Mood and the perception of unusual people: Affective asymmetry in memory and social judgments

Does good and bad mood have a different influence on our perceptions of typical and atypical people? In this experiment, people in happy, sad or neutral moods recalled, and formed impressions of high- or low-prototypical characters. We expected an asymmetric mood effect on memory, with better recall of typical targets that require simplified, schematic processing in positive mood, but greater negative mood effects on atypical targets that require more detailed and inferential processing. Subjects (N = 66) an audio-visual mood induction in an allegedly separate experiment, before recalling, and forming impressions about people who were consistent or inconsistent with familiar prototypes within their social milieu. We found the predicted mood-congruent bias in judgments, that was significantly greater for non-typical than for typical people. We also found evidence for positive-negative mood asymmetry in memory, with better recall of typical people in positive mood, and atypical people in negative mood. The findings are discussed in terms of contemporary multi-process models of affect and cognition (Forgas, 1992), and the implications for everyday affective influences on social judgments and stereotyping are considered.     

Emotional language processing: how mood affects integration processes during discourse comprehension

This research tests whether mood affects semantic processing during discourse comprehension by facilitating integration of information congruent with moods’ valence. Participants in happy, sad, or neutral moods listened to stories with positive or negative endings during EEG recording. N400 peak amplitudes showed mood congruence for happy and sad participants: endings incongruent with participants’ moods demonstrated larger peaks. Happy and neutral moods exhibited larger peaks for negative endings, thus showing a similarity between negativity bias (neutral mood) and mood congruence (happy mood). Mood congruence resulted in differential processing of negative information: happy mood showed larger amplitudes for negative endings than neutral mood, and sad mood showed smaller amplitudes. N400 peaks were also sensitive to whether ending valence was communicated directly or as a result of inference. This effect was moderately modulated by mood. In conclusion, the notion of context for discourse processing should include comprehenders’ affective states preceding language processing.     

Positive memory enhancement training for individuals with major depressive disorder

When in a negative mood state, individuals with major depressive disorder (MDD) may have difficulties recalling positive autobiographical memories in a manner that repairs that negative mood. Using cognitive bias modification techniques, investigators have successfully altered different aspects of cognition among individuals with MDD. However, little has been done to investigate the modification of positive autobiographical memory recall. This study examined the impact of a novel positive memory enhancement training (PMET) on the memories and subjective affective experiences of individuals with MDD (N = 27). Across a series of trials, participants first recalled a sad memory to elicit a negative mood state. They then recalled a happy memory and completed procedures to elicit a vivid, here-and-now quality of the memory. PMET procedures were hypothesized to promote mood repair via the recall of increasingly vivid and specific positive memories. PMET participants demonstrated improved memory specificity and greater perceived ability to “relive” positive memories. The procedures also repaired mood; PMET participants’ affect following recall of positive memories did not differ from control participants’ affect following recall of neutral memories. Results provide preliminary support for PMET as a method to improve the quality of positive memories and facilitate emotion regulation in MDD.     

Is retrieving positive self-concordant specific memory beneficial to mood repair? The moderation effect of depressive symptoms

The present study examined whether positive specific memory recall improves mood more than overgeneral memory recall. Moreover, this study examined the mood contrast effect in subclinically depressed participants. The mood contrast effect refers to when people ruminate on discrepancies between the current self and a past ideal self by recall of positive self-discrepant (low self-concordant) memories and thereby, fall into a negative mood. Undergraduate students (N?=?161) underwent a negative mood induction, and then concentrated on positive specific memory recall, positive overgeneral memory recall, or distraction. Results showed that there were no group differences in mood repair. Nevertheless, recalled memory self-concordance was associated with sad mood repair in the specific memory group, and moreover, this effect was not significant in people high in depressive symptoms. We discussed the results of mood repair effect from the perspective of baseline negative mood in subclinical depression.     

