Dispositional pessimism,defensive pessimism and optimism: The effect of induced mood on prefactual and counterfactual thinking and performance

This study analyses the extent to which dispositional pessimists differ from defensive pessimists and optimists in the generation of prefactual and counterfactual thoughts and in their performance in an anagram task, under different conditions of induced mood. Dispositional pessimists performed in a similar manner in all circumstances, recording an equal number of prefactual thoughts. By contrast, optimists and defensive pessimists optimised their performance under positive and negative conditions, respectively. It should be noted that after performing this task, the number of counterfactual thoughts expressed by dispositional pessimists varied according to mood states. The results are discussed in terms of the rigidity of the generalised expectations of dispositional pessimism.     

The future is now: prospective temporal self-appraisals among defensive pessimists and optimists

Three studies found that prospective temporal self-appraisals can be part of defensive pessimists' strategy; they felt closer to equally distant negative than positive futures. In Study 1, defensive pessimists felt closer to future failures and reported more negative affect than those considering success. In Study 2, when manipulated negative futures were close, defensive pessimists felt bad and performed well; results suggested that viewing negative futures as close may be part of their natural strategy. Study 3 found that prospective self-appraisals influenced performances through felt preparation. Optimists did not use prospective self-appraisals (Study 1) and their performances were unaffected by manipulated temporal distance (Studies 2 and 3). Discussion centers on prospective self-appraisals and multiple strategies of defensive pessimists.     

The motivational and emotional consequences of considering positive or negative possibilities for an upcoming event.

The hypothesis that attention to negative possibilities for an upcoming event can have advantages for performance in comparison with a more optimistic approach was examined in 2 studies. Focus of attention to positive or negative possibilities for a social interaction was manipulated for Ss previously identified as optimists or defensive pessimists in the social domain. In Study 1, negatively focused defensive pessimists performed better in their conversations than positively focused defensive pessimists on several dimensions (e.g., talk time, perceived effort, and sociability). Optimists' behavior was unaffected by the focus manipulation. However, all negatively focused Ss felt worse after their conversations than did positively focused subjects. Study 2 examined the cognitive process by which a negative focus may lead to positive behaviors. Some pessimists may benefit from an initial negative focus that is not accompanied by lowered expectations and that actually facilitates positive thoughts about the self.     

Optimism, pessimism, and gambling: the downside of optimism

Three studies examined the relation between dispositional optimism and gambling. In Study 1, optimists were more likely than pessimists to have positive gambling expectations and report maintaining these expectations following losses. They also were more likely to indicate that winning money was a primary motivation for their gambling. Study 2 demonstrated that pessimists but not optimists reduce their betting and expectations after poor gaming performance. Study 3 replicated this effect using a more controlled experiment and showed that after losing, optimists report remembering more near wins than do pessimists. Thus, all three studies suggest that optimists, more than pessimists, maintain positive expectations and continue gambling after experiencing negative gaming outcomes. The authors suggest that despite optimism's many benefits, there are common situations in which the pessimistic tendency to disengage is beneficial.     

Optimism, pessimism, and false failure feedback: Effects on vigilance performance

Following the logic of a prior experiment (Seligman et al., 1990) with varsity collegiate swimmers, sixty student volunteers performed a brief, but highly stressful vigilance task. Half were then given false feedback indicating poor performance; the others experienced a non-evaluative display at that point. All were then asked to repeat the vigil. Half the observers were assessed as high optimists and half as high pessimists. The pessimists showed a steeper vigilance decrement than the optimists, consistent with a model (Scheier and Carver, 1987) that proposes that pessimists are more emotion-focused under stress than optimists, and hence would be less attentive to the vigilance display, regardless of feedback condition. The false negative feedback actually turned out to be ineffective; hence, based on Seligman's account of the swimmer study, which requires effective negative feedback, there should have been no vigilance performance difference between optimists and pessimists, either pre- or post-feedback.     

