What is the relationship between Aphantasia,Synaesthesia and Autism?

For people with aphantasia, visual imagery is absent or markedly impaired. Here, we investigated the relationship between aphantasia and two other neurodevelopmental conditions also linked to imagery differences: synaesthesia, and autism. In Experiment 1a and 1b, we asked whether aphantasia and synaesthesia can co-occur, an important question given that synaesthesia is linked to strong imagery. Taking grapheme-colour synaesthesia as a test case, we found that synaesthesia can be objectively diagnosed in aphantasics, suggesting visual imagery is not necessary for synaesthesia to occur. However, aphantasia influenced the type of synaesthesia experienced (favouring ‘associator’ over ‘projector’ synaesthesia - a distinction tied to the phenomenology of the synaesthetic experience). In Experiment 2, we asked whether aphantasics have traits associated with autism, an important question given that autism – like aphantasia – is linked to weak imagery. We found that aphantasics reported more autistic traits than controls, with weaknesses in imagination and social skills.     

The differential contributions of visual imagery constructs on autobiographical thinking

There is a growing theoretical and empirical consensus on the central role of visual imagery in autobiographical memory. However, findings from studies that explore how individual differences in visual imagery are reflected on autobiographical thinking do not present a coherent story. One reason for the mixed findings was suggested to be the treatment of visual imagery as an undifferentiated construct while evidence shows that there is more than one type of visual imagery. The present study investigates the relative contributions of different imagery constructs; namely, object and spatial imagery, on autobiographical memory processes. Additionally, it explores whether a similar relation extends to imagining the future. The results indicate that while object imagery was significantly correlated with several phenomenological characteristics, such as the level of sensory and perceptual details for past events – but not for future events – spatial imagery predicted the level of episodic specificity for both past and future events. We interpret these findings as object imagery being recruited in tasks of autobiographical memory that employ reflective processes while spatial imagery is engaged during direct retrieval of event details. Implications for the role of visual imagery in autobiographical thinking processes are discussed.     

视觉表象生成系统及其影响因素

视觉表象是在记忆基础上产生的类似知觉的信息表征, 也是人们在日常生活中不可或缺的心理活动之一。本综述介绍了该领域中比较有影响力的表象计算理论模型, 并进一步归纳了视觉表象生成系统的成分及其对应的神经基础。分析结果强调了初级视觉皮层作为“视觉缓冲器”是生成表象的主要机能结构, 以“视觉缓冲器”为基础的表象生成系统的机能受多重因素影响。本综述有助于对视觉表象生成系统形成全面的认识, 促进视觉表象实质的进一步研究。     

Emotional Mental Imagery as Simulation of Reality: Fear and Beyond—A Tribute to Peter Lang

This article pays tribute to the seminal paper by Peter J. Lang (1977; this journal), “Imagery in Therapy: Information Processing Analysis of Fear.” We review research and clinical practice developments in the past five decades with reference to key insights from Lang’s theory and experimental work on emotional mental imagery. First, we summarize and recontextualize Lang’s bio-informational theory of emotional mental imagery (1977, 1979) within contemporary theoretical developments on the function of mental imagery. Second, Lang’s proposal that mental imagery can evoke emotional responses is evaluated by reviewing empirical evidence that mental imagery has a powerful impact on negative as well as positive emotions at neurophysiological and subjective levels. Third, we review contemporary cognitive and behavioral therapeutic practices that use mental imagery, and consider points of extension and departure from Lang’s original investigation of mental imagery in fear-extinction behavior change. Fourth, Lang’s experimental work on emotional imagery is revisited in light of contemporary research on emotional psychopathology-linked individual differences in mental imagery. Finally, key insights from Lang’s experiments on training emotional response during imagery are discussed in relation to how specific techniques may be harnessed to enhance adaptive emotional mental imagery training in future research.     

