伊朗思想家毛拉·萨德拉关于灵魂返回而非轮回的哲学论证

灵魂不朽是宗教非常重要的观念,与此观念相关的一个重要观念是关于轮回的学说,在伊斯兰教思想史上,伊朗的思想家毛拉·萨德拉对轮回观念提出了自己的理解,他以"本质性运动"为基础的灵魂学说否定轮回观念,主张灵魂返回说。     

论独一理智——驳阿维洛伊主义者

托马斯.阿奎那与阿维洛伊的理智学说之争是中世纪神哲学史上的一场极其重要的学术之争。本文是阿奎那对阿维洛伊理智学说的一次清算。阿维洛伊不仅将亚里士多德的可能理智称作物质理智,宣布理智是一种脱离身体而独立存在的实体,而且还宣布这种可能理智为全人类所共有的独一的理智。阿奎那则依据亚里士多德的《论灵魂》、《物理学》和《论动物的产生》等论著,针对阿维洛伊的上述观点,强调指出"理智是灵魂的一种能力,而灵魂则是身体的形式或现实",从而昭示出他们两个的理智学说在神学信仰和"哲学原则"方面的根本对立。     

亚里士多德的灵魂观与当代功能主义:兼容抑或冲突?

心灵哲学的功能主义者认为亚里士多德的灵魂学说是他们的理论先驱。他们指出亚里士多德既不赞同柏拉图的灵魂与身体的二元论,也不同意德谟克利特的物理主义,因而他的灵魂观与当代功能主义共享深层的理论预设。功能主义者在解释亚里士多德的灵魂观时涉及了三个主要观点:反物理还原论、心灵状态的"物理构成的可塑性",以及心灵与身体的"随附性"关系。本文从这三个方面出发试图主张亚里士多德的灵魂观与当代功能主义在根本上是不兼容的,并指出他的灵魂观应当称为"质料-形式主义的"。     

身体的激情——论笛卡尔激情理论的现代性

本文以柏拉图的灵魂学说为参照系,并联系身体观来考察笛卡尔的激情理论。通过梳理笛卡尔关于"激情"的定义并还原他所描述的激情的产生机制,本文试图说明如下三个方面的问题:首先,笛卡尔其实认为心灵并不能直接和主动地掌控激情;其次,笛卡尔赋予激情保护身体的使命:最后,笛卡尔的激情理论是现代心理学的源头。     

柏拉图和亚里士多德论中庸之道

在西方哲学中,亚里士多德首次提出"中庸"(或"中道")概念,并以此为基础阐发了其"美德"学说。本文通过分析并比较亚里士多德的"中庸"学说和柏拉图的相关思想,表明柏拉图实际上已经具备了一套完整的关于"中庸美德"的学说;进而指出,柏拉图的二元本原学说不仅为"中庸美德"作了形而上的奠基工作,而且为后学指出了一条明确的走向美德之路,即通过辩证法知识而达到理论和实践的统一。而后者恰恰是亚里士多德哲学未能妥善解决的问题。     

奥利金的灵魂先在说

奥利金的灵魂先在学说对理解自由意志问题有重要意义。在《上帝之城》第11和12卷,奥古斯丁重点批评了这一学说。在奥古斯丁看来,奥利金主张灵魂先在,进而主张灵魂的善恶与身体的好坏相配,这一说法既与上帝创世的善好目的相悖,也与人在宇宙中应有的地位不符。奥古斯丁的批评尽管部分切中要害,但没有充分把握灵魂先在说的用意和复杂性。一方面,奥利金提出灵魂先在学说,主要是为了回应灵知派的挑战,以维护理性造物的自由意志;另一方面,灵魂先在说并非没有考虑到上帝创世的善好目的,恰恰相反,它极大地保证了上帝创世时的绝对平等,缓解了神义论的难题。不过,正如许多学者所指出的,灵魂先在说一旦推向上帝创世的初始阶段,就会引发与柏拉图《蒂迈欧篇》中类似的原始质料问题。     

东西方哲学思维中的现象学、本体论与形而上学

在东西方哲学中均有现象学、本体论和形而上学这三种言说方式和思维向度:现象学是关于感性可见之物的学说、关于观念的被给予之物的学说、关于存在的无蔽的学说、关于在智的直觉中被把握的本体的学说;本体论是关于根本自在之物、倚于自身之物的学说,是关于万物存在的学说和关于历史存在的学说;形而上学则是对不显现的东西、在现象背后可能存在的东西的讨论和思考。这三种思想风格的差异都曾在海德格尔哲学中表露出来。     