Optimism, pessimism, and false failure feedback: Effects on vigilance performance

Following the logic of a prior experiment (Seligman et al., 1990) with varsity collegiate swimmers, sixty student volunteers performed a brief, but highly stressful vigilance task. Half were then given false feedback indicating poor performance; the others experienced a non-evaluative display at that point. All were then asked to repeat the vigil. Half the observers were assessed as high optimists and half as high pessimists. The pessimists showed a steeper vigilance decrement than the optimists, consistent with a model (Scheier and Carver, 1987) that proposes that pessimists are more emotion-focused under stress than optimists, and hence would be less attentive to the vigilance display, regardless of feedback condition. The false negative feedback actually turned out to be ineffective; hence, based on Seligman's account of the swimmer study, which requires effective negative feedback, there should have been no vigilance performance difference between optimists and pessimists, either pre- or post-feedback.     

Risk perception and behavior: Pessimism,realism, and optimism about aids-related health behavior

Abstract

This study investigates the perceived risk of becoming infected with HIV for heterosexuals with multiple sexual partners, examines cognitive and motivational antecedents of biases in risk perception, and relates these biases to behavior. We obtained a moderate degree of optimism in a longitudinal study based on a sample of 535 visitors of a STD clinic. Further analyses—after classifying subjects as “pessimists”, “realists”, or “optimists”—revealed that pessimists were extremely pessimistic and optimists remarkably optimistic. Optimism increased with perceived control and decreased with prior experience, supporting a cognitive explanation of optimism. The data also provided some support for a motivational explanation: optimists who scored higher on a defensive coping style were more optimistic about their risks. Contrary to other findings, we found a positive relation between optimism and intentions to reduce risks. Furthermore, results revealed that optimists showed lower levels of subsequent behavioral risk. It was concluded that optimists were not unrealistically optimistic about their personal vulnerability. but rather that pessimists were unrealistically pessimistic. Previous behavior was found to be the best predictor of subsequent behavior. Although measures of perceived risk were also related to subsequent behavior, their predictive power was rather modest.     

How Dispositional Optimists and Pessimists Evaluate their Past,Present and Anticipated Future Life Satisfaction: A Lifespan Approach

Dispositional optimism is typically conceptualized with respect to generalized positive expectancies for personal future outcomes. The present work draws on lifespan development theory to evaluate how dispositional optimists and pessimists from across the lifespan evaluate their past, present and anticipated future life satisfaction (LS). Using data from an American probability sample (n = 3871, ages = 30–84 years, 55% female), I compared dispositional optimists and pessimists across six age decades. Subjective LS trajectories reflected in mean trends in ratings of past, present and future LS were contoured by lifestage, revealing inclining trajectories among young dispositional optimists and pessimists and declining trajectories among older optimists and pessimists. After adjusting for age‐specific normative trends, however, differences between dispositional optimists and pessimists in subjective LS trajectories were consistent across lifestage, revealing a single dissociative pattern wherein optimists rated their past, present and anticipated future LS more positively than did pessimists. Of the three temporal perspectives, evaluations of present (rather than past or future) LS were most consistently related to dispositional optimism. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mental Simulations, Affect, and Subjective Confidence: Timing Is Everything

Three studies demonstrated that mental simulations and affect are related to temporal changes in subjective confidence. In Study 1, students' confidence in their midterm exam performance lessened from the first day of class (3.5 weeks before the exam) to exam day, and confidence correlated negatively with upward simulations (i.e., simulations that are better than reality) and negative affect. In Study 2, manipulated upward simulations produced low confidence and negative mood even when the exam was viewed from a distance; students who were forced to think about upward simulations 1 month prior to the exam felt no more confident than did students on exam day. In Study 3, manipulated negative moods produced low confidence and more upward simulations when students anticipated laboratory tasks, and again distal and proximal confidence did not differ. Discussion centers around reciprocal relations between mental simulations and affect, and a possibly integrative account of previous explanations.     

Discerning the role of optimism in persuasion: the valence-enhancement hypothesis

The valence-enhancement hypothesis argues that because of their active coping strategies, optimists are especially likely to elaborate on valenced information that is of high personal relevance. The hypothesis predicts that as a result, optimists will be more persuaded by personally relevant positive messages and less persuaded by personally relevant negative messages than pessimists. It also predicts that when the message is not personally relevant, optimism and persuasion will not be related in this manner. The results of 3 studies support these predictions and supply evidence against several alternative hypotheses. The possibility that the observed effects are not due to optimism but to the confounding influence of 7 additional variables is also addressed and ruled out. Implications are discussed.     