The Role of Vividness of Visual Mental Imagery on Different Dimensions of Creativity

Although research demonstrated that people can mentally manipulate and synthesize visual elements into a creative object, the role that vividness of visual imagery plays on creative imagery is still unclear. This study explored the relationships between vividness of visual imagery and 3 dimensions of creative imagery: originality, practicality, and mental spatial transformations of visual elements. Fifty-three participants performed the creative mental synthesis task and completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ). Results revealed a positive relationship between vividness and the practicality dimension of objects. No relationship was found either between vividness and originality or between vividness and transformational complexity. The association vividness–practicality seems to reflect the ability to use pictorial information of imagery when people generate functional objects that belong to specific categories. Future research directions are discussed.     

Einstein’s jacket: Evidence for long-term perceptual specificity in mental imagery

To what extent are visual fantasies constrained by our perceptual experience of the real world? Our study exploits the fact that people’s knowledge of the appearance of individuals from the early 20th Century (e.g., Albert Einstein, Winston Churchill) derives predominantly from viewing black-and-white media images. An initial experiment shows that mental imagery for individuals from this period are experienced as significantly less colourful than imagery for individuals from the era of colour media. A second experiment manipulated whether participants were instructed to explicitly imagine using colour or not (i.e., “imagine Albert Einstein wearing a green jacket” vs. “imagine Albert Einstein wearing a jacket”). Results show that colour manipulation only influences imagery for black-and-white era individuals, with no comparable effect on imagery for colour era individuals. This finding is replicated in a third experiment that includes an additional control condition of imagining generic characters (i.e., “Imagine a knight wearing a cloak” vs. “imagine a knight wearing a red cloak”). Again, only imagery for black-and-white era individuals is affected by the colour manipulation. Overall these results provide evidence for long-term perceptual specificity effects in mental imagery. We argue that visual fantasies can be constrained by surface features of underlying representations in memory, even when imagining something we have never directly perceived.     

Look again: Phenomenology and mental imagery

This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.     

Computational model of enactive visuospatial mental imagery using saccadic perceptual actions

From the onset of cognitive revolution, the concept of mental imagery has been given different, many times opposing, theoretical accounts. Mental imagery appears to be a ubiquitous, yet wholly individual, easy to explain experience on the one hand, being hard to deal with scientifically on the other hand. The focus of this research is on an enactive approach to visuospatial mental imagery, inspired by Sima’s perceptual instantiation theory. We designed a hybrid computational model, composed of a forward model, an inverse model, both implemented as neural networks, and a memory/controller module, that grounds simple mental concepts, such as a triangle and a square, in perceptual actions, and is able to reimagine these objects by performing the necessary perceptual actions in a simulated humanoid robot. We tested the model on three tasks – salience-based object recognition, imagination-based object recognition and object imagination – and achieved very good results showing, as a proof of concept, that perceptual actions are a viable candidate for grounding the visuospatial mental concepts as well as the credible substrate of visuospatial mental imagery.     

Visual mental imagery influences attentional guidance in a visual-search task

Visual mental imagery resembles visual working memory (VWM). Because both visual mental imagery and VWM involve the representation and manipulation of visual information, it was hypothesized that they would exert similar effects on visual attention. Several previous studies have demonstrated that working-memory representations guide attention toward a memory-matching task-irrelevant stimulus during visual-search tasks. Therefore, mental imagery may also guide attention toward imagery-matching stimuli. In the present study, five experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of visual mental imagery on visual attention during a visual-search task. Participants were instructed to visualize a color or an object clearly associated with a specific color, after which they were asked to detect a colored target in the visual-search task. Reaction times for target detection were shorter when the color of the target matched the imagined color, and when the color of the target was similar to that strongly associated with the imagined object, than when the color of the target did not match that of the mental representation. This effect was not observed when participants were not instructed to imagine a color. These results suggest that similar to VWM, visual mental imagery guides attention toward imagery-matching stimuli.     

