契约原则是否带来了自由和平等:国外马克思主义者与自由主义者的论战——雅克·比岱的元结构与罗尔斯的正义理论

马克思主义者与自由主义者的论战涉及社会主义与资本主义最根本的立论基础问题。自由与平等 ,尽管内涵不同 ,是双方共同追求的价值导向。本文接着《自我所有原则走向哪里 :国外马克思主义与自由主义的论战》②一文继续分析国外马克思主义者与自由主义者的论战 ,以及马克思主义者相互之间的分歧 ,试图在一些基本理论问题上作进一步探讨。1 .罗尔斯正义理论所包含的内在矛盾　　资本主义社会的两极分化以及由此产生的社会问题 ,使西方理论家在老自由主义基础上发展了新自由主义的观点 ,即更加关注社会平等问题。罗尔斯的《正义论》就试图以社…     

自我所有原则走向哪里:国外马克思主义者与自由主义者的论战——读柯亨的《自我所有、自由与平等》

《哲学研究》近年发表的两篇文章《中国的自由主义和中国的马克思主义之关系的历史、现状与未来》 (《哲学研究》 1 999年第 1 1期 )与《也谈中国的自由主义与中国的马克思主义之关系》 (《哲学研究》 2 0 0 0年第 6期 ) ,反映了持续 1 0年之久的马克思主义与自由主义的论战在逐渐向深处发展。 2 0世纪初 ,这场论战随着马克思主义的传入而在我国展开 ,由于它体现了两种不同的社会发展道路 ,每当社会处于动荡和转折关头 ,这场论战就趋于白热化。这两篇文章追述和分析了这段历史与现实。随着时代的发展与社会体制的差异 ,国内外马克思主义与自…     

马克思主义与自由主义的论争——雅克·比岱教授学术报告会纪要

法国巴黎第十大学、国际马克思大会组织者雅克·比岱教授应邀于11月1-5日访问了中山大学马克思主义哲学与中国现代化研究所,并做了《马克思主义与自由主义的论战》、《资本主义和社会主义的自由问题》的学术报告,徐俊忠教授和叶汝贤教授分别主持了会议。 在报告中,比岱从分析自己的一般理论(generaltheory)入手,介绍了目前西方马克思主义者正在讨论的问题。他认为,从马克思对自由主义的批判这个意义上     

再论社会主义市场经济条件下的道德原则

市场经济的健康发展必然遵循着自利和利他相统一的互利原则.从历史发展来看,根植于资本主义发展的个人主义是西方市场经济遵循的核心道德原则,而整体本位则最终成为中国传统道德原则的灵魂,两者都不能从根本上适应社会主义市场经济条件下利益主体的需求.社会主义市场经济需要的是对两者的超越,实现道义原则与利益原则、外在功利价值与内在精神价值以及道德的工具性与目的性的统一.实践证明,只有马克思主义的集体主义道德原则才真正克服了对个人和整体的抽象、片面的理解,才真正完成了对历史上所有价值理论的扬弃和超越.     

马克思对洛克财产权理论的透视与批判

洛克财产权理论为后世自由主义的资本主义所有制辩护奠定了劳动原则与个人所有原则。从表面上看,洛克财产权理论的两大原则与马克思劳动理论具有一定的同质性。事实上,马克思通过以劳动为基础的私有制和以占有他人劳动为基础的私有制的区分,证明了洛克的劳动原则无法成为资本主义私有制的正当性依据;并根据商品所有权规律向资本主义占有规律的转化,揭示自由主义在为资本主义所有制辩护时陷入劳动幻象的根源与机制。同时,马克思在劳动力商品化的分析中通过描述劳动者与劳动力分离的历史过程,对洛克自我所有原则进行前提性批判,即人与人格的区分是自我所有原则的前提,而人与人格的区分是历史的产物,而非自然法的前提。     

