Post-Established Harmony: Kant and Analogy Reconsidered

This essay is a response to John Milbank’s comparison of Kant and Aquinas’ theories of analogy in ‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’. A critique of Milbank’s essay forms the point of departure for my reconstruction of Kant’s actual theory of analogy. I show that the usual focus on the Prolegomena for this end is insufficient; in fact, the full extent of Kant’s theory of analogy only becomes clear in the Critique of Judgment. I also consider the significance of the Analogies of Experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. In conclusion, I draw on the work of Michel Guérin to designate Kantian analogy, ‘post-established harmony’.     

Splendid Vices and Secular Virtues: Variations on Milbank's Augustine

John Milbank's case against secular reason draws much of its authority and force from Augustine's critique of pagan virtue. Theology and Social Theory could be characterized, without too much insult to either Augustine or Milbank, as a postmodern City of God. Modern preoccupations with secular virtues, marketplace values, and sociological bottom‐lines are likened there to classically pagan preoccupations with the virtues of self‐conquest and conquest over others. Against both modern and antique “ontological violence” (where ‘to be’ is ‘to be antagonistic’), Milbank advances an Augustinian hope for the peace that is both beyond and prior to the peace of (temporarily) repressed antagonism. One aim of this essay is to consider whether virtues conceived out of such a hope are really all that different from the virtues they are taken to replace. I take a critical look at Augustine's critique of pagan virtue, Milbank's appropriation of that critique, the applicability of that critique to Plato, and the polemical value of Augustine's notion of original sin. I end up being skeptical of the notion of a peculiarly Christian way to turn antagonistically conceived virtues into love, but I am not unsympathetic to Milbank's concerns about a loveless and self‐complacent secularity.     

ON BEING HEARD BUT NOT SEEN: MILBANK AND LASH ON AQUINAS,ANALOGY AND AGNOSTICISM

The article investigates an important recent dispute within systematic theology over the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. John Milbank has defended the view that the doctrine of analogy in Aquinas is peculiarly implicated with his entire ontology, that it cannot be understood in merely semantic terms, and that it involves a less “agnostic” position on knowledge of God than is often assumed. The article critically engages this position in two ways. It offers an archaeology of the prior polemical context out of which the claim arose, for the meaning and purpose of Milbank's claim are illuminated once it is seen as the vigorous repudiation of a “grammatical” or “linguistic” interpretation of Thomas on analogy which had been proffered earlier by Nicholas Lash. It will also provide a close investigation of the citations and interpretations of Aquinas texts that Milbank uses to ground his position, in order to adjudicate the dispute with Lash. The result will be to call strongly into question the plausibility of Milbank's readings of Aquinas. The article also indicates at several points the way in which those readings are shaped by an overriding anti‐Kantian thrust in Milbank's entire approach to the discussion. In conclusion, it adumbrates the larger and older question which subtends the entire dispute: to what degree is some kind of vision or intuitive grasp of being as such, or of God's being, granted human beings in this life?     

The ‘Divine Names’ and the ‘Attributes of Deity’: On the (Infinite) Analogical Interval in Forty-Six Aphorisms

For the modern tradition of analytic philosophy of religion (that this article rejects), goodness, beauty, wisdom, and so on are divine attributes, whereas, for the classical tradition of Christian theology, they are divine names. This crucial distinction between attributes and names helps to explain why feminist philosopher Grace Jantzen’s charge of an identification of the male self with the divine self in Anglo-American philosophy of religion leads on, directly, to a critique of the ‘doctrine’ of analogy. Jantzen’s critique of ‘classical theism’ is directed against the (largely modern) reduction of God to a (male) superbeing. Here, God’s ‘attributes’ are merely human ones, even if extended to a superlative degree. I distinguish the analogical reflections of Aquinas (following Dionysius) and his heirs from the anthropomorphic dissolutions of the divine in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. Theology’s analogical speech, I argue, has the potential to answer – at least partially – the feminist critique of God as a ‘pure projection’ of ‘man’. For Aquinas, God’s perfections must be qualitatively different and not merely quantitative maximisations of our own. I contend that feminist philosophy of religion cannot afford to dismiss the potential of the way of analogy, especially in its negative or apophatic dimensions.     

