论《周易》中的生命伦理意蕴

《周易》哲学本质上就是有关"生命"的道德哲学。《周易》以"生"为体,从伦理本体论的角度揭示了生命的本源、意义与价值,从而确证了"顺天"之于人之当为的根本意义。"顺天"也即"顺性命之理",因为"性"与"命"皆是天道在不同向度上的表现或要求。因此"穷理尽性以至于命"就是人的生命存在之应然,也是人之生命最完美的终极表现。而其途径即"和顺于道德而理于义",也即顺应天道之"正"。"养正则吉"可视为《周易》生命伦理的工夫原则,它不同于现代物理与精神"养生",这是一种涉及养万物之生、万民之生、个体身心兼养的全面的"养生"。《周易》的这些思想,对于我们在改造自然和处理人工干预生命进程等生命伦理问题时,具有重要的启发意义。     

道与生命存在——《庄子·养生主》发微

庄子认为,个体的生命有其限度,一味地追求无尽的外部知识,意味着以有限追随无限,从而陷于困顿之境。这一看法蕴含着如下观念:合理的选择在于从追求外部世界的知识回归自我本身。在社会领域,对个体生命存在的多方面肯定,以"为善无近名,为恶无近刑"为前提。通过"庖丁解牛"的寓言,庄子突出了"技进于道",这里的"道"也就是普遍的自然法则,养生的关键在于"依乎天理""因其固然",亦即合乎自然法则。养生的直接意义关乎生命的延续,然而生又与死相对,对生的理解无法离开对死的把握,后者同时关乎个体和类的关系。以薪火关系为喻,庄子肯定个体总有消亡之时,又确认了类的恒久延续。     

浅析中国传统艺术的精神性——儒道释美学思想比较

儒道释三家思想可谓殊途同归,他们最终的目标始终是"天人合一"。由此看出,中国传统美学、中国传统艺术都非常重视作为世界主体的人,因而使得它们更富于主体性和精神性。儒家由天道入人道,推崇人的伦理秩序和博爱之心,是个体人格向精神向宇宙本体的融合。道家由人道入天道,追求绝对自由。禅宗追求的是人的心性与佛性在精神层面上的升华和统一,追求与大自然的融合,追求真正体验生命冲动和生命情调的审美意境。这其间,自然与人,宇宙与个体,主体与个体都在"天人合一"中找到了归宿和位置。而这一点正决定了中国传统美学的特质,决定了中国传统艺术的精神性。     

歌德的《论花岗岩》——为现代个体生命奠定自然根基

在歌德的普罗米修斯神话研究中,在歌德神话人生之中,我们时时看到花岗岩意象在闪耀。首先,花岗岩意象之于歌德来说,它是主体对世界的立场。歌德的神义论表明,人类的存在并非自然的,只有灵魂不朽是自然的。我们只有在融合水成论和火成论的层面上建立对世界的基础的信靠。其次,花岗岩作为基础的信靠性在现代市民社会里表现为"永恒的根基"被个体的非道德性侵蚀,我们应"顺乎伟大的生命"为生命不朽创造基础。最后,花岗岩蕴藏的自然奥秘以歌德所谓的"自然兴现"的方式向我们的审美知觉敞开,以此建立一种理解自我与世界的核心形象,倾心呼唤作为生命之根的自然。     

社会价值观念与国民结合研究的重要维度——“熵”对于理解认同和共识机制的启示

一定意义上,存在于社会生活中的"熵"可以作为表征新世界观的哲学范畴。在个体意识和社会意识中存在着以"熵"为标志值的有序和无序状态,"熵"定律决定了在一个封闭系统中"熵"总是自发地趋向于大,因此个体意识和社会意识必须自为地通过认同和共识打破封闭性,从外界"摄取自由能量",使其中的"熵"由高向低转化。这种自为性以"生命的第一本能"形式体现出来,更以"人的类特性"形式体现出来。人文精神作为关于生命过程的社会意识积淀,在本质上就是对于自由的不断追求。体现人文精神时代特征的社会价值观念,只有通过认同和共识,以提高主体行为有序性和有效性的方式,才能对社会产生积极影响;即便如此,社会价值观念融入个体意识和社会意识时,其"熵"值也应控制在一定的"度"之内。这就要求用人文精神时代特征作为"原则",对认同和共识进行批判,以调整个体意识和社会意识有序与无序之间的态势,把握个体意识和社会意识"熵"值中的"度"。     