Young Children Use Letter Names in Learning to Read Words

Three studies demonstrated that mental simulations and affect are related to temporal changes in subjective confidence. In Study 1, students' confidence in their midterm exam performance lessened from the first day of class (3.5 weeks before the exam) to exam day, and confidence correlated negatively with upward simulations (i.e., simulations that are better than reality) and negative affect. In Study 2, manipulated upward simulations produced low confidence and negative mood even when the exam was viewed from a distance; students who were forced to think about upward simulations 1 month prior to the exam felt no more confident than did students on exam day. In Study 3, manipulated negative moods produced low confidence and more upward simulations when students anticipated laboratory tasks, and again distal and proximal confidence did not differ. Discussion centers around reciprocal relations between mental simulations and affect, and a possibly integrative account of previous explanations.     

Expectations about the future and the emotional consequences of perceiving prejudice

Three studies tested the hypothesis that possessing a pessimistic outlook on life moderates the effects of perceiving sexism on emotions and self-esteem. Across all studies, a pessimistic outlook on life (either dispositionally held or experimentally induced) served as a source of emotional vulnerability among women (Studies 1-3) and men (Study 1) faced with evidence of sexism directed against their gender group. Study 3 demonstrated that one's outlook on life influences emotional adjustment to prejudice through the cognitive appraisal process. Relative to optimists, pessimists appraised sexism as more stressful and believed they possessed fewer resources for coping with it. This research emphasizes the importance of examining sources of vulnerability and resilience in understanding emotional responses to prejudice.     

Defensive pessimism,self‐esteem instability,and goal strivings

Defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986a) is conceived as an adaptive motivational strategy employed in academic contexts. The present research investigates some potentially deleterious correlates of the defensively pessimistic strategy. We examined the hypothesis that defensive pessimists would have a relatively high ratio of negative‐to‐positive academically relevant self‐thoughts, and these accessible thoughts would be related to high self‐esteem instability. Mediational analyses generally supported this hypothesis. However, defensive pessimism‐optimism differences in self‐esteem seemed to partially account for the mediated effects. We also found support for the hypothesis that, relative to optimists, defensive pessimists would tend to be less oriented toward mastery goals and more oriented toward performance‐avoidance achievement goals in academic settings. Results were discussed in terms of the processing correlates and adaptive trade‐offs of defensive pessimism.     

On the partial independence of optimism and pessimism

This study tested the hypothesis that the moderate correlation between optimism (O) and pessimism (P) scores (their non-bipolarity) found in earlier studies may be an artifact of the differential sensitivity of O and P items to two response sets: defensive pessimism and Pollyannaism. The data failed to support either component of the hypothesis. Thus, defensive pessimists, as measured in two quite different ways, had lower depression scores (BDI) than genuine pessimists, but contrary to prediction, had higher depression scores than optimists. Moreover, deleting P items with a strong defensive quality from the P scale failed to increase the correlation between O and P scores. Similarly, controlling Pollyannaism by a partial correlation procedure failed to increase the strength of the relation between O and P. The results in general support the notion that optimism and pessimism are not polar opposites. This article is based on a dissertation presented by the senior author to the Division of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the Doctor of Philosophy degree.     

On the partial independence of optimism and pessimism

This study tested the hypothesis that the moderate correlation between optimism (O) and pessimism (P) scores (their non-bipolarity) found in earlier studies may be an artifact of the differential sensitivity of O and P items to two response sets: defensive pessimism and Pollyannaism. The data failed to support either component of the hypothesis. Thus, defensive pessimists, as measured in two quite different ways, had lower depression scores (BDI) than genuine pessimists, but contrary to prediction, had higher depression scores than optimists. Moreover, deleting P items with a strong defensive quality from the P scale failed to increase the correlation between O and P scores. Similarly, controlling Pollyannaism by a partial correlation procedure failed to increase the strength of the relation between O and P. The results in general support the notion that optimism and pessimism are not polar opposites. This article is based on a dissertation presented by the senior author to the Division of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the Doctor of Philosophy degree.     

