Where there are internal defeaters,there are “confirmers”

There is widespread consensus that there are undercutting and rebutting defeaters that diminish or destroy the warrant of a belief B. I argue that there are counterparts of defeaters: the counterparts of undercutting defeaters are “requirement fulfillment beliefs”, the counterparts of rebutting defeaters are “consistency beliefs”. These beliefs confirm the warrant of B, I therefore call them “confirmers”.     

What are numbers?

This paper argues that (cardinal) numbers are originally given to us in the context ‘Fs exist n-wise’, and accordingly, numbers are certain manners or modes of existence, by addressing two objections both of which are due to Frege. First, the so-called Caesar objection will be answered by explaining exactly what kind of manner or mode numbers are. And then what we shall call the Functionality of Cardinality objection will be answered by establishing the fact that for any numbers m and n, if there are exactly m Fs and also there are exactly n Fs, then m = n.     

What are groups?

In this paper I argue for a view of groups, things like teams, committees, clubs and courts. I begin by examining features all groups seem to share. I formulate a list of six features of groups that serve as criteria any adequate theory of groups must capture. Next, I examine four of the most prominent views of groups currently on offer—that groups are non-singular pluralities, fusions, aggregates and sets. I argue that each fails to capture one or more of the criteria. Last, I develop a view of groups as realizations of structures. The view has two components. First, groups are entities with structure. Second, since groups are concreta, they exist only when a group structure is realized. A structure is realized when each of its functionally defined nodes or places are occupied. I show how such a view captures the six criteria for groups, which no other view of groups adequately does, while offering a substantive answer to the question, “What are groups?”     

What are numbers?

A number is the number of a class which is an objective, nonactual, mathematical object. The concept of class is analyzed and it is concluded that a number is the number of a pure founded class. A tempting strategy of explaining numbers away is rejected. Some well‐known definitions of numbers are analyzed and it is concluded that this analysis purports the thesis that the unique notion of number does not exist. Numbers are conventional. Nevertheless, an argument is offered purporting the thesis that von Neumann's ordinal numbers are the ordinal numbers. Accordingly, the corresponding von Neumann's cardinal numbers are the numbers.     

If structured propositions are logical procedures then how are procedures individuated?

This paper deals with two issues. First, it identifies structured propositions with logical procedures. Second, it considers various rigorous definitions of the granularity of procedures, hence also of structured propositions, and comes out in favour of one of them. As for the first point, structured propositions are explicated as algorithmically structured procedures. I show that these procedures are structured wholes that are assigned to expressions as their meanings, and their constituents are sub-procedures occurring in executed mode (as opposed to displayed mode). Moreover, procedures are not mere aggregates of their parts; rather, procedural constituents mutually interact. As for the second point, there is no universal criterion of the structural isomorphism of meanings, hence of co-hyperintensionality, hence of synonymy for every kind of language. The positive result I present is an ordered set of rigorously defined criteria of fine-grained individuation in terms of the structure of procedures. Hence procedural semantics provides a solution to the problem of the granularity of co-hyperintensionality.

     

Commentary: What are behavior systems and what use are they?

The contributions of this symposium on behavior systems are summarized and evaluated by considering two questions: (1) What is a behavior system? (2) What use to the learning theorist are behavior systems? Two examples of behavior systems from the classical ethological literature are compared with the behavior systems discussed in the symposium, and some similarities and differences in the type of analyses used are discussed. Analysis of the pre-organized species-typical behavior systems relevant to the unconditioned stimuli or reinforcers in learning experiments can contribute performance rules and better understanding of the conditions and contents of learning. The organization of behavior systems can also provide important clues to the neural circuitry underlying behavior, and a behavior systems approach can raise novel questions concerning learning and behavioral development. Possible future directions for the behavior systems approach are briefly discussed.     

What are impossible worlds?