Autobiographical memory characteristics in depression vulnerability: formerly depressed individuals recall less vivid positive memories

The differential activation hypothesis (DAH; Teasdale, 1988) proposes that individuals who are vulnerable to depression can be distinguished from non-vulnerable individuals by the degree to which negative thoughts and maladaptive cognitive processes are activated during sad mood. While retrieval of negative autobiographical memories is noted as one such process, the model does not articulate a role for deficits in recalling positive memories. Two studies were conducted to compare the autobiographical memory characteristics of never-depressed and formerly depressed individuals following a sad mood induction. In Study 1, features of negative memories of never-depressed and formerly depressed individuals did not differ, either in neutral or sad mood. For positive memories, groups did not differ in neutral mood, but following a sad mood induction, formerly depressed individuals rated their positive memories as less vivid than their never-depressed counterparts. Study 2 examined positive autobiographical memory features more comprehensively and replicated the finding that in a sad mood formerly depressed individuals recalled less vivid positive memories than never-depressed controls. These findings suggest that the phenomenological features of positive memories could represent an important factor in depressive vulnerability, and, more broadly, that depression may be associated with a deficit in the processing of positive material.     

Autobiographical memory characteristics in depression vulnerability: Formerly depressed individuals recall less vivid positive memories

The differential activation hypothesis (DAH; Teasdale, 1988) proposes that individuals who are vulnerable to depression can be distinguished from non-vulnerable individuals by the degree to which negative thoughts and maladaptive cognitive processes are activated during sad mood. While retrieval of negative autobiographical memories is noted as one such process, the model does not articulate a role for deficits in recalling positive memories. Two studies were conducted to compare the autobiographical memory characteristics of never-depressed and formerly depressed individuals following a sad mood induction. In Study 1, features of negative memories of never-depressed and formerly depressed individuals did not differ, either in neutral or sad mood. For positive memories, groups did not differ in neutral mood, but following a sad mood induction, formerly depressed individuals rated their positive memories as less vivid than their never-depressed counterparts. Study 2 examined positive autobiographical memory features more comprehensively and replicated the finding that in a sad mood formerly depressed individuals recalled less vivid positive memories than never-depressed controls. These findings suggest that the phenomenological features of positive memories could represent an important factor in depressive vulnerability, and, more broadly, that depression may be associated with a deficit in the processing of positive material.     

Effects of children's emotional state on their reactions to emotional expressions: A search for congruency effects

Abstract

Three groups of 30 six-year-old children were tested to examine whether one's own happy or sad mood state causes a specific preference for happy or sad expressions in others, a systematic bias in the labelling of ambiguous expressions, and a selective memory for happy or sad expressions. In two of these groups, a happy or sad mood state was induced by a mental imagery procedure. The third group served as control subjects. It was found that all groups showed a distinct preference for happy faces. Happy children, however, tended to opt for extremely happy faces, whereas sad children chose mildly happy expressions. Furthermore, children (especially the children that received a happy mood induction) were inclined to interpret ambiguous expressions as being congruent with their own mood state. Finally, the “sad” group recalled fewer expressions correctly than the other two, irrespective of the nature of these expressions. Overall, the happy face was more often correctly identified than the sad one.     

Memory for facial expression is influenced by the background music playing during study

The effect of the emotional quality of study-phase background music on subsequent recall for happy and sad facial expressions was investigated. Undergraduates (N = 48) viewed a series of line drawings depicting a happy or sad child in a variety of environments that were each accompanied by happy or sad music. Although memory for faces was very accurate, emotionally incongruent background music biased subsequent memory for facial expressions, increasing the likelihood that happy faces were recalled as sad when sad music was previously heard, and that sad faces were recalled as happy when happy music was previously heard. Overall, the results indicated that when recalling a scene, the emotional tone is set by an integration of stimulus features from several modalities.     

The retrieval of self-defining memories is associated with the activation of specific working selves

This article presents two studies that investigated the impact of the retrieval of self-defining memories on individuals' sense of self. Participants recalled positive and/or negative self-defining memories, rated memory characteristics and completed measures focusing on different self-aspects. Study 1 found that participants reported higher state self-esteem after recalling a positive memory than after recalling a negative one. They also reported lower negative self-consistency and higher state self-concept clarity and positive self-consistency, but this result became non-significant after controlling for state self-esteem. Study 2 found that participants reported higher state self-esteem, a marginally higher proportion of recreation/exploration, goals and a marginally lower proportion of achievement goals after recalling a positive memory than after recalling a negative one. They also reported a higher proportion of self-cognitions referring to emotional states after recalling memories from which they had not abstracted meaning than after recalling memories from which they had done this. These findings suggest that the retrieval of vivid, emotional and highly self-relevant memories may be accompanied by the activation of specific self-representations or working selves. They also suggest that the experience of memory-related intrusive images may temporarily influence individuals' sense of self. The implications of these findings for clinical practice are discussed.     