Adult attachment and preemptive defenses: converging evidence on the role of defensive exclusion at the level of encoding

The objective of this research was to determine whether the tendency of highly avoidant adults not to recall attachment-related information is best explained through defensive strategies that operate on encoding or retrieval processes. In Study 1 participants listened to an emotionally evocative recording and were given both explicit and implicit tests of their memory for the material. Compared to less avoidant people, highly avoidant people recalled fewer details from the recording and performed worse on an implicit test of their memory for the information. In Study 2 we manipulated people's motivation to retrieve information from memory by offering participants a monetary award for recall. Highly avoidant people recalled less information than less-avoidant people despite the monetary incentive. Taken together, these results suggest that the relative inability of avoidant adults to recall attachment-related information is due to the defensive exclusion of information at the time of encoding rather than the time of retrieval.     

Coping with stress: divergent strategies of optimists and pessimists

Previous research has shown that dispositional optimism is a prospective predictor of successful adaptation to stressful encounters. In this research we attempted to identify possible mechanisms underlying these effects by examining how optimists differ from pessimists in the kinds of coping strategies that they use. The results of two separate studies revealed modest but reliable positive correlations between optimism and problem-focused coping, seeking of social support, and emphasizing positive aspects of the stressful situation. Pessimism was associated with denial and distancing (Study 1), with focusing on stressful feelings, and with disengagement from the goal with which the stressor was interfering (Study 2). Study 1 also found a positive association between optimism and acceptance/resignation, but only when the event was construed as uncontrollable. Discussion centers on the implications of these findings for understanding the meaning of people's coping efforts in stressful circumstances.     

Self‐Regulation in Goal Striving: Individual Differences and Situational Moderators of the Goal‐Framing/Performance Link1

We propose that negative goal framing (i.e., defining a goal as a negative state to be avoided) can adversely affect performance. Study 1 (N = 133) revealed that negative goal framing predicted poorer future performance independent of goal level, expectancy, and earlier performance. Study 2 (N = 188) examined the relation between goal framing and performance at 2 times in the academic year, and with respect to individual differences in defensive pessimism. As predicted, the negative goal‐framing/poorer‐performance link was greater on a later exam (after receiving feedback) than an earlier one, and was greater for nondefensive pessimists than for defensive pessimists. The findings implicate self‐regulatory processes in understanding how goal framing affects performance.     

I want to be creative: exploring the role of hedonic contingency theory in the positive mood-cognitive flexibility link

Three studies explored the role of hedonic contingency theory as an explanation for the link between positive mood and cognitive flexibility. Study 1 examined the determinants of activity choice for participants in happy, sad, or neutral moods. Consistent with hedonic contingency theory, happy participants weighted potential for creativity as well as the pleasantness of the task more heavily in their preference ratings. In Study 2, participants were given either a neutral or mood-threatening item generation task to perform. Results illustrated that happy participants exhibited greater cognitive flexibility in all cases; when confronted with a potentially mood-threatening task, happy participants were able to creatively transform the task so as to maintain positive mood and interest. Finally, Study 3 manipulated participants' beliefs that moods could or could not be altered. Results replicated the standard positive mood-increased cognitive flexibility effect in the nonmood-freezing condition, but no effects of mood on creativity were found in the mood-freezing condition. These studies indicate that the hedonic contingency theory may be an important contributing mechanism behind the positive mood-cognitive flexibility link.     

Optimism and social support: The providers’ perspective

It has been presumed that the beneficial health effects of optimism are mediated by social support provided by the social environment. To further analyze this assumption, in two experiments (N?=?240 and N?=?120) social responses toward optimists, pessimists, and realists were examined. Participants listened to tape-recorded conversations in which optimistic, pessimistic and realistic targets reported how they were dealing with a stressful situation before completing a questionnaire assessing (a) their evaluation of the target's behavior and personality, (b) their attraction to the target, and (c) their willingness to provide the target with social support. Optimistic and realistic targets were viewed more favorably than pessimistic targets, while the behavior of realists was regarded as being more adequate than that of optimists. However, the more positive evaluation of optimists and realists compared to pessimists was not accompanied by a greater willingness to provide them with social support.