青少年道德推脱与攻击行为：道德判断调节作用的性别差异

通过对756名青少年的问卷调查,考察了道德判断在青少年道德推脱与攻击行为之间调节作用的性别差异。结果发现:(1)道德推脱会对青少年的攻击行为产生显著的正向影响,道德判断不会对青少年的攻击行为产生显著的影响,但是道德判断可以显著地调节道德推脱与攻击行为之间的关系;(2)道德判断在调节道德推脱与攻击行为之间的关系时存在明显的性别差异,较高的道德判断能力难以削弱道德推脱对男生攻击行为的正向影响,但可以明显地削弱道德推脱对女生攻击行为的正向影响。     

道德相对主义和厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响

社会直觉模型认为有意识的道德推理过程发生在道德直觉判断之后。那么, 道德直觉判断又是怎么形成的, 是否受认知推理和情绪的影响?实验1首先验证道德直觉判断的存在; 实验2考察了道德相对主义对道德直觉判断的影响; 实验3考察了厌恶情绪对道德直觉判断的影响。结果发现: (1)道德绝对主义比道德相对主义条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受认知推理影响。(2)厌恶情绪比中立情绪启动条件下, 个体更倾向于做出道德直觉判断, 说明道德直觉判断受情绪影响。因此, 道德直觉判断会受认知推理和情绪的影响。     

不同道德评价取向对企业道德决策的预测作用

本研究基于Hunt和Vitell（1986）所提出的市场营销领域的道德通用理论模型,随机选取129名MBA学生为被试,采用Reidenbach和Robin的多维道德量表和情景研究法,旨在考察个体在应对企业决策中的道德问题时,不同道德评价取向对道德决策（整体性道德判断和道德意图阶段）的预测作用。结果表明：1）与对道德判断的单项目测量相比,多维道德量表对道德意图具有高的预测效度;2）道德公平、功利主义和契约主义对整体道德判断具有显著的预测作用;3）道德公平和相对主义对自我和他人道德意图具有显著预测作用。     

6~10岁儿童对损人情境下行为者的道德情绪判断与归因

采用故事情境法探讨6~10岁儿童对损人情境下损人者和旁观者的道德情绪判断与归因的发展。结果发现：（1）在损人情境下,6岁儿童能理解损人行为是不对的,但直到8岁儿童才能理解旁观行为是不对的;（2）随着年龄增长,儿童判断损人者的愉悦程度逐渐降低,情绪归因从结果定向过渡到道德定向;儿童判断旁观者的愉悦程度逐渐降低,情绪归因从无法有效归因过渡到道德定向;（3）儿童对不同行为者的道德情绪判断同时受年龄和性别的影响,6岁男孩判断损人者愉悦程度显著高于女孩,6岁男孩判断旁观者愉悦程度显著低于女孩;8岁和10岁儿童对两类行为者的道德情绪判断未发现显著的性别差异。     

关于马基雅维利主义的道德心理研究

上世纪60～70年代,Christie创造了马基雅维利主义的心理学构念,而Exline,Geis和Bogart开创了关于马基雅维利主义的道德心理研究,后继研究者继承并不断完善他们的实验方法,探讨了马基雅维利主义与不道德行为(尤其是欺骗和逢迎)、道德判断(包括道德观和道德推理)、道德教育的关系。研究结果发现,尽管有证据证明马基雅维利主义与不道德行为存在密切关系,但两者是否是直接的因果关系仍存争议,不过多数学者一致认为马基雅维利主义者的不道德行为缘于其道德判断和道德教育,他们决策时将传统道德标准排除在决策标准体系之外,因此描述他们道德判断应采用"非道德"而不是"不道德"。     

坏念头，罪几何？意图信息的强弱变化对大学生道德判断的影响

成人在对他人的行为进行道德判断时,对意图和结果信息的利用存在不稳定的现象。Cushman提出道德判断双加工过程理论,认为当存在重大负性后果时,需要综合考虑意图和结果信息;而当不存在负性后果时,主要关注意图信息。本研究通过句式变化操控意图信息的明显性,分别考察了两组大学生在对道德情景进行判断时意图信息强弱变化所造成的影响,结果发现：（1）对中性行为进行道德判断时,突显负性意图信息后被试会增加道德谴责;（2）对负性行为进行道德判断时,道德谴责程度没有因意图信息明显性的改变而发生显著变化。此研究结果表明,在行为结果为中性时,人们主要利用意图的信息做出道德判断,但此时对负性意图的谴责程度并不稳定,容易受明显性变化的干扰。     