马克思主义的自由个性与自由主义的个人优先性

20世纪 90年代自由主义在中国的登台亮相 ,尤其是自由主义和新左派的世纪性大论战 ,一方面表明中国思想理论界新格局的形成 ,另一方面表明自由主义正在成为中国思想理论界不少人、尤其是不少高级知识分子中某种显性或隐性的社会意识。这势必影响到中国特色的社会主义建设的发展。论战的实质是未来中国的走向问题 :自由主义提供的是渐进的向资本主义演变的方案 ,新左派则没有自己的现成方案 ,但大体上表现出的是社会民主主义的倾向。在这场论战中 ,少有马克思主义者参与其中 ,自由主义正在成为中国思想理论界的话语霸权。同时 ,以往对马克思…     

价值多元:自由主义的证成还是否定?

自以赛亚·伯林提倡价值多元主义并将其与自由主义结合之后,价值多元主义与自由主义的关系便成为当代西方政治哲学的重要问题。伯林认为价值多元主义自然地证成自由的重要性;罗尔斯在《政治自由主义》中坚持中立性原则,仍然遵循二者结合的思路。但格雷、凯克斯等人发现了多元主义与自由主义的不相容性,甚至主张多元主义必然否定自由主义。笔者认为,"多元主义反对自由主义"虽有一定道理,但也存在比较明显的问题,而如果以一种更现实的眼光看待二者的关系,不难发现自由主义是维护多元的最佳选择。     

自我所有、分配正义与政府角色

公平正义是全面深化改革的重要目标,从观念层面对社会正义进行理论研究对扎实推进社会公正、界定政府职责有极强的价值意义。自由主义正义观从自我所有权出发,将绝对财产权、自由交换描绘为社会公正的理想图景,进而推崇最小化政府角色定位,而平等主义正义观则反对固化自由任意的交换结果,强调人的平等发展图景,寄望于发挥政府调节贫富差距、促进人的公平发展等职能。在二者的理论辩难中,自我所有权是争论的基础和核心议题。从税收的自愿性维度出发,强调结果平等的正义性和政府超越"守夜人"的积极性定位,不仅能从平等主义正义观中推导出,而且能够从自由主义的自我所有权观念推导而来。     

契约理念:历史与现实的反思——兼论全球化时代的契约文明

在我国学术界,学者们更多地立足于纵向的、思想史的维度对契约论加以探讨,但实际上,它是关于政治社会发展的一般理论,概括了社会发展的主要问题。美国学者熊彼特认为,契约论“试图创立一种有关社会的综合性理论,涉及社会的所有方面和所有问题”(转引自于海,第86页)。它实际上是一种政治哲学,蕴含了深刻的哲学底蕴。一方面,作为一种价值理性,契约论包含了人本主义价值原则;另一方面,作为一种工具理性,契约论蕴     

评罗杰斯与斯金纳关于人类行为控制问题的争论

罗杰斯与斯金纳于1956年开始展开的关于人类行为控制问题的一系列尖锐辨论,是现代心理学史上的著名论战之一。从表面上看,辨论的焦点是主观选择与环境控制问题,但实质上却代表了人本主义心理学与行为主义心理学在一系列基本观点上的尖锐对立,因而具有典型的意义。本文试对这场争论双方的观点进行比较,并分析其根源于各自所遵循的哲学思想和方法的实质与局限性,以此为建立马克思主义哲学思想指导的科学心理学提供借鉴。     

Ethnocentrism,Social Contract Liberalism and Positivistic-Conservatism: Rorty's Three Theses on Politics

In this article I argue that Rorty has three separatearguments for liberalism. The pragmatic-ethnocentric argument for liberalism,as a system which works for `us liberals', is rejectedfor entailing relativism. The social contract argument results in an extreme formof individualism. This renders politics redundantbecause there is no need for the (liberal) state toprotect poetic individuals, who are capable ofdefending themselves. Even if the less able areharmed, the state could not prevent this, givenRorty's arguments about discursive enrichment withina language game. Finally, the positivistic-conservative argument legitimisesliberal politics by fiat, and makes normativediscussion about the status quo illegitimate. Herethe argument is that politics is a matter of reactivetechnical piecemeal problem-solving, to restore theharmony of the status quo. As politics deals with`facts', normative `problematisations' of thefunctional status quo are illegitimate (in the public/political sphere). So, either anything goes, andpolitics is redundant, or discussion of politics isdepoliticised and confined to the private sphere.Consequently, Rorty has no way to explore issues ofpower, or normative contestation. Therefore he isunable to address issues of social justice withinliberal democracies, such as feminist arguments aboutan ascribed gender status limiting equalityof opportunity.     

