和内省有关的几个问题

本文指出内省有各种各样的,不宜不加区别地赞成或反对内省。一直受到批评的只是古典内省,而这种内省在铁钦纳1927年逝世以后,在实验室中已经无人使用。现在还经常使用的内省,如被试对刺激的评价或判断等,包括激进的行为主义者在内,从来没人反对过,并且已成为心理实验的惯例。作者认为被试只能报告他心理过程的结果,要求他报告出心理过程本身实际上是不可能的。如果在赞成和反对哪种内省方面没有重大分歧,可否采取求同存异的原则,对其它枝节问题先放一放,等到新的事实累积多些时,再来讨论这个问题?     

心理学与内省

本文围绕内省这一心理学基本问题,结合西方心理学的历史,论述了对内省的早期争论、古典内省、现代心理学主要学派和我国心理学界对内省所持的态度,总结了内省的历史功绩,肯定了内省的可用性和积极意义,也指出了内省的困难及其克服途径。论文最后的结语主张正确对待内省,加强对内省的研究,以促进我国心理学的发展。     

关于内省问题几次争论的评说

本文评述了关于内省问题的若干次争论,从而阐述了(一)内省法是心理学研究的一种方法,有其局限性;(二)除经验内省外,从冯特的实验内省一直到当今认知心理学家强调的口语记录法,各种别名的内省都是在控制一定条件下、与实验法相结合加以使用的,所以不能孤立地仅对内省法进行评价;(三)既然内省法都是与实验法结合使用的,因此它既可用来研究心理活动的结果,也有助于心理过程的研究。     

内隐自尊探析

作为内隐社会认知领域的一部分,内隐自尊是指人们在对与自我相关或自我分离的客体进行评价时的一种态度表现,而这种态度无法通过内省的方式被意识到。目前,内隐自尊的研究在方法采用间接测量的方式;在研究成果上主要集中于内隐自尊与外显自尊的对照性研究,内隐自尊的应用性研究两方面。本文拟就内隐自尊研究的缘起、研究方法、已有研究成果作尝试性探讨。     

攻击性内隐社会认知的研究综述

对攻击性的内隐特征的研究源自于内隐社会认知。内隐社会认知是指社会认知过程中虽然主体自身不能报告或内省某些过去经验,但这些经验潜在地对主体的判断和行为产生着影响。本文主要介绍攻击性内隐社会认知的相关概念、研究方法及已有研究,并对未来本领域的研究方向作简要展望。     

试评冯特心理学的古典内省

古典内省专指冯特、铁钦纳心理学的内省方法,它在构造派心理学体系里占有特殊重要的地位。从心理学学科发展的观点评论冯特的古典内省,尝试作些具体分析,通过总结西方心理学的历史经验,正确对待内省方法,将会有助于我国心理学的建设。     

心是什么:心文化与心理学的视角——兼谈心理学的流变与中国文化心理学的可能

"心"作为中国文化的基本范畴之一,蕴含着独特的心理学理念与方法,从而形成特有的心文化。心文化之"心"包含着内外深浅两个不同的层面,并试图通过"内求于心"的直觉内省式心法达到"天人合一"的境界,其侧重点是内在的"道心"层面。西方主流心理学侧重于外在的心理层面,目的是通过实证研究达到对心理现象的客观认识;而人本主义等人文心理学的兴起,缩短了东西方"心"的距离,也潜藏着中国文化心理学发展的新契机。     

医学人文社会科学实证研究如何走向深入——基于《医学与哲学》275篇实证研究论文的统计分析

对2006年1月～2012年6月《医学与哲学》(人文社会医学版)发表的275篇实证研究论文进行了统计,分析的主要内容包括研究方法、统计技术、数据呈现方式等研究设计方面存在的主要缺陷,以及研究选题分布情况、作者情况、基金项目情况等,分析结果揭示了目前医学人文社会科学实证研究方面存在的主要问题.     

无神论：当代的人数与类型

《剑桥无神论指南》一书由波士顿大学哲学教授、著名无神论者M.Martin（1932-）编著,该书分析批判了古典与当代的多种有神论证,具有较高的学术价值,被认为是研究无神论的入门之作。本文是《剑桥无神论指南》第一部分《背景》的第三篇。作者综合近10余年来大量相关研究报告,对当代无神论与有神论在整个世界的变动与分布状况进行了全局性的介绍与描述。在国内学界对西方无神论发展状况普遍缺乏客观了解的情况下,作者提供的大量数据无疑是弥足珍贵的。在依靠充足实证材料的支持下,作者令人信服地分析了无神论水平与社会健康度之间存在的密切关系,并驳斥了宗教信仰＂天赋性＂的观点。当然,在社会主义国家无神论的存在状况问题上,作者的偏见与局限性也是非常明显的。     

关于唯物主义哲学家爱尔维修的一本新书

苏联国际关系研究所出版社在去年出版了姆·阿·西林所著的的“克劳德·阿德里安·爱尔维修——十八世纪法国杰出的唯物主义哲学家”一书。在这本害中,作者就几个主要问题论述了爱尔维修的哲学观点,解剖了他的著作中的革命的哲学内容。在阐述爱尔维修的思想时,作者还把他的观点与霍尔巴赫、狄德罗的观点作了比较,也与拉吉舍夫的观点作了比较。作者首先在“导言”中分析了十八世纪法国的社会经济和政治情况,指出当时的哲学革命是     

The neural basis of event-time introspection

We explored the neural mechanisms allowing humans to report the subjective onset times of conscious events. Magnetoencephalographic recordings of neural oscillations were obtained while human subjects introspected the timing of sensory, intentional, and motor events during a forced choice task. Brain activity was reconstructed with high spatio-temporal resolution. Event-time introspection was associated with specific neural activity at the time of subjective event onset which was spatially distinct from activity induced by the event itself. Different brain regions were selectively recruited for introspection of different event types, e.g., the bilateral angular gyrus for introspection of intention. Our results suggest that event-time introspection engages specific neural networks to assess the contents of consciousness. Subjective event times should therefore be interpreted as the result of complex interactions between introspection and experience networks, rather than as direct reproduction of the individual’s conscious state or as a mere post hoc interpretation.     

