Inference of one's attitude from behavior recalled under linguistically manipulated cognitive sets

To test Bem's (1972) hypothesis that individuals infer their attitudes from information about their behavior in a given context, subjects were asked their attitudes about a course after reporting their behaviors for the course and receiving a linguistic manipulation intended to produce an intrinsic or extrinsic cognitive context (set). Intrinsic set was manipulated by having subjects complete statements of the form “I generally do X because I …”. Extrinsic set was manipulated by having subjects complete statements of the form “I generally do X in order to …”. A pretest found that the intrinsic form resulted in a class perceived as more interesting than useful while the extrinsic form resulted in a class perceived as more useful than interesting. The present experiment found that subjects' attitudes are derived from information about different behaviors under the two cognitive sets. The attitudes of extrinsic set subjects were correlated with behaviors relevant to obtaining course out-comes like grades (contingent behaviors) and uncorrelated with behaviors relevant to personal interest (noncontingent behaviors); the opposite was found for intrinsic set subjects.     

False physiological feedback and persuasion: Effect of fear arousal vs. fear reduction on attitude change

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that increases in false physiological feedback of fear arousal will enhance persuasion and that reduction in the arousal feedback is unnecessary for increased persuasion to occur. Prior research has usually found a positive relation between level of arousal and persuasion, but support for the drive reduction hypothesis is tenuous. However, Harris and Jellison (1971) claimed support for such a hypothesis. They manipulated subjects' fear arousal cognitively via false physiological feedback while the subjects listened to a persuasive communication. The present experiments used a similar procedure in an attempt to test an "arousal only" against an "arousal reduction" hypothesis. Subjects listened to a persuasive speech while receiving false feedback via a meter concerning their fear arousal. In Experiment I half of the subjects received high arousal and half received moderate arousal information. Within each of these conditions half of the subjects had their arousal reduced, and the other half did not. In Experiment II subjects received either low arousal, high arousal, or high then low arousal feedback while listening. The results of the two studies generally provided support for the "arousal only" hypothesis. An interpretation in terms of Bem's attribution theory was tentatively suggested.     

Manipulation of responsibility in non-clinical subjects: does expectation of failure exacerbate obsessive-compulsive behaviors?

An exaggerated sense of responsibility is currently considered as the ground for the obsessive-compulsive disorder. Obsessive-like behaviors, such as hesitations and checks, may be induced in non-clinical subjects by increasing perceived responsibility (i.e., perceived personal influence on negative outcomes). In line with Salkovskis' proposal [The cognitive approach to anxiety: threat beliefs, safety-seeking behavior, and the special case of health anxiety and obsessions, in: P.M. Salkovskis (Ed.), Frontiers of Cognitive Therapy, Guilford, New York], we tested the hypothesis that reduced coping abilities (i.e., an exaggerated expectation of failure) are another effectual factor contributing to obsessive-like behaviors. We examined 47 normal volunteers in a visuo-spatial memory task, and manipulated their perceived personal influence and expectation of failure by giving differential instructions and feedback about their performance. Increase of perceived personal influence induced slowness, hesitations and checks without enhancing performance. Expectation of failure exacerbated obsessive-like behaviors, again without affecting performance. These results confirm the role of responsibility in obsessive-like behavior and indicate that reduced coping abilities may contribute to worsen dysfunctional strategies.     

Emotion,controllability and orientation towards stress as correlates of children’s coping with interpersonal stress

Guided by the motivational theory of coping (Skinner and Zimmer-Gembeck in Ann Rev Psychol 58:119–144. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085705, 2007), we investigated children’s anticipated coping with three different stressful events (bullying, parental argument, parent–child verbal conflict), and examined whether their reliance on challenge coping responses versus threat coping responses could be accounted for by emotional reactions (including feelings of sadness, anger and fear), perceived controllability, and orientation or interest in the stressor. In addition, we examined parents’ reports of their children’s temperamental traits as correlates of coping. In random order followed by a positive stimulus, children (N = 206, age 8–12 years) watched each of the three stressful events, and reported their emotions, perceived control, orientation and coping after each one. As anticipated, results indicated that controllability was associated with more challenge coping (a composite of adaptive/approach coping responses such as problem solving and support seeking) and less threat coping (a composite of maladaptive/withdrawal coping responses such as helplessness and escape). In general, feelings of sadness were more strongly associated with challenge coping, whereas fear and anger especially related to more threat coping. Greater orientation towards the stressor was particularly predictive of more challenge coping, but also was associated with more threat coping in response to parent stressors. These associations were significant, even after controlling for temperament (negative reactivity, task persistence, withdrawal, and activity), which was generally unrelated to children’s coping. Other combinations of coping responses were also examined.     

