Unspecific postevent information,attribution of responsibility,and eyewitness performance

A large number of experiments have demonstrated that misleading postevent information may result in distortions of eyewitness performance. However, most studies have employed a quite specific piece of misinformation (the colour of a car, a type of a road sign) rather than more general postevent information. In the present experiment subjects viewed a film depicting a traffic accident and were subsequently informed that the car driver had or had not committed hit-and-run behaviour and that the motorcyclist had or had not been drinking. An additional control group received no information. In a subsequent interrogation subjects were asked to rate the amount of cause, responsibility and guilt attributable to the car driver and motorcyclist. Results showed that responsibility and guilt and the statements on the accident-related behaviour were influenced by the postevent information. In general, subjects who had received negative information about one of the persons involved attributed higher amounts of responsibility and guilt to them and provided more negative statements concerning their behaviour. However, details that were not closely related to the accident were not significantly influenced by postevent information. The results are discussed in terms of schematic memory reports.     

The Impact of the Guilty but Mentally III Verdict on Juror Decisions: An Empirical Analysis

The present study attempted to determine the impact of alternative verdict choices on the decisions of mock jurors. Subjects used in this study as mock jurors were all college undergraduates. They were shown one of two versions of a videotaped simulated murder trial. Both films presented a defendant who appeared to be suffering emotional difficulties, but in one film the defendant had clearly committed the act while in the other film the defendant's actions were less certain. Subjects than gave their individual verdicts and, after deliberation with other subjects, a total jury verdict. The verdicts available to the subjects varied across three conditions such that the subjects in one condition were only allowed to find the defendant to be innocent or guilty. In another condition the subjects could find the defendant innocent, guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). In the third condition the subjects were allowed to choose between innocent, guilty, NGRI, and guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). The results indicated that the addition of the "mental health" verdicts had a significant impact on the decisions of the jurors. In particular, it appears that only defendants who would otherwise have been found innocent were likely to be found NGRI. This study also indicated that the GBMI verdict is very attractive to mock jurors. Indeed, even innocent defendants were found to be GBMI, a form of guilt, when this alternative was made available. These findings raise potentially important constitutional and practical issues for the trial of emotionally disturbed criminal defendants.     

Guilt following transgression: an attribution of responsibility approach

People typically experience guilt when they violate sociomoral norms. Using Heider's (1958) attribution of responsibility model in the two experiments reported here, I examined the attributional mediators of posttransgression guilt. The basic design of both studies was a Level of Responsibility X Subject Role factorial. The first study used a role-playing methodology; in the second, subjects generated protocols describing their own past experiences. The second experiment also distinguished between attributions of responsibility, causality, and blame. In both studies, harmdoer guilt was higher following accidental as opposed to intentional transgressions. The discussion focuses on the dynamics of guilt development and reduction and on the importance of maintaining conceptual distinctions among the various attribution measures in future guilt research.     

A study of the comparative structure of guilt and shame in a Chinese society.

On the basis of previous theoretical and empirical analyses of the comparative structures of guilt and shame, the authors hypothesized that antecedent condition (personal inadequacy vs. moral norm violation), audience presence, and personal responsibility attribution would distinguish shame from guilt. Although the subject population was Hong Kong Chinese, evidence from previous studies suggests that the comparative structures of guilt and shame are quite similar across cultures. The subjects were asked to recall either a guilt or a shame incident, and their responses were then coded into the predictor variables. The results of the study indicated that guilt was most likely to emerge when individuals had violated a moral norm and held themselves responsible for their conduct. In contrast, shame emerged more frequently when subjects felt personally inadequate than when they had violated moral norms. Moreover, when a guilt incident was reported, and audience was rarely mentioned, whereas subjects who reported a shame incident would generally feel personally responsible and often mentioned being looked at or evaluated. However, neither personal responsibility nor the presence of an audience seemed to be essential for a person to experience shame.     

The contribution of thought-action fusion and thought suppression in the development of obsession-like intrusions in normal participants

Both thought-action fusion (TAF: i.e., a cognitive bias implying an inflated sense of responsibility for one's own thoughts) and thought suppression have been claimed to contribute to the development of obsession-like intrusions. Therefore, it seems plausible that conjunction of these phenomena results in highly intense intrusions. However, possible interactions between TAF and thought suppression have not yet been investigated experimentally. In the current study, healthy volunteers were exposed to a TAF-like intrusion. They were, then, randomly assigned to a suppression (n=21) or non-suppression condition (n=19). Next, visual analogue scales (VASs) were completed measuring anxiety, feelings of responsibility and guilt, urge to neutralise and so on. Contrary to expectation, several VAS scores were lower for participants in the suppression group than for those in the non-suppression group. Hence, it is concluded that thought suppression may, at least in the short term, alleviate discomfort caused by TAF-like intrusions.     

Role of responsibility in conditional reasoning

A series of recent studies showed that facilitation on the Wason Selection Task could be produced by perceived utilities. The present work was aimed at testing whether a similar factor could also be involved in human reasoning performance in the context of responsibility. We supposed that the motivation of the subject assuming responsibility is affected by normative goals. These goals prescribe the actions and the results to be achieved, also considering the different social roles. In this experiment the responses of different groups of subjects (N = 270) to a selection task were compared in two different conditions involving different responsibility contexts. The results show that the subjects' strategies in searching for possible violators depended on the condition (responsibility vs no responsibility). In particular, only in the context of responsibility were the performances elicited by conditional rules characterised by a falsification strategy.     

Causal and moral responsibility: Antecedents and consequences of group‐based guilt

In six studies (N = 1045) conducted in three European countries, we demonstrate distinctions between causal responsibility, group‐based guilt, and moral responsibility. We propose that causal responsibility is an antecedent of group‐based guilt linking the ingroup to previous transgressions against the victim group. In contrast, moral responsibility is a consequence of group‐based guilt and is conceptualized as a sociomoral norm to respond to the consequences of the ingroup's transgressions and the current needs of the victim group. As such, moral responsibility can be stimulated by group‐based guilt and directly predicts individual action intentions. Studies 1 and 2 focus on the conceptual distinctions among the three constructs. Study 3 tests the indirect effect of causal responsibility on moral responsibility via group‐based guilt. The remaining studies explore the mediating role of moral responsibility in associations