Disease and social theory: A problem of conversation

The paper offers a critical examination of ‘introspection’ and ‘stoicism’ as two apparently opposing responses to pain, and examines their adequacy as theoretical postures vis-a-vis the life-world. Following Wittgenstein, who suggests that introspection is fundamentally at fault, the paper moves to consider the ‘theoretic’ stoicism of Durkheim as a possible alternative for inquiry. It comes to the conclusion, however, that stoicism, just as introspection fails to develop a strong theoretical interest in pain when it refuses to make the problem pain poses for discourse conversational.     

Is Imagination Introspective?

The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves, and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it looks as if in these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience.     

心理科普教育与自我教育结合初探

本文对中国心理科普教育进行了回顾与反思,指出了忽视自育、心育特殊性等问题;根据十六年的教育实验,总结了心理科普教育与自育结合的多种有效途径。     

Introspecting in the spirit of William James: comment on Fox, Ericsson, and Best (2011)

Fox, Ericsson, and Best's (2011) thoughtful justification of the use of think-aloud protocols for revealing the stream of consciousness comes on the centennial of the death of William James, history's greatest practitioner and advocate of introspection. This confluence naturally invites speculation about how James might have responded to the analysis of Fox et al. I suggest that although James would likely view the think-aloud procedure as a scientifically rigorous form of introspection, he would also admonish us not to overlook its limitations. Most notably, although the think-aloud procedure readily captures substantive verbal thoughts, it is less able to capture inchoate cognitions. The conclusion that verbal protocols are nonreactive also raises several additional issues. First, the nonreactivity of thinking aloud does not necessarily speak to its validity. Second, the conclusion that verbal protocols are benign is at odds with recent findings in which verbalization impairs performance on various tasks. I suggest that whereas James might express some concerns regarding aspects of conscious thought that may be overlooked by the think-aloud procedure as well as some caution regarding the possible situations in which thinking aloud might still be reactive, he would almost certainly be pleased to see introspection finally getting the scientific grounding that it deserves.     

Administration of the thematic apperception test: Contributions of psychoanalytic psychotherapy

Psychodiagnosis has given more to than it has received from psychotherapy. Some psychological tests may benefit from the wisdom accrued and embodied in the psychoanalytic situation. Using the well known projective instrument, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), guided by the intent to make the use of the test more consistent with the psychoanalytic situation and contemporary projective theory, it is suggested that the basic TAT instruction be modified and that greater attention be paid to an explicit theoretical rationale by which the cards are selected and presented. Inviting the patient to collaborate in a self-interpretation of the TAT can serve as an assessment of the patient's capacity for introspection and the development of the working alliance. It is further suggested that psychoanalytic developmental theory can function as an epigenetic organizer of the patient's TAT protocol.This research was supported by the Veterans Administration. The author is grateful for the inspirational and thoughtful comments of Drs. Marvin Acklin, Murray Tieger, and Edwin Wagner.     

The Rationality of Happiness

Abstract

In his recent book, Happiness: personhood, community, purpose, Pedro Tabensky answers the question of what happiness is. He develops an Aristotelian account of happiness that, he claims, is everyone’s maximally rational ideal. Much of the support for this claim rests on what Tabensky calls the method of critical introspection. This method involves introspecting on the kind of beings that we are and the kind of lives we can thus lead. If properly carried out, Tabensky claims, critical introspection will reveal to any individual that the active life of virtue is in fact the maximally rational ideal. I argue that two features of Tabensky’s account undermine this claim. The first is his account of the method of critical introspection itself. The second is his account of the nature and acquisition of virtue developed in his analogy between living and painting, and in his discussion of the eudaimon community. Tabensky’s account of critical introspection carried out at the general level of persons shows only that it works negatively to identify the kind of lives we could not lead as persons. It does not function positively to reveal that the maximally rational life for any person is the active exercise of virtue. Tabensky does suggest that the method carried out by particular individuals will reveal the kind of life they should be leading. However, it follows from Tabensky’s account of the nature and acquisition of virtue, I argue, that critical introspection can only reveal the active life of virtue to be the maximally rational ideal for those individuals who have had the right sort of upbringing in the right sort of community.     

天人合一心理研究范式发微

从学科本体对心理学做重新审视。在方法论上,把意识和物质等同犯了“范畴错误”; 在科学性上,心理学不该用证实主义而应用证伪主义的标准,且心理学难以成为自然科学意义的科学却有望成为胡塞尔“严格意义的科学”; 在认识论上,主客二分研究范式具有“‘主-客-间'双重障碍”。天人合一范式可解决双重障碍,并以直观内省体察普遍性定理。故汲取中国哲学中的观物取象法、虚壹而静原则、中国式内省并结合西方现象学提出天人合一研究范式的初步构想。     

Validation Study of the Orientation Model: A Dual‐Process Assessment Framework

The orientation model is a multidimensional dual‐process assessment framework composed of 4 empirically validated instruments of cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and introspection. It lends counselors a flexible means to assess client processing patterns relevant to clinical practice. The author used 375 participant responses to determine whether selected subscales align with analytic and experiential dual processes. Results suggest that the orientation model can serve as a dispositional framework for counseling practice. Implications and directions for future research are suggested.     

Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information‐Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information‐theoretic framework of Dretske (1981) , we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so‐called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so‐called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them.