The Medieval Origins of Conceivability Arguments

The central recommendation of this article is that philosophers trained in the analytic tradition ought to add the sensibilities and skills of the historian to their methodological toolkit. The value of an historical approach to strictly philosophical matters is illustrated by a case study focussing on the medieval origin of conceivability arguments and contemporary views of modality. It is shown that common metaphilosophical views about the nature of the philosophical enterprise as well as certain inference patterns found in thinkers from Descartes to Chalmers have their origin in the theological concerns of the Scholastics. Since these assumptions and inference patterns are difficult to motivate when shorn of their original theological context, the upshot is that much post‐Cartesian philosophy is cast in an altogether unfamiliar, and probably unwelcome, light. The methodological point, however, is that this philosophical gain is born of acquaintance with the history of ideas.     

Methodological Challenges in the Study of Emotions in Politics and How to Deal With Them

This introductory article to the special issue zooms in on the literature on political emotions with a specific focus on methodological questions of “how to study” political emotions. To the extent that methodological matters are addressed in the extant literature, the associated challenges are often portrayed as a clash between social science and natural science disciplines, a clash frequently illustrated by the meeting between political science and neuroscience. Rather than being a clash between academic disciplines, this article argues that many of the methodological challenges facing emotional research have their origin in scholars' diverse views on the relationship between themselves as researchers and political emotions as a research object. In the light of this acknowledgment, the article encircles and discusses the methodological challenges associated with three key conceptual distinctions between: (1) individual and collective emotions, (2) emotions and reason, and between (3) involuntary political emotions and the strategic usage of political emotions. Using the contributions to this special issue as illustrations, the article argues in favor of moving beyond mutually exclusive dichotomies regarding these conceptual distinctions and offers pathways for dealing with current methodological challenges to emotional research. It points to methodological pluralism, transparency, and context‐sensitive research strategies.     

A philosophical examination of coercion for mental health issues

This article considers two philosophical questions about coercion and mental disorders: (1) an analytical question, i.e., what is meant by the concept of coercion? (2) a normative question, i.e., what justifies the use of coercion? The article distinguishes between coercion from other forms of power such as inducement, persuasion, and authority. It then considers a range of arguments for the paternalistic use of coercion for the benefit of mentally disordered persons and the use of coercion to restrain mentally disordered dangerous persons. This article rests on the assumption that there is something to be said for an academic division of labour, that empirical research in mental health and the law can benefit from conceptual clarification and the analysis of normative arguments. In this article I distinguish between two importantly different sorts of questions that we can ask about coercion and then offer some answers to those questions in broad strokes.     

Writing consumer research: the world according to Belk

• Writing is a core scholarly competence. Not only is it a skill that every academic must acquire, regardless of their methodological, philosophical or empirical affiliations, but also it is ‘a substantial differentiating characteristic of eminent researchers’. This article offers an analysis of the writing style of one of the field's most eminent researchers, Russell W. Belk. It identifies five literary devices that help Belk's writing stand out from the crowd and, while the article does not claim to contain the secret of writing success, it considers the crucial part writing plays in the consumer research process.

Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Argument by Analogy

In this essay I characterize arguments by analogy, which have an important role both in philosophical and everyday reasoning. Arguments by analogy are different from ordinary inductive or deductive arguments and have their own distinct features. I try to characterize the structure and function of these arguments. It is further discussed that some arguments, which are not explicit arguments by analogy, nevertheless should be interpreted as such and not as inductive or deductive arguments. The result is that a presumed outcome of a philosophical dispute will have to be reconsidered.     

Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions

Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential process. A series of philosophical case studies shows that intuitions in these arguments contain the relevant features. The view has implications for philosophical method, offering a compromise between opponents on the divisive debate of the merits of experimental philosophy: experimental philosophy provides an especially useful role in philosophical assumption analysis.     

A Step‐by‐Step Guide to Using Secondary Data for Psychological Research

The purpose of this paper is to serve as a primer for those who have never used, or even considered using, secondary data as a resource for psychological research. Secondary data (SD) can provide a unique methodological tool with which to examine psychological issues and can serve as a valuable contribution to a program of research. However, this important resource may often be overlooked because its use can sometimes appear daunting and time‐consuming. We seek to assist new users of SD by describing the process in a step‐by‐step manner. We address both benefits and challenges to anticipate when using SD, and discuss identifying and acquiring potential datasets, creating a personalized dataset, variable creation, statistical considerations, and the potential problem of conflicting findings when large datasets are used by multiple researchers. Our goal is to encourage researchers who are novices to the approach to consider using SD as an adjunct to their program of research.     

