Maximum likelihood estimation of parameters of signal detection theory—A direct solution

Ogilvie and Creelman have recently attempted to develop maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of signal-detection theory from the data of yes-no ROC curves. Their method involved the assumption of a logistic distribution rather than the normal distribution in order to make the mathematics more tractable. The present paper presents a method of obtaining maximum likelihood estimates of these parameters using the assumption of underlying normal distributions.This research was supported in part by grants from the National Institutes of Health, MH-10449-02, and from the National Science Foundation, NSF GS-1466.     

Inhibitory effects of repeating color and shape: inhibition of return or repetition blindness?

There is a current debate regarding whether attention is influenced by stimulus attributes other than location. The present article replicates and extends previous findings that repeating the nonspatial attribute of color leads to a delay in target detection (M. B. Law, J. Pratt, & R. A. Abrams, 1995). Repetition disadvantage effects were found for the stimulus attributes of both color and shape, as well as for location. However, the nonspatial repetition disadvantage disappeared if the stimuli were presented in peripheral locations (Experiments 3a, 3b, and 4) or the cue was presented for 50 ms (Experiment 6). Moreover, the magnitude of the repetition disadvantage tended to decline as the cue-target stimulus-onset asynchrony increased (Experiments 5a, 5b, and 6). These results suggest that a repetition blindness mechanism may underlie the repetition disadvantage effects of nonspatial features, rather than an inhibition of return mechanism.     

Table of criterion values (β) used in signal detection theory

A table of criterion values for use with the theory of signal detection (TSD) is presented. Criterion values (β) are presented for varying proportions of hits and false alarms. A brief explanation of signal detection theory is given, and the measures for sensory sensitivity (d′) and response criterion (β) are described.     

A grand theory of motivation: Why not?

Baumeister asks what a grand theory of motivation might look like, and he identifies the key problems, challenges, and opportunities that need to be considered in its pursuit. I address four of these challenges—how to define motivation, whether motivation is a state or a trait, the primacy of motivation in psychology, and the necessity to not only manage motivational conflict but also to vitalize motivational assets. I focus primarily, however, on the key obstacle that prevents a grand theory—our non-shared assumptions about the nature and dynamics of motivation. I suggest we capitalize on new advances in statistics, methodology, and technology to test what used to be untestable assumptions about motivation. Shared assumptions are necessary for a coherent science, and only a coherent science is capable of constructing a general theory.     

When should clinicians switch treatments? An application of signal detection theory to two treatments for women with alcohol use disorders

Statistical application of signal detection theory has been used to study the clinical utility of early treatment response in a range of treatments and psychiatric disorders. The current study sought to examine the predictive value of weekly within-treatment drinking using receiver operator curves (ROCs) and zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression in 102 women with alcohol use disorders (AUDs) randomized to either alcohol behavioral individual treatment (ABIT; n = 52) or alcohol behavioral couples treatment (ABCT; n = 50). ROC analyses indicated that failure to achieve or sustain abstinence by the end-of-treatment and one-year follow-up was predicted with reasonable accuracy by week 4 percent days abstinent (PDA) in ABIT. ZIP models yielded similar results with evidence for within-treatment PDA with week 6 PDA predicting both the abstinence as well as percent days drinking at the end-of-treatment and one-year follow-up. Within-treatment PDA was a significantly better predictor of outcomes for ABIT than ABCT, despite a better overall treatment response for ABCT. Implications for stepped care models of alcohol treatment are discussed and recommendations for future research made. When Should Clinicians Switch Treatments: An Application of Signal Detection Theory to Two Treatments for Women with Alcohol Use Disorders.     

Is signal detection theory fundamentally flawed? A response to Balakrishnan (1998a, 1998b, 1999)

For nearly 50 years, signal detection theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) has been of central importance in the development of psychophysics and other areas of psychology. The theory has recently been challenged by Balakrishnan (1998b), who argues that, within SDT, an alternative index is “better justified” than d’ and who claims to show (1998a, 1999) that SDT is fundamentally flawed and should be rejected. His evidence is based on new nonparametric measures that he has introduced and applied to experimental data. He believes his results show that basic assumptions of SDT are not supported—in particular, that payoff and probability manipulations do not affect the position of the decision criterion. In view of the importance of SDT in psychology, these claims deserve careful examination. They are critically reviewed here. It appears that it is Balakrishnan’s arguments that fail, and not SDT.     

