朱熹对宋代易学的发展——兼论朱熹、程颐易学思想之异同

朱熹提出《易》之本义为卜筮的见解,由此对程颐易学和义理学派提出批评。朱熹主张区分《周易》经传,提出易学发展阶段说。通过比较《周易本义》和《周易程氏传》,可见两者之异同。朱熹以象数、卜筮求易理,把义理学派与象数学派统一起来,从而发展了宋代易学。     

Islam as an ethical tradition of international relations

This article explores the ethical traditions of Islam in order to examine its potential as a source that would help precipitate ethical and peaceful, as opposed to political and conflictual, relations between nations, faiths, and cultural groups. While using philosophical and ethical categories borrowed from the Western epistemes, this paper in a way reintroduces Islam as an ethical tradition. Given the significance that Islamic sentiments and Islamic symbolism have for a billion people and over fifty nation states, this paper recommends the inclusion of Islamic traditions in discourses whose concern is the proliferation of ethical consideration in international and intercultural relations. Having said that, the paper proceeds to elaborate foundations for an Islamic ethic of international relations.     

The challenges and future of applied Islamic ethics discourse: a radical reform?

In this paper, I explore the concept of applied Islamic ethics, the facts, its challenges, and its future. I aim to highlight some of the deep-rooted issues that Muslims have faced historically and continue to experience today as they apply religious guidance to their daily lives. I consider the causes and rationale behind the current situation and look beyond to suggest ways in which this may evolve, calling for a radical reform. Muslims throughout the world are experiencing a deepening crisis of identity and confusion about their faith's principles and practices. I suggest how improvements might be achieved, in order to gain more coherence and understanding. This approach recognizes the importance of inviting an in-depth, deliberate analysis of relevant dialogues between religious experts of the text (scholars) and practitioners, those working at the grassroots. This approach remains faithful to the fundamental principles of the Islamic sources but also considers our present context. I recommend a shift in authority from scholars alone to a more inclusive, critical engagement of practitioners. Through this more comprehensive methodology of applied Islamic ethics, I suggest that Muslim communities, organizations, and individuals can remain faithful to their religious principles while, at the same time, actively participating in and contributing to our evolving societies. While I recognize that this will be a long process, I am confident that with applied Islamic ethics, the current feelings of confusion, self-doubt, and even apathy, given the previous failed processes of adaptation and reform, will give way to a new confidence in knowing how to address contemporary challenges.     

Divine simplicity

According to a doctrine widely held by most medieval philosophers and theologians, whether in the Muslim or Christian world, there are no metaphysical distinctions in God whatsoever. As a result of the compendious theorizing that has been done on this issue, the doctrine, usually called the doctrine of divine simplicity, has been bestowed a prominent status in both Islamic and Christian philosophical theology. In Islamic philosophy some well-known philosophers, such as Ibn Sina (980–1037) and Mulla Sadra (1571–1640), developed this doctrine through a metaphysical approach. In this paper, considering the historical order, I shall first concentrate on Ibn Sina’s view. Then I shall turn to the theory of divine simplicity of Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274), as the most developed and comprehensive version of the medieval theories in Christian world. Finally, I will return to Islamic philosophy and explore the more complicated and mature account of the doctrine as it was introduced by Mulla Sadra according to his own philosophical principles.     

BRAIN DEATH AND ITS ENTANGLEMENTS

The Islamic philosophical, mystical, and theological sub‐traditions have each made characteristic assumptions about the human person, including an incorporation of substance dualism in distinctive manners. Advances in the brain sciences of the last half century, which include a widespread acceptance of death as the end of essential brain function, require the abandonment of dualistic notions of the human person that assert an immaterial and incorporeal soul separate from a body. In this article, I trace classical Islamic notions of death and the soul, the modern definition of death as “brain death,” and some contemporary Islamic responses to this definition. I argue that a completely naturalistic account of human personhood in the Islamic tradition is the best and most viable alternative for the future. This corporeal monistic account of Muslim personhood as embodied consciousness incorporates the insights of pre‐modern Muslim thinkers yet rehabilitates their characteristic mistakes and thus has the advantages of neuroscientific validity and modern relevance in trans‐cultural ethical discourse; it also helps to alleviate organ shortages in countries with majority Muslim populations, a serious ethical impasse of recent years.     

What is morally at stake when using algorithms to make medical diagnoses? Expanding the discussion beyond risks and harms

In this paper, we examine the qualitative moral impact of machine learning-based clinical decision support systems in the process of medical diagnosis. To date, discussions about machine learning in this context have focused on problems that can be measured and assessed quantitatively, such as by estimating the extent of potential harm or calculating incurred risks. We maintain that such discussions neglect the qualitative moral impact of these technologies. Drawing on the philosophical approaches of technomoral change and technological mediation theory, which explore the interplay between technologies and morality, we present an analysis of concerns related to the adoption of machine learning-aided medical diagnosis. We analyze anticipated moral issues that machine learning systems pose for different stakeholders, such as bias and opacity in the way that models are trained to produce diagnoses, changes to how health care providers, patients, and developers understand their roles and professions, and challenges to existing forms of medical legislation. Albeit preliminary in nature, the insights offered by the technomoral change and the technological mediation approaches expand and enrich the current discussion about machine learning in diagnostic practices, bringing distinct and currently underexplored areas of concern to the forefront. These insights can contribute to a more encompassing and better informed decision-making process when adapting machine learning techniques to medical diagnosis, while acknowledging the interests of multiple stakeholders and the active role that technologies play in generating, perpetuating, and modifying ethical concerns in health care.

