形式显示的诠释学何以可能?——兼论形式显示方法在海德格尔“纳托普报告”中的隐秘出场

尽管早期海德格尔在他的一个核心文本“纳托普报告”中没有直接讨论形式显示方法,甚至没有出现过“形式显示”这个名称,但事实上,形式显示及其核心内容亦即对现象的三重意义方向的划分已经被海德格尔化用在他的具体阐释之中了。一方面,海德格尔借助于对实际生活之沉沦趋向的反向动变和否定性的优先性阐明了形式显示的防御特征;另一方面,他又从形式显示的开端特征出发,分析了诠释学处境的基本结构,并由此走向了一种形式显示的诠释学构想。     

作为发生事件(Ereignis)的生命体验——关于青年海德格尔早期弗莱堡讲座的构境论解读

在1919年早期的弗莱堡讲座"哲学的观念与世界观问题"中,海德格尔通过对问题体验的分析,提出了超出意识现象学的界限,在前理论的周围世界的"世界化"中突显"自行给出的东西",这就是作为发生事件(Ereignis)的生命体验。     

海德格尔学术思想文本中的“怎样”(Wie)——构境论文本学新得

海德格尔的哲学之思,并非一种由单层线性的同质性进化和异质转向所构成的历时性思想体,而是一个复杂的迷宫式的多层思想构境:海德格尔一生的主要劳作是在马克思对形而上学的颠覆和尼采对全部西方文明的终结之后,使形而上学启始的全部西方文化复基于被遗忘的存在;经过艰辛的努     

佛教伦理思想中的生命关怀精神——兼论印顺法师的“人之正性”思想

佛教伦理以缘起论为理论基石,万事万物皆缘集而生、缘散而灭,启示人们应正视相互之间的依存性,自觉意识并担当起应尽的社会责任;佛教伦理以慈悲为怀,拔众生之苦痛、予众生以快乐,启示人们应积极投身到救灾扶贫、照顾鳏寡孤独等社会公益事业中来,为缓解弱势群体之困厄、促进社会之和谐作出应有的贡献;佛教伦理倡导忍辱精进精神,有助人们倡导和营建一个宽容而进取的社会。佛教伦理中蕴含的强烈的关注人生、关怀生命等精神价值资源,有益于人们在竞争日趋激烈的今天,调适自己的心灵,从而使生命得到真正地安顿。印顺法师的“人之正性”思想,立足于人心浮躁和困惑的现代人间世,吁求人们扬弃“众生性”而完满“人之正性”,进一步开显佛性,冀此来提升现代人的精神品质和追求,从而实现社会的和谐与安康。     

“圣贤气象”与生命风范——宋代理学“圣贤气象”论的美学解读

“圣贤气象”为儒者的有机生命在日常生活中呈现于他者的意象,是感性与理性、生命与形式的统一,具有着整体性、时机性与主体间性的特征。以德性为主,知识、思想、经验、性格、气质等要素均参与到“圣贤气象”的主体生成之中。尽管宋代理学存在着“理性压倒感性”的倾向,但“圣贤气象”的根源并不在于此,而在于两者之间所形成的动态和谐关系。于宋儒而言,“圣贤气象”是具身化的道之显现,具有感性的美感并不断呼唤着他者的感知,成为了儒家经典诠释的重点和儒家示范伦理得以维系的关键所在。     

意志与让予的交错——论海德格尔式“泰然让之”的内在结构及其伦理缺失

\"泰然让之(Gelassenheit)\"是理解海德格尔后期技术批判以及存有之思的关键概念。它具有一种双向结构:一是存有本身的层面,即存有本身的自行敞开与让予;二是属人层面,即人对存有本身之让予的让予。其中,属人层面的泰然让之又具有三个环节:从主体性强力意志以及表象性思维中的\"让出\"——无所施为地等待——\"让\"自身\"入\"于存有本身的自行敞开。然而,泰然让之并非一种消极性的存在姿态,而是有着\"力量和决心\"在其中隐藏和支配着,通过归属于存有而促进自身本己本质的提高,从而呈现出意志与让予相交错的结构。此外,泰然让之作为海德格尔后期所谓\"源始伦理学\"的核心姿态,必然会使得自我与他人的关联隶属于与存有本身的关联,从而为列维纳斯的他者伦理所批评。但需要注意二者的视角差异,以及两种伦理观之间的互补性。     