The relationship between qualitative and quantitative research: Lessons from feminist psychology

The dominant methodological approach in psychological research has involved the use of quantitative methods within a positivist framework. In this article we argue that both qualitative and quantitative methods have their strengths and limitations, depending on the research question under investigation. We examine some of the advantages of qualitative methods, paying particular attention to the value of such methods for feminist researchers. We challenge the positivist assumption that all research should be apolitical and value-free, arguing that the political context in which all research studies take place plays an important role in decisions about the appropriate research methods to use. Despite the value attached to qualitative methods by feminist researchers, there may be projects for which quantitative methods, or a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, are more suitable. We draw on examples from our research on the transition from school to the job market for young people, and a study of 16- to 19-year-old first time mothers to illustrate these points, examining the practical implications of our arguments for applied social psychology research.     

Is the moral domain unique? A social influence perspective for the study of moral cognition

The nature of the cognitive processes that give rise to moral judgment and behavior has been a central question of psychology for decades. In this paper, we suggest that an often ignored yet fruitful stream of research for informing current debates on the nature of moral cognition is social influence. We introduce what we call the “social‐moderation‐of‐process” perspective, a methodological framework for leveraging insights from social influence research to inform debates in moral psychology over the mechanisms underlying moral cognition and the moral domains in which those mechanisms operate. We demonstrate the utility of the social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective by providing a detailed example of how research on social influence in behavioral ethics can be utilized to test a research question related to a debate between two prominent theories in moral psychology. We then detail how researchers across the field of moral psychology can utilize our social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective.     

Exploring tensions of using interpretative phenomenological analysis in a domain with conflicting cultural practices

ABSTRACT

The philosophical foundations of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA)—phenomenology, hermeneutics, and idiography—guide its practice and use. However, this foundation is often at odds with cultural practices of disciplines that value post-positivist perspectives emphasizing that reality can be objectively known. The conflict between the philosophical underpinnings of the methodology and the cultural practices of particular disciplines can serve to limit the use and acceptance of IPA. This article highlights ways researchers can use IPA even when the underlying tenets of that methodological approach may be in conflict with disciplinary norms. As such, we have set out to explore the tensions that accompany the choice to use IPA in the context of engineering education research within the United States. As a group of engineering education researchers, we drew upon collaborative inquiry to systematically examine our use of IPA. Our exploration of using IPA, as connected to everyday practice in a discipline that takes a postpositivist stance toward knowledge generation, provides examples for the use of IPA in tension with these disciplinary norms.     

THE METAPHYSICS OF DOWNWARD CAUSATION: REDISCOVERING THE FORMAL CAUSE

The methodological nonreductionism of contemporary biology opens an interesting discussion on the level of ontology and the philosophy of nature. The theory of emergence (EM), and downward causation (DC) in particular, bring a new set of arguments challenging not only methodological, but also ontological and causal reductionism. This argumentation provides a crucial philosophical foundation for the science/theology dialogue. However, a closer examination shows that proponents of EM do not present a unified and consistent definition of DC. Moreover, they find it difficult to prove that higher‐order properties can be causally significant without violating the causal laws that operate at lower physical levels. They also face the problem of circularity and incoherence in their explanation. In our article we show that these problems can be overcome only if DC is understood in terms of formal rather than physical (efficient) causality. This breakdown of causal monism in science opens a way to the retrieval of the fourfold Aristotelian notion of causality.     

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS:

Abstract: This article argues that teachers of environmental ethics must more aggressively entertain questions of private property in their work and in their teaching. To make this case, it first introduces the three primary positions on property: occupation arguments, labor theory of value arguments, and efficiency arguments. It then contextualizes these arguments in light of the contemporary U.S. wise‐use movement, in an attempt to make sense of the concerns that motivate wise‐use activists, and also to demonstrate how intrinsic value arguments miss the mark. Finally, it offers some suggestions about further directions for environmental ethics, reasoning that there is a good deal of headway to be gained for environmental ethics by accepting that nature can be owned as property, but nevertheless engaging the idea of private property critically.     

Conducting a Multi Family Member Interview Study

Family researchers have long recognized the utility of incorporating interview data from multiple family members. Yet, relatively few contemporary scholars utilize such an approach due to methodological underdevelopment. This article contributes to family scholarship by providing a roadmap for developing and executing in‐depth interview studies that include more than one family member. Specifically, it outlines the epistemological frames that most commonly underlie this approach, illustrates thematic research questions that it best addresses, and critically reviews the best methodological practices of conducting research with this approach. The three most common approaches are addressed in depth: separate interviews with each family member, dyadic or group interviews with multiple family members, and a combined approach that uses separate and dyadic or group interviews. This article speaks to family scholars who are at the beginning stages of their research project but are unsure of the best qualitative approach to answer a given research question.     

