Hegel on Kant's Analytic–Synthetic Distinction

In this paper, I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/synthetic distinction—that, indeed, his version of the distinction deserves to be called Kantian. For both Kant and Hegel, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be explained in terms of the discursive character of cognition: insofar as our cognition is discursive, its most basic form can be articulated in terms of a genus/species tree. The structure of that tree elucidates the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Second, I argue that Hegel has an interesting and so far unexplored argument for the analytic/synthetic distinction: Hegel argues that the systematic relationship between concepts expressed in a genus/species tree can only be expressed through synthetic judgments. Third and finally, I explore some of the implications that the arguments in the first two parts of the essay have for understanding the way in which Hegel differs from Kant. I argue that Hegel accepts Kant's point that discursive cognition cannot be used to cognize the absolute. However, Hegel thinks that we can, nevertheless, cognize the absolute. I explore the character of this non‐discursive cognition and argue that we can understand Hegel's glosses on this form of cognition—as simultaneously analytic and synthetic and as having a circular structure—through contrasting it with his account of discursive cognition. As a consequence, I argue that we must give up on attempts to understand ‘the dialectical method’ and ‘speculative cognition’ on the model of discursive cognition.     

Extending Dynamical Systems Theory to Model Embodied Cognition

We define a mathematical formalism based on the concept of an ‘‘open dynamical system” and show how it can be used to model embodied cognition. This formalism extends classical dynamical systems theory by distinguishing a ‘‘total system’’ (which models an agent in an environment) and an ‘‘agent system’’ (which models an agent by itself), and it includes tools for analyzing the collections of overlapping paths that occur in an embedded agent's state space. To illustrate the way this formalism can be applied, several neural network models are embedded in a simple model environment. Such phenomena as masking, perceptual ambiguity, and priming are then observed. We also use this formalism to reinterpret examples from the embodiment literature, arguing that it provides for a more thorough analysis of the relevant phenomena.     

Sensations as Representations in Kant

This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ‘subjective representations’ and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational at all, because sensations are not cognitively sophisticated enough to possess intentionality, I argue that Kant does not use the term ‘Vorstellung’ to refer to intentional mental states exclusively. Sensations do not possess their own intentionality, but they nevertheless perform a representational function in virtue of their role as the matter of empirical intuition. In empirical intuition, the sensory qualities given in sensation are combined with the representation of space to constitute the intuited appearance. The representational function of sensation consists in sensation being the medium out of which intuited appearances are constituted: the qualities of sensations stand in for what the understanding will judge (conceptualize) as material substance.     

The closed mind: ‘Experience’ and ‘cognition’ aspects of openness to experience and need for closure as psychological bases for right‐wing attitudes

Openness to Experience and Need for Closure (NFC) are dispositional variables related to social‐cultural right‐wing attitudes. The present study investigated their joint effects. Factor analysis revealed an ‘experiential’ dimension with high loading openness items, and a ‘cognition’ dimension with high loadings for most NFC items and about a quarter of the openness item set. The experiential openness items were weakly related to right‐wing attitudes, demonstrating little predictive value. Conversely, the cognitive openness and NFC items were powerful predictors of right‐wing attitudes, and also played an important role in integrative models, both as a predictor of authoritarianism‐based racism and as a mediator of age related increments in right‐wing attitudes. It is concluded that right‐wing attitudes should be primarily understood in terms of (motivated) cognition, and to a smaller extent in terms of experiential openness. The distinction between ‘experiential’ and ‘cognitive’ openness is critically assessed, and it is asserted that because cognition is a multifaceted construct openness contains more than one cognitive dimension. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neo‐pragmatism,Representationalism and the Emotions

This paper offers a neo‐pragmatist account of the representational character of the emotions, for those emotions that have such a character. Put most generally, neo‐pragmatism is the view that language should not be conceived primarily in terms of a robust relation of reference to or representation of antecedently given objects and properties. Rather, we should view it as a social practice that lets us do various quite different sorts of things. One of those things might be called ‘assessing representational accuracy’, but this need not be thought of in terms of a metaphysically heavyweight relation. In applying neo‐pragmatist techniques to the domain of the emotions, the result will be an alternative to currently popular accounts that individuate emotions partly in terms of what they represent. This alternative continues to allow us to use representational language in connection with some emotions. And it also helps to explain the awkwardness of representational talk in connection with other emotions: an awkwardness that was always a liability of monolithic representationalist views.     

