共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Edward Omar Moad 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,62(3):135-148
I propose a framework for comparative Islamic—Western ethics in which the Islamic categories Islam, Iman, and Ihsan are juxtaposed with the concepts of obligation, value, and virtue, respectively. I argue that shari’a refers to both the obligation component and the entire structure of the Islamic ethic; suggesting a suspension of the understanding
of shari’a as simply Islamic “law,” and an alternative understanding of usul al-fiqh as a moral epistemology of obligation. I will test this approach by addressing the question of reason in Islamic moral epistemology
via an examination of an argument advanced by a founding usul scholar Muhammad bin Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī (150 A.H./767 C.E.). 相似文献
2.
Damon A. Young 《Sexuality & culture》2005,9(4):58-79
Karl Marx once compared philosophy to masturbation, essentially seeing both as privative, idealistic, and impractical activities.
Indeed, many lay folk see philosophers as “wankers.” While the present state of universities does throw doubt on the liberatory
character of contemporary philosophy, Marx’s jibe nonetheless mischaracterizes masturbation. This paper is a brief attempt
to correct Marx’s characterization of masturbation by drawing on the work of a thinker ofter associated with “intellectual
onanism”: Martin Heidegger. Speaking ontologically, Heidergger’s theories can be developed to show that masturbation it is
not privative, but “stretched” in time and place. Moreover, masturbation plays a practical role in the creative development
of the self, including the self’s essential bodiliness. While not necessarily defending philosophy against Marx’s charges,
this paper does show how even so-called “onanistic” philosophy might be redeemed.
“Only a being which, like man, ‘had’ the word... can and must ‘have’ ‘the hand’” —Martin Heidegger
“I have a dangerously supple wrist.” —Friedrich Nietzsche 相似文献
3.
Janet Donohoe 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(1):127-140
In this paper, I explore a confrontation between Husserl’s ethical position of vocation and its absolute ought with a feminist
ethical position. I argue that Husserl’s ethics has a great deal to offer a feminist ethics by providing for the possibility
of an ethics that is particular rather than universal, that recognizes the role of the social through tradition in establishing
values and norms without conceding the ethical responsibility of the individual, and that acknowledges the role of both reason
and desire in establishing moral values that has the consequence of breaking down the public/private distinction that has
reigned in so many ethical theories. In order to make this case, I proceed with a review of Husserl’s position of the absolute
ought, some typical criticisms that might be leveled at his position, and finally, responses to those criticisms that show
ways in which Husserl’s position can be beneficial to the formulation of a feminist ethics that is inclusive of the emotional
aspect of moral valuation, and the particularity of ethical commitments, while providing for a different way of evaluating
thinking that accommodates what are usually understood to be “feminine” concerns. In addition to describing Husserl’s position,
I show how that position meets some of the expectations for a feminist ethics as put forth by Iris Marion Young and Sara Ruddick. 相似文献
4.
Lau AS 《Science and engineering ethics》2004,10(2):359-368
One of the methods used at Penn State to teach engineering students about ethics is a one-credit First-Year Seminar entitled
“How Good Engineers Solve Tough Problems.” Students meet in class once a week to understand ethical frameworks, develop ethical
problem-solving skills, and to better understand the professional responsibilities of engineers. Emphasis is on the ubiquity
of ethical problems in professional engineering. A learning objective is the development of moral imagination, similar to
the development of technical imagination in engineering design courses. Making sound arguments is also addressed in the process
of reasoning through cases, and critiquing other’s arguments. Over the course of the semester, students solve five engineering
ethics cases. Each week, a student team of four people is responsible for reading the assigned section of the text, developing
a summary, and leading the class discussion.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting,
New Orleans, 2003. 相似文献
5.
E. M. Swiderski 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(4):329-343
Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’—to which he devoted a number of writings starting in 1902—presents problems of interpretation.
A conceptual approach to his conception shows it to be a sometimes uneasy mix of realist and anti-realist notions. Brzozowski
appears to have thought that labour is not first of all about the things it supposedly transforms, but rather about itself.
I suggest that Brzozowski can be read in the spirit of Nelson Goodman’s nominalist constructionalism (“worldmaking”). On this
account, labour in Brzozowski’s idiom turns out to be the constitution of forms of symbolizing sufficient unto themselves
and the needs they satisfy. However, that Brzozowski was not entirely consistent in the views I impute to him—he forever sought
for some ‘external’ measure of the rightness of labour/symbolizing—can be explained at least in part by his ‘humanism’, that
is, his commitment to the task he assigns humankind, that of creating the one meaningful world attesting to virtually unrestricted
human power. 相似文献
6.
