IS A COMPLETE BIOCOGNITIVE ACCOUNT OF RELIGION FEASIBLE?

The biological and cognitive approach to religion has matured somewhat and reveals interesting results. Nevertheless, some questions arise about its foundation and development. The essay offers a review of current research in the cognitive field, focusing on its conclusions, the internal discussions, and the problems that need more study or correction. Emphasis is placed on a more intricate account of the factors involved in religious experience, discussing the proper use of the discoveries of biocognitive research and the limits that should be placed on said conclusions.     

WHAT IS AN "EXPLANATION" OF BEHAVIOR?

The cognitive "revolution" in psychology introduced a new concept of explanation and somewhat novel methods of gathering and interpreting evidence. These innovations assume that it is essential to explain complex phenomena at several levels, symbolic as well as physiological: complementary, not competitive. As with the other sciences, such complementary makes possible a comprehensive and unified experimental psychology. Contemporary cognitive psychology also introduced complementary of another kind, drawing upon, and drawing together, both the behaviorist and the Gestalt traditions.     

IS REFLECTIVE SUPERVISION ENOUGH? AN EXPLORATION OF WORKFORCE PERSPECTIVES

Infant mental health practice requires the performance of intense emotional labor. Professionals comprising the infant mental health (IMH) field are largely women at seminal points in adult life‐span development. The purpose of this article is to explore the day‐to‐day challenges faced by clinical infant mental health professionals and their perspectives on the supports available for effective job performance. We review reflective supervision as a long‐cherished professional support in the IMH field designed to hold the practitioner's fears, worries, and ambivalence, so that she may return to the work fortified to remain in therapeutic alliance with families despite unsolvable problems and an unknowable future (Weatherston, D., 2009). Yet, we propose that reflective supervision alone may not be an adequate protective measure for a workforce performing intensive emotional labor for extended periods and therefore at potentially increased risk for burnout and high turnover (Hochschild, A.R. 1983 ; C. Maslach, 1982 , C.M. Brotheridge & A.A. Grandey, 2009; A.S. Wharton, 2009 ). We suggest that structural factors concerning organizational culture, flexibility in scheduling, and professional growth and versatility bear deeper examination for their merits in supporting the IMH workforce. Finally, we contend that the overrepresentation of women in practitioner positions in IMH leaves an empirical gap where little is known about the experience of male IMH practitioners and the ramifications of their performance of emotional labor.     

WHY IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY WORTH OUR STUDY?

Abstract: Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where “doing philosophy” refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of “authorial” propositions, that is, propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments for thinking that doing history of philosophy is valuable—specifically, valuable in such a way that its value does not reduce to the value of doing philosophy. Most such arguments proffered by historians of philosophy fail, as I show. I then offer a proposal about what makes doing history of philosophy uniquely valuable, but it is one that many historians will not find agreeable.     

WHY IS CONFUCIANISM NOT A RELIGION? THE IMPACT OF ORIENTALISM

This study attempts to answer the question why Confucianism, the dominant “teaching” among the Three Teachings, is not a religion in contemporary China, unlike the other two “teachings,” Buddhism and Daoism. By examining this phenomenon in the social‐historical context, this study finds its origin in Orientalism. The Orientalist conceptualization of religion became part of the New Culture discourse at the turn of the twentieth century. While China has undergone tremendous social changes over the past century, the old discourse remains.     

IS THE SELF-CONCEPT A HABITUAL REFERENT IN JUDGMENTS OF SIMILARITY?