“永恒”和“背后世界”:拟尼采与克尔凯郭尔的对话

尼采曾把那些认为在我们生活的现实世界背后存在着一个更完满的世界的人称为"背后世界论者",他们因"痛苦和无能",经"致命的一跃"达到终极的疲惫。这个"跳跃"的意象很容易让人联想到克尔凯郭尔的信仰学说。但是,克尔凯郭尔通过揭示"道成肉身"原则的存在论意义,把"神步入时间"转变成"永恒真理在时间中生成"的哲学命题。对于生存者来说,永恒不在身后,永恒就是未来,他要在时间中与永恒真理建立关系。这个认识突破了古希腊"回忆说"所蕴含的永恒真理在我们身后的认识,凸显了个体在时间中面向未来生存的意义。相比之下,尼采经历了从宣扬艺术形而上学到批判"背后世界论"的思想历程。他最终提出了"相同者的永恒轮回"的思想,其中蕴含的极度张扬生命意志的"生命形而上学"实际上就是支撑着尼采的"背后世界"。     

从思维方式看屈原生命悲剧的人性深度

屈原的生命精神是个体与社会绝对统一的绝对集体主义,具有"无我"的"准宗教"性。这种"准宗教"性的生命精神具有走向悲剧的必然性,其原因在于他把"知性思维"推上了"形而上学"的极端。这也是屈原不同于儒道之避免悲剧的根本原因。"知性思维"与"辩证思维"一样,也是人类运用自己的理性把握世界及自身的思维方式,是人的"知性理性"的具体展开,是人性被激发起来的一种存在状态。因此,屈原因其知性思维方式而促成的生命悲剧不是浅层次上的生死观问题,而是在人性层面上显示出来的深度悲剧。     

"宗教乡愁"如何可能?

宗教乡愁(religious nostalgia)是伊利亚德表述的一个重要概念.它意指对神圣的渴望,渴望回归于起源性的时间,也就是渴望回归于众神的临在,而存在于"彼时"(illo tempore)的世界里.本文沿着"宗教乡愁如何可能"的追问,试着探讨宗教认知方式的本体论根源.本文认为人的有死与有限的生存方式成就了这种本体性的根源,此外,正是宗教乡愁使人成为完全的人,获得宗教与文化意义上的生命.     

如何过上有意义的生活?——基于生命意义理论模型的整合

在整个生命历程中,个体没有停止过对自身生命意义的探寻。生命意义是个体从其生活经历或经验中萃取的生活的目标和重要性,它根源于个体对自己、世界以及自己与世界关系的理解。生命意义具有促进身心健康的作用,具体表现为增进身体健康,提升幸福感与生活满意度,引发积极应对方式,促进人际和谐,提高学习与工作绩效,以及修复心理创伤促进心理成长等。生命意义形成的理论模型主要包括寻找意义模型、应对与成长模型、整合模型、双系统模型、五"A"模型和层次模型等6种。这些模型主要包含情境性意义和一般性意义这两种意义形态,并认为它们之间的不一致性是意义构建的动力。基于此,本文进一步推论这种不一致性所带来的心理需求未满足感才是意义构建的根本动力。未来研究将更加注重生命意义内涵的整合和作用的挖掘,验证基本心理需求是否满足与生命意义形成之间的关系,以及推进生命意义的认知神经机制及跨文化比较研究。     

略论徐梵澄的精神哲学与儒家诠释学

徐梵澄先生是当代中国的学术大家和思想大家,他关于中国精神哲学的整全性理解,贯彻的方法就是经典的互诠、互证以及相互的转义,并有效地融入了个体的生命体验和文化的忧患意识。徐先生所持重的儒家诠释学,试图提升儒家之精神性和神圣性的维度,为重建中国儒家的"永恒生命"提供了一个健康的发展方向。徐先生以儒家的生命哲学为安身立命之所(圣门),是当之无愧的"当代新儒家"。     

Doing things with music

This paper is an exploration of how we do things with music—that is, the way that we use music as an “esthetic technology” to enact micro-practices of emotion regulation, communicative expression, identity construction, and interpersonal coordination that drive core aspects of our emotional and social existence. The main thesis is: from birth, music is directly perceived as an affordance-laden structure. Music, I argue, affords a sonic world, an exploratory space or “nested acoustic environment” that further affords possibilities for, among other things, (1) emotion regulation and (2) social coordination. When we do things with music, we are engaged in the work of creating and cultivating the self, as well as creating and cultivating a shared world that we inhabit with others. I develop this thesis by first introducing the notion of a “musical affordance”. Next, I look at how “emotional affordances” in music are exploited to construct and regulate emotions. I summon empirical research on neonate music therapy to argue that this is something we emerge from the womb knowing how to do. I then look at “social affordances” in music, arguing that joint attention to social affordances in music alters how music is both perceived and appropriated by joint attenders within social listening contexts. In support, I describe the experience of listening to and engaging with music in a live concert setting. Thinking of music as an affordance-laden structure thus reaffirms the crucial role that music plays in constructing and regulating emotional and social experiences in everyday life.     