Meyers C 《Science and engineering ethics》2004,10(2):269-276
Much of the work in professional ethics sees ethical problems as resulting from ethical ignorance, ethical failure or evil
intent. While this approach gets at real and valid concerns, it does not capture the whole story because it does not take
into account the underlying professional or institutional culture in which moral decision making is imbedded. My argument
in this paper is that this culture plays a powerful and sometimes determinant role in establishing the nature of the ethical
debate; i.e., it helps to define what are viable action options, what is the organization’s genuine mission, and what behaviors
will be rewarded or criticized. Given these conclusions, I also argue that consulting ethicists need more than an understanding
of ethics theory, concepts and principles; they also need a sufficiently rich understanding of organizational culture and
a willingness and an ability to critique that culture.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting,
New Orleans, 2003. 相似文献
7.
Changchi Hao 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(3):382-400
In this essay I argue that Mozi’s philosophy is anything but utilitarianism by way of analysing four ethical theories. Utilitarianism
is an ethics in which the moral subject is an atomic individual human being, and its concern is how to fulfill the interests
of the individual self and the social majority. Confucian ethics is centered on the notion of the family and its basic question
is that of priority in the relationship between the small self and the enlarged or collective self. Opposite to these two
moral theories is Mozi’s ethics: The interests that Mozi is primarily concerned with are not the interests of my individual
self or my collective self, but the interests of the other. The fulfillment of the material needs of the other is my moral
obligation. The arguments are centered on the three basic concepts, “the I,” “the we,” and “the other.” The significance of
Mozi’s thought in modern or postmodern context lies in its striking resemblance to the philosophy of a contemporary western
philosopher, Levinas. In both Mozi and Levinas, there is a suspension of utilitarianism.
__________
Translated from Zhongguo Zhexue Shi 中国哲学史 (History of Chinese Philosophy), 2005 (1) 相似文献
8.
In order to fulfill ABET requirements, Northern Arizona University’s Civil and Environmental engineering programs incorporate
professional ethics in several of its engineering courses. This paper discusses an ethics module in a 3rd year engineering
design course that focuses on the design process and technical writing. Engineering students early in their student careers
generally possess good black/white critical thinking skills on technical issues. Engineering design is the first time students
are exposed to “grey” or multiple possible solution technical problems. To identify and solve these problems, the engineering
design process is used. Ethical problems are also “grey” problems and present similar challenges to students. Students need
a practical tool for solving these ethical problems. The step-wise engineering design process was used as a model to demonstrate
a similar process for ethical situations. The ethical decision making process of Martin and Schinzinger was adapted for parallelism
to the design process and presented to students as a step-wise technique for identification of the pertinent ethical issues,
relevant moral theories, possible outcomes and a final decision. Students had greatest difficulty identifying the broader,
global issues presented in an ethical situation, but by the end of the module, were better able to not only identify the broader
issues, but also to more comprehensively assess specific issues, generate solutions and a desired response to the issue. 相似文献
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11.
Lauren Freeman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(4):545-568
An important shift occurs in Martin Heidegger’s thinking one year after the publication of Being and Time, in the Appendix to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. The shift is from his project of fundamental ontology—which provides an existential analysis of human existence on an ontological
level—to metontology. Metontology is a neologism that refers to the ontic sphere of human experience and to the regional ontologies that were
excluded from Being and Time. It is within metontology, Heidegger states, that “the question of ethics may be raised for the first time.” This paper makes explicit both Heidegger’s
argument for metontology, and the relation between metontology and ethics. In examining what he means by “the art of existing,” the paper argues that there is an ethical dimension to Heidegger’s
thinking that corresponds to a moderate form of moral particularism. In order to justify this position, a comparative analysis
is made between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams. 相似文献
12.
Michael Friedman 《Synthese》2008,164(3):385-400
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem
of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between
Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools
of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed
by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine. 相似文献
13.
In a recent paper, Peter Singer suggests that some interesting new findings in experimental moral psychology support what
he has contended all along—namely that intuitions should play little or no role in adequate justifications of normative ethical
positions. Not only this but, according to Singer, these findings point to a central flaw in the method (or epistemological
theory) of reflective equilibrium used by many contemporary moral philosophers. In this paper, we try to defend reflective equilibrium from Singer’s attack
and, in part, we do this by discussing Singer’s own favoured moral methodology as outlined in his Practical Ethics. Although basing ethics solely on (certain kinds of) intuitions certainly is problematic, we argue, basing it solely on ‘reason’
gives rise to similar problems. The best solution would arguably be one which could strike a balance between the two—but,
we suggest, this is precisely what reflective equilibrium is all about. 相似文献
14.