Abstract— People typically provide higher similarity ratings in response to the question "How similar is the typical preppie to you?" than to the question "How similar are you to the typical preppie?" Observed asymmetries in comparisons of the self and person prototypes have been offered as evidence that the self-concept acts as a habitual reference point in social judgment However, such a task does not test the habitual placement of a concept in the referent position of a comparison. In this study, participants judged the similarity between the self and person prototypes in response to linguistic (forced directional) queries or to spatial (nonforced) queries in which the self was positioned above or below the person concept Participants also rated pairs of familiar and unfamiliar countries in a similar manner, to replicate and extend the work of Tversky (1977) Expected asymmetries were observed in forced comparisons. The self and the familiar country were seen as more similar to other people and less familiar countries, respectively, when the former concepts served as the referent of a comparison than when they served as the subject Asymmetries were not observed in the nonforced conditions, and mean similarity in these conditions was of the same magnitude as in the forced condition in which the more familiar stimulus was the referent of the comparison. This result provides the first direct evidence that the self serves as a habitual referent in similarity judgments     

IS SEXUAL DESIRE RACED?: THE SOCIAL MEANING OF INTERRACIAL PROSTITUTION

I shall forgive the white South much in its final judgment day: I shall forgive its slavery, for slavery is a world-old habit; I shall forgive its fighting for a well-lost cause, and for remembering that struggle with tender tears; I shall forgive its so-called "pride of race," the passion of its hot blood, and even its dear, old, laughable strutting and posing; but one thing I shall never forgive, neither in this world nor the world to come: its wanton and continued and persistent insulting of the black womanhood which it sought and seeks to prostitute to its lust. (W.E.B. DuBois)
The assumption that one can privilege gender, in advance, as a category, setting the terms of inclusion without fully considering those for whom gender alone fails to capture the multiplicity of experience, is itself an Orientalist move. (Dorinne Kondo)     

SOCIAL VALIDITY ASSESSMENTS: IS CURRENT PRACTICE STATE OF THE ART?

The use of evaluative feedback from consumers to guide program planning and evaluation is often referred to as the assessment of social validity. Differing views of its role and value in applied behavior analysis have emerged, and increasingly stereotyped assessments of social validity are becoming commonplace. This paper argues that current applications of social validity assessments are straying from the point originally proposed for them. Thus, several suggestions for improving current social validity assessment are proposed, including (a) expanding the definition of consumers to acknowledge the variety of community members able and likely to affect a program's survival, (b) increasing the psychometric rigor of social validity assessments, (c) extending assessment to heretofore underrepresented populations, (d) implementing widespread application of well-designed social validity assessments, (e) increasing meaningful consumer involvement in the planning and evaluation of behavioral programs, and (f) educating consumers to make better informed programming decisions.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE QUESTION “WHAT IS THIS?” ON TACT-TRAINING OUTCOMES OF CHILDREN WITH AUTISM