Toupee or not toupee? The role of instructional set,centrality, and relevance in change blindness

The influence of instructional set, centrality, and relevance on change blindness was examined. In a one-shot paradigm, participants reported alterations of items across pairs of driving scenes under two different instructional conditions. Alterations involved either relocations or disappearances of the same items and included driving-relevant and driving-irrelevant alterations to items of central and marginal interest. Three main findings emerged: Centrality was not a function of driving relevance/meaningfulness, disappearances of central interest items were identified significantly more often than positional changes to them, and instructions highlighting the importance of the task to driving attenuated change blindness. The possible role of a simple listing strategy in mediating successful identification of alterations is discussed. Together, the findings demonstrate that cognitive factors play an important role in change blindness.     

One or two? A Process View of pregnancy

Philosophical Studies - How many individuals are present where we see a pregnant individual? Within a substance ontological framework, there are exactly two possible answers to this question. The...     

Two in one or one in two? Pushing off from Jung with Wolfgang Giegerich

This paper responds to a recent paper by Wolfgang Giegerich entitled ‘Two Jungs: apropos a paper by Mark Saban’. Giegerich disputes my assertion that the ‘rigorous notion’ at the heart of his psychology ‘finds no source in Jung's psychology, implicit or explicit’. In order to do this he posits the existence of two Jungs, an exoteric Jung and an esoteric Jung. The implications of Giegerich's binary scission of Jung are explored in this paper, and show that the tendency to exalt one Jung while disparaging the other betrays a comprehensive blindness toward the contradictory complexity of Jung's psychology as a whole. It is suggested that this blindness is the consequence of Giegerich's systematic prioritization of a neo‐Hegelian agenda that is in profound conflict with the telos of Jung's psychology.     

Unconscious perception or not? An evaluation of detection and discrimination as indicators of awareness

Most investigations of unconscious perception use a dissociation design in which an awareness variable (e.g., detection) is compared with a perceptual processing variable (e.g., identification). Unconscious perception is inferred when the awareness variable lacks sensitivity to the stimulus but evidence of perceptual processing is still obtained. In two studies we examined the relationship between word identification and detection (Study 1) or discrimination (words vs. nonwords; Study 2) with a variety of techniques. In both studies, dissociations suggestive of unconscious perception occurred when the data were examined with subjective threshold approaches, but these differences disappeared when the variables were compared with techniques derived from signal detection theory (SDT). These results do not support unconscious perception in subjective threshold paradigms. In addition, detection appears to be the most sensitive and appropriate task for assessing stimulus awareness, provided that several SDT assumptions are met.     

Does word training increase or decrease interference in a stroop task?

First and second graders (6- and 7-year-olds) practiced reading 20 words. Before and after word training, they named pictures printed with and without these words as distractors. Of interest was whether training would enhance or diminish the interference created by these words in the picture-naming task. Results indicated that children who learned to recognize unfamiliar distractor words more accurately suffered more interference after training. In contrast, children who were already familiar with the words and learned to recognize them faster experienced less interference following training. Results are interpreted as supporting LaBerge and Samuels' model of automatic word processing. Effects of accuracy training are attributed to the elimination of attention as a requirement for processing distractor words. Effects of speed training are attributed to a reduction in the time consumed by distractor words in the central processor.     

Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task

In a recent article, [Sergent, C. &; Dehaene, S. (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15(11), 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. (2001). Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness, Psyche, 7, 18]. In the experimental study described in this article, we find support for this opposite notion that we should have a parsimonious account of conscious perception. Our reported finding relates to the hypothesis that there is more than one perceptual threshold [Merikle, P.M., Smilek, D. &; Eastwood, J.D. (2001). Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology, Cognition, 79, 115–134], but goes further to argue that there are different “levels” of conscious perception.     

Two Concepts or Two Approaches? A Bifactor Analysis of Psychological and Subjective Well-Being

Researchers often debate about whether there is a meaningful differentiation between psychological well-being and subjective well-being. One view argues that psychological and subjective well-being are distinct dimensions, whereas another view proposes that they are different perspectives on the same general construct and thus are more similar than different. The purpose of this investigation was to examine these two competing views by using a statistical approach, the bifactor model, that allows for an examination of the common variance shared by the two types of well-being and the unique variance specific to each. In one college sample and one nationally representative sample, the bifactor model revealed a strong general factor, which captures the common ground shared by the measures of psychological well-being and subjective well-being. The bifactor model also revealed four specific factors of psychological well-being and three specific factors of subjective well-being, after partialling out the general well-being factor. We further examined the relations of the specific factors of psychological and subjective well-being to external measures. The specific factors demonstrated incremental predictive power, independent of the general well-being factor. These results suggest that psychological well-being and subjective well-being are strongly related at the general construct level, but their individual components are distinct once their overlap with the general construct of well-being is partialled out. The findings thus indicate that both perspectives have merit, depending on the level of analysis.     

Paradigm shift in religious education? A reply to Gearon,or when is a paradigm not a paradigm?