Graham Ward’s Poststructuralist Christian Nominalism

In his Cities of God, Graham Ward advocates for what he calls an ‘analogical worldview’. On the one hand, he suggests that this analogical worldview has its roots in pre-modern theology and philosophy, especially in Augustine and Aquinas. On the other hand, Graham Ward draws heavily on contemporary critical theory to express this view. The thesis defended in this paper is that by reading the concept of analogy from Augustine and Aquinas in terms of contemporary critical theory, especially that of Jacques Derrida, Ward develops an analogical worldview that has strikingly nominalist ramifications. These ramifications imply that, in the end, there is no longer an adequacy between the perceiving mind and the reality perceived. The argument is developed in three steps. In the first step, Ward’s reading of contemporary critical theory, especially with respect to Derrida, is introduced. In the second step, the theological appropriation of Derrida in the analogical worldview is analyzed. In the third step, the nominalist implications of this application are shown in terms of Ward’s critique of privileging heterosexual relationships. In this third section, I will also deal more extensively and precisely with the question of what I mean by labeling his work as ‘nominalism’ as well as outlining the specific form of nominalism that I am here invoking. In the penultimate section, I will attempt to show that Ward’s nominalism can also be found in the works of Milbank and Pickstock, as it has to do with the specific way in which they take up the Platonic tradition. In my concluding remarks, I will come back to the discussion about the ontological status of sexual relations, indicating my own view on this issue.     

Reformed and Radically Orthodox?: Participatory Metaphysics,Reformed Scholasticism and Radical Orthodoxy's Critique of Modernity

Radical Orthodoxy locates the intellectual roots of secular modernity in the attenuation of Thomistic participatory metaphysics in the late medieval period. John Milbank implicates Reformational theologies in this unintentionally secularizing movement. I examine seventeenth‐century Reformed scholastic Stephen Charnock, contending that he articulates an account of participatory metaphysics similar to Thomas Aquinas, and even further, fails to exhibit the negative trends which Milbank and Catherine Pickstock associate with Scotus and the via moderna. This analysis of Charnock calls into question the location of Reformed theology in Radical Orthodoxy's genealogy of secular modernity, and opens up possibilities for rapprochement between Reformed theology and Radical Orthodoxy.     

A Critical Reading of Jean-Luc Marion's Interpretation of Anselm's Ontological Argument

In this essay, I qualify Jean-Luc Marion's anti-ontological interpretation of Anselm's argument. Marion claims that the argument is not ontological but in line with Dionysian apophatic theology. To substantiate his anti-ontological reading, Marion suggests that the main regulative idea of the Proslogion is bonum. The final regulative idea, however, is gaudium, since gaudium, not bonum, leads the argument to the beatific vision. If we reformulate the Proslogion focusing on gaudium, we find that Marion's analysis misses the evident ontological aspects of the argument, such as the tradition of prayer and hermeneutics. Since Anselm promulgated the argument within the Benedictine tradition of Bec, the practice of prayer or meditation is the legitimate context of the argument. However, because of his emphasis on the structure of call and response over the ontological and hermeneutical aspects of revelation, his analysis neglects the importance of the hermeneutic relation within which the Proslogion is born.     

Thomas Aquinas on hylomorphism and the in-act principle

In Summa Theologiae I.76.1 Aquinas presents an argument for the hylomorphic union of body and soul that he attributes to Aristotle. Aquinas builds on Aristotle’s original argument, however, offering his own short but powerful line of reasoning in support of one of the main premises. This additional argument involves an appeal to the principle that nothing acts except insofar as it is in act. This principle has roots in the thought of Aristotle, but is not explicitly used by him. It is, however, fundamental for Aquinas and pervasive throughout his work. In this paper I examine the principle and its implications for Aquinas’ version of the argument. Furthermore, I argue that the principle is foundational to Aquinas’ criticisms of Averroes’ account of the intellective soul and that its inclusion renders Aquinas’ version of the argument incompatible with Averroes’ view.     