Tact training is a common element of many habilitative programs for individuals with developmental disabilities. A commonly recommended practice is to include a supplemental question (e.g., “What is this?”) during training trials for tacts of objects. However, the supplemental question is not a defining feature of the tact relation, and prior research suggests that its inclusion might sometimes impede tact acquisition. The present study compared tact training with and without the supplemental question in terms of acquisition and maintenance. Two of 4 children with autism acquired tacts more efficiently in the object-only condition; the remaining 2 children acquired tacts more efficiently in the object + question condition. During maintenance tests in the absence of the supplemental question, all participants emitted tacts at end-of-training levels across conditions with no differential effect observed between training conditions.Key words: autism, language training, stimulus control, tacts, verbal behaviorSkinner (1957) defined the tact as a response “evoked by a particular object or event or property of an object or event” (p. 82) and considered it to be one of the most important verbal operants. Tacts are maintained by generalized social reinforcement and, thus, they are central to many social interactions. For example, the tact “That cloud looks like a horse” (under the control of a visual stimulus) could evoke a short verbal interaction about the sky or horses. The tact “My tummy hurts” (under the control of an interoceptive stimulus) could evoke soothing statements from a parent. A child who tacts “doggie” in the presence of a cat likely would evoke a correction statement from an adult, further refining two stimulus classes (i.e., dog and cat). These examples illustrate that, despite their topographical differences, the tact relations share antecedent control by a nonverbal discriminative stimulus (S^D) and are maintained by generalized social reinforcement.In habilitative programs for individuals with language impairments, autism, and intellectual disabilities, tacts often are taught for objects (e.g., ball), object features (e.g., color, size, shape), activities (e.g., jumping), prepositions (e.g., between), and emotions (e.g., sad) among others. Although conceptualized differently among therapeutic approaches, the tact relation occupies a central position in many early-intervention curricula. For example, Lovaas (2003) and Leaf and McEachin (1999) describe these relations as expressive labels and recommend that they be taught early in language training using three-dimensional objects accompanied by the supplemental questions “What is it?” or “What''s this?” Alternatively, Sundberg and Partington (1998) explicitly refer to the relation as a tact and recommend beginning instruction by including the question “What is it?” before eventually fading the question. In addition to these clinical manuals, the use of supplemental questions during tact training has appeared in some empirical studies on tact or expressive-label training (e.g., Braam & Sundberg, 1991; Coleman & Stedman, 1974), but not others (e.g., Williams & Greer, 1993). Regardless of whether tact training initially includes supplemental questions prior to response opportunities, tacts ultimately should be emitted readily under the sole control of the nonverbal S^D as well as when it happens to be accompanied by a question.Conceptually, at least four potential problems could arise from introducing supplemental questions early and consistently in tact training. First, the acquired responses might not be emitted unless the question is posed (i.e., prompt dependence). This problem would lead to few spontaneous tacts occurring outside the explicit stimulus control of the training environment. Williams and Greer (1993) compared comprehensive language training conducted under the stimulus control specified in Skinner''s (1957) taxonomy of verbal behavior to a more traditional psycholinguistic perspective with supplemental questions and instructions embedded within trials. For all three adolescents with developmental disabilities, the targets taught from the verbal behavior perspective were maintained better in natural contexts than those taught from the psycholinguistic perspective. However, because data were not reported for each individual verbal operant, it is unclear what specific impact their tact-training procedures had on the outcomes.The second potential problem is that the supplemental question might acquire intraverbal control over early responses and interfere with the acquisition of subsequent tact targets. For example, Partington, Sundberg, Newhouse, and Spengler (1994) showed that the tact repertoire of a child with autism had been hindered by prior instruction during which she was asked “What is this?” while being shown an object. The supplemental question subsequently evoked previously acquired responses and blocked the ability of new nonverbal S^Ds (i.e., objects) to evoke new responses. Partington et al. then showed that new tacts were acquired by eliminating the supplemental question from instructional trials.The third potential problem is that learners might imitate part of or the entire supplemental question prior to emitting the target response (e.g., “What is it” → “What is it … ball.”). For example, Coleman and Stedman (1974) demonstrated that a 10-year-old girl with autism imitated the question “What is this?” while being taught to label stimuli depicted in color photographs. Such an outcome results in a socially awkward tact repertoire and requires additional intervention to remedy the problem.Finally, including supplemental questions during tact training might impede skill acquisition, perhaps via a combination of the problems described earlier. Sundberg, Endicott, and Eigenheer (2000) taught sign tacts to two young children with autism who had prior difficulty acquiring tacts. In one condition, the experimenter held up an object and asked, “What is that?” In the comparison condition, the experimenter intraverbally prompted the participant to “sign [object name]” in the presence of the object. Sundberg et al. demonstrated substantially more efficient tact acquisition under the sign-prompt condition than when the question “What is that?” was included in trials; the latter condition sometimes failed to produce mastery-level responding.Teaching an entire tact repertoire while including supplemental questions (e.g., “What is it?”) during training trials could produce a learner who is able to talk about his or her environment only when asked to do so with similar questions. To the extent that this is not a therapist''s clinical goal, teaching the tact under its proper controlling variables may eliminate such problems. Of course, inclusion of supplemental questions during the early phases of language training could be faded over time such that the target tact relation is left intact prior to the end of training (Sundberg & Partington, 1998). However, the aforementioned studies have documented problems with using supplemental questions during tact training. Given the ubiquity of tact training in habilitation programs, the numerous problems that may arise when supplemental questions are included in training trials, and the limited research on the topic, further investigation is warranted. Thus, the purpose of the present study was to compare directly the rate of acquisition and subsequent maintenance of tacts taught using only a nonverbal S^D (i.e., object only) with tacts taught using a question (“What is this?”) in conjunction with the nonverbal S^D (i.e., object + question). The present study extends earlier research by examining both acquisition and maintenance and by including individuals with no prior history of formal tact training.     