Judgments of Grammaticality of Japanese Sentences Violating the Principle of Full Interpretation

Two experiments investigated the linguistic intuition of Japanese speakers in which they judged the grammaticality of sentences violating Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation. Experiment 1 used bitransitive sentences, which included an extra argument that assumed a role of either subjective, dative, or objective on the one hand and that specified semantically a preceding argument or stood in par with it on the other. Findings showed that the speakers judged ungrammatical sentences involving a dative or an objective extra argument as more grammatical than those involving a subjective extra argument. Ungrammatical sentences with an extra specified argument were judged more grammatical than those with an extra par argument when the extra argument was objective. Experiment 2 used sentences that included a verbal noun (VN) comprising a noun followed by a verb, shita (did). Ungrammatical VN sentences contained two arguments given the same objective marker. These sentences were judged to be highly grammatical despite the violation of the principle. Findings suggest that speakers' actual knowledge of language is not fully consistent with the knowledge they are alleged by Chomsky to possess, including the principle of Full Interpretation.     

Self‐supporting Arguments*

Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically dependent upon their conclusions—epistemically self‐supporting arguments—need not be viciously circular. R.B. Braithwaite and James Van Cleve use internalist and externalist versions of this strategy in their proposed solutions to the problem of induction. Unfortunately, their arguments for self‐support are unsound and any theory of inferential justification that does not require justified belief in the corresponding conditionals of justification‐affording arguments is unacceptably arbitrary. So self‐supporting arguments cannot be justification‐creating.     

The Implicit Argument for the Basic Liberties

Most criticism and exposition of John Rawls’s political theory has focused on his account of distributive justice rather than on his support for liberalism. Because of this, much of his argument for protecting the basic liberties remains under explained. Specifically, Rawls claims that representative citizens would agree to guarantee those social conditions necessary for the exercise and development of the two moral powers, but he does not adequately explain why protecting the basic liberties would guarantee these social conditions. This gap in his argument leads to two problems. First, the Rawlsian argument for the priority of liberty would fail if the gap could not be filled. His argument would still support the protection of individual freedoms, but these freedoms would be treated like other primary goods and regulated by the difference principle. Second, without a full argument, there is not sufficient reason to favor Rawls’s left-liberal conception of the basic liberties over a more right-leaning conception that would prioritize the protection of free-market rights. To address these two problems, this paper fills in the gap in order to better explain Rawls’s full argument for egalitarian liberalism.     

Consistent Liberalism does not Require Active Euthanasia

I argue that ‘classical liberalism’ does not sanction any easy permissiveness about suicide and active euthanasia. I will use liberal arguments to argue that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is real and that assisted suicide is, at the very least, deeply troubling when viewed from an authentic liberal perspective. The usual argument for active euthanasia is a utilitarian, not a liberal argument, as recent calls to eliminate the conscientious objection rights of doctors who refuse participation in such procedures plainly demonstrate. The paper focuses on arguments in the public sphere (such as those articulated by James Rachels).     