The role of perceived physiological activity in affective judgments

This study assessed the physiological and cognitive effects of Valins' (Valins, S. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 400–408) false heart rate procedure. Twenty-two male subjects were exposed to two feedback conditions during which measures of actual heart rate and skin conductance were obtained. In each condition, eight slides of nude females were presented; some slides were associated with false heart rate increases, while for other slides the feedback remained stable. In one condition, subjects were told that the heart rate was that of another subject; in the other condition, subjects were told that the feedback was their own heart rate. In both conditions, subjects judged the attractiveness of the slides from their own point of view and from the point of view of the other subject. Slides associated with false heart rate increases were rated as more attractive than stable slides when subjects (1) heard their own heart rate and rated their own attraction; (2) heard the other subject's heart rate and rated their own attraction; and (3) heard the other subject's heart rate and rated the other subject's attraction. Skin conductance responses and actual cardiac decelerations were greater when subjects heard what was allegedly their own heart rate and when the slides were accompanied by apparent cardiac acceleration. However, these actual physiological responses did not play a causal role in relation to the affective judgments. Instead, the relationship between perceived physiological changes and feelings of attractiveness was mediated by cognitive processes associated with informational and directive influences of the feedback.     

Nonimmediate language style and inconsistency between private and expressed evaluations

It was hypothesized that certain language style variations would reflect apprehension about affirming the validity of communication content. Wiener and Mehrabian (Language within language: Immediacy, a channel in verbal communication. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,1968) have identified a cluster of such variations called verbal nonimmediacy, which they describe as indicators of psychological distance between the communicator and his/her communication. Four experiments are reported. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that communication about positive manifestations of disliked traits and negative manifestations of liked traits was more nonimmediate than when positive manifestations of liked traits or negative manifestations of disliked traits were described. This was true both when one's own or another's personality traits were described. In Experiment 3, nonimmediacy was found to increase when communications involved clear fabrications about either one's liked or disliked traits. Experiment 4 showed that when self-regard was experimentally manipulated, low self-regard subjects showed more opinion conformity and nonimmediacy in their disclosures to a confederate than did high self-regard subjects.     

Perceived aversiveness of recommended solution and locus of control as determinants of response to danger

As determined by their scores on Rotter's Locus of Control scale (Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80 (1, Whole No. 609)), internal and external subjects were exposed either to a high-, low-, or no-fear message on the dangers of exposure to a sunlamp. It was recommended to half the subjects in each condition that they apply a cream which was described as producing minimal skin irritation (low aversiveness), while half the subjects received recommendations to apply a cream described as producing considerable skin irritation (high aversiveness). It was predicted that (a) a high-fear message would be more effective than a low-fear message in getting subjects to use the cream, especially when the recommended behavior was perceived as low in aversivensss; and (b) a high-fear message would be more effective than a low fear message for subjects classified as internals. The second prediction was confirmed, and the first was tentatively supported. Results were interpreted in terms of the perceptual processes which may mediate the relationship between fear and action. The findings did not support the fear-drive model.     

Generalization of conditioned fear along a dimension of increasing fear intensity