初级视觉皮层在表象表征方式研究中的作用

表象的信息表征方式一直是心理学研究的热点问题,脑成像技术在该问题的研究中发挥了巨大作用。本文以初级视觉皮层(V1)在表象表征方式研究中的作用为主线,系统梳理了基于脑成像技术开展的表象实质争论的核心问题,归纳分析了相关争论问题演绎发展的内在逻辑脉络,在此基础上指出了表象研究中需要进一步解决的关键问题,以期能够促进相关研究问题的进一步开展。     

从表征和认知过程上看表象与知觉、记忆的关系

表象、知觉和记忆是一个整合的认知系统。由于知觉和记忆提供了表象生成的材料,因而三者共享相似的表征,并激活广泛而相似的脑区。然而在认知加工过程上三者存在一定的差异。与知觉相比,表象的编码方式更抽象、更依赖过去经验的参与且处理细节能力更弱;与记忆相比,表象更容易受无关信息的干扰。未来对三者关系的研究应关注不同来源和不同类型的表象与知觉、记忆之间的关系,以及工作记忆在三者关系中所起的作用。     

Individual differences in spatial mental imagery

In this article, we report a new image-scanning paradigm that allowed us to measure objectively individual differences in spatial mental imagery—specifically, imagery for location. Participants were asked to determine whether an arrow was pointing at a dot using a visual mental image of an array of dots. The degree of precision required to discriminate “yes” from “no” trials was varied. In Experiment 1, the time to scan increasing distances, as well as the number of errors, increased when greater precision was required to make a judgement. The results in Experiment 2 replicated those results while controlling for possible biases. When greater precision is required, the accuracy of the spatial image becomes increasingly important—and hence the effect of precision in the task reflects the accuracy of the image. In Experiment 3, this measure was shown to be related to scores on the Paper Folding test, on the Paper Form Board test, and on the visuospatial items on Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices—but not to scores on questionnaires measuring object–based mental imagery. Thus, we provide evidence that classical standardized spatial tests rely on spatial mental imagery but not object mental imagery.     

Evaluating the mind's eye: the metacognition of visual imagery

Can people evaluate phenomenal qualities of internally generated experiences, such as whether a mental image is vivid or detailed? This question exemplifies a problem of metacognition: How well do people know their own thoughts? In the study reported here, participants were instructed to imagine a specific visual pattern and rate its vividness, after which they were presented with an ambiguous rivalry display that consisted of the previously imagined pattern plus an orthogonal pattern. On individual trials, higher ratings of vividness predicted a greater likelihood that the imagined pattern would appear dominant when the participant was subsequently presented with the binocular rivalry display. Off-line self-report questionnaires measuring imagery vividness also predicted individual differences in the strength of imagery bias over the entire study. Perceptual bias due to mental imagery could not be attributed to demand characteristics, as no bias was observed on catch-trial presentations of mock rivalry displays. Our findings provide novel evidence that people have a good metacognitive understanding of their own mental imagery and can reliably evaluate the vividness of single episodes of imagination.     

视觉表象个体差异及其神经基础

视觉表象涉及人类一种重要信息表征方式, 与工作记忆和注意相比, 视觉表象研究更为关注其所产生的主观内容, 而这一主观内容的产生存在明显的个体差异。本文从个体差异的角度, 系统介绍了视觉表象个体差异的表现与内在的神经基础及其可能的应用, 并展望了未来的研究方向。本研究将有助于对视觉表象个体差异的认识, 促进视觉表象功能与实质问题研究的进一步开展。     

Perspectives on prediction: Does third-person imagery improve task completion estimates?