心理虐待与忽视对青少年攻击行为的影响:道德推脱的中介与调节作用

在一般攻击模型（GAM）和个体-环境交互作用模型的视角下,采用儿童心理虐待与忽视量表、青少年道德推脱问卷和攻击行为问卷对696名青少年进行调查,以探讨心理虐待与忽视对青少年攻击行为的影响以及道德推脱在其中的作用机制。结果发现：（1）心理虐待与忽视与青少年攻击行为和道德推脱均呈显著正相关,道德推脱与青少年攻击行为也呈显著正相关;（2）道德推脱在心理虐待与忽视和青少年攻击行为之间起着部分中介作用,道德推脱的中介作用不存在性别差异,但存在显著的年龄差异,在初中组中,道德推脱在心理虐待与忽视和青少年攻击行为间的中介作用为部分中介,而在高中组中为完全中介;（3）道德推脱在心理虐待与忽视和青少年攻击行为之间的调节作用不显著,道德推脱的调节作用不存在年龄差异,但存在显著的性别差异,在男生组中,道德推脱在心理虐待与忽视和青少年攻击行为间的调节作用不显著,而在女生组中显著。     

道德判断中的框架效应:一个新的视角

道德领域亦存在框架效应,但有关这类偏差的研究仍然存在不足。研究以600名大学生为对象,以亚洲疾病和工厂风波两类经典情境为实验情境,设置正面和负面两类属性框架,以研究道德判断的框架效应。结果发现,在面临道德判断情境时,在正面框架下被试倾向于选择确定性方案,而在负面框架下被试倾向于选择风险性方案; 在正面框架下被试倾向于评价风险性方案更违背道德,在负面框架下则认为确定性方案更违背道德; 被试对情境中人物选择确定性或风险性方案道德之可谴责性评价与确定性或风险性方案本身之道德违背性评价的判断并不一致:在正面框架下,若情境中人物选择风险性方案,被试认为其行为更应受到谴责; 但在负面框架下,被试对情境中人物选择确定性方案和风险性方案在道德上应受谴责性的评价并无显著差异。研究还发现道德判断框架效应存在性别差异,负面框架下女生更为风险寻求。     

道德直觉分析：内涵、形成机制与加工判断机制

自Haidt 提出道德判断的社会直觉模型后,道德直觉便成为道德心理研究中的重要课题。本文围绕这三方面的问题就最近10多年来道德直觉的相关理论与实证研究进行了评述,得到如下结论：（1）道德直觉作为社会直觉的一种,它既有一般社会直觉的一些共性特点,又有其特殊性。从目前道德的神经认知研究结果来看,与一般社会直觉的神经机制相比,道德直觉过程还涉及到眶额皮层、颞顶联合区以及前额叶的更多脑区。相关研究表明这些脑区涉及到情绪刺激的再评价、以及对行为动机、意图、心理理论等认知成分的联合处理。（2）对于道德直觉的起源与形成问题,尽管道德直觉表现出跨文化的普遍性,但是目前还没有充分的证据支持道德直觉的先天论;同时,本研究认为基于“进化-文化-个人”的具身隐喻过程可能是道德直觉形成的重要机制。（3）目前道德判断研究的有关理论与实证研究仍然难以回答道德直觉加工的情理之争问题,但有几点发现值得注意：一是从加工的水平差异角度来看,道德直觉可能存在不同的亚类形式,且不同类型的道德直觉可能有着不同的学习获得机制与加工机制;二是道德直觉判断不完全是情绪直接作用的结果,而与道德情境中的情绪认知以及情绪背后的道德规则（信念）之间有着重要联系。     

哈奇森论道德的情感之源

哈奇森认为,道德的根源不会来自外在于人的外在自然,也不会来自人的理性、知识、最高者的条律以及利益,只会来自人的情感。作为道德判断的对象,情感构成了道德判断的起点;在道德判断过程中,以情感为基础的道德感官是唯一的判断依据;作为道德判断的结果,对人的情感以及受到情感推动的行为的激发是道德判断的唯一目的所在。     

Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

Moral judgment and self-reported moral events in adulthood

As part of a 13-year study of the development of reasoning about the Good Life and moral judgment, 29 middle-class, well-educated adults, ranging in age from 18 to 80 years, were interviewed twice, 4 years apart on Standard Form Moral Judgment interviews and were asked to describe their own moral events that occurred recently. Both times, the average moral judgment score on the hypothetical dilemmas was about stage 4. The reasoning in the spontaneously reported moral events was significantly lower, although the two scores were highly correlated. Difference scores between the two were not related to scores on the hypothetical dilemmas. While there were no significant gender differences in scores on the hypothetical dilemmas, there were in scores on spontaneously reported events favoring males. The philosophic quality of the reported events could be easily categorized by traditional moral-philosophic categories; about half of the events contained traditional deontic moral content (moral right); the other half contained material defined as the moral good. The context of most events was interpersonal as opposed to societal. The most frequent issue discussed concerned honesty about financial issues, particularly income tax evasion. Ways to expand the research on adult moral experience are discussed.     

Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory

Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory’s key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented.     

Competing Conceptions of Justice: Faculty Moral Reasoning About Affirmative Action

College faculty (N = 115) were recruited to investigate the influence of moral reasoning on hiring decisions about affirmative action dilemmas. Participants completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a standard test of moral reasoning, a measure that presented two hypothetical moral dilemmas about affirmative action that manipulated candidates' race and moral issues, and a scale evaluating the use of external norms versus self-chosen principles. Results indicated that moral issue but not race of a minority candidate affected hiring decisions. Faculty used greater percentages of principled reasoning when solving the more salient affirmative action dilemmas than when solving the hypothetical dilemmas of the DIT. Higher scores on the DIT were related to the use of principles rather than norms when making hiring decisions. Findings suggest that faculty decisions about hiring a hypothetical affirmative action candidate are more influenced by moral reasoning level and competing conceptions of justice than racial bias or ambivalence.     

Multiple moral foundations predict responses to sacrificial dilemmas

Moral dilemmas, by definition, demand trade-offs between competing moral goods (e.g., causing one harm to prevent another). Although moral dilemmas have served as a methodological pillar for moral psychology, surprisingly little research has explored how individual differences in moral values influence responses to dilemmatic trade-offs. In a cross-sectional study (N = 307), we tested competing claims regarding the relationship between the endorsement of foundational moral values and responses to sacrificial dilemmas, in which one judges the moral acceptability of causing fatal harm to one person to save multiple others. Inconsistent with Moral Dyad Theory, our results did not support the prediction that Harm concerns would be the unequivocally most important predictor of sacrifice endorsement. Consistent with Moral Foundations Theory, however, multiple moral values are predictive of sacrifice judgments: Harm and Purity negatively predict, and Ingroup positively predicts, endorsement of harmful action in service of saving lives, with Harm and Purity explaining similar amounts of unique variance. The present study demonstrates the utility of pluralistic accounts of morality, even in moral situations in which harm is central.     

Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination

There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems. These thought experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios. Across seven studies (N = 968), we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a particular outcome. Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn influence moral judgments. Our findings demonstrate that intuitive likelihoods are one critical factor in moral judgment, one that is not suspended even in moral dilemmas that explicitly stipulate outcomes. Features thought to underlie moral reasoning, such as intention, may operate, in part, by affecting the intuitive likelihood of outcomes, and, problematically, moral differences between scenarios may be confounded with non‐moral intuitive probabilities.     

Moral dilemmas and moral rules

Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find that participants show a parallel asymmetry about versions of the dilemmas that have minimized emotional force. In a third experiment, we find that people distinguish between whether an action violates a moral rule and whether it is, all things considered, wrong. We propose that judgments of whether an action is wrong, all things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits.     

Should I save or should I not kill? How people solve moral dilemmas depends on which rule is most accessible

The literature on how people solve moral dilemmas often focuses on situations in which individuals have to make a decision where different moral rules are in conflict. In some of these situations, such as in footbridge dilemmas, people have to choose between sacrificing a few people in order to save many. The present research focuses on how people decide what to do in dilemmas involving conflicting moral rules. We propose that the rule that is cognitively most accessible during the decision making process (e.g., “Save lives” or “Do not kill”) will influence how people solve these moral dilemmas. Three studies are reported that indeed demonstrate that the most accessible rule influences willingness to intervene within footbridge dilemmas. This effect is found even when the accessibility of the rule is induced subliminally.     

The denial of moral dilemmas as a regulative ideal

The traditional debate about moral dilemmas concerns whether there are circumstances in which an agent is subject to two obligations that cannot both be fulfilled. Realists maintain there are. Irrealists deny this. Here I defend an alternative, methodologically-oriented position wherein the denial of genuine moral dilemmas functions as a regulative ideal for moral deliberation and practice. That is, moral inquiry and deliberation operate on the implicit assumption that there are no genuine moral dilemmas. This view is superior to both realism and irrealism in accounting for moral residue and other crucial phenomenological dimensions of our experience of moral dilemmas.     

A reanalysis of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral psychology research

Greene and colleagues [Greene, J., Sommerville, B. R., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293, 2105-2108.] have revealed an apparent distinction in folk psychology between ‘up close and personal’ and ‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas. Reasoning about these types of dilemmas is purportedly supported by partially dissociable neural systems. However, further investigation of the data supporting this hypothesis indicated that only a small number of stimuli used by Greene et al. are driving the effect originally found. Implications of the apparent distinction initially reported and of other research in the domain of moral psychology are discussed.