听从逻各斯的实践何以可能?——亚里士多德论希求

理性和欲望的关系是古代西方哲学的焦点问题之一。亚里士多德继承与推进了柏拉图的思想,提出希求概念,它标志着理性和欲望(欲求)的统一。本文首先结合柏拉图与亚里士多德的灵魂学说,对希求概念的演变进行简要梳理;继而考察希求背后的欲求与努斯、真的善与显得善之间的关系,表明希求是对于"真的善"的欲求,揭示了灵魂统一的可能性;最后,通过这种灵魂-伦理学的澄清,触及政治学的重要问题,即如何培养好人,表明希求概念同样是回答这一问题的关键。     

美德伦理的道德理由及其基础——关于亚里士多德主义与儒家伦理的比较

任何规范的伦理学都可被大致区分为道德要求、道德理由以及用于支撑理由的存在论基础和心理学基础等层面。作为美德伦理学可资采用的两种伦理学范式,亚里士多德主义和儒家伦理分别提供了以"最高善"和"道"为宗旨的道德理由。进一步地,前者通过诉诸本性/自然学说和灵魂学说,后者通过诉诸"天命"观念和"心性"观念,描述了相关的存在图景和心灵结构,为各自的道德理由奠定基础。     

“经济儒学”论纲

"经济儒学"是儒家文化中关于经世济民、经邦济国的学说。"经济儒学"源远流长,其名称随着儒学对市场经济的作用应运而生。"经济儒学"的特点表现为内容上体现外王本质、形式上贴近大众民生、地位上未被正确评价、作用上极具现实意义。"经济儒学"的体系可以从源、体、用三个层面来架构,面临儒家经济思想的挖掘、扬弃和实践三大任务。"经济儒学"属于应用儒学,现实作用是中国经济的灵魂和世界经济的灵药。"经济儒学"有助于儒学跳出意识形态的窠臼,真正从传统走向现代以及去经院化和迈向社会化。     

Pleasure and Illusion in Plato

Plato links pleasure with illusion, and this link explains his rejection of the view that all desires are rational desires for the good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory. One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul (the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic , not all desires are rational, and thus virtue depends on bringing one's non-rational desires under the control of reason.     

论道德理论在马克思思想体系中的地位

正确认识马克思的道德理论在其思想体系中的地位,关系到对整个马克思思想及其贡献的理解。针对中外学界对这一问题的种种不同看法和误解,本文认为,伦理道德是马克思一生学术实践所关注的,是马克思思想体系的灵魂,自由与解放则是马克思道德研究及其整个思想体系的主旨。     

Aristotle's De Anima: On Why the Soul is Not a Set of Capacities

Although it is common for interpreters of Aristotle's De Anima to treat the soul as a specially related set of powers of capacities, I argue against this view on the grounds that the plausible options for reconciling the claim that the soul is a set of powers with Aristotle's repeated claim that the soul is an actuality cannot be unsuccessful. Moreover, I argue that there are good reasons to be wary of attributing to Aristotle the view that the soul is a set of powers because this claim conflicts with several of his metaphysical commitments, most importantly his claims about form and substance. I argue that although there are passages in the De Anima in which Aristotle discusses the soul in terms of its powers or capacities, these discussions do not establish that the soul is a set of capacities.     

THE BIBLICAL ROOTS OF LOCKE'S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

Locke's consciousness‐based theory of personal identity resulted not only from his agnosticism on substance, but also from his biblical theology. This theory was intended to complement and sustain Locke's moral and theological commitments to a system of otherworldly rewards and sanctions as revealed in Scripture. Moreover, he inferred mortalist ideas from the Bible, rejecting the resurrection of the same body and maintaining that the soul dies at physical death and will be resurrected by divine miracle. Accordingly, personal identity is neither in the soul, nor in the body, nor in a union of soul and body. To Locke, personal identity is in consciousness, which, extending “backwards to any past Action or Thought,” enables the self, both in this life and upon resurrection for the Last Judgment, to recognize that “it is the same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Essay II.xxvii.9).     

Brentano on the individuation of mental acts

This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the “soul,” and this allowed him to explain the individuation of mental acts. Finally, after his “reistic” turn, he excluded mental acts from his ontology, for he rejected abstracta of any kind, including abstract particulars, and admitted only things, or res (in Latin), that is, concrete particulars; in his late philosophy, there are no “thinkings,” but only “thinkers.” However, he still needed to explain what individuates different thinkers, and this was again the soul. In the conclusion, the paper critically compares the different theoretical options considered by Brentano.     