Transmission of the Communicative Competence: Genetic,Cultural, When,and How?

Several recent contributions from various disciplines have improved the interpretation of determinants influencing the interrelated processes of speech acquisition, and cognitive and emotional development. The existence of precursors of abstract symbolisation and of words in the animal world suggest a continuity in the evolution of communicative capacities. In man, evolution has not only favoured a specific precocity in communicative development in infants, but also the co-evolution of a species-specific environmental support for speech acquisition in caretakers. Thus, speech acquisition results from both biogenetic predispositions and environmental support as it becomes evident in micro-analysis of parent-infant interactions and experimental verifications. The preverbal period of communicative development appears in a new light from theoretical and clinical views.     

The Problem of Evil: A Solution From Science

In this essay, I attempt to solve the problem of the existence of evil in a world created by an omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent God. I conclude that evil exists because God wanted to create moral creatures. Because choice is necessary for morality, God created creatures with enormous capacities for choice—and therefore enormous capacities for evil. Material creatures are subject to pain and death because, for such creatures, moral choices are deeply serious. The laws that underlie the material world and from which material life arises are such that, from their workings out on a planet that can support life, natural evils happen.     

Translating the covenant: The behavior analyst as ambassador and translator

Behavior analysts should be sensitive to how others react to and interpret our language because it is inextricably related to our image. Our use of conceptual revision, with such terms as punishment, has created communicative confusion and hostility on the part of general and professional audiences we have attempted to influence. We must, therefore, adopt the role of ambassador and translator in the nonbehavioral world. A number of recommendations are offered for promoting, translating, and disseminating behavior analysis.     

Alfred Schutz’ Theory of Communicative Action

This paper addresses the notion of communicative action on the basis of Alfred Schutz’ writings. In Schutz’ work, communication is of particular significance and its importance is often neglected by phenomenologists. Communication plays a crucial role in his first major work, the Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt from 1932, yet communication is also a major feature in his unfinished works which were later completed posthumously by Thomas Luckmann: The Structures of the Life World (1973, 1989). In these texts, Schutz sometimes refers to “communicative action,” and he comes to ascribe a crucial role to communication within the domain of the life world he calls everyday life. Based on Schutz’ texts, I shall first attempt to critically reconstruct the defining features of his notion of communication and communicative action. As a result, it emerges that Schutz’ notion of communication, particularly in its early incarnation, seems to be, at first glance, characterized by a dichotomy between virtual communication, that is communicative action in a narrow sense, and non-virtual communication. As I want to show with respect to the seemingly established dichotomous distinction between “mediated” and “immediate social action,” Schutz himself started to overcome this dichotomy. Based on this thesis, I will try to sketch a basic outline of a theory of communicative action, a theory less formulated by Schutz’ than built on Schutz’ writings. As the idea of communicative action, and particularly the transgression of the distinction between mediated and immediate action, affects the very structures of the life-world described by Schutz and Luckmann, I will ultimately demonstrate that any mundane phenomenology of the life-world requires a triangulatory method.     

All too skeptical theism

Skeptical theism contends that, due to our cognitive limitations, we cannot expect to be able to determine whether there are reasons which justify God’s permission of apparently unjustified evils. Because this is so, the existence of these evils does not constituted evidence against God’s existence. A common criticism is that the skeptical theist is implicitly committed to other, less palatable forms of skepticism, especially moral skepticism. I examine a recent defense against this charge mounted by Michael Bergmann. I point out that the Bergmannian skeptical theist is unable to determine concerning any event or feature of the world whether that feature or event is good or evil all-things-considered. Because of this the skeptical theist must abandon any attempt to act in such a way that the world becomes better rather than worse as a result. These, I claim, are seriously skeptical conclusions, and should cause us to be skeptical about skeptical theism itself.     