论“形式显示”在海德格尔思想中的实质含义——基于对《宗教现象学导论》的文本分析

对于海德格尔的"形式显示"思想,国内外学者已进行了大量研究,但可能仍未彻底澄清其为何如此重要。海德格尔本人在《宗教现象学导论》中曾罕见地用一章篇幅详细阐释了"形式显示"思想的来龙去脉,这一文本作为所有相关研究的基石理应得到彻底阐明。通过对它的深入分析并结合前后期海氏思想语境,我们将会看到,"形式显示"事实上具有"存在论差异"和"存在与人之关联"的双重意蕴,也正是这两种至关重要的意蕴决定了"形式显示"的那种无与伦比的重要性。     

“事之空性”——和辻哲郎对海德格尔的超越

和辻哲郎关于“事”的哲学思考,既有西田几多郎思想的影响,亦有以西田思想为媒介对海德格尔现象学的解释学批判性接受过程。具言之,和辻关于“物-事”关系的思考,起初只有作为“事”之“事”性的“行”,即只有“事”的一极。在受到海德格尔用具理论影响后,和辻尝试恢复之前被“事”所压抑的“物”,创造出“物”与“事”的两极构造。最后,“空”作为一切现实性的主体性根源,通过否定的辩证运动使“主体”再生,“物-事”的两极构造被转化为“物-事-者”的三极构造。总之,和辻通过借用海德格尔现象学的解释学方法,打破了实体性的自我同一的“物”的基始性,确立了“事”之“空”性,构建了有别于海德格尔“此在”伦理的关系伦理。     

儒道边界的内在性与流动性——魏晋时期“经玄”关系之辨证性研究

玄学究竟为附着于经学抑或与其对立,是魏晋经学史上的一个重要问题.在魏晋时期,经学与玄学之间的边界是“内在性”的而非“外在性”的,其界限是“流动”的而非“停滞”的,显现儒道两家在思想上具有“相互否定”“相互依存”“相互融合”之特点,两者的差异性最后统一在广义的“经学”中,因此,玄学是经学发展到魏晋时期的一个环节和阶段.儒...     

“中华民族的新文化”何以自信——毛泽东诗词的文化之“志”解读

作为诗、史、思有机结合的传世经典,毛泽东诗词在诗化语言中凝聚着以毛泽东为代表的中国共产党人建立“中华民族的新文化”的情志。透过毛泽东的诗性思索,可察见这一新文化足以自信的深层原因在于：中国人民担当文化自信的主体力量,社会主义和共产主义引领文化自信的目标方向,中华大地提供文化自信的深厚土壤。毛泽东诗词蕴藏的文化之“志”富含辩证性,既突显自信与谦卑的对立统一,亦体现主体、目标、根基三位一体,昭示了“民族的科学的大众的”中华民族的新文化方向,为全面推进中华民族伟大复兴背景下的文化艺术发展提供了深刻启示。     

Anti-Realist Interpretations of Plato: Paul Natorp

The paper considers Paul Natorp's Kantian reading of Plato's theory of ideas, as developed in his monumental work, Platos Ideenlehre, eine Einführung in den Idealismus (1903, 1921). Central to Natrop's reading are, I argue, the following two claims: (1) Plato's ideas are laws, not things; and (2) Plato's theory of ideas in the first instance a theory about the possibility and nature of thought - in particular cognitive and indeed scientific or explanatory thought - and only as a consequence is it a theory about the nature of reality. Natrop thus argues that Plato's theory of ideas is at its heart a transcendental theory, and that Plato's metaphysics is built on this basis. The paper considers these claims - and their textual basis in Plato - in some detail, and attempts an initial evaluation of their plausibility as a reading of Plato. I am on the whole sympathetic to Natorp's reading, though a proper assessment goes beyond the present paper. The wider interest of this idealist or anti-realist reading of Plato ought to be obvious, especially in view of the commonly accepted assumption these days that both Plato and Aristotle, and indeed the Greeks in general, took realism entirely for granted (see e.g. M. Burnyeat). Natorp argues that this is true of Aristotle, but quite untrue of Plato. But he is quite clear that the idealism he ascribes to Plato is not Berkeleyan or metaphysical idealism, but a certain kind of transcendental or epistemological idealism. Natorp, however, is no uncritical follower of Kant, and the version of trascendental idealism that he ascribes to Plato is, I argue, very different from Kant's.     

