From “philosophy of science”

Much of the most typical “New Criticism”; has been strongly rationalistic; especially critics who follow the line of I. A. Richards emphatically hold that one can reason about everything in poetry. The techniques developed within modern analytical philosophy have properties which make them well adapted to reconstructive criticism of such reasoning about poetry, for which purpose Professor Hunger‐land uses them with evident success. I shall give an account of her brilliant book, and after some critical remarks proceed to a discussion of the fruitfulness of her approach.     

A science of meaning. Can behaviorism bring meaning to psychological science?

An argument is presented for making meaning a central dependent variable in psychological science. Principles of operant psychology are then interpreted as providing a basic foundation for a science of meaning. The emphasis here is on the generality of basic operant concepts, where learning is a process of meaning making that is governed largely by natural contingencies; reinforcement is an organic process in which environment-behavior relations are selected, defined here as a dialectical process of meaning making; and reinforcers are experiential consequences with acquired, ecologically derived meanings. The author concludes with a call for a more interdisciplinary science of psychology, focusing on the individual in society.     

Kant’s conception of proper science

Kant is well known for his restrictive conception of proper science. In the present paper I will try to explain why Kant adopted this conception. I will identify three core conditions which Kant thinks a proper science must satisfy: systematicity, objective grounding, and apodictic certainty. These conditions conform to conditions codified in the Classical Model of Science. Kant’s infamous claim that any proper natural science must be mathematical should be understood on the basis of these conditions. In order to substantiate this reading, I will show that only in this way it can be explained why Kant thought (1) that mathematics has a particular foundational function with respect to the natural sciences and (2) as such secures their scientific status.     

Does cognitive science show belief in god to be irrational? The epistemic consequences of the cognitive science of religion

The last 15 years or so has seen the development of a fascinating new area of cognitive science: the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Scientists in this field aim to explain religious beliefs and various other religious human activities by appeal to basic cognitive structures that all humans possess. The CSR scientific theories raise an interesting philosophical question: do they somehow show that religious belief, more specifically belief in a god of some kind, is irrational? In this paper I investigate this question and argue that CSR does not show that belief in god is irrational.     

Is a science of psychotherapy possible? Subjectivity problems

Two sorts of subjectivity problems are discussed. The 1st concerns the characterization of psychotherapy as an attempt to alter clients' meanings. The 2nd concerns the seemingly subjective nature of value judgments about psychotherapy outcomes. It is argued that despite initial appearances, neither of these problems poses an insuperable difficulty for transforming the discipline of psychotherapy into a genuine science.     

Can there be a science of the symbolic?

Science means not just 'knowing', but knowing verified by replicability. Science is particularly hard to bring to depth psychology because the individual uniquenesses that can't be repeated are what make people most deeply themselves. Everyone, including the analytic investigator, however, has a science, in the sense of a world-view that is replicated by experience. Jung offered hermeneutics as an alternative mode to science for getting to know the psychological subject. But as Heidegger emphasized, hermeneutics always begins with the projection of a world-view, i.e., the science of the would-be interpreter. In the analytic situation, dialogue is available to test the world-view and enlarge its horizon, in accord with Gadamer's expansion of hermeneutics, 'the classical discipline concerned with the art of understanding texts', into a method of inquiry open to the possibilities of otherness. An example is given from an analytic training seminar, in which the author began by projecting his version of the theory of psychological types onto the dream material a candidate offered in response to the seminar. A dialogue with the candidate ensued which enabled the teacher to correct his original, somewhat rigid, application of his scientific viewpoint. In such a dialogue, psyche emerges as the final interpreter of what is, generating hypotheses that can fruitfully be applied to the understanding of other cases.     

What kind of research in psychoanalytic science?1

The kind of science that psychoanalysis is (can be), and the kind of research appropriate to it, qualitative and/or quantitative, have been divisive issues from the very inception of the discipline. I explore in detail the complexity of these issues, definitional and semantic, as well as methodological and substantive. A plea is made for the application of qualitative (idiographic)and quantitative (nomothetic) research methods, each to the extent that is appropriate, separately or in conjunction, across the entire spectrum of research domains in psychoanalysis, empirical, clinical, conceptual, historical, and interdisciplinary.     

Do gender–science stereotypes predict science identification and science career aspirations among undergraduate science majors?

The present research examined whether gender–science stereotypes were associated with science identification and, in turn, science career aspirations among women and men undergraduate science majors. More than 1,700 students enrolled in introductory science courses completed measures of gender–science stereotypes (implicit associations and endorsement of male superiority in science), science identification, and science career aspirations. Results were consistent with theoretically based predictions. Among women, stronger gender–science stereotypes were associated with weaker science identification and, in turn, weaker science career aspirations. By contrast, among men stronger gender–science stereotypes were associated with stronger science identification and, in turn, stronger science career aspirations, particularly among men who were highly gender identified. These two sets of modest but significant findings can accumulate over large populations and across critical time points within a leaky pipeline to meaningfully contribute to gender disparities in STEM domains.     

The birth of modern science out of the ‘European Miracle’

Journal for General Philosophy of Science - To understand the present situation we must know something about its history. The ‘Rise of the West’, which grew out of the ‘European...     

Is evidence-based practice diverse enough? Philosophy of science considerations

In its policy rationale for evidence-based practice in psychology (EBPP), the APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice claims to have constituted itself with "scientists and practitioners from a wide range of perspectives and traditions, reflecting the diverse perspectives within the field" (p. 273). We applaud this attention to diversity but contend that an entire perspective of the debate was omitted in the Task Force's newly approved policy and its underlying report. The failure to consider a philosophy of science perspective led the Task Force to make a number of epistemological assumptions that are not based on evidence or rationale and that thus violate the very spirit of evidence-based decision making. In this comment, we reveal a few of these assumptions and discuss their detrimental consequences.     