     

MOTIVES FOR PHILOSOPHIZING DEBUNKING AND WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Abstract: In this article I contest a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations —a reading of it as debunking philosophy. I concede that such a reading is not groundless, but I show why it is nonetheless mistaken. To do so, I distinguish two different ways of viewing Philosophical Investigations and its concern with philosophical problems, an External View and an Internal View. On the External View, readers of the book are taken to know ahead of time what philosophical problems are. On the Internal View, readers are not taken to know this ahead of time: the task of the book is to disclose what philosophical problems are, to show them coming into being. One thing disclosed is our participatory role in philosophical problems coming to be. Learning about the nature of philosophical problems is thus learning about our own nature; metaphilosophical knowledge is in part self-knowledge. If the Internal View is correct (as I believe it is), then Philosophical Investigations does not debunk philosophy but provides a different conception of philosophy and the philosopher's task.     

Meditations on the Origin of Philosophy

Wittgenstein in his later writing often remarked on the negative influence of language on philosophy. Here, I call attention to a previously unnoticed but significant way that language has influenced philosophy: we use the very same vocabulary in two different ways, in philosophical talk and in our everyday interactive speaking‐situations. Our propensity for using this double talk has prevented us from resolving most philosophical problems. Is our attraction to philosophical talk the result of our learning to use a phonetic alphabet, so that words can be used outside of interactive situations?     

KARL BARTH AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

It is commonly held that Karl Barth emphatically rejected the usefulness of philosophy for theology. In this essay I explore the implications of Barth's theological epistemology for the relationship and proper boundaries between philosophy and theology, given its origin in Barth's theology of revelation. I seek to clarify Barth's position with respect to philosophy by distinguishing the contingency of its offence from any necessary incompatibility. Barth does not reject philosophy per se, but the way in which philosophy is typically conducted. This is made explicit through an analysis of Barth's censure of the uncritical acceptance in theology of modernist philosophical presuppositions. I nuance Barth's response to a collection of philosophical assumptions that are rarely distinguished in theological literature. Finally, I highlight a representative instance of Barth's reflections on philosophy in relationship to theology, to demonstrate that the criterion for evaluating the usefulness of philosophical assumptions and methods in the service of theology is the same criterion by which theology is itself evaluated.     

Different visuomotor processes maturation rates in children support dual visuomotor learning systems

Different processes are involved during visuomotor learning, including an error-based procedural and a strategy based cognitive mechanism. Our objective was to analyze if the changes in the adaptation or the aftereffect components of visuomotor learning measured across development, reflected different maturation rates of the aforementioned mechanisms. Ninety-five healthy children aged 4–12 years and a group of young adults participated in a wedge prism and a dove prism throwing task, which laterally displace or horizontally reverse the visual field respectively. The results show that despite the age-related differences in motor control, all children groups adapted in the error-based wedge prisms condition. However, when removing the prism, small children showed a slower aftereffects extinction rate. On the strategy-based visual reversing task only the older children group reached adult-like levels. These results are consistent with the idea of different mechanisms with asynchronous maturation rates participating during visuomotor learning.     

Self-organizing individual differences in brain development

Brain development is self-organizing in that the unique structure of each brain evolves in unpredictable ways through recursive modifications of synaptic networks. In this article, I review mechanisms of neural change in real time and over development, and I argue that change at each of these time scales embodies principles of self-organizing systems. I demonstrate how corticolimbic configurations that emerge within occasions lay down synaptic structure across occasions, giving rise to individual trajectories that become entrenched with age. Emotions have a powerful influence on this process.This is because the neural processes mediating emotion consolidate patterns of activation across the brain, through their enhancement of inter-regional coordination in real time and their contribution to synaptic shaping over development. The loss of corticolimbic plasticity with age is an unfortunate fact of development, but it is compensated in part by transitional phases and individual learning experiences through which habits are modified or replaced. I emphasize variations in inter-systemic coupling as a key mediator of developing individual differences, and I discuss the acquisition of anxious/depressive appraisals as an example.     