This article responds to Liam Gearon’s reply to my article Misrepresenting Religious Education’s Past and Present in Looking Forward: Gearon Using Kuhn’s Concepts of Paradigm, Paradigm Shift and Incommensurability. In maintaining my critique of Gearon’s use of Kuhn’s terminology, I question his claim that ‘incommensurability’ does not necessarily imply ‘incompatibility’, and challenge his view that ‘faith-based’ approaches to religious education and ‘inclusive’ approaches are incommensurable and deeply incompatible. I also question Gearon’s placement of particular scholars within his constructed paradigms, noting that those identified by Gearon with specific paradigms do not necessarily share the same views concerning the nature of religious education and its pedagogy, and that various scholars, associated by Gearon with particular paradigms, draw on a variety of disciplines in their work. I argue that Gearon’s construction of paradigms is a device he uses for ‘separation’, leading to his misrepresentation of the work of researchers. I argue for the benefits of collaboration, in research, teaching and policy development. Finally, I give reasons for writing the article, which do not result from any engagement in ‘paradigm wars’, and I draw attention to pressing issues relating to the future of ‘inclusive’ religious education which are not addressed by Gearon.     

Rhythm or music? Contrasting two types of auditory stimuli in the performance of a dancing routine

The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether rhythmic beats only or music would be more effective as accompaniment for the motor performance of specific rhythmic-dance steps by 30 female students of physical education (M age 20.1 yr.), without prior experience in music or dance. They performed a dance routine in synchronization with a musical phrase of eight rhythmical meters, with the general value of 4/4 each. Each meter involved representative steps of the rhythmical values of 4/4, 1/4, 1/8, and 1/16 like rhythmical walking, small kicks, galloping, chassé, cat leap, and different ways of balancing. Subjects performed these in synchronization to the rhythm played on a tambourine or to music played on an harmonium. All movement performances were registered using two video cameras. Differences between the two groups ("rhythm" and "music") and across the different meters (4/4, 1/8, 1/8, 1/16, 1/4) were analyzed by a mixed between-within subjects 2 x 3 analysis of variance with repeated measures of "meter." Students who performed with the tambourine showed better synchrony with that external auditory stimulus than students who performed the same routine guided by music played on the harmonium. Also, students showed better synchrony with the external rhythm when performing a whole (4/4 meter) than when performing either the 1/8 or the mixed 1/8-1/16-1/4 meters. These findings suggest that for highly complex artistic movements such as the ones involved in dance, beginners perform much better when their movements are guided by a rhythmical sequence of single beats than when guided by a musical phrase having identical metrical structure.     

Combination or Differentiation? Two theories of processing order in classification

Does cognition begin with an undifferentiated stimulus whole, which can be divided into distinct attributes if time and cognitive resources allow (Differentiation Theory)? Or does it begin with the attributes, which are combined if time and cognitive resources allow (Combination Theory)? Across psychology, use of the terms analytic and non-analytic imply that Differentiation Theory is correct—if cognition begins with the attributes, then synthesis, rather than analysis, is the more appropriate chemical analogy. We re-examined four classic studies of the effects of time pressure, incidental training, and concurrent load on classification and category learning (Kemler Nelson, 1984; Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1984; Smith & Shapiro, 1989; Ward, 1983). These studies are typically interpreted as supporting Differentiation Theory over Combination Theory, while more recent work in classification (Milton et al., 2008, et seq.) supports the opposite conclusion. Across seven experiments, replication and re-analysis of the four classic studies revealed that they do not support Differentiation Theory over Combination Theory—two experiments support Combination Theory over Differentiation Theory, and the remainder are compatible with both accounts. We conclude that Combination Theory provides a parsimonious account of both classic and more recent work in this area. The presented data do not require Differentiation Theory, nor a Combination–Differentiation hybrid account.     

Is the label ‘conspiracy theory’ a cause or a consequence of disbelief in alternative narratives?

Using the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is widely perceived to be a way of discrediting wild ideas and unsubstantiated claims. However, prior research suggests that labelling statements as conspiracy theories does not reduce people's belief in them. In four studies, we probed this effect further, and tested the alternative hypothesis that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is a consequence rather than a cause of (dis)belief in conspiracy-related statements. Replicating prior research, Study 1 (N = 170) yielded no evidence that the label ‘conspiracy theory’ affects belief in statements. In Study 2 (N = 199), we discovered that the less people believed in statements, the more they favoured labelling them as ‘conspiracy theories’. In Studies 3 and 4 (Ns = 150 and 151), we manipulated the relative believability of statements and found that participants preferred the label ‘conspiracy theory’ for relatively less believable versus more believable statements. The current research therefore supports the hypothesis that prior (dis)agreement with a statement affects the use of the label ‘conspiracy theory’ more than the other way around.