The present study investigated the extent to which fear generalization in humans is determined by the amount of fear intensity in nonconditioned stimuli relative to a perceptually similar conditioned stimulus. Stimuli consisted of graded emotionally expressive faces of the same identity morphed between neutral and fearful endpoints. Two experimental groups underwent discriminative fear conditioning between a face stimulus of 55% fear intensity (conditioned stimulus, CS+), reinforced with an electric shock, and a second stimulus that was unreinforced (CS−). In Experiment 1 the CS− was a relatively neutral face stimulus, while in Experiment 2 the CS− was the most fear-intense stimulus. Before and following fear conditioning, skin conductance responses (SCR) were recorded to different morph values along the neutral-to-fear dimension. Both experimental groups showed gradients of generalization following fear conditioning that increased with the fear intensity of the stimulus. In Experiment 1 a peak shift in SCRs extended to the most fear-intense stimulus. In contrast, generalization to the most fear-intense stimulus was reduced in Experiment 2, suggesting that discriminative fear learning procedures can attenuate fear generalization. Together, the findings indicate that fear generalization is broadly tuned and sensitive to the amount of fear intensity in nonconditioned stimuli, but that fear generalization can come under stimulus control. These results reveal a novel form of fear generalization in humans that is not merely based on physical similarity to a conditioned exemplar, and may have implications for understanding generalization processes in anxiety disorders characterized by heightened sensitivity to nonthreatening stimuli.Fear generalization occurs when a fear response acquired to a particular stimulus transfers to another stimulus. Generalization is often an adaptive function that allows an organism to rapidly respond to novel stimuli that are related in some way to a previously learned stimulus. Fear generalization, however, can be maladaptive when nonthreatening stimuli are inappropriately treated as harmful, based on similarity to a known threat. For example, an individual may acquire fear of all dogs after an aversive experience with a single vicious dog. In this case, recognizing that a novel animal is related to a feared (or fear-conditioned) animal is made possible in part by shared physical features to the fear exemplar, such as four legs and a tail. On the other hand, fear generalization may be selective for those features that are associated with natural categories of threat; a harmless dog may not pose a threat, but possesses naturally threatening features common to other threatening animals, such as sharp teeth and claws. Moreover, the degree to which an individual fearful of dogs responds with fear may be related to either the physical similarity to the originally feared animal (e.g., from a threatening black dog to another black dog), or the intensity of those threatening features relative to the originally feared animal (e.g., sharp teeth from one animal to sharp teeth of another animal). Therefore, fear generalization based on perceptual information may occur via two routes—similarity to a learned fear exemplar along nonthreatening physical dimensions or along dimensions of fear relevance. Given that fear generalization often emerges as a consequence of conditioning or observational learning, it is important to determine which characteristics of novel stimuli facilitate fear generalization and the extent to which generalization processes can be controlled.Early explanations of stimulus generalization emphasized that an organism''s ability to generalize to nonconditioned stimuli is related to both the similarity and discriminability to a previously conditioned stimulus (CS) (Hull 1943; Lashley and Wade 1946). While Lashley and Wade (1946) argued that generalization was simply a failure of discriminating between a nonconditioned stimulus (CS−) and the reinforced CS (CS+), contemporary views contend that generalization enables learning to extend to stimuli that are readily perceptually distinguished from the CS (Pearce 1987; Shepard 1987; McLaren and Mackintosh 2002). This latter view has been supported by empirical studies of stimulus generalization in laboratory animals (Guttman and Kalish 1956; Honig and Urcuioli 1981). In these studies, animals were reinforced for responding to a CS of a specific physical quality such as color, and then tested with several different values along the same stimulus dimension as the CS (e.g., at various wavelengths along the color spectrum). Orderly gradients of responses are often reported that peak at or near the reinforced value and decrease as a function of physical similarity to the CS along the stimulus dimension (Honig and Urcuioli 1981). Further generalization was shown to extend from the CS+ to discriminable nonconditioned stimuli, suggesting that generalization is not bound to the organism''s ability to discriminate stimuli (Guttman and Kalish 1956, 1958; Shepard 1987).Interestingly, when animals learn to distinguish between a CS+ and a CS−, the peak of behavioral responses often shift to a new value along the dimension that is further away from the CS− (Hanson 1959). For instance, when being trained to discriminate a green CS+ and an orange CS−, pigeons will key peck more to a greenish-blue color than the actual CS+ hue. Intradimensional generalization of this sort is reduced when animals are trained to discriminate between two or more stimulus values that are relatively close during conditioning (e.g., discriminating a green-yellow CS+ from a green-blue CS−), suggesting that the extent of generalization can come under stimulus control through reinforcement learning (Jenkins and Harrison 1962). Spence (1937) described the transposition of response magnitude as an effect of interacting gradients of excitation and inhibition formed around the CS+ and CS−, respectively, which summate to shift responses to values further from the inhibitory CS− gradient. In all, early theoretical and empirical treatments of stimulus generalization in nonhuman animals revealed that behavior transfers to stimuli that are physically similar, but can be discriminated from a CS, and that differential reinforcement training can both sharpen the stimulus gradient and shift the peak of responses to a nonreinforced value.Although this rich literature has revealed principles of generalization in nonhuman animals, few studies of fear generalization have been conducted in humans (for review, see Honig and Urcuioli 1981; Ghirlanda and Enquist 2003). Moreover, the existing human studies have yet to consider the second route through which fear responses may