Philosophical Methodology and Conceptions of Evil Action

There is considerable philosophical dispute about what it takes for an action to be evil. The methodological assumption underlying this dispute is that there is a single, shared folk conception of evil action deployed amongst culturally similar people. Employing empirical research the authors undertook, this article suggests that this assumption is false. There exist, amongst the folk, numerous conceptions of evil action. Hence, the authors argue, philosophical research is most profitably spent in two endeavours. First, in determining which (if any) conception of evil action we have prudential or moral (or both) reason to deploy and, second, in determining whether we could feasibly come to adopt that conception as the single shared conception given our psychological make‐up and the content of the conceptions currently deployed.     

Carving Intuition at its Joints

A central metaphilosophical project seeks to evaluate the reliability of the types of evidence that figure in philosophical arguments and, relatedly, the justificatory status of relying on those types of evidence. Traditionally, metaphilosophers have approached this project via an analysis of intuition. This article argues that the category picked out by “intuition” is both too broad and too heterogeneous to serve as the appropriate target for metaphilosophical inquiry. Intuition is a gerrymandered and disjunctive kind, undeserving of the widespread attention it receives in the literature. Instead, metaphilosophers should examine more finely grained mental states. Three promising strategies for parsing intuitions more finely are proposed: by their causal origins, by their context of employment, and by the exoticism of their content. This more narrow focus may significantly alter the dialectic in three prominent metaphilosophical arguments: the argument from calibration, the argument from self‐defeat, and the argument from intuitional sensitivity.     

消费者研究：存在主义现象学方法论与应用

在实证主义占主导地位的消费者研究领域,存在主义现象学具有其独特优势,它提供了对消费现象的一种基于经验的、方法论上的准确理解。如果不考虑哲学假设和方法论约束上的差异,存在主义现象学方法也能符合逻辑实证主义主要评价标准的要求。文章在消费者研究范式的大框架中对之进行了阐述,试图说明并强调,非实证主义方法也有自身的哲学基础和具体规范,但只有准确地运用,才能发挥出对学术研究的独特价值     

What Are We to Think about Thought Experiments?

Arguments from thought experiment ask the reader to imagine some hypothetical, sometimes exotic, often fantastic, scenario for the sake of illustrating or countering some claim. Variously characterized as mental experimentation, imaginary cases, and even crazy cases, thought experiments figure into both scientific and philosophical arguments. They are often criticized for their fictive nature and for their lack of grounding. Nevertheless, they are common especially in arguments in ethics and philosophy of mind. Moreover, many thought experiments have spawned variations that attempt to both affirm and refute their original arguments. These emended thought experiments exhibit a variety of styles, details, and embellishments. A rhetorical analysis of these variations suggests a reciprocal influence between the arguers' selection of details and their philosophical commitments. I offer examples of this relationship from the variations on John Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment and Judith Thomson's unconscious violinist thought experiment.     

From single case to database: A new method for enhancing psychotherapy, forensic, and other psychological practice

This article proposes a new model for knowledge generation in applied and professional psychology—the pragmatic case study (PCS) method. Drawing from both psychology's traditional, quantitative and alternative, qualitative approaches, the PCS method involves the creation of systematic, peer-reviewed case studies (in all areas of applied psychology) that follow D. Peterson's “disciplined inquiry” epistemological model. The studies would be organized into “journal-databases” that combine (a) individual studies; (b) articles that address epistemological, theoretical, methodological, logistical, economic, political, and ethical issues in the PCS method; and (c) substantive cross-case analyses of groups of individual cases already published in the database. To lay out the proposal's arguments, the article begins by setting forth relevant historical and philosophical context, and then examines a possible set of initial methodological guidelines for ensuring rigorous quality in each case study. Next the PCS method's value in creating new and useful applied knowledge is demonstrated for two areas: psychotherapy efficacy research and forensic psychology. Finally, the implications of the present proposal are explored. Throughout, the emphasis is on creating an integrative, pragmatic alternative for gaining new useful knowledge in our discipline.     

Values in Qualitative and Quantitative Research

The authors identify the philosophical underpinnings and value‐ladenness of major research paradigms. They argue that useful and meaningful research findings for counseling can be generated from both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, provided that the researcher has an appreciation of the importance of philosophical coherence in working within a particular research tradition. Moreover, the authors recognize that the research world is one of methodological pluralism; they discuss particular critical values central to conducting research and evaluating research findings. Finally, the authors demonstrate that there is not a 1 ‐to‐1 correspondence between a research method and the research paradigm.     

Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism

Abstract

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non‐dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non‐dogmatic arguments, they – or more specifically, what I shall call ‘general transcendental arguments’ – involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non‐dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call ‘specific transcendental arguments’ and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re‐interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non‐dogmatic fashion.