In this paper, I argue for a particular conception of impossible worlds. Possible worlds, as traditionally understood, can be used in the analysis of propositions, the content of belief, the truth of counterfactuals, and so on. Yet possible worlds are not capable of differentiating propositions that are necessarily equivalent, making sense of the beliefs of agents who are not ideally rational, or giving truth values to counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. The addition of impossible worlds addresses these issues. The kinds of impossible worlds capable of performing this task are not mysterious sui generis entities, but sets of structured propositions that are themselves constructed out of possible worlds and relations. I also respond to a worry that these impossible worlds are unable to represent claims about the shape of modal space itself.     

What are constructive forces?

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

What are self-generated actions?

The concept of self-generated action is controversial, despite extensive study of its neural basis. Why is this concept so troublesome? We analyse the concept of self-generated action as employed by [Passingham et al., 2010a] and [Passingham et al., 2010b] . There are two definitions of self-generated action; as operant action and as underdetermined action. The latter draws on subjective experience. Experiments on action awareness suggest that experience may not be a good guide for defining self-generated action. Nevertheless, we agree with Passingham and colleagues that self-generated actions exist distinct from operant actions. But defining ‘self-generated’ by the degree of involvement of an endogenous process risks regress. We sketch an alternative account of self-generated action that tries to avoid these problems to make self-generated actions accessible to experimental science.     

What Good are Counterexamples?

Intuitively, Gettier cases are instances of justified true beliefsthat are not cases of knowledge. Should we therefore conclude thatknowledge is not justified true belief? Only if we have reason totrust intuition here. But intuitions are unreliable in a wide rangeof cases. And it can be argued that the Gettier intuitions have agreater resemblance to unreliable intuitions than to reliableintuitions. What’s distinctive about the faulty intuitions, Iargue, is that respecting them would mean abandoning a simple,systematic and largely successful theory in favour of a complicated,disjunctive and idiosyncratic theory. So maybe respecting theGettier intuitions was the wrong reaction, we should instead havebeen explaining why we are all so easily misled by these kinds ofcases.     

Does information about what things are influence children's memory for where things are?

Two experiments examined how information about what objects are influences memory for where objects are located. Seven-, 9-, and 11-year-old children and adults learned the locations of 20 objects marked by dots on the floor of a box. The objects belonged to 4 categories. In one condition, objects belonging to the same category were located in the same quadrant of the box. In another condition, objects and locations were randomly paired. After learning, participants attempted to replace the objects without the aid of the dots. Children and adults placed the objects in the same quadrant closer together when they were related than when they were unrelated, indicating that object information led to systematic biases in location memory.     

What are human express saccades?

When a fixation point is removed 200 msec prior to target onset (the gap condition), human subjects are said to produce eye movements that have a short latency (80–120 msec), that form the early peak of a bimodal latency distribution, and that have been labeled “human express saccades” (see, e.g., Fischer, 1987; Fischer & Breitmeyer, 1987; Fischer & Ramsperger, 1984, 1986). In three experiments, we sought to obtain this express saccade diagnostic pattern in the gap condition, We orthogonally combined target location predictability with the presence versus absence of catch trials (Experiment 1). When target location was fixed and catch trials were not used, we found mostly anticipations. In the remaining conditions, where responses were under stimulus control, bimodality was not frequently observed, and, whether it was or not, latencies were not in the express saccade range. Using random target locations, we then varied stimulus luminance and the mode of stimulus presentation (LEDs vs. oscilloscope) in the gap and overlap (fixation is not removed) conditions (Experiment2). Bimodality was rarely observed, the gap effect (overlap minus gap reaction time) was additive with luminance, and only the brightest targets elicited saccades in the express range. When fixed locations and no catch trials were combined with latency feedback (Experiment 3), we observed many responses in the express saccade range and some evidence for bimodality, but the sudden introduction of catch trials revealed that many early responses were not under stimulus control. Humanscan make stimulus-controlled saccades that are initiated very rapidly (80–120 msec), but unless catch trials or choice reaction time is used, it is not possible to distinguish such saccades from anticipatory responses that are prepared in advance and timed to occur shortly after target onset. Because the express saccade diagnostic pattern is not a characteristic feature of human saccadic performance, we urge investigators to focus their attention on the robustgap effect