"Reflexive Embodied Empathy": A Phenomenology of Participant-Researcher Intersubjectivity

In this article, I advocate a research process that involves engaging, reflexively, with the embodied intersubjective relationship researchers have with participants. I call this practice reflexive embodied empathy. First, I explicate the concept of empathy through exploring ideas from the philosophical phenomenological literature. I then apply this theory to practice and offer examples of reflexive analysis of embodied empathy taken from various hermeneutic phenomenological research projects. Three interpenetrating layers of reflexivity are described, each involving different but coexisting dimensions of embodied intersubjectivity. The 1st layer-connecting-of-demonstrates how people can tune into another's bodily way of being through using their own embodied reactions. The 2nd layer-acting-into-focuses on empathy as imaginative self-transposal and calls attention to the way existences (beings) are intertwined in a dynamic of doubling and mirroring. The 3rd layer-merging-with-involves a "reciprocal insertion and intertwining" of others in oneself and of one in them (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968, p. 138), where self-understanding and other-understanding unite in mutual transformation. Through different examples of reflexive analysis from my research, I have tried to show how intersubjective corporeal commonality enables the possibility of empathy and how, in turn, empathy enables understanding of the Other and self-understanding. I discuss how the coexisting layers of empathy and the resultant understandings can be enabled through hermeneutic reflection and collaborative research methods.     

On love, hate and knowledge

In this short theoretical paper, I discuss Bion's three relations of love, hate, and knowledge, using Peirce's semiotic theory of relations and Bakhtin's semiotic/philosophical writings. Reading Bion through the prism of these resources allows us to better understand the meaning and ontogenesis of the basic relations and to examine their clinical explanatory value.     

The puzzle of philosophical testimony

An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief.     

Imaginaries of Development: The Rockefeller Foundation and Rice Research

This article is both a historical and contemporary analysis of the Rockefeller Foundation's changing role in rice research over the past 50 years, and though there are many overlaps between them, focuses on three broad periods: first, the RF's early work in rice research, particularly through the establishment of the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and the Green Revolution era of the 1960s and 1970s; second, the development of the RF's rice biotechnology program in the 1980s; and third, the RF's focus on agricultural research in Africa, with rice research as a subset of their programmatic efforts, during the 1990s and beyond. Rice research in each of the different periods was driven by different framings of problems and potential solutions, incorporating wider ideologies, epistemologies, and key actors and networks, with the RF at the center. Viewed in this way, the Rockefeller Foundation's involvement in rice research cannot be seen ‘simply’ as an agricultural modernization project, but rather as simultaneously a sociopolitical project that extends particular modes of governance through homogenization and paternalism.     

When Worlds Collide: Psychoanalysis and the Empirically Supported Treatment Movement

In this conclusion, I synthesize and elaborate on some of the central threads running through the contributions to the symposium on the implications of the empirically supported treatment (EST) controversy for psychoanalysis. I argue that the EST controversy brings increased urgency to discussions about the role that empirical research should play in the development of psychoanalysis and about the potential contributions of different research paradigms to the field. Different research paradigms are associated with different epistemologies and worldviews, and the dialogue between these worldviews is critical to the vitality and health of the field. On one hand, the EST movement embodies limited, mechanistic, and one-sided values, and psychoanalysis has an important role to play in challenging these values. On the other hand, the EST movement can offer an important corrective to the more insular and rarefied strands within psychoanalysis and to its tradition of argument on the basis of authority.     

Healing relationships and the existential philosophy of Martin Buber

The dominant unspoken philosophical basis of medical care in the United States is a form of Cartesian reductionism that views the body as a machine and medical professionals as technicians whose job is to repair that machine. The purpose of this paper is to advocate for an alternative philosophy of medicine based on the concept of healing relationships between clinicians and patients. This is accomplished first by exploring the ethical and philosophical work of Pellegrino and Thomasma and then by connecting Martin Buber's philosophical work on the nature of relationships to an empirically derived model of the medical healing relationship. The Healing Relationship Model was developed by the authors through qualitative analysis of interviews of physicians and patients. Clinician-patient healing relationships are a special form of what Buber calls I-Thou relationships, characterized by dialog and mutuality, but a mutuality limited by the inherent asymmetry of the clinician-patient relationship. The Healing Relationship Model identifies three processes necessary for such relationships to develop and be sustained: Valuing, Appreciating Power and Abiding. We explore in detail how these processes, as well as other components of the model resonate with Buber's concepts of I-Thou and I-It relationships. The resulting combined conceptual model illuminates the wholeness underlying the dual roles of clinicians as healers and providers of technical biomedicine. On the basis of our analysis, we argue that health care should be focused on healing, with I-Thou relationships at its core.     

The development and learning of the visual control of movement: An ecological perspective

We compare development and learning of the visual control of movement from an ecological perspective. It is argued that although the constraints that are imposed upon development and learning are vastly different, both are best characterised as a change towards the use of more useful and specifying optic variables. Implicit learning, in which awareness is drawn away from movement execution, is most appropriate to accomplish this change in optic variable use, although its contribution in development is more contentious. Alternatively, learning can also be affected by explicit processes. We propose that explicit learning would typically invoke vision for perception processes instead of the designated vision for action processes. It is for that reason that after explicit learning performance is more easily compromised in the face of pressure or disorders. We present a way to deal with the issue of explicit learning during infancy.