Is social projection based on simulation or theory? Why new methods are needed for differentiating

The literature on social cognition reports many instances of a phenomenon titled ‘social projection’ or ‘egocentric bias’. These terms indicate egocentric predictions, i.e., an over-reliance on the self when predicting the cognition, emotion, or behavior of other people. The classic method to diagnose egocentric prediction is to establish high correlations between our own and other people's cognition, emotion, or behavior. We argue that this method is incorrect because there is a different way to come to a correlation between own and predicted states, namely, through the use of theoretical knowledge. Thus, the use of correlational measures is not sufficient to identify the source of social predictions. Based on the distinction between simulation theory and theory theory, we propose the following alternative methods for inferring prediction strategies: independent vs. juxtaposed predictions, the use of ‘hot’ mental processes, and the use of participants’ self-reports.     

Understanding the ‘active’ in ‘enactive’

Much recent work on cognition is characterized by an augmentation of the role of action coupled with an attenuation of the role of representation. This coupling is no accident. The appeal to action is seen either as a way of explaining representation or explaining it away. This paper argues that the appeal to action as a way of explaining, supplementing, or even supplanting, representation can lead to a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the concept of action to which we appeal cannot, on pain of circularity, be a representational concept. Such an appeal would presuppose representation and therefore can neither explain it nor explain it away. On the other hand, I shall argue, if the concept of action to which we appeal is not a representational one, there is every reason for supposing that it will not be the sort of thing that can explain, or supplement, let alone supplant, representation. The resulting dilemma, I shall argue, is not fatal. But avoiding it requires us to embrace a certain thesis about the nature of action, a thesis whose broad outline this paper delineates. Anyone who wishes to employ action as a way of explaining or explaining away representation should, I shall argue, take this conception of action very seriously indeed. I am going to discuss these issues with respect to a influential recent contribution to this debate: the sensorimotor or enactive model of perception developed by Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë.     

The Mere Addition Paradox,Parity and Vagueness*

Derek Parfit’s mere addition paradox has generated a large literature. This paper articulates one response to this paradox—which Parfit himself suggested—in terms of a formal account of the relation of parity. I term this response the ‘parity view’. It is consistent with transitivity of ‘at least as good as’, but implies incompleteness of this relation. The parity view is compatible with critical‐band utilitarianism if this is adjusted to allow for vagueness. John Broome argues against accounts which involve incompleteness. He thinks they are based on an intuition of ‘neutrality’, which is most naturally understood in terms of equality. There is no rationale, on Broome’s view, for seeing it as ‘incommensurateness’ which leads to incompleteness. Parity provides one. Broome’s worries that ‘incommensurateness’ makes neutrality implausibly ‘greedy’, and that ‘incommensurateness’ and vagueness are incompatible do not constitute a knock‐down case against the parity view. Similar worries arise for his preferred vagueness view.     

Social cognition: learning about what matters in the social world

Social‐cognitive principles underlie people's learning about what matters in the social world. The benefits of these social‐cognitive principles reveal essential aspects of what it means to be human. But these social‐cognitive principles also have inherent costs , which highlight what it means to be ‘only human’. Social cognition is ‘social’ because what is learned concerns the social world, and where the learning takes place is in the social world. This paper reviews the benefits and costs of both sides of social cognition: (1) the cognition of social psychology principles of organization, explanation, knowledge activation and use; and (2) the social psychology of cognition principles of shared reality role enactment, social positions and identities and internal audiences. The fact that there are inherent costs of the same social‐cognitive principles for which there are essential benefits affords a new perspective on social‐cognitive costs that is different from either the classic ‘conflict’ perspective or the more current ‘limited capacity’ and ‘dual‐process’ perspectives. This ‘trade‐off’ perspective deepens both our understanding of the true nature of these principles and our appreciation of our common humanity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consistent Truth