Influence of mood on health-relevant cognitions

Three experiments assessed the effects of mood on symptom appraisal, health behavior self-efficacy, outcome expectations, and perceptions of vulnerability. Ss in Experiments 1 and 2 were acutely ill, whereas Ss in Experiment 3 were healthy. In each experiment, happy, sad, and neutral moods were induced. In Experiment 1, Ss who experienced sadness reported more aches and pains and greater discomfort than happy Ss. Sad Ss were less confident that they could carry out illness-alleviating behaviors. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that mood's influence on vulnerability perceptions is moderated by health status. Although mood had little impact on perceptions of vulnerability among ill Ss, probability estimates of future negative health-relevant events among healthy Ss were mood sensitive. Seeing oneself as invulnerable to future negative events was accentuated among happy Ss and attenuated among sad Ss. Mood may be an important determinant of care seeking, adherence, and recovery from illness.     

Misery loves company: mood-congruent emotional responding to music

We examined emotional responding to music after mood induction. On each trial, listeners heard a 30-s music excerpt and rated how much they liked it, whether it sounded happy or sad, and how familiar it was. When the excerpts sounded unambiguously happy or sad (Experiment 1), the typical preference for happy-sounding music was eliminated after inducing a sad mood. When the excerpts sounded ambiguous with respect to happiness and sadness (Experiment 2), listeners perceived more sadness after inducing a sad mood. Sad moods had no influence on familiarity ratings (Experiments 1 and 2). These findings imply that "misery loves company." Listeners in a sad mood fail to show the typical preference for happy-sounding music, and they perceive more sadness in music that is ambiguous with respect to mood.     

The Effects of Mood on Moral Judgment: The Role of Self‐Monitoring1

After being induced, via film clips, into either a positive (happy) or negative (sad) mood, high and low self‐monitors completed a moral reasoning task (the Defining Issues Test). The results indicate that mood had a significant impact on the moral decision making of low, but not high self‐monitors. In particular, low self‐monitors induced into a positive mood demonstrated more sophisticated and principled moral reasoning strategies than did low self‐monitors induced into a negative mood. In contrast, the level of moral reasoning among high self‐monitors did not differ significantly as a function of induced mood.     

Effects of induced sad mood on facial emotion perception in young and older adults

Older adults perceive less intense negative emotion in facial expressions compared to younger counterparts. Prior research has also demonstrated that mood alters facial emotion perception. Nevertheless, there is little evidence which evaluates the interactive effects of age and mood on emotion perception. This study investigated the effects of sad mood on younger and older adults’ perception of emotional and neutral faces. Participants rated the intensity of stimuli while listening to sad music and in silence. Measures of mood were administered. Younger and older participants’ rated sad faces as displaying stronger sadness when they experienced sad mood. While younger participants showed no influence of sad mood on happiness ratings of happy faces, older adults rated happy faces as conveying less happiness when they experienced sad mood. This study demonstrates how emotion perception can change when a controlled mood induction procedure is applied to alter mood in young and older participants.     

Mood Regulation and Memory: Repairing Sad Moods with Happy Memories

A total of 106 undergraduates participated in a study examining how individuals retrieve memories to repair negative moods. Participants first completed a measure of depression. Two weeks later, participants were assigned to either a sad or neutral mood induction. After mood induction, they recalled two memories, rated their affective responses to the memories, and indicated why they chose the valence and order of the memories. Consistent with mood-congruent recall, participants in the sad condition reported sadder memories than those in the neutral condition. However, participants with prior low depression scores tended to recall more positive second memories, whereas participants with higher prior depression scores recalled consecutive negative memories. Sixty-eight per cent of sad participants who retrieved a negative first and positive second memory mentioned mood repair as motivating the recruitment of the more positive second memory.     

