熟悉性对汉语隐喻义与本义加工机制的影响

采用句子违反范式考察汉语隐喻义与本义加工机制的差异及隐喻熟悉性的调节作用。要求被试阅读不同熟悉性的隐喻和本义句子并判断句子正确性,记录其行为与脑电反应。结果显示,熟悉句子隐喻义的加工显著快于本义的加工,而新奇句子则本义的加工更快;脑电水平上,对于熟悉句子,隐喻义违反比本义违反诱发增强的N400和降低的P600效应,而对于新奇句子,隐喻义和本义违反诱发出基本类似的ERP反应。这些结果表明隐喻义和本义加工存在差异,熟悉性显著影响隐喻义的加工,这种影响在较早语义分析和较晚的语义整合阶段均有体现。     

高功能孤独症者非字面语义理解缺陷:隐喻视角的研究

研究采用事件相关电位技术从隐喻语义加工角度考察了高功能孤独症成人非字面语义理解中的行为特点及脑半球参与模式。行为结果显示:高功能孤独症成人对新异隐喻句的反应时最长,两类隐喻句的反应时均长于普通成人,错误率上两组间无差异。脑电结果显示:高功能孤独症组对新异隐喻句的N400波幅最大,未出现半球偏侧化现象,传统隐喻句在左脑的N400波幅大于右脑,两类隐喻句的N400波幅均大于正常被试。结论:高功能孤独症成人具备低效率的隐喻理解能力,隐喻加工的脑半球优势效应异常。     

不同性质的汉语高熟悉度隐喻意义加工过程——来自ERP研究的证据

采用ERP技术考察不同性质隐喻加工的时间进程与神经机制。以词对方式呈现词源性隐喻、引发性隐喻、一般字面义,被试进行语义相关判断任务。结果发现:从引发性隐喻、一般字面义到词源性隐喻,N400平均波幅呈阶梯状递减,引发性隐喻和词源性隐喻的P600平均波幅大于一般字面义。对于不同类型词对诱发的N400,大脑左半球没有显著差异,但右半球上引发性隐喻显著大于词源性隐喻和字面义词对。并且右半球P600平均波幅更大,但三种词对间没有显著差异。结果表明:(1)日常熟悉隐喻的理解更符合平行假说但需要更多的认知资源;(2)右半球是否参与以及参与程度与隐喻性质和加工阶段有关。     

高功能孤独症者非字面语义理解缺陷：隐喻视角的ERP研究

研究采用事件相关电位技术从隐喻语义理解角度考察了高功能孤独症成人非字面语义理解中的行为特点及脑半球参与模式。行为结果显示：高功能孤独症成人对新异隐喻句的反应时最长,两类隐喻句的反应时均长于普通成人,但错误率上两组被试间无差异。脑电结果显示：高功能孤独症组对新异隐喻句的N400波幅最大,未出现半球偏侧化现象,传统隐喻句在左半球的N400波幅大于右半球,两类隐喻句的N400波幅均大于正常被试。结论：高功能孤独症成人具备隐喻理解能力,并对新异隐喻的理解做出更多努力,但右脑功能异常仍旧存在,左右半球在总体功能或神经联通性上仍旧弱于常人。     

显性度对隐喻加工的影响:事件相关电位研究

为探明意义显性度因素对隐喻与直义语言加工的影响,本研究采用修改后的S1－S2范式,使用ERP技术考察高、低不同显性度条件下隐喻与直义材料加工的差异。被试判断S1、S2词间的语义关联强度,记录S2词的事件相关电位。实验发现：低显性度比高显性度材料诱发更负的N400,在低显性度条件下隐喻比直义材料诱发了更负的N400;P600时间窗内低显性材料平均波幅更低,隐喻与直义平均波幅差异不显著。结果支持意义显性度假说,显性度因素影响隐喻加工,同时在隐喻加工的后期语义整合阶段,可能还有其他因素影响隐喻加工。     

高度模糊靶字下的N400语义启动效应：词汇加工理论的证据

本研究基于不可识别模糊字词仍能诱发N400的词汇加工理论的假设,让被试对模糊字进行同一字延迟判断,利用脑电技术记录不同模糊程度靶字的认知过程,来探讨N400出现的条件,以阐明N400反映的是词汇加工,还是词汇后加工。实验结果表明：与可识别、轻度模糊汉字一样,不可识别、高度模糊汉字仍然可以诱发N400;这种N400语义启动效应反映了词汇加工过程。     

隐喻认知机制的ERP研究

近年来,人们通过ERP(事件相关电位)对隐喻认知展开了多方面研究,主要有以下成果:(1)找到了有关隐喻认知"标准模式"和"并行加工模式"的证据;(2)发现字面表达、常见隐喻、新异隐喻诱发的N400波幅呈现逐级递增;(3)在隐喻理解的脑区差异上,有研究发现右脑在隐喻中起着重要作用,但还没有得到一致认可.     