Modern Logic has generated a lot of problems for itself through inattention to natural forms of speech. In particular it has had difficulties with a large group of ‘logical paradoxes’ through its preoccupation with the Predicate Calculus and related structures to the exclusion of other formal structures that represent natural language more fully, and thereby escape these paradoxes. In natural speech the unrecognized forms involved are principally individual referring terms with a non‐specific or fictional reference. For, under the influence of the Logical Empiricists, the focus in formal logic has been on individual terms with a specific, factual reference. But a similar point arises with certain predicates, and indeed even the proper concept of a predicate has been lost, producing the most notorious of the standard puzzles: Russell's Paradox. The paper inevitably makes reference to contemporary logical symbolism in places, but its purpose is to show that the only way forward is to use a symbolism that is abbreviatory only, i.e. maps directly onto natural speech.     

文化差异影响彝、白、纳西和汉族大学生对黑白的认知

以彝族、白族、纳西族和汉族的大学生为被试,采用颜色相似性判断和颜色再认任务,考察了彝族、白族、纳西族和汉族的大学生对于黑色和白色的认知,意在探究不同民族的黑、白文化是否影响人们对黑、白颜色的认知。结果发现：⑴彝族、白族、纳西族和汉族的黑、白文化影响四个民族的大学生对于黑色和白色的认知;⑵语言和文化对于颜色认知的影响包括间接效应和直接效应。整个研究表明,语言和文化对颜色认知有重要影响     

The emergence of a shared action ontology: building blocks for a theory

To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions about the structure of reality, which at the same time shape the causal profile of the brain's motor output and its representational deep structure, in particular of the conscious mind arising from it (its "phenomenal output")? How do they constrain high-level phenomena like conscious experience, the emergence of a first-person perspective, or social cognition? By reviewing a series of neuroscientific results and integrating them with a wider philosophical perspective, we will emphasize the contribution the motor system makes to this process. As it will be shown, the motor system constructs goals, actions, and intending selves as basic constituents of the world it interprets. It does so by assigning a single, unified causal role to them. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the brain models movements and action goals in terms of multimodal representations of organism-object-relations. Under a representationalist analysis, this process can be conceived of as an internal, dynamic representation of the intentionality-relation itself. We will show how such a complex form of representational content, once it is in place, can later function as a functional building block for social cognition and for a more complex, consciously experienced representation of the first-person perspective as well.     

The paradox of ‘freedom’ and the social function of psychiatry

This paper considers the concept of ‘freedom’ in behavioural terms, defining it in relation to ‘freedom of action’. This notion is applied to psychiatric abnormalities, and it is suggested that this new way of looking at the problem may go some way to surmount the philosophical difficulties normally attaching to the notion of ‘freedom’.     

Naturalness,Representation and the Metaphysics of Truth

Abstract: This paper explores how consideration of the notions of naturalness and eligibility, which have played an increasingly significant role in contemporary metaphysics, might impact on the study of truth. In particular, it aims to demonstrate how taking such notions seriously may be of benefit to ‘representational’ theories of truth by showing how the naturalness of truth on a representational account provides a response to the ‘Scope Problem’ presented by Lynch (2009) .     

Dissecting the symbolic distance effect: Comparison and priming effects in numerical and nonnumerical orders

When participants are asked to compare two stimuli, responses are slower for stimuli close to each other on the relevant dimension than for stimuli further apart. Previously, it has been proposed that this comparison distance effect originates from overlap in the representation of the stimuli. This idea is generally accepted in numerical cognition, where it is assumed that representational overlap of numbers on a mental number line accounts for the effect (e.g., Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005). In contrast, others have emphasized the role of response-related processes to explain the comparison distance effect (e.g., Banks, 1977). In the present study, numbers and letters are used to show that the comparison distance effect can be dissociated from a more direct behavioral signature of representational overlap, the priming distance effect. The implication is that a comparison distance effect does not imply representational overlap. An interpretation is given in terms of a recently proposed model of quantity comparison (Verguts, Fias, & Stevens, 2005).     