generalize—via gradients of fear relevance. While a wide range of neutral stimuli, such as tones or geometric figures, can acquire fear relevance through conditioning processes, other stimuli, such as threatening faces or spiders, are biologically prepared to be fear relevant (Lanzetta and Orr 1980; Dimberg and Öhman 1996; Whalen et al. 1998; Öhman and Mineka 2001). Compared with fear-irrelevant CSs, biologically prepared stimuli capture attention (Öhman et al. 2001), are conditioned without awareness (Öhman et al. 1995; Öhman and Soares 1998), increase brain activity in visual and emotional processing regions (Sabatinelli et al. 2005), and become more resistant to extinction when paired with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US) (Öhman et al. 1975). Although the qualitative nature of the CS influences acquisition and expression of conditioned fear, it is unknown how generalization proceeds along a gradient of natural threat. For instance, human studies to date have all tested variations of a CS along physically neutral stimulus dimensions, such as tone frequency (Hovland 1937), geometric shape (Vervliet et al. 2006), and physical size (Lissek et al. 2008). These investigations implicitly assume that the generalization gradient is independent of the conditioned value (equipotentiality principle). In other words, since the stimuli are all equally neutral prior to fear learning, fear generalization operates solely as a function of similarity along the reinforced physical dimension. However, since fear learning is predisposed toward fear-relevant stimuli, generalization may be selective to those shared features between a CS+ and CS− that are associated with natural categories of threat. Examining generalization using fear-relevant stimuli is thus important to gain better ecological validity and to develop a model system for studying maladaptive fear generalization in individuals who may express exaggerated fear responses to nonthreatening stimuli following a highly charged aversive experience (i.e., post-traumatic stress disorder or specific phobias).To address this issue, the present study examined generalization to fearful faces along an intradimensional gradient of fear intensity. A fearful face is considered a biologically prepared stimulus that recruits sensory systems automatically for rapid motor responses (Öhman and Mineka 2001), and detecting fearful faces may be evolutionarily selected as an adaptive response to social signals of impending danger (Lanzetta and Orr 1980; Dimberg and Öhman 1996). During conditioning, an ambiguous face containing 55% fear intensity (CS+) was paired with an electric shock US, while a relatively neutral face (11% fear intensity) was explicitly unreinforced (CS−) (Experiment 1). Skin conductance responses (SCR) were recorded as a dependent measure of fear conditioning. Before and following fear conditioning, SCRs were recorded in response to face morphs of the same actor expressing several values of increasing fear intensity (from 11% to 100%; see Fig. 1). A total of five values along the continuum were used: 11% fear/88% neutral, 33% fear/66% neutral, 55% fear/44% neutral, 77% fear/22% neutral, and 100% fear. For clarity, these stimuli are herein after labeled as S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5, respectively.Open in a separate windowFigure 1.Experimental design. (A) Pre-conditioning included six presentations of all five stimulus values without the US. (B) Fear conditioning involved discriminative fear learning between the S3, paired with the US (CS+), and either the unreinforced S1 (Experiment 1) or the unreinforced S5 (Experiment 2) (CS−). (C) The generalization test included nine presentations of all five stimuli (45 total), with three out of nine S3 trials reinforced with the US. Stimuli are not drawn to scale.Testing generalization along an intradimensional gradient of emotional expression intensity allows for an examination of the relative contributions of fear intensity and physical similarity on the magnitude of generalized fear responses. If fear generalization is determined purely by the perceptual overlap between the CS+ and other morph values, without regard to fear intensity, then we would expect a bell-shaped generalization function with the maximum SCR centered on the reinforced (intermediate) CS+ value (S3), less responding to the directly adjacent, but most perceptually similar values (S2 and S4), and the least amount of responding to the most distal and least perceptually similar morph values (S1 and S5). This finding would be in line with stimulus generalization reported along fear-irrelevant dimensions (Lissek et al. 2008) and in stimulus generalization studies using appetitive instrumental learning procedures (Guttman and Kalish 1956). If, however, fear generalization is biased toward nonconditioned stimuli of high fear intensity, then an asymmetric generalization function should result with maximal responding to the most fear-intense nonconditioned stimuli. This finding would suggest that fear generalization is selective to the degree of fear intensity in stimuli, similar to studies of physical intensity generalization gradients in nonhuman animals (Ghirlanda and Enquist 2003). We predicted that the latter effect would be observed, such that the magnitude of SCRs will disproportionately generalize to stimuli possessing a greater degree of fear intensity than the CS+ (Experiment 1). A secondary goal was to determine whether fear generalization to nonconditioned stimuli can be reduced through discriminative fear learning processes. Therefore, a second group of participants was run for whom the CS− was the 100% fearful face (Experiment 2). In this case, we predicted that discriminative fear conditioning between the CS+ (55% intensity) and the most fear-intense nonconditioned stimulus would sharpen the generalization gradient around the reinforced CS+ value, and that responses to the most fear-intense stimulus would decrease relative to Experiment 1. Moreover, this discriminative fear-learning process may provide evidence that fear generalization is influenced by associative learning processes and is not exclusively driven by selective sensitization to stimuli of high fear relevance (Lovibond et al. 1993). Finally, we were interested to discover whether generalization processes would yield subsequent false memory for the intensity of the CS+ in a post-experimental retrospective report. In sum, the present study has implications for understanding how fear generalization is related to the degree of fear intensity of a nonconditioned stimulus, the extent to which discrimination training efforts can thwart the generalization process, and how fear generalization affects stimulus recognition.     