科学语言的认知神经加工机制研究:来自ERP的证据

本研究采用尾词范式,使用ERP技术,对比分析了科学语言(隐喻和直义)与日常语言诱发的N400和LPC平均波幅和激活脑区的异同,从而探讨了科学语言认知加工机制的神经特异性。实验结果表明,与日常语言相比,在科学语言认知加工过程中,语义检索和提取难度更大,顶叶区尤其是右顶叶区的激活程度最为显著,左右脑都发挥了重要作用。此外,科学隐喻的相关研究发现支持隐喻加工的意义显性度假说,科学语言特有的复杂性和抽象性降低了语言表达的显性度,并且对后期的语义整合阶段产生影响。     

先天视觉经验缺失对颜色认知的影响：一项ERP研究

感觉与认知是否是相互独立的？本研究通过对比先天盲被试与明眼被试在进行物体颜色判断时的行为反应和神经电生理信号变化,探讨视觉经验缺失对颜色认知的影响。结果发现,先天盲被试具有一定的颜色知识,但其水平低于明眼被试;两组被试都出现了由颜色不匹配所诱发的N400效应,且都表现出左半球优势;但是盲人组的N400效应大于明眼组,盲人组的N400反应潜伏期小于明眼组。该结果说明,直接的视觉经验是颜色认知的充分条件而非必要条件。     

对语义网络中概念非类属关系的实验研究

本研究包括三个实验。实验一在混和呈现条件下比较被试对隐喻句和类属句的加工时问,发现可理解性高的隐喻句的R_T不比类属句的慢。实验二在分组呈现条件下比较被试加工隐喻句与类属句的速度,结果与实验一基本相同。实验一、二中还发现类属概念的层次与语义加工时间没有必然联系。实验三比较了隐喻句对三类概念的启动作用,发现隐喻对自身的语义特征概念有明显的启动作用。根据三个实验的结果,我们提出了一种称为特征联结的语义网络结构模型。     

The Time-Course of Metaphor Comprehension: An Event-Related Potential Study

ERPs were recorded while subjects were reading short familiar metaphors (e.g., Those fighters are lions), unfamiliar metaphors (Those apprentices are lions), or literal control sentences (Those animals are lions) presented in isolation or preceded by either an irrelevant or relevant context (e.g., They are not idiotic: . . . .” vs. “They are not cowardly: Those fighters are lions”). The terminal word of metaphors elicited larger N400 components than did the terminal word of literal sentences (Experiment 1) suggesting that the (incongruous) literal meaning of metaphors was indeed accessed at some point during comprehension. The analysis of the 600–1000 and 1000–1400 latency bands (Late Positive Components) revealed no significant difference between metaphors and literal sentences. The manipulation of metaphor difficulty (Experiments 2 and 3) also failed to reveal any late effect specifically linked to metaphorical processing. Finally, an effect of the preceding sentence context was found in Experiments 3 and 4, as early as 300 ms following the terminal word onset. Overall, these results support a context-dependent account of metaphor comprehension stating that when contextually relevant, the metaphorical meaning is the only one accessed.     

Conceptual integration and metaphor: an event-related potential study

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were recorded from 18 normal adults as they read sentences that ended with words used literally, metaphorically, or in an intermediate literal mapping condition. In the latter condition, the literal sense of the word was used in a way that prompted readers to map conceptual structure from a different domain. ERPs measured from 300 to 500 msec after the onset of the sentence-final words differed as a function of metaphoricity: Literal endings elicited the smallest N400, metaphors the largest N400, whereas literal mappings elicited an N400 of intermediate amplitude. Metaphoric endings also elicited a larger posterior positivity than did either literal or literal mapping words. Consistent with conceptual blending theory, the results suggest that the demands of conceptual integration affect the difficulty of both literal and metaphorical language.     

Understanding metaphors: Is the right hemisphere uniquely involved?

