德性伦理论要

德性伦理强调以人类自身的内在品质作为人的一切生活的出发点,这不仅使德性伦理在人类伦理思想的起源处规避着人类伦理生活的方向,而且在现代人类遭遇道德困境的形势下,又指示着人类伦理生活所应该采取的态度。德性伦理最终的理论指向便是将成就德性与明其规范统一起来,从而真正实现人自身的价值。在现代社会价值多元化的背景下,对传统德性伦理资源的挖掘,显得尤为重要。无论是亚里士多德的德性传统,还是原始儒家的德性传统,都可以为现代伦理理论的建设提供丰富的智性资源。     

当代医学伦理教育的德性回归

医学伦理教育有规范与德性两大路向,突破规范伦理僵化约束、推动其向德性化教育转变,是破解理论与实践困境的核心路径。立足医学教育实践,剖析规范伦理三大困境,梳理其从神的德性到人的德性、从德性到规范、德性回归的本质流变,明确德性伦理是规范伦理的核心支撑,缺乏德性滋养则规范伦理失其本色。结合我国美德伦理教育缺位与医学技术异化风险,从医学人本本质回归、规范局限破解、技术与人文平衡三个维度,论证德性回归合理性,指明德性养成是医学伦理教育的核心,是应对医疗伦理问题、锚定医学人文方向的关键。     

美德复兴的历程与医学美德的复苏

美德伦理的复兴是20世纪伦理学研究的重要转向和理论图景,国外美德伦理研究以麦金太尔为代表,迈克尔•斯洛特的情感主义美德伦理学最具代表性,国内在译介国外研究的基础上提出美德与规范的互补。在医学领域也开始复兴美德伦理,内因在于美德伴随医学的产生,比规范伦理有更悠久的历史,外因在于扭转社会的去道德化倾向,美德伦理与规范伦理同样重要,甚至某些情况下更重要。但在美德伦理的复兴过程中,也面临着内在与外在的阻力,美德伦理复兴任重而道远。

     

Is There an Identity Crisis in Environmental Ethics?

Environmental ethics is both a moral philosophy and an applied ethics.This duality has led some people to feel confused about environmental ethics' identity and to cast doubts on its legitimacy.This paper,by distinguishing and exploding environmental ethics' two patterns of inquiry (the moral philosophy pattern and the applied ethics pattern) and their characteristics,tries to resolve the discipline's identity crisis and to argue for its legitimacy.     

企业伦理的德性主义进路及其条件——以所罗门的亚里士多德方式为例

理解企业伦理的德性主义进路不可或缺。美国当代著名经济伦理学家罗伯特·C．所罗门成功地将亚里士多德德性论引入企业伦理学,为人们把握企业伦理提供了一条德性主义的诠释进路。而亚里士多德德性论强调实践、团体、人对幸福的追求和追求卓越等也为企业伦理的德性主义进路提供了思想资源。而美德自身也能够使人们正确地理解商业和商业伦理、使经济交易成为可能、使经济的运行更为成功。但德性主义进路不是没有条件的,它需要个体或企业具有良好的道德价值观念和良好的判断力,也需要规范伦理与之匹配,以及一个尊重美德的社会环境和相关的制度安排。     

护士道德勇气研究进展

当护士拥有道德勇气时能履行对病人的道德责任等多种作用。本文对国内外护士道德勇气的研究进行梳理,列举了中西方学者对于道德勇气概念的定义,并且从质性和量性研究两方面分析护士道德勇气的研究现况,总结了人口学因素、组织伦理氛围、道德困境、道德敏感性与道德韧性等影响护士道德勇气的相关因素。本文有助于更全面的理解这一护士美德,未来可通过结合中国国情进一步探索并构建干预方案以提高护士的道德勇气,保障患者享受高质量护理。     

当代西方医学伦理学前沿检视

生物医学技术提出了深刻和尖锐的伦理学挑战,迫切需要人类审视并回应。西方因其在生物技术领域和医学伦理研究中处于比较发达阶段,而具有前瞻性和一定普遍性。从他者视角检视西方医学伦理学前沿问题,对于全面深刻理解医学伦理学问题及其破解之道的来龙去脉具有重要参考。基于从视域、视角到路径的学理方式,将西方医学伦理学前沿问题划分为理论前沿和实践前沿;前者包含规范伦理与德性伦理之争,后者涉及临床伦理从规范伦理走向境遇伦理,生物医学研究伦理、新型生物技术伦理以及全球健康伦理等。

     

Consequentializing and Underdetermination

The paper explores a new interpretation of the consequentializing project. Three prominent interpretations are criticized for neglecting the explanatory dimension of moral theories. Instead, it is argued that consequentializing leads to a phenomenon that is structurally analogous to one in science—the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This provides important insights into the consequentializing debate, and advances our general understanding of the moral domain.     