The effects of feedback consistency and feedback favorability on self-perceived task competence and perceived feedback accuracy

The present study, employing a 2 × 2 true-experimental design and regression analyses assessed the main and interactive effects of feedback consistency (consistent vs inconsistent), and feedback favorability (acceptable vs superior), for feedback given at two time periods on measures of perceived feedback accuracy and self-perceived task competence. Among the study's findings were that (a) the perceived accuracy of feedback at the second period was a function of the favorability of feedback received at the first time period, (b) the self-perceived task competence levels of subjects were jointly determined by the favorability of feedback received at both time periods, and (c) the perceived accuracy of feedback was a function of its consistency. Organizational implications of the study's results are offered.     

Determinants of fear over the course of avoidance learning

Most theorists have explained attenuation of fear over the course of avoidance learning by assuming that fear extinguishes with repeated nonreinforced avoidance trials. Experiment 1 replicates the finding that rats trained to a criterion of 27 consecutive avoidance responses (CARs) show less fear during the CS than rats trained to a criterion of 3 or 9 CARs. This attenuation of fear cannot, however, be accounted for by simple Pavlovian fear extinction, because yoked partners receiving the exact same pattern of CSs and USs did not show this attenuation and did not differ from yoked partners receiving only reinforced CS presentations. Experiment 2 found that feedback from the master avoidance learner's response is sufficient to produce this attenuation in yoked animals; “control” per se is not necessary. Several possible explanations are discussed regarding the mechanism underlying this role of feedback in diminishing fear of the CS in the avoidance learning context.     

