界流行的主要观点来看,基本是在立法的意义上,将道德法律化理解为把最基本的道德规则通过立法程序上升为法律制度。“道德法律化是国家的立法机关借助于一…     

道德的法律强制探析

由于存在着道德仅靠自身力量所无法解决的问题 ,而这些问题因其对社会秩序和社会生活的重要性又必须获得解决 ,使得道德的法律强制成为必要。多元背景下道德共识的存在 ,道德与法律共同的问题域以及现代社会的立法民主化机制 ,为道德的法律强制提供了可能。道德法律强制的合理性 ,只有通过对于应当予以法律强制的道德的性质、可强制的道德的范围以及道德法律强制的立法和司法程序的学理分析 ,方可予以证成。     

An n-dimensional Weber Law and the Corresponding Fechner Law

Weber's law of 1834, DeltaS/S=c for the just noticeable difference (jnd), can be written as S+DeltaS=kS, k=1+c. It follows that the stimulus decrement required to elicit one jnd of sensation is S-DeltaS*=k(-1)S. If generalized for two stimulus dimensions and two corresponding response dimensions, Weber's law would have to state such equations for all directions of change in the plane. A two-dimensional Weber law with exactly these properties is realized by [S(x)+DeltaS(x)(straight theta), S(y)+DeltaS(y)(straight theta)]=[k(sin(straight theta))S(x), k(cos(straight theta))S(y)] which determines the stimulus coordinates for all stimuli just noticeably different from the stimulus (S(x), S(y)) in all directions 0R(2)) is [x, y]mapsto[log(k)(x), log(k)(y)]. The solution is generalized to arbitrarily many dimensions by substituting the sin and cos in the generalized Weber law by the standard coordinates of a unit vector. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Suicide and the Law

SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter is to delineate how mental health professionals can prevent their clients from acting in a suicidal manner while protecting themselves against potential liability when a client attempts or completes suicide. In our increasingly litigious society mental health professionals can apply their understanding about the elements of legal liability in cases involving client suicidal behaviors to structure their services in a manner to meet their responsibility in treating potentially suicidal clients.     

Common Law Approaches to the Relationship Between Law and Morality

How are general relations of law and morality typically conceived in an environment of Anglo-saxon common law? This paper considers some classical common law methods and traditions as these have confronted and been overlaid with modern ideas of legal positivism. While classical common law treated a community and its morality as the cultural foundation of law, legal positivism's analytical separation of law and morals, allied with liberal approaches to legal regulation, have made the relationship of legal and moral principles more complex and contested. Using ideas from Durkheim's and Weber's sociology, I argue that the traditional common law emphasis on an inductive, empirical treatment of moral practices has continuing merit, but in contemporary conditions the vague idea of community embedded in classical common law thought must be replaced with a much more precise conceptualisation of coexisting communities, whose moral bonds are diverse and require a corresponding diversity of forms of legal recognition or protection.     

Analytical methods in the theory of psychophysical discrimination II: The Near-miss to Weber's Law, Falmagne's Law, the Psychophysical Power Law and the Law of Similarity

We examine the possibility of accounting for an empirical phenomenon in auditory psychophysics called the “Near-Miss to Weber's Law” [Jesteadt, W., Weir, C., & Green, D. (1977). Intensity discrimination as a function of frequency and sensation level. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, A, 61, 169-177], within the framework of Fechner's Psychophysics. To this end, we introduce a pair of Psychophysical Laws governing the behavior of Weber sensitivities. One of these, the Power Law, embodies ideas that Jesteadt et al. introduced in their original discussion of the near-miss phenomenon. Falmagne's Law captures ideas of Falmagne and colleagues [Falmagne, J.-Cl. (1985). Elements of psychophysical theory. New York: Oxford University Press; Doble, C., Falmagne, J.-Cl., & Berg, B.G. (2003). Theoretical note: Recasting (the near-miss to) Weber's Law. Psychological Review, 110, 365-375]. These two laws, which account for the near-miss phenomenon in quite different ways, are shown to be special cases of a more general Psychophysical Law of Similarity. We find all (smooth) solutions of this Law of Similarity that are compatible with Fechnerian psychophysics. Of the 11 solutions, four are relevant to the near-miss phenomenon; two of these solutions reproduce the models of Jesteadt et al. and Doble et al. and the other two solutions each provide a new accounting of the near-miss phenomenon. We discuss the possibility of distinguishing among these four models in empirical data.     

Aquinas and the Natural Law

Recent decades have seen a shift away from the traditional view that Aquinas's theory of the natural law is meant to supply us with normative guidance grounded in a substantive theory of human nature. In the present essay, I argue that this is a mistake. Expanding on the suggestions of Jean Porter and Ralph McInerny, I defend a derivationist reading of ST I‐II, Q. 94, A. 2 according to which Aquinas takes our knowledge of the genuine goods of human life and their proper ordering to one another to be self‐evident only to the wise who are able to discern the truth about our God‐given human nature. I then show that this reading provides a better account of Aquinas's view than two recent alternatives: John Finnis's brand of inclinationism and Daniel Mark Nelson's virtue‐based interpretation.     

Paternalism and the Criminal Law

ABSTRACT If it could be shown that law is, in some sense, a moral system the apparent contradiction between (moral) autonomy and (legal) heteronomy might be challenged. In order to prepare for such a challenge this paper questions the prevailing view that law is not in the business of enforcing morals. That is done primarily by using decisions of the criminal courts to show that the law does not always criminalise conduct merely to prevent harm to others. Paternalism is distinguished from the harm principle in order to show that the law (rightly or wrongly) sometimes seeks to secure that which is (thought to be) morally good, irrespective of the prevention of harm, at least overall harm.
If such an insight is well founded there are consequences for legal theory in that neither of the ruling paradigms (naturalism and positivism) seems able adequately to accommodate the view of law which emerges. Consequently, an attempt is made in the essay to develop a middle theory of law, between naturalism and positivism, which is referred to as 'normative positivism'. The theory presented has, in turn, consequences for political practice. If law can be seen as community morality rather than as merely the morality of officials, then everyone has a stake in the moral content of law and there may be good moral reasons for disobeying official laws. Civil disobedience is the citizen's ultimate resort against the official morality that has appropriated to itself the eulogistic name of 'law'. That law may be seen as community morality also calls into question some ruling paradigms as to the nature of morality but, if the claim can be sustained, then the legal system may be seen as applied moral philosophy in action.