Can negative affect eliminate the power of first impressions? Affective influences on primacy and recency effects in impression formation

Can good or bad mood influence the common tendency for people to form judgments based on first impressions? Based on research on impression formation and recent work on affect and social cognition, this experiment predicted and found that positive mood increased, and negative mood eliminated the primacy effect. After an autobiographical mood induction (recalling happy or sad past events), participants (N = 284) formed impressions about a character, Jim described either in an introvert-extrovert, or an extrovert-introvert sequence (Luchins, 1958). Impression formation judgments revealed clear mood and primacy main effects, as well as a mood by primacy interaction. Primacy effects were increased by positive mood, consistent with the more assimilative, holistic processing style associated with positive affect. Negative mood in turn eliminated primacy effects, consistent with a more accommodative, externally focused processing style. The relevance of these findings for first impressions in everyday judgments is considered, and their implications for recent affect-cognition theories are discussed.     

Proactive and reactive control depends on emotional valence: a Stroop study with emotional expressions and words

We examined proactive and reactive control effects in the context of task-relevant happy, sad, and angry facial expressions on a face-word Stroop task. Participants identified the emotion expressed by a face that contained a congruent or incongruent emotional word (happy/sad/angry). Proactive control effects were measured in terms of the reduction in Stroop interference (difference between incongruent and congruent trials) as a function of previous trial emotion and previous trial congruence. Reactive control effects were measured in terms of the reduction in Stroop interference as a function of current trial emotion and previous trial congruence. Previous trial negative emotions exert greater influence on proactive control than the positive emotion. Sad faces in the previous trial resulted in greater reduction in the Stroop interference for happy faces in the current trial. However, current trial angry faces showed stronger adaptation effects compared to happy faces. Thus, both proactive and reactive control mechanisms are dependent on emotional valence of task-relevant stimuli.     

Emotional Contagion and Social Judgment

This study examined the influence of another's emotional expressions and individual differences in responsiveness to afferent feedback on attention, evaluations, and memory. In a mixed design, participants (N = 71) rated pictures following exposure to a sender in a neutral mood and then in either a happy or sad mood. Attention, ratings, and recall evidenced a bias characteristic of the sender's mood: Participants spent more time viewing happy and sad pictures following exposure to the happy and sad sender, respectively; ratings by participants exposed to the happy and sad sender were more positive and negative, respectively, and this effect was greater for those more cue-responsive; participants recalled more pictures congruent with the sender's mood and those more cue-responsive exposed to the sad sender exhibited impaired memory characteristic of the effect of sadness on memory. Findings suggest that exposure to even mild emotional expressions can influence cognition and behavior and this effect is greater for those more responsive to cues generated by afferent feedback.     

Sad mood promotes self-initiated mental contrasting of future and reality

Self-regulation by mentally contrasting a positive future with negative reality leads people to differentiate in their goal commitments: They commit to goals when expectations of success are high and let go when expectations of success are low. On the contrary, when indulging in the positive future or dwelling on negative reality, people fail to consider expectations of success and do not form selective goal commitments (Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001). Whereas prior research has examined the effects of experimentally induced mental contrasting, we address sad mood as a contextual influence promoting self-initiated mental contrasting. Across various mood inductions, sad moods--which are associated with problem solving strategies--facilitated self-initiated mental contrasting more than neutral moods (Studies 1, 5) or happy moods (Studies 2, 3, 4, 6). Importantly, mood did not affect the relation between mental contrasting and selective formation of goal commitment (Studies 5, 6). The results suggest that sad moods aid in self-regulation by making people self-initiate goal commitments that are sensitive to their expectations of success.     

情绪启动条件下三种反刍思维类型的注意偏向

目的:探讨积极型、消极型和低型反刍思维者对不同情绪刺激的注意偏向。方法:采用积极和消极反刍思维量表区分三种反刍思维类型的大学生,以情绪面孔(高兴,中性,悲伤)图片为实验材料,采用“空间线索任务”实验范式,探讨不同反刍思维类型个体注意偏向特点。结果:无启动条件下,三种类型都未产生注意偏向。积极情绪启动条件下,积极型和低型产生对积极刺激的注意警觉,消极型产生对消极刺激的注意警觉和注意解脱困难。消极启动条件下,三种类型都产生对积极刺激的注意警觉,且积极型的警觉水平高于低型和消极型。结论:积极和消极启动对三种反刍思维类型注意偏向的影响不完全符合情绪一致性效应。