Cognitive coping with the threat of rape: vigilance and cognitive avoidance

Individual differences in women's avoidant and vigilant style in coping with the threat of rape were explored in four studies. In the first study, 97 women read a rape scenario and completed measures of cognitive vigilance and avoidance. They also provided ratings of fear of rape and anticipated coping problems in case of sexual assault. Vigilance was associated with significantly higher levels of fear of rape and anticipation of more severe coping problems. No effects were found for cognitive avoidance. Study 2 replicated these findings with a sample of 275 women. In addition, it showed that high vigilance was associated with significantly more rape-preventive behaviors. Study 3, including 172 women, was an online study on the effect of cognitive coping style on fear of rape, anticipated coping problems, and two behavioral measures of rape avoidance. High vigilance was related to higher levels of fear of rape, anticipation of more severe coping problems, and more rape-preventive behaviors. Finally, Study 4 (N=210) showed that individual differences in cognitive coping style affected rape-related affect and behavior in the absence of a rape scenario, underlining the chronic salience of the threat of rape for women. Vigilance was positively related to fear of rape, rape-avoidance behavior, and anticipated coping problems. In contrast, a negative relationship was found between cognitive avoidance and fear of rape, rape-avoidance strategies, and anticipated coping problems. Across the four studies, no evidence was found for an interactive effect of cognitive avoidance and vigilance, as suggested by the construct of repression versus sensitization. The findings are discussed in the light of previous research on repression-sensitization in coping with threatening information.     

The actions of others as determinants of behavior in social trap situations

Three studies were conducted to determine the effects of observing the behaviors of others upon an individual's actions in a simulated social trap situation. In Experiment 1, it was found that merely having the opportunity to make comparative appraisals of the actions of others led to greater competition for a finite common resource than when subjects were physically isolated from one another. In Experiment 2, false feedback was given to subjects to determine if the actions of others alone were responsible for the deleterious effects of having the opportunity for comparative appraisal; it was found that subjects quickly conformed to the behavior pattern of the interacting others, regardless of whether the false feedback indicated that the other subjects were consuming more or less than no-treatment control subjects. Experiment 3 was conducted to determine the motivation of subjects reacting to the actions of others; differential predictions based upon a competition/relative outcome explanation and upon an information search explanation were made. The data were consistent with the information search explanation.     

The role of risk perception and efficacy cognitions in the prediction of HIV-related preventive behavior and condom use

The salience of the Protection Motivation Theory to HIV preventive behavior was investigated in a sample of 468 heterosexual men 20-45 years of age recruited in Germany and at vacation spots in Spain. This theory conceptualizes self-protective behaviors as a function of the severity of the threat, perceived personal vulnerability to this threat, the availability of coping responses, and the effectiveness of these responses. Cognitive variables measured included perceived severity of the threat of AIDS, sexual self-efficacy expectancy, self-efficacy expectations in terms of sexual communication skills, response efficacy, and attitude toward condom use. On a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high), perceived severity of the AIDS threat averaged 5.3, individual susceptibility ratings averaged 3.5, and susceptibility of peers had a mean of 4.9. Although 33% of respondents had made behavioral changes in response to the AIDS epidemic, only 15% always used condoms while 12% used them occasionally. Self-efficacy expectancy with regard to assertiveness and use of preventive measures emerged as the most significant predictor of HIV-related behaviors. The causal analyses indicated that high communicative self-efficacy expectancy is associated with high-risk sexual behaviors, while self-efficacy expectancy regarding assertiveness and the use of preventive measures promotes risk reduction. These associations were strongest in men over 26 years of age, singles, and tourists. These findings suggest a need for interventions for couples such as assertiveness training and guidance on communicating about sex and AIDS. Also demonstrated was the need for AIDS education programs to identify where participants are in terms of perceiving the threat of and coping with the AIDS epidemic and promote conditions that will help people advance to the next stage.     

Caffeine ingestion,misattribution therapy,and speech anxiety

While theoretical analogs of misattribution therapy appeared promising (Nisbett & Schachter, 1966; Ross, Rodin, & Zimbardo, 1969), attempts with clinically relevant behaviors have not been so successful (Kellogg & Baron, 1975; Singerman, Borkovec, & Baron, 1976). Since the plausibility of the misattribution manipulation appears to be the central problem, the present study attempted to increase plausibility by manipulating familiarity with the setting and actual psychological arousal in a clinically relevant situation. Subjects only slightly fearful of giving speeches presented a speech in front of two observers. Familiarity was varied by having half of the subjects give a pretest speech, while arousal was manipulated by having half of the subjects ingest caffeine while the others ingested a placebo just prior to the test speech. The subjects' attributions were varied by giving them either arousal or irrelevant symptom instructions regarding the effects of the ingested drug. Direct suggestion rather than misattribution effects occurred: Those subjects receiving arousal symptoms reported more nervousness than subjects who had received irrelevant symptoms. The authors conclude that while the misattribution effect may have experimental validity, it is not effective with clinically relevant behavior.     