Two divided visual field priming experiments examined cerebral asymmetries for understanding metaphors varying in sentence constraint. Experiment 1 investigated ambiguous words (e.g., SWEET and BRIGHT) with literal and metaphoric meanings in ambiguous and unambiguous sentence contexts, while Experiment 2 involved standard metaphors (e.g., The drink you gave me was a meteor) with sententially consistent and inconsistent targets (i.e., POTENT vs COMET). Similar literal and metaphor priming effects were found in both visual fields across most experimental conditions. However, RH processes also maintained activation of sententially inconsistent literal meanings following metaphoric expressions. These results do not strongly support the RH as the preferred substrate for metaphor comprehension (e.g., ), and suggest that processes in both hemispheres can support metaphor comprehension, although not via identical mechanisms. The LH may utilize sentence constraint to select and integrate only contextually relevant literal and metaphoric meanings, whereas the RH may be less sensitive to sentence context and can maintain the activation of some alternative interpretations. This may be potentially useful in situations where an initial understanding must be revised.     

Components of metaphoric processing

Three experiments examined whether sentences interpretable as metaphorical and literal expressions differed on three components of processing: perceptual decoding, sense selection, and integration of terms. In Experiments 1 and 2 metaphorical words were identified more readily than literal words on separate tests of perceptual identification and word recognition. In Experiment 3 the conveyed meaning of a metaphor was not recalled better than a literal interpretation of the same target sentence. It is concluded that metaphorical and literal sentences utilize separate perceptual and selectional decoding strategies, but do not differ with respect to comprehension processes once metaphorical and literal referents are instantiated. Discussion is given as to whether these differences constitute a separate metaphor strategy.Shinjo and Myers also described a fourth component process,retrieval, involved in the foregrounding of prime words used in their experiments.     

Novel metaphors appear anomalous at least momentarily: evidence from N400

This study addresses a central question in perception of novel figurative language: whether it is interpreted intelligently and figuratively immediately, or only after a literal interpretation fails. Eighty sentence frames that could plausibly end with a literal, truly anomalous, or figurative word were created. After validation for meaningfulness and figurativeness, the 240 sentences were presented to 11 subjects for event related potential (ERP) recording. ERP's first 200 ms is believed to reflect the structuring of the input; the prominence of a dip at around 400 ms (N400) is said to relate inversely to how expected a word is. Results showed no difference between anomalous and metaphoric ERPs in the early window, metaphoric and literal ERPs converging 300-500 ms after the ending, and significant N400s only for anomalous endings. A follow-up study showed that the metaphoric endings were less frequent (in standardized word norms) than were the anomalous and literal endings and that there were significant differences in cloze probabilities (determined from 24 new subjects) among the three ending types: literal > metaphoric > anomalous. It is possible that the low frequency of the metaphoric element and lower cloze probability of the anomalous one contributed to the processes reflected in the early window, while the incongruity and near-zero cloze probability of the anomalous endings produced an N400 effect in them alone. The structure or parse derived for metaphor during the early window appears to yield a preliminary interpretation suggesting anomaly, while semantic analysis reflected in the later window renders a plausible figurative interpretation.     

ERP evidence for conceptual mappings and comparison processes during the comprehension of conventional and novel metaphors

Cognitive linguists suggest that understanding metaphors requires activation of conceptual mappings between the involved concepts. We tested whether mappings are indeed in use during metaphor comprehension, and what mapping means as a cognitive process with Event-Related Potentials. Participants read literal, conventional metaphorical, novel metaphorical, and anomalous target sentences preceded by primes with related or unrelated mappings. Experiment 1 used sentence-primes to activate related mappings, and Experiment 2 used simile-primes to induce comparison thinking. In the unprimed conditions of both experiments, metaphors elicited N400s more negative than the literals. In Experiment 1, related sentence-primes reduced the metaphor-literal N400 difference in conventional, but not in novel metaphors. In Experiment 2, related simile-primes reduced the metaphor-literal N400 difference in novel, but not clearly in conventional metaphors. We suggest that mapping as a process occurs in metaphors, and the ways in which it can be facilitated by comparison differ between conventional and novel metaphors.     

Topic—vehicle interaction in metaphor comprehension

Property comparison models of metaphor comprehension assume that the topic and vehicle terms in metaphors are both understood to be referring to their conventional literal referents. In contrast, the interactive property attribution model (Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997) assumes that the vehicle is understood to be referring to a metaphoric category that includes the topic's literal referent as a member. A priming paradigm was used to test the implications of these different models. Prior to interpreting a metaphor, participants read (1) the topic or vehicle concept alone, (2) a sentence ascribing a metaphor-relevant property to one concept, or (3) a sentence ascribing a metaphor-irrelevant property to one concept. All of the prime types facilitated metaphor comprehension with the exception of sentences ascribing metaphor-irrelevant properties to vehicles. The failure of these sentences (but not their topic counterparts) to facilitate metaphor comprehension is attributable to their priming an inappropriate literal interpretation of the vehicle term. These results are consistent with the claim that irrelevant information is suppressed during language comprehension (Gernsbacher, 1990) and support the interactive property attribution model.