WHAT IS THE SCIENCE OF THE SOUL? A CASE STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF LATE MEDIEVAL NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

This paper aims at a partial rehabilitation of E. A. Moody's characterization of the 14th century as an age of rising empiricism, specifically by contrasting the conception of the natural science of psychology found in the writings of a prominent 13th-century philosopher (Thomas Aquinas) with those of two 14th-century philosophers (John Buridan and Nicole Oresme). What emerges is that if the meaning of empiricism can be disengaged from modern and contemporary paradigms, and understood more broadly in terms of a cluster of epistemic doctrines concerned with the methodology of knowing, it characterizes very appropriately some of the differences between the ways in which late-medieval thinkers both understood and practised the science of psychology. In particular, whereas Aquinas thinks psychology is about reasoning demonstratively to the real nature of the soul from its evident operations (thereby assimilating psychology to metaphysics), Buridan and Oresme, both of whom doubt whether real animate natures can be known empirically, focus on giving detailed accounts of those operations themselves (thereby assimilating psychology to physics).     

IS THE UNIVERSE OPEN FOR SURPRISE? PENTECOSTAL ONTOLOGY AND THE SPIRIT OF NATURALISM

Given the enchanted worldview of pentecost‐alism, what possibility is there for a uniquely pentecostal intervention in the science‐theology dialogue? By asserting the centrality of the miraculous and the fantastic, and being fundamentally committed to a universe open to surprise, does not pentecostalism forfeit admission to the conversation? I argue for a distinctly pentecostal contribution to the dialogue that is critical of regnant naturalistic paradigms but also of a naive supernaturalism. I argue that implicit in the pentecostal social imaginary is a distinct conception of nature that is amenable to science but in conflict with naturalism.     

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE DIALOGUE PROPOSED BY WILLIAM KLINK?

Abstract. Klink rejects the use of ecological models in environmental decision making because their predictions cannot be tested by rigorous scientific methods. I argue that models that cannot be tested according to the rigorous standards of the physical sciences can still be considered “scientific”; they are useful (and, in practice, used) for assessing the impacts of human actions on the environment and choosing between alternative courses of action. It is, however, important to be aware of the uncertainties and to make corrections as new data and insights become available. The interplay between (1) model-based decisions and action and (2) their consequences and subsequent corrections can be regarded as a dialogue between humans and nature (or God) in the sense proposed by Klink. Klink also claims that future actions should be informed by the larger vision of theology and should not be based on science. I suggest that science has an indispensible role. The larger vision is needed to respond to the fundamental religious question: How should I live—and why? But this question cannot be answered without first addressing the fundamental scientific question: How does the world work? I suggest that responses to the first question can be formulated as visions of a future state of existence that we feel compelled to strive to realize, and that science is necessary to provide “maps of reality” needed to realize visions. I also suggest that Christian traditions can probably provide adequate visions; the crucial need is for improving our “maps of reality.”     

WHAT IS META-COGNITIVE SKILL? KINDLING A CONVERSATION BETWEEN CULADASA AND CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY

ABSTRACT

I explore affinities and tensions between Culadasa’s model of meta-cognitive skill, in his recent The Mind Illuminated, and theories of skill and meta-cognition in contemporary philosophy of psychology. I find that, while there are many assumptions that these different approaches share, for the most part, contemporary philosophy of psychology has ignored the possibility that meta-cognitive skills can be cultivated through practice, as Culadasa persuasively argues. The one exception is Joëlle Proust’s recent The Philosophy of Metacognition. This work defends a model of procedural meta-cognition with some striking similarities to Culadasa’s notion of ‘meta-cognitive introspective awareness’, which he views as an important step in the development of ?amatha. This is noteworthy, as they have clearly arrived at these notions completely independently, drawing on strikingly different kinds of evidence and argument. I conclude with some thoughts on distinctive puzzles that arise for Culadasa’s conception of meta-cognitive skill.     