Memories of Childhood Threat,Fear of Disclosure and Paranoid Ideation: A Mediation Analysis Using a Nonclinical Sample

This study investigated whether associations between childhood memories of threat and adult paranoia could be partially mediated by factors associated with impeded interpersonal communication (concealment and fear of disclosure of personal and distressing information). University undergraduates (N = 179) completed a battery of psychometric scales. Mediation analysis identified a direct effect between early memories of threat and paranoid ideation (B = 0.11, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.14], p = .00). A mediated effect between these variables was also significant (B = .05, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.07], p = .01). However, although significant associations were identified between memories of threat and each of the mediating variables (self-concealment, fear of self-disclosure, anxiety, depression) only fear of self-disclosure displayed a significant association with paranoid ideation (B = .05, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.07], p = .01).     

Effects of learned helplessness training on instrumental heart rate control in humans

In Experiment 1, subjects who received feedback contingent on short interbeat intervals (relative to a baseline period) learned to accelerate their heart rates, but subjects who received noncontingent feedback did not. In Experiment 2, subjects who were exposed to noncontingent aversive noises later showed significant performance deficits on both an instrumental and a cognitive task. Attributional style predicted helplessness deficits on the cognitive but not the instrumental task. Experiment 3 demonstrated that experimentally induced helplessness interferes with biofeedback learning. Attributional style did not predict the occurrence of helplessness deficits in this context. Results are discussed in terms of the nature of biofeedback training and the range of behaviors that learned helplessness training affects.     

Observer states and traits and the imitative process: A test of a new formulation

In three studies the formulation was tested that characteristics of the observer have an effect on imitation only in situations which provide little information concerning appropriate or expected behaviors. In Experiment I, female college students of high, medium, and low need for social approval underwent either a high or low arousal manipulation. Subjects observed a videotaped model who engaged in a size judgment task. For half the subjects the model received verbal reward (high information); for the other half the model received no feedback (low information). Subsequently, the model and subject responded alternately in the task during which no feedback was given. Neither need for social approval nor manipulated arousal was found to be systematically related to imitation in either information condition. However, the hypothesized relationships were found when subjects' arousal or anxiety levels were determined by self ratings. These results were replicated in a second, similar experiment. In a third experiment, which involved an improved arousal manipulation, the hypothesized relationships were confirmed.     

Loomingness and the Fear of AIDS: Perceptions of Motion and Menace

The authors examined the role of "perceived loomingness" in fear of HIV. Perceived loomingness refers to perceptions of rapid forward movement and instantaneous changes in the distance and danger of a potential threat (Riskind, 1992). One hundred and twenty undergraduates rated vignettes of two public encounters with an HIV-positive stranger. High-HIV fear subjects perceived greater loomingness and danger in these vignettes than did low-HIV fear subjects. Regression analyses that tested for a mediated model confirmed that the perceptions of loomingness may spark threat cognitions (such as the probability and imminence of harm), which, in turn, lead to fear. As predicted by the harm-looming model, loomingness also had some effects on fear that were not mediated by such standard threat cognitions.     

Self-assessment and task performance

The present study tested the idea that the amount of effort expended in task performance is a function of the amount of uncertainty in one's ability level the resulting outcomes are expected to reduce. Two determinants of expected uncertainty reduction were manipulated: prior uncertainty about one's ability level and the diagnosticity of the task. Subjects first performed an initial task and then received fictitious feedback to manipulate their prior uncertainty. To induce low uncertainty, the feedback implied that the subjects are highly likely to have either low, intermediate, or a high level of ability. To induce high uncertainty, the feedback implied that the various ability levels were equally probable. Subjects then performed a task whose perceived diagnosticity regarding the ability under consideration was varied. As expected, subjects who were highly uncertain about their ability level performed better than subjects who were relatively certain they possessed either low, intermediate, or a high level of ability. Performance also improved with task diagnosticity, and the effect of task diagnosticity on performance was more pronounced when prior uncertainty was high than when it was low. Past research on the relationship between prior feedback and subsequent performance was discussed in light of the present results and a self-assessment model of achievement behavior.