Saint Thomas Aquinas’ ontological epistemology as clarified realism: The relating of subject to object for ontological knowledge

The Kantian revolution limited the possibility of ontological knowledge, severing subject from thing as is evident in its legacy in both continental and analytic philosophy. Consequently, if a thing cannot be known as it is, the philosophical status of empirical science as a study about existing natural things should be called into question. It could be construed, for instance, that a scientific theory is a construction about something to which the subjective constructor can never have ontological access. But, when empirical scientists develop evidence-based proofs for their theories the assumption of realism usually stands: scientific theories constructed by scientists are actually purported to represent natural entities back to these constructing scientists. Given that there is a danger of philosophy becoming isolated from empirical science, we attempt to bridge the gap between philosophical discourse and science-in-praxis through a recapitulation of Aquinas’ ontological epistemology. Aquinas argued for a clarified realism in which the epistemic is construed as an intersection between the thinking subject and the object. Contrary to naïve realism, then, it will be explicated how Aquinas’ realism was a precursor of “critical realism”, as he discerned the complex interaction of thinking subject and the being of the object as both bearing on the production of knowledge.     

Divine authority and the virtue of religion: a Thomistic response to Murphy

In his book, An Essay on Divine Authority, Mark Murphy argues that God does not have practical authority over created, rational agents. Although Murphy mentions the possibility of an argument for divine authority from justice, he does not consider any. In this paper, I develop such an argument from Aquinas’s treatment of the virtue of religion and other parts of justice. The divine excellence is due honor, and, as Aquinas argues, honoring a ruler requires service and obedience. Thus, a classical conception of God coupled with some of Aquinas’s theses concerning justice show that God has practical authority over all created, rational agents.

     

Theoria versus Poesis: Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in Aquinas,John Milbank,Jean-Luc Marion and John Zizioulas

The totality with which postmodern Christian theology asserts its right to proceed independently of philosophy is, in fact, philosophically situated and determined. Heidegger, primarily, defines theology's project by his narration of Western Fate in terms of onto-theology. Two trinitarian differences are required of theologians who understand theology's situation thus: the first, associated with the procession of the Logos, requires getting beyond philosophy; the second, associated with the Spirit, requires getting beyond theology to poesis. Following Heidegger transforms theology into poesis and praxis. Beginning from a criticism of Aquinas implicit in a contrast made by Milbank between true trinitarian differential ontology and that possible from within Aristotelian categories like potency, act and actus purus , the paper considers what response might be made on behalf of medieval western philosophical theology and its development of trinitarian difference within theoria. The argument is that its union of Neoplatonic negative theology and metaphysics does not escape being onto-theology but does provide genuine trinitarian difference.     

Beyond the Apophatic Circle: Rethinking the Debate Between Jean-Luc Marion and Jacques Derrida

This study offers a new perspective on the much-discussed debate between French phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion and postructuralist theorist Jacques Derrida on the question of ‘negative theology’ and the Christian mystical tradition. It argues that Marion's critique of Derrida betrays a fundamental misunderstanding, specifically, that it fails to recognise that Derrida is not interested in negative theology qua theology, but rather as a discursive practice with certain resources for the performative ‘unsaying’ of logocentric systems. It continues to show that Derrida's principal object is not the God of apophatic theology, but the broader, juridico-political implications of all ‘transcendental signifieds’. Finally, it suggests that Marion's oversight of these facts in his defence of the apophatic tradition unwittingly legitimates Derrida's critique, to the extent that it insulates the Christian tradition from external criticism, and thereby limits the responsiveness of that tradition to the demands of justice.     