‘THE TURBAN IS NOT A HAT’: QUEER DIASPORA AND PRACTICES OF PROFILING

This article examines two facets of post 9–11 South Asian organizing in the US – that of South Asian queer diasporics and of Sikh Americans. Ironically, South Asian queer diasporic subjects are under even greater duress to produce themselves as exceptional American subjects, not necessarily as heteronormative but as homonormative, even as the queernesses of these very bodies are simultaneously used to pathologize populations of terrorist look-a-like bodies. As contagions that trouble the exceptionalisms of queer South Asian diasporas, male turbaned Sikh bodies, often mistaken for Muslim terrorist bodies, are read as patriarchal by queer diasporic logics and placed within heteronormative victimology narratives by Sikh American advocacy groups focused on redressing the phenomenon of ‘mistaken identity’. Both the queer diasporic and Sikh American logics are indebted to visual representations of corporeality. Hence, I re-read these bodies as affectively troubling – generating affective confusion and indeterminancy – in terms of ontology, tactility, and the combination of organic and non-organic matter. Reading turbans through affect challenges both the limits of queer diasporic identity that balks at the non-normativity of the turbaned body (even as it avows the pathological racial-sexual renderings of terrorist bodies) while simultaneously infusing the ‘mistaken identity’ debates with different methods of comprehending the susceptibility of these bodies beyond heteronormative victimology narratives.     

DISCOUNTING OF DELAYED FOOD REWARDS IN PIGEONS AND RATS: IS THERE A MAGNITUDE EFFECT?

Temporal discounting refers to the decrease in the present, subjective value of a reward as the time to its receipt increases. Results from humans have shown that a hyperbola-like function describes the form of the discounting function when choices involve hypothetical monetary rewards. In addition, magnitude effects have been reported in which smaller reward amounts are discounted more steeply than larger amounts. The present research examines the cross-species generality of these findings using real rewards, namely food pellets, with both pigeons and rats. As with humans, an adjusting amount procedure was used to estimate the amount of immediate reward judged equal in value to a delayed reward. Different amounts of delayed food rewards (ranging from 5 to 32 pellets in pigeons and from 5 to 20 pellets in rats) were studied at delays varying from 1 s to 32 s. A simple hyperbola, similar to the hyperbola-like mathematical function that describes the discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards in humans, described the discounting of food rewards in both pigeons and rats. These results extend the generality of the mathematical model of discounting. Rates of discounting delayed food rewards were higher for pigeons than for rats. Unlike humans, however, neither pigeons nor rats showed a reliable magnitude effect: Rate of discounting did not vary systematically as a function of the amount of the delayed reward.     

IS MATCHING INNATE?

Experimentally naive mice matched the proportions of their temporal investments (visit durations) in two feeding hoppers to the proportions of the food income (pellets per unit session time) derived from them in three experiments that varied the coupling between the behavioral investment and food income, from no coupling to strict coupling. Matching was observed from the outset; it did not improve with training. When the numbers of pellets received were proportional to time invested, investment was unstable, swinging abruptly from sustained, almost complete investment in one hopper, to sustained, almost complete investment in the other-in the absence of appropriate local fluctuations in returns (pellets obtained per time invested). The abruptness of the swings strongly constrains possible models. We suggest that matching reflects an innate (unconditioned) program that matches the ratio of expected visit durations to the ratio between the current estimates of expected incomes. A model that processes the income stream looking for changes in the income and generates discontinuous income estimates when a change is detected is shown to account for salient features of the data.