医学伦理学与生命伦理学的联系与区别

医学伦理学和生命伦理学有共同的哲学伦理学和医学的学科基因。二者都遵守共同的伦理原理和原则,但是它们实施原理原则的方法和路径却有区别。医学伦理学构建了常态下的医德原则和规范体系。在经常的医疗卫生活动中医务人员会\"以义导利\"。当医务人员的选择面临价值冲突时,会按照伦理学原则提出的价值顺位安排医疗卫生行为的优先顺位。生命伦理学面对的常常是高科技带来的道德冲突,没有现成的价值顺位可以套用。在生命伦理学的许多具体案例中,人们只能通过协商讨论来寻求方案,达成共识。二者都是哲学伦理学和医学的子集,两者之间有交集,但是侧重不同。     

规范与美德的并存与互补：历史视角

美德伦理与规范伦理是生成道德整体系的两个源头,也是伦理学的两大传统和两个必要的组成部分,并有其各自的特殊功能,在其长期演进的历史过程中,展示了各自的长处与短处。历史和现实表明,美德伦理的长处正是规范伦理的短处,美德伦理的短处正是规范伦理的长处。美德伦理犹如伦理大厦的地基,地基不牢,大厦就会倒塌;规范伦理犹如这座伦理大厦的四梁八柱,是支撑伦理大厦的骨架,骨架缺失,大厦焉存？美德伦理与规范伦理的关系是并存与互补的关系。认清美德伦理与规范伦理的并存与互补的关系,是建设包括医学伦理在内的社会伦理完整体系的最佳选择。     

解析现代生育伦理问题的思维路向

人类生育选择有以“善”为核心和以“正当”为核心的两类价值定位 ,因而 ,对现代生育伦理问题的理论解释 ,不能只是其中的任何一种思维路向 ,而应当是两种思维路向的合理整合。     

亚里士多德伦理学对医德培养的启示

探讨了亚里士多德对德性的论述,结合医务人员心理过程的变化分析,对如何处理德性与医学伦理的关系、德性与医学德性的关系以及德性与医学伦理教育的关系进行了讨论,认为当代仍然需要培养医德,而医德的内容、形成过程和培养方式都符合亚里士多德德性伦理学的论述。因此,医德培养并非提出过高的道德要求,而是现实中从规范到行为必然的过程;不能停留在知识传授和了解规范上,而应当引入更多的实践教学、案例教学以及终身教育,在课程安排、课程内容、授课方式和考核方式上都需要进行变革。     

INTRODUCTION: VIRTUE AND VICE

Abstract: This introduction to the collection Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic addresses three main questions: (1) What is a virtue theory in ethics or epistemology? (2) What is a virtue? and (3) What is a vice? (1) It suggests that a virtue theory takes the virtues and vices of agents to be more fundamental than evaluations of acts or beliefs, and defines right acts or justified beliefs in terms of the virtues. (2) It argues that there are two important but different concepts of virtue: virtues are qualities that attain good ends, and virtues are qualities that involve good motives. (3) Accordingly, vices are qualities that either fail to attain good ends or involve bad motives. Finally, the introduction summarizes the eleven essays in the collection, which are divided into four sections: the Structure of Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology; Virtue and Context; Virtue and Emotion; and Virtues and Vices.     

Tragic Dilemmas and the Priority of the Moral

My purpose in this paper is to argue that we are not vulnerableto inescapable wrongdoing occasioned by tragic dilemmas. I directmy argument to those who are most inclined to accept tragicdilemmas: those of broadly Nietzschean inclination who reject``modern moral philosophy' in favor of the ethical ideas of theclassical Greeks. Two important features of their project are todeny the usefulness of the ``moral/nonmoral distinction,' and todeny that what are usually classified as moral reasons always oreven characteristically ``trump' nonmoral reasons in anadmirable agent's deliberations.I show critics of modern moral philosophy such as BernardWilliams that their acceptance of tragic dilemmas underminestheir project of denying the moral/nonmoral distinction and thepriority of moral reasons. The possibility of tragic dilemmasrequires an account of practical deliberation in which moralreasons appear as already in-force obligations, with blame andguilt ready to be invoked, while nonmoral reasons appear as merereasons. This makes moral reasons importantly different fromnonmoral reasons in how they achieve their deliberative weight,and also makes them characteristically weightier. Thus,accommodating tragic dilemmas reinforces the moral/nonmoraldistinction and the priority of moral reasons, the very thingsthese critics want to deny. By accepting the possibility oftragic dilemmas, these critics are undermining their own project.The standard normative theories are dead set against tragicdilemmas, and the critics of modern moral philosophy shouldreject tragic dilemmas for the good of their project. Thus we allshould reject tragic dilemmas.     

Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.     

Hume on the Standard of Virtue

Among those sympathetic to Hume'smoral philosophy, a general consensus hasemerged that his first work on the topic,A Treatise of Human Nature, is his best. Hislater work, An Enquiry Concerning thePrinciples of Morals, is regarded as scaleddown in both scope and ambition. In contrastto this standard view, I argue that Hume'slater work offers a more sophisticated theoryof moral evaluation. I begin by reviewing theTreatise theory of moral evaluation tohighlight the reasons why commentators find socompelling Hume's account of the corrections wemake to our moral sentiments. The method isendorsed by philosophers such as Henry DavidAiken and Annette C. Baier because, theyallege, it shows that moral sentiments reflecta process of judgment that includes thepossibility of corrigibility and ofjustification. But Hume's method of correctionfalls short and does not establish why thesentiments conforming to the standard of virtueshould count as moral judgments. In the secondEnquiry, Hume lays out a different set ofcriteria, including not only the need forcertain virtues of good judgment but attentionto the particular cultural and historicalorigins of the norms governing the virtues ofgood judgment. Hume's attention to diversityin evaluative outlook in his more matureposition takes seriously the relation betweenmoral authority and public debate.