Analogies between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s Ethical Perspectives

Al-Māturīdī and Duns Scotus share an ethical paradigm that represents the middle ground between divine command and natural law theories in ethics. While al-Māturīdī’s theory can generally be located between Ash?arite divine command and Mu?tazilite natural law theories in Islamic ethics, Scotus’s theory can be placed between William of Ockham’s divine command and Thomas Aquinas’s natural law theories in Christian ethics. Although the starting point of their ethical perspectives is fundamentally based on criticism of natural law theory, neither theologian can be labelled as a typical divine command theorist. This moderate theory may therefore be described as the theory of soft divine command. The main purpose of this article is to draw attention to some similarities between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s ethical perspectives: First, both theologians highlight the composite picture of human nature in terms of morality. In other words, they posit that humans have two opposite tendencies: ‘affection for justice’ and ‘affection for advantage’. Second, although both theologians grant reason an ontological authority in determining what is good and bad, this authority is not limitless. Finally, both theologians argue that, unless one takes account of God’s freedom and wisdom, the moral order in the world cannot be fully comprehended.     

Vermigli Replicating Aquinas: An Overlooked Continuity in the Doctrine of Predestination

Although Peter Martyr Vermigli is well recognized for his integration of Thomism with Reformed theology, there is no consensus on whether to consider Thomas Aquinas a dominant influence on his doctrine of predestination. Recent scholarship argues that Gregory of Rimini’s influence is greater than Aquinas. This essay provides strong evidence to the contrary for the influence of Aquinas on Vermigli’s early exposition of predestination as a Reformer. Vermigli not only drew upon Aquinas’s doctrine in general, as he does elsewhere, but reproduced the details of Aquinas’s article in the Summa on whether foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. This finding has significance for understanding the development of Vermigli’s thought, his relation to Thomist scholasticism, and his mature writings on predestination. In general, this evidence increases the importance of Thomas as a formative influence on Vermigli’s thought.     

‘Fides mater virtutum est’

Abstract

Peter Martyr Vermigli’s elevation of faith over charity displays similarities and differences with Thomas Aquinas and other medieval authors. For Thomas, faith does not perceive its object and thus denotes an uncertain assent to imperfectly revealed truths. Aquinas posits a reordering of will and intellect in order to explain how faith is more certain than ‘scientia.’ Vermigli on the other hand attempts to maintain the natural order between intellect and will in virtuous action (that is, natural law) even for the theological virtues. He likens faith to vision and practical wisdom arguing that God illuminates the mind to make the object of faith apprehensible to the judgment of reason. This perspective presents a more optimistic account of temporal, intellectual perfection via grace.     

On the causal role of privation in Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics

“Privation” (privatio) is defined by Thomas Aquinas as the want of some property in a subject that ought naturally to possess that property. In this paper, I explicate the ontological status of privation as a form of nonbeing in order to shed light on the challenging question whether privation, as a kind of absence, can play a causal role for Aquinas, and if so, how. According to Aquinas, I argue, privations in a subject serve to determine what sort of (efficient) causal relations that subject can enter into, but, as nonbeings, privations cannot be the cause of the subject's entering into those relations, and in this way, they cannot be efficient causes of effects distinct from the subject.     

DO DESCARTES AND ST. THOMAS AGREE ON THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF?

Abstract: Contrary to received opinion, Descartes’ view on the merits of the ontological proof may actually agree with that of Thomas Aquinas, whose rejection of the a priori existence proof has stocked the armories of anti‐Anselmians ever since. In a rarely noted passage of the First Replies, Descartes claims not to differ in any respect from Thomas on the proof, a claim that gains sense in light of recent work on the Fifth Meditation. That work in turn reveals a well‐founded, if surprising, understanding of the Cartesian proof and of Cartesianism's true relation to Thomism.     

Peter Martyr Vermigli on grace and free choice

Abstract

Within contemporary scholarship there has been considerable debate over the character and scope of Peter Martyr Vermigli’s scholasticism, which has sought to locate his thought between the two poles of the ‘via Thomae’ and the ‘via Gregorii.’ This paper traces the Augustinian-Thomist polarity throughout Vermigli’s doctrine of grace and free choice. In particular it seeks to discover Gregorian distinctives in his thought, namely, doctrinal points shared by Vermigli and Rimini, representing a development of Augustine and a departure from Aquinas. Without denying the important Thomist and Aristotelian elements of his thought, this paper concludes that renewed attention now needs to be paid to his profound debt to late-medieval Augustinian scholasticism and its global impact on his theology.