Local and normative rationality of science: The ‘content of discovery’ rehabilitated

The recent turn to the context of discovery and other postmodernist developments in the philosophy of science have undermined the idea of a universal rationality of science. This parallels the fate of the classical dream of a logic of discovery. Still, justificational questions have remained as a distinct perspective, though comprising both consequential and generative justification — an insight delayed by certain confusions about the (original) context distinction. An examination of one particular heuristic strategy shows its local rationality; even as an efficient procedure of hypothesis generation, it carries probative weight. It will be explored in which respects such a strategy can be normative or contain normative elements.Parts of this paper were published, in summary fashion, in Kirschenmann (1989).     

Parent-child conversations about science: the socialization of gender inequities?

This study investigated the family as a context for the gender typing of science achievement. Adolescents (N = 52) from 2 age levels (mean ages = 11 and 13 years) participated with their mothers and fathers on separate occasions; families were from predominantly middle-income European American backgrounds. Questionnaires measured the parents' and the child's attitudes. Each parent also engaged his or her child in 4 structured teaching activities (including science and nonscience tasks). There were no child gender or grade-level differences in children's science-related grades, self-efficacy, or interest. However, parents were more likely to believe that science was less interesting and more difficult for daughters than sons. In addition, parents' beliefs significantly predicted children's interest and self-efficacy in science. When parents' teaching language was examined, fathers tended to use more cognitively demanding speech with sons than with daughters during one of the science tasks.     

Using principles of cognitive science to improve science learning in middle school: What works when and for whom?

Four principles of cognitive science were used to make systematic revisions in middle school science instructional modules from two kinds of curriculum: one popular textbook series and one popular hands‐on series (two modules each). Schools were randomly assigned to 1 of the 3 arms (cognitive science modifications with professional development, active control with professional development, or business‐as‐usual). Two cohorts of students were followed in each arm for each setting. There were significant benefits of the cognitive science intervention, but the nature of effects varied for the two settings and curricula. For the text‐based curriculum, positive effects of cognitive science modifications were concentrated in classrooms with lower proportions of underrepresented minority students. For the hands‐on curriculum, there were positive effects that were not linked to school composition. Participation in the active control did not significantly improve student learning. Implications for policy and research are discussed.     

The future of psychotherapy outcome research: science or political rhetoric?

Although the relationship between research and clinical psychology has at times been conflicted, it has also been productive. Psychologists from both specialties have benefited from each others' work. The area of psychotherapy outcome research represents an important interface between the fields of clinical and research psychology. In an era of scarce resources and demands for accountability, there is pressure for researchers to justify the value of clinical practices. Recently, numerous articles have appeared recommending changes to the way psychotherapy research is conducted. The authors of these articles emphasize with urgency the importance of conducting and reporting research in a manner that will influence the decisions of policymakers and sanction funding for psychotherapy services. This article is an exploration of the impact of these recommendations, whose objective appears to be the promotion of psychological techniques for inclusion in clinical practice guidelines. It is argued that such recommendations may be in conflict with the philosophy and methods of science and may adversely affect public perception, perhaps leading psychologists to be seen as political lobbyists rather than clinicians and researchers.     

Is science like a crossword puzzle? Foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant

This paper argues that the crossword puzzle analogy is great for scientific rationality, but not scientific warrant. It provides a critical analysis of foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant, especially that of Susan Haack, and closely related positions, such as non-doxastic coherentism. Foundherentism takes the middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism. The main idea is that warrant, including that of scientific theories, is like warrant of crossword entries: the degree to which a theory is warranted depends on one’s observations, the extent to which it coheres with one’s other scientific theories and whether one’s evidence includes a sufficiently large portion of the relevant evidence. I identify three problems for a foundherentist conception of scientific warrant, two of which are also problems for the image of science as a crossword puzzle. First, Haack’s conceptions of personal and social warrant of scientific theories are incompatible. Second, the notion of warrant defeaters is crucial to any account of warrant, but foundherentism cannot accommodate certain warrant defeaters. Third, Haack’s treatment of inconsistent evidence renders her account of social warrant for scientific theories implausible. Finally, I suggest that switching from the objective notion of warrant to the subjective notion of rationality might save foundherentism about scientific theories and the image of science as a crossword puzzle. I also draw lessons for social epistemology generally by applying the distinction between warrant and rationality to non-doxastic coherentism and Paul Faulkner’s hybrid theory of testimonial warrant.     

Yearning for certainty and the critique of medicine as “science”

A debate has simmered concerning the nature of clinical reasoning, especially diagnostic reasoning: Is it a “science” or an “art”? The trend since the seventeenth century has been to regard medical reasoning as scientific reasoning, and the most advanced clinical reasoning is the most scientific. However, in recent years, several scholars have argued that clinical reasoning is clearly not “science” reasoning, but is in fact a species of narratival or hermeneutical reasoning. The study reviews this dispute, and argues that in a theoretical sense, the dispute rests upon a naïve—but very popular—caricature of what constitutes “science reasoning.” But, if the dispute rests upon just such a caricature, why is it so persistent? The study concludes by suggesting that we, as patients and as physicians, have deep psychological tendencies that incline us to adopt the very naïve “science” concept/model of diagnostic reasoning, even if (or when) we understand its inaptness.