Projective identification: A theoretical investigation of the concept starting from ’Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’1

This paper submits passages from four papers‐‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’ (Klein); ‘On identification’ (Klein); ‘Analysis of a schizophrenic state with depersonalization’ (Rosenfeld); and ‘Remarks on the relation of male homosexuality to paranoia, paranoid anxiety and narcissism’ (Rosenfeld)‐to a critical reading, enabling the theoretical premises which have produced the current, differing views on projective identification to be traced. These views revolve both around the role assigned to identification in the process and around the meaning of the expression‘to identify oneself with’ which in ‘On identification’ goes from ‘to feel similar to, or identical to the other’ to ‘to take another person as a model’. This legitimizes the inclusion of very different phenomena into the concept of projective identification. The author describes some uses of the term ‘projective identification’ and proposes the hypothesis that the process constitutes a way for managing otherness and the separateness of the object (be it external or internal, real or imaginary) that can compromise its reality to a greater or lesser degree. Covering a large set of phenomena, the author poses the question of whether it is useful to retain the term ‘projective identification’. She proposes an answer in the last part of the paper.     

Small on the left,large on the right: numbers orient visual attention onto space in preverbal infants

Numbers are represented as ordered magnitudes along a spatially oriented number line. While culture and formal education modulate the direction of this number–space mapping, it is a matter of debate whether its emergence is entirely driven by cultural experience. By registering 8–9‐month‐old infants’ eye movements, this study shows that numerical cues are critical in orienting infants’ visual attention towards a peripheral region of space that is congruent with the number's relative position on a left‐to‐right oriented representational continuum. This finding provides the first direct evidence that, in humans, the association between numbers and oriented spatial codes occurs before the acquisition of symbols or exposure to formal education, suggesting that the number line is not merely a product of human invention.     

Systematic,Evidence-Based Review of Exercise,Physical Activity,and Physical Fitness Effects on Cognition in Persons with Multiple Sclerosis

Cognitive dysfunction is highly prevalent, disabling, and poorly-managed in persons with multiple sclerosis (MS). Recent evidence suggests that exercise might have beneficial effects on cognition in this population. The current systematic, evidence-based review examined the existing literature on exercise, physical activity, and physical fitness effects on cognition in MS to accurately describe the current status of the field, offer recommendations for clinicians, and identify study-specific and participant-specific characteristics for providing future direction for ongoing MS research. We performed an open-dated search of Medline, PsychInfo, and CINAHL in December 2015. The search strategy involved using the terms ‘exercise’ OR ‘physical activity’ OR ‘physical fitness’ OR ‘aerobic’ OR ‘resistance’ OR ‘balance’ OR ‘walking’ OR ‘yoga’ OR ‘training’ OR ‘rehabilitation’ AND ‘multiple sclerosis’. Articles were eliminated from the systematic review if it was a review article, theoretical paper, or textbook chapter; did not involve persons with MS; involved only persons with pediatric-onset MS; did not involve neuropsychological outcomes; did not include empirical data to evaluate outcomes; involved pharmacological interventions; or was not available in English. The selected articles were first classified as examining exercise, physical activity, or physical fitness, and were then randomly assigned to 2 independent reviewers who rated each article for level of evidence based on American Academy of Neurology criteria. Reviewers further completed a table to characterize important elements of each study (i.e., intervention characteristics), the cognitive domain(s) that were targeted, participant-specific characteristics, outcome measures, and study results. The present review resulted in 26 studies on the effects of exercise, physical activity, and physical fitness on cognition in persons with MS. This included 1 Class I study, 3 Class II studies, 8 Class III studies, and 14 Class IV studies. Of the 26 total studies, 6 were randomized controlled trials. Overall, there is conflicting evidence for the effects of exercise on cognition in MS, and overall positive, but not definitive evidence for the effects of physical activity and physical fitness, respectively, on cognition in this population. Collectively, there is insufficient well-designed research to definitively conclude that exercise, physical activity, and physical fitness are effective for improving cognition in MS. This is based, in part, on methodological issues of Class I and II studies, such as inclusion of cognition as a secondary outcome (35 % of reviewed studies), poorly-developed exercise interventions, and paucity of research that included cognitively-impaired MS samples. However, promising evidence from Class III and Class IV studies may be useful for informing the development of better intervention research.