Nature vs. nurture is nonsense: On the necessity of an integrated genetic,social, developmental,and personality psychology

The field of behavioural genetics unambiguously demonstrates that heritable individual differences exist and are important in explaining human behaviour. Despite this, some psychological perspectives ignore this research. If we wish to comprehensively understand the impact of parenting, the environment, or any social factor, however, we must engage with genetics. In this article, I review research that reveals that genes affect not only our personalities, but the way that we understand and react to the social world. Studies further reveal that notable life events are in part explained by genetic variance. I detail how this could be the case through active, evocative, and passive genetic correlations, and go on to argue that all complex psychological traits are likely the result of multifaceted gene by environment interactions. A mistaken belief that genetic influence implies genetic essentialism, and is therefore tantamount to prejudice, is raised as possible reason why heritability is often ignored in the social sciences. The article concludes with practical suggestions for how we can embrace behavioural genetics as our methods struggle to match the divine complexity of human existence.     

How to Do Things with Emotional Expressions: The Theory of Affective Pragmatics

It is widely accepted that emotional expressions can be rich communicative devices. We can learn much from the tears of a grieving friend, the smiles of an affable stranger, or the slamming of a door by a disgruntled lover. So far, a systematic analysis of what can be communicated by emotional expressions of different kinds and of exactly how such communication takes place has been missing. The aim of this article is to introduce a new framework for the study of emotional expressions that I call the theory of affective pragmatics (TAP). As linguistic pragmatics focuses on what utterances mean in a context, affective pragmatics focuses on what emotional expressions mean in a context. TAP develops and connects two principal insights. The first is the insight that emotional expressions do much more than simply expressing emotions. As proponents of the Behavioral Ecology View of facial movements have long emphasized, bodily displays are sophisticated social tools that can communicate the signaler's intentions and requests. Proponents of the Basic Emotion View of emotional expressions have acknowledged this fact, but they have failed to emphasize its importance, in part because they have been in the grip of a mistaken theory of emotional expressions as involuntary readouts of emotions. The second insight that TAP aims to articulate and apply to emotional expressions is that it is possible to engage in analogs of speech acts without using language at all. I argue that there are important and so far largely unexplored similarities between what we can “do” with words and what we can “do” with emotional expressions. In particular, the core tenet of TAP is that emotional expressions are a means not only of expressing what's inside but also of directing other people's behavior, of representing what the world is like and of committing to future courses of action. Because these are some of the main things we can do with language, the take home message of my analysis is that, from a communicative point of view, much of what we can do with language we can also do with non-verbal emotional expressions. I conclude by exploring some reasons why, despite the analogies I have highlighted, emotional expressions are much less powerful communicative tools than speech acts.     

Derived embodiment and imaginative capacities in interactional expertise

Interactional expertise is said to be a form of knowledge achieved in a linguistic community and, therefore, obtained entirely outside practice. Supposedly, it is not or only minimally sustained by the so-called embodied knowledge. Here, drawing upon studies in contemporary neuroscience and cognitive psychology, I propose that ‘derived’ embodiment is deeply involved in competent language use and, therefore, also in interactional expertise. My argument consists of two parts. First, I argue for a strong relationship among language acquisition, language use and the real world (i.e. the world accessible to the senses). Biological constraints in very early childhood anchor language to the body. These constraints are by-products of our evolutionary peculiarity that we gain because of our physical and psychological immaturity at birth. Thus, infancy is predominantly concerned with the bodily needs and experiences of the concrete while language acquisition takes place. Particular interest in the concrete furnishes our linguistic world and installs ‘concrete’ language as the principal constituent of competent language use. Second, I argue that well-established concrete language implicitly and explicitly elicits mental representations, namely partial reactivations of sensorimotor states that occur during experience. These are stepping stones by which we subsequently make sense of expressions in new linguistic areas. Like any competent language user, the interactional expert, therefore, prompts multimodal imagination and re-enacts concrete experiences when acquiring linguistic knowledge pertaining to a specialist field. Finally, I outline the characteristics of those imaginative powers to identify mechanisms that improve interactional expertise and discuss the obvious relation between interactional expertise and ordinary knowledge acquisition after the concrete language stage.     

Language and know-how

I address the assumption that communicative interaction is made possible by knowledge of a language. I argue that this assumption as it is usually expressed depends on an unjustified reification of language, and on an unsatisfactory understanding of ‘knowledge’. I propose instead that communicative interaction is made possible by (Rylean) know-how and by the development of (Davidsonian) passing theories. We then come to see that our focus ought to be, not on propositional knowledge of a language which we internally represent, but on the practical application of know-how in our understanding and interpretation of others.