People typically underestimate the time necessary to complete their tasks. According to the planning fallacy model of optimistic time predictions, this underestimation occurs because people focus on developing a specific plan for the current task and neglect the implications of past failures to meet similar deadlines. We extend the classic planning fallacy model by proposing that a phenomenal quality of mental imagery – the visual perspective that is adopted – may moderate the optimistic prediction bias. Consistent with this proposal, participants in four studies predicted longer completion times, and thus were less prone to bias, when they imagined an upcoming task from the third-person rather than first-person perspective. Third-person imagery reduced people’s focus on optimistic plans, increased their focus on potential obstacles, and decreased the impact of task-relevant motives on prediction. The findings suggest that third-person imagery helps individuals generate more realistic predictions by reducing cognitive and motivational processes that typically contribute to bias.     

Are things that are hard to physically move also hard to imagine moving?

Are objects that are more difficult to physically manipulate also more difficult to mentally manipulate? In our study, participants interacted with wooden objects modeled after the figures from Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) classic mental rotation experiment. One pair of objects was easy to physically rotate while another pair was difficult. They then completed a standard mental rotation task on images of these objects. Participants were slower to mentally rotate objects that were harder to physically rotate when they engaged in motor imagery. Further, this cost accrued with increasing angles of rotation. We verified this was the result of motor imagery by showing that the costs can be eliminated by using a strictly visual imagery strategy (imagining the objects moving on their own). These results reveal a striking constraint imposed by our real-world motor experiences on mental imagery, and also demonstrate a way that we can overcome such constraints.     

Remembering the past and imagining the future: a role for nonvisual imagery in the everyday cognition of blind and sighted people

Images can be generated in all sensory modalities. Nevertheless, research on the everyday use of mental imagery, for example in autobiographical memory tasks, has suggested that it is only visual images that facilitate memory retrieval (e.g., Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 1999). If this is the case, individuals born without sight may be forced to rely more on verbal encoding (Goddard & Pring, 2001). This paper explores the presence and everyday role of nonvisual sensory imagery in 16 individuals with and 16 without sight. Using a cue word paradigm, contrary to previous research, Experiment 1 suggested that for both blind and sighted people, nonvisual imageries have a significant role to play in the generation of autobiographical memories. These results were reinforced by similar findings in Experiment 2, which used the same cue word method to explore the role of visual and nonvisual (auditory) imagery when generating future events. The results refute the claim that "useful" imagery in everyday tasks is exclusively visual.     

Visual perception and visual mental imagery of emotional faces generate similar expression aftereffects

What is the relationship between visual perception and visual mental imagery of emotional faces? We investigated this question using a within-emotion perceptual adaptation paradigm in which adaptation to a strong version of an expression was paired with a test face displaying a weak version of the same emotion category. We predicted that within-emotion adaptation to perception and imagery of expressions would generate similar aftereffects, biasing perception of weak emotional test faces toward a more neutral value. Our findings confirmed this prediction. Adaptation to mental images yielded aftereffects that inhibited emotion recognition of test expressions, as participants were less accurate at recognising these stimuli compared to baseline. While the same inhibitory effect was observed when expressions were visually perceived, the size of the aftereffects was greater for perception than imagery. These findings suggest the existence of expression-selective neural mechanisms that subserve both visual perception and visual mental imagery of emotional faces.     

Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery

This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience.     

You see, the ends don't justify the means: visual imagery and moral judgment

We conducted three experiments indicating that characteristically deontological judgments-here, disapproving of sacrificing one person for the greater good of others-are preferentially supported by visual imagery. Experiment 1 used two matched working memory tasks-one visual, one verbal-to identify individuals with relatively visual cognitive styles and individuals with relatively verbal cognitive styles. Individuals with more visual cognitive styles made more deontological judgments. Experiment 2 showed that visual interference, relative to verbal interference and no interference, decreases deontological judgment. Experiment 3 indicated that these effects are due to people's tendency to visualize the harmful means (sacrificing one person) more than the beneficial end (saving others). These results suggest a specific role for visual imagery in moral judgment: When people consider sacrificing someone as a means to an end, visual imagery preferentially supports the judgment that the ends do not justify the means. These results suggest an integration of the dual-process theory of moral judgment with construal-level theory.