Hofmann B 《Science and engineering ethics》2003,9(3):343-352
The objective of this article is to investigate ethical aspects of technology through the moral term “paternalism”. The field
of investigation is medicine. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, “paternalism” has gained moral relevance through modern
medicine, where physicians have been accused of behaving paternalistic and threatening patients’ autonomy. Secondly, medicine
is a brilliant area to scrutinise the evaluative aspects of technology. It is argued that paternalism is a morally relevant
term for the ethics of technology, but that its traditional conception is not adequate to address the challenges of modern
technology. A modification towards a “technological paternalism” is necessary. That is, “technological paternalism” is a fruitful
term in the ethics of technology. Moreover, it is suited to point out the deficiencies of the traditional concept of paternalism
and to reform and vitalise the conception of paternalism in ethics in order to handle the challenges of technology. 相似文献
15.
陈少明 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2008,3(3):335-351
By analysing the two relevant psychological phenomena of “endurance” and “non-endurance,” this essay aims to reveal the ethical
implications of a Confucian approach, namely regarding non-endurance as an impulse of primary virtue. Based on this case study,
the author then explores the significance of moral cultivation or psychological training in establishing moral personality
and the complexities of such a process. Meanwhile, “love” in Confucian ethics means sympathy for the inferior rather than
affection for the revered. Hopefully, this study may deepen our understanding of virtue ethics.
Translated by Zheng Shuhong from Xueshu Yuekan 学术月刊 (Academic Monthly), 2007, (1): 60–65 相似文献
16.
Elizabeth Brake 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(1):23-39
Wedding vows seem to be promises. So they go: “I promise to love, honour, and cherish ....” But this poses a problem. Divorce
is not widely seen as a serious moral wrong, but breaking a promise is. I first consider, and defend against preliminary objections,
a ‘hard-line’ response: divorce is indeed prima facie impermissible promise-breaking. I next consider the ‘hardship’ response—the
hardship of failed marriages overrides the prima facie duty to keep promises. However, this would release promisors in far
too many cases. I resolve the triad by considering the content of the vows. Vows concerning love are not promises at all.
We cannot promise to do acts the performance of which is outside our control, and love involves states of mind outside our
control. Vows concerning spousal roles are complicated by diverse social understandings of marriage and the centrality of
emotion to the roles. 相似文献
17.
Itay Snir 《Continental Philosophy Review》2010,43(3):407-437
This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s “new categorical imperative”: it suggests that the new imperative is
an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It
is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative
attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential
part of moral philosophy, and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge
to be translated into “right” action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to
suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into
happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My
interpretation of the “new categorical imperative” focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the “old,” Kantian one—self-evidence
and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. 相似文献
18.
Seumas Miller 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):185-201
The last few decades have seen a dramatic increase in concern with matters of ethics in all areas of public life. This ‘applied
turn’ in ethics raises important issues not only of focus, but also of methodology. Sometimes a moral end or moral feature
is designed into an institution or technology; sometimes a morally desirable outcome is the fortuitous, but unintended, consequence
of an institutional arrangement or technological invention. If designing-in ethics is the new methodological orientation for
applied ethics, globalisation is providing many of the practical ethical problems upon which to deploy this methodology.
This is a revised version of an article that was presented at the 2007 Applied Ethics Conference in Sapporo, Japan, hosted
by the University of Hokkaido. Thanks to Jeroen van den Hoven for the key idea of ‘designing-in-ethics’. 相似文献
19.
Christopher Cordner 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):593-609
In his later writings on ethics Foucault argues that rapport à soi – the relationship to oneself – is what gives meaning to
our commitment to ‘moral behaviour’. In the absence of rapport à soi, Foucault believes, ethical adherence collapses into
obedience to rules (‘an authoritarian structure’). I make a case, in broadly Levinasian terms, for saying that the call of
‘the other’ is fundamental to ethics. This prompts the question whether rapport à soi fashions an ethical subject who is unduly
self-concerned. Here we confront two apparently irreconcilable pictures of the source of moral demands. I describe one way
of trying to reconcile them from a Foucaultian perspective, and I note the limitations in the attempt. I also try to clear
away what I think to be a misunderstanding on Foucault’s part about what is at stake in the choice between these pictures.
To clarify my critique of Foucault, I also relate it to a similar recent critique of virtue ethics by Thomas Hurka.
相似文献
Christopher CordnerEmail: |
20.
Imtiaz Moosa 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):159-182
In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical
claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing
how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent
conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not.
My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.
相似文献
Imtiaz MoosaEmail: |