Enigmatic Bayle

The subject of this article is Herder’s unique conception of the soul-body relationship and its divergence from and dependence on Leibniz. Herder’s theory is premised on a rejection of the windowlessness of monads in two important respects: interaction between material bodies (as gleaned from Crusius and Kant) and interaction between the soul and body. Herder’s theory depends on Leibniz insofar as it agrees with the intimate connection Leibniz posits between the soul and the body, as his epistemology demonstrates, with, however, the significant modification that the connection is real. Herder transforms the Leibnizian rehabilitation and use of substantial forms to develop a double-conception of the human soul as both thinking substance and substantial form: the soul, qua thinking substance, needs a body through whose senses it can interact with, and acquire knowledge of, the external world; the soul, qua substantial form, constructs itself this material body by harnessing the forces of attraction and repulsion. Herder’s theory provides an alternative to other contemporary accounts of the soul-body relationship, especially Kant’s, which start from the problem of relating two distinct substances. His unique and original reconciliation of the modern dichotomy of spirit and matter, via his connecting of Leibniz’s realms of final and efficient causes, is of great significance for the rise of German Idealism.     

The Spiritual Implications of Interpersonal Abuse: Speaking of the Soul

A holistic view of the person includes body, mind and spirit, or soul. The purpose of this paper is to explore the concepts of “soul” and “radical evil” within a conversation about destructive interpersonal abuse. Most religions and spiritual disciplines understand the human person, especially the human soul, as sacred. When the perpetrator, propelled by his own internal alienation, desecrates the soul of his victim through relational sexual abuse, the victim often experiences herself as a no-person. Her ongoing sense of identity is fragmented, her capacity for spiritual experience, for imagination, creativity, relatedness are deeply wounded. With the help of information from the field of neuroscience, as well as other theological perspectives, some pathways for healing of the soul are discussed.     

“心灵鸡汤”对温度知觉、他人评价和自我评价的影响

本研究基于具身认知观点和概念隐喻理论,采用三个实验探讨了 “心灵鸡汤”对环境温度的感知觉影响、对陌生他人人品评价的影响以及对自我人格特质评定的影响。结果发现,“心灵鸡汤”的阅读能有效提高个体对环境温度的评定,且不存在性别差异;阅读“心灵鸡汤”后倾向于对陌生人的人品有更高的积极评定;“心灵鸡汤”对自我评定不存在显著影响。     

The form of the soul ― on the body in Freud’s psychoanalysis

To formulate the problem of the relation between body and soul in terms of how one should understand the relation between consciousness and the brain, or in terms of explaining how mind can arise out of matter, is a modern and far from innocent tendency that has instigated the whole spectrum of theories and answers suggested by the philosophy of mind of the so-called Analytic tradition during the 20th century. During the last 5 decades, we have seen a number of attempts at incorporating Freud into this discussion about the relation between body and soul. In this article, the author develops an argument according to which the philosophy of mind of the Analytic tradition is not really an appropriate intellectual environment for Freud´s theory of the body and its constitutive rôle. Rather, we should turn to phenomenology and transcendental philosophy where the body is thematized, not in terms of matter taken to give rise to consciousness in an empirical sense, but rather in terms of the “lived body” that is taken, in a transcendental sense, to constitute the organization of meaning in our conscious and our unconscious psychological life. On the basis of an outline of this phenomenological theory, the author argues that Freud, most of all in his theory of psychosexual development, thematizes the body as the form of the soul.     

Plato's Criticism of the ``Democratic Man' in the Republic

The article discusses two puzzles about Plato's account of the democratic person: (1) unlike his account of the democratic city, his characterization of a democratic person is markedly incorrect. (2) His criticism of a person so characterized is criticism of a straw man. The article argues that the first puzzle is resolved if we see it as a result of Plato's assumption that a democratic person is a person whose soul is isomorphic to a democratic constitution. Such a person has a desire satisfaction theory of good and adopts liberty and equality of desires as a basis for action. The article then argues that Plato's criticism brings up two problems endemic to desire satisfaction theories of good, the problem of bad desires and the problem of conflicts of desires. The criticism is that the democratic person's way of dealing with these problems, by applying the social principles of liberty and equality to his desires, is irrational.