Heidegger's Gods

The notorious difficulty of Heidegger's post‐Second World War discussions of ‘the gods’, along with scholarly disagreement about the import of those discussions, renders that body of work an unlikely place to look for a substantive theory of religion. The thesis of this article is that, contrary to these appearances, Heidegger's later works do contain clues for developing such a theory. Heidegger's concerns about the category of ‘religion’ are addressed, and two recent attempts to ‘de‐mythologize’ Heidegger's ‘gods’ are examined and criticized. The paper concludes by outlining four substantial contributions that Heidegger's later work makes to a phenomenological account of religion.     

Heidegger's Early Critique of Husserl

This paper examines Heidegger's critique of Husserl in its earliest extant formulation, viz. the lecture courses Ontologie from 1923 and Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung from 1923/4. Commentators frequently ignore these lectures, but I try to show that a study of them can reveal both the extent to which Heidegger remains committed to phenomenological research in something like its Husserlian form, and when and why Heidegger must part with Husserl. More specifically, I claim that Heidegger rightly criticizes Husserl's account of 'equipmental objects', and that he is especially unsatisfied with the terminology in which Husserl presents his phenomenological analyses, not only of 'equipment', but of other types of entities as well. However, it will also emerge that Heidegger's own phenomenological work presupposes the performance of what Husserl calls the 'epoch 7 ', the method of 'bracketing' natural knowledge. In this way, Heidegger's sometimes very severe critique must be understood as an internal critique.     

Heidegger's Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy

In this paper I seek to shed some light on Heidegger's conception of phenomenology, and on the relationship between Heidegger's conception and that of Husserl. In particular, I am concerned to elucidate the sense in which Heidegger's phenomenology can be seen as a species of transcendental philosophy. In the concluding section of the paper I briefly consider the significance of Heidegger's conception of phenomenology for his later philosophy, as represented by 'The Question Concerning Technology'.     

On Tugendhat's Analysis of Heidegger's Concept of Truth

This paper responds to Tugendhat's well‐known and influential critique of Heidegger's concept of truth with the resources of Heidegger's texts, in particular §44 of Being and Time. To start with, Tugendhat's primary critical argument is reconstructed. It is held to consist firstly in the charge of ambiguity against Heidegger's formulations of his concept of truth and secondly in the claim that Heidegger's concept of truth is incompatible with an adequate concept of falsehood. It is shown that the supposedly ambiguous meanings are, on the one hand, in fact clearly distinguished by Heidegger and, on the other, that they merely amount to different extensions of the same meaning of truth. It is then shown how this concept of truth is indeed compatible with an adequate, albeit post‐metaphysical, concept of falsehood. Finally, the grounds of falsehood in the untruth of the existential of Verfallen are pursued and further objections are dismissed.     

论海德格尔对康德实践哲学的解读

海德格尔对康德实践哲学的解读是他阐释康德哲学的重要组成部分。本文围绕着道德情感、实践理性、实践自由等问题分析了海德格尔在这一方面的解读内容,并且指出海德格尔的解读是定向于存在论的,属于基础存在论筹划,人的存在问题是关注的核心。他力图发掘康德思想中的存在论-生存论的内涵,这反而丧失了原初的伦理学意义。     

海德格尔的《精神现象学》解读:三个简论

该文是对海德格尔之黑格尔《精神现象学》解读工作的一个简述。文章首先简述了海德格尔解读《精神现象学》的三次尝试及其相关文献情况;其次分析了海德格尔之《精神现象学》解读中所致力考察过的三个要点,这三个要点都是从《精神现象学》一书标题之变更出发而引伸出的重大问题;最后,文章提示了进一步解读的三个可能方向。