Leninism and the Enlightenment

Conclusion The outcome of this comparison of the impact of the Englishtenment on two rival philosophical traditions suggests that there are points of contact even on the issues that appear to push Leninism in an opposite direction from liberalism. The lack of communication between these two traditions results in a lack of vigor in developing their philosophies in a way that addresses the accomplishments of rival philosophies. For example, Leninism, which seeks to justify limits on the freedom of speech for those viewed as anti-socialist, would do well to reinforce its position by mastering the reasoning of the liberals who differentiate the rights of the Ku Klux Klan from those of the N.A.A.C.P. And liberalism, which has been concerned with overcoming formal equality to implement real, practical equality of opportunity, is in effect echoing one of Lenin's main concerns about democracy under capitalism.Insofar as Lenin put forward the idea of Marxism as the continuation and sublation of the best accomplishments of human culture, it appears to be a weakness of contemporary Leninism that it fails sufficiently to embrace or confront the body of philosophical thought characterizing the liberal democratic conceptions of the Enlightenment and of contemporary liberalism. Even though this body of thought was known to Lenin and partially appropriated as well as confronted by him, there is a lack of emphasis by Leninists upon the mastering of the arguments advanced by liberalism. The fact that rival, anti-Leninist thought also began from certain ideas of the Enlightenment underscores the importance for Leninism's own self-understanding of studying the evolution of Enlightenment philosophy, its links with twentieth-century liberalism, and the reasons for the rejection of liberal conceptions by Lenin.     

Foundations of Academic Freedom: Making New Sense of Some Aging Arguments

The article distinguishes between the various arguments traditionally offered as justifications for the principle of academic freedom. Four main arguments are identified, three consequentialist in nature (the argument from truth, the democratic argument, the argument from autonomy), and one nonconsequentialist (a variant of the autonomy argument). The article also concentrates on the specific form these arguments must take in order to establish academic freedom as a principle distinct from the more general principles of freedom of expression and intellectual freedom.     

Clergy-Congregation Mismatches and Clergy Job Satisfaction

Clergy are sometimes matched with congregations that are not as liberal or conservative as they are. We develop two arguments that predict different effects of clergy-congregation mismatches in theological conservatism/liberalism on clergy job satisfaction. One argument predicts no effect of a mismatch on job satisfaction because clergy have been socialized to expect challenges and frustrations in their ministry. The other argument predicts a reduction in clergy job satisfaction because of the clergy-congregation conflict produced by the theology mismatch. National data ( N = 2,467) from two Protestant denominations are used to test these two hypotheses. We find support for the conflict argument: theology mismatches do produce clergy job dissatisfaction, net of numerous other factors. However, this happens only when the minister is more liberal (not more conservative) than the congregation. Additional analysis also showed that these mismatched clergy are more likely to intend to leave their current churches.     

On Argumentation Schemes and the Natural Classification of Arguments

We develop conceptions of arguments and of argument types that will, by serving as the basis for developing a natural classification of arguments, benefit work in artificial intelligence. Focusing only on arguments construed as the semantic entities that are the outcome of processes of reasoning, we outline and clarify our view that an argument is a proposition that represents a fact as both conveying some other fact and as doing so wholly. Further, we outline our view that, with respect to arguments that are propositions, (roughly) two arguments are of the same type if and only if they represent the same relation of conveyance and do so in the same way. We then argue for our conceptions of arguments and argument types, and compare them to alternative positions. We also illustrate the need for, and some of the strengths of, our approach to classifying arguments through an examination of aspects of two prominent and recent attempts to classify arguments using argumentation schemes, namely those of M. Kienpointner and D. Walton. Finally, we clarify how our conception of arguments and of argument types can assist in developing an exhaustive classification of arguments.     

Biothics, the Christian Citizen, and the Pluralist Game

The ascendancy of Christian activism in bioethical policy debateshas elicited a number of responses by critics of this activism.These critics typically argue that the public square ought toembrace Secular Liberalism (SL), a perspective that its proponentsmaintain is the most just arrangement in a pluralist society,even though SL places restraints on Christian activists thatare not placed on similarly situated citizens who hold moreliberal views on bioethical questions. The author critiquesthree arguments that are offered to defend SL: (1) the goldenrule contract argument, (2) the secular reason argument, and(3) the err-on-the-side-of-liberty argument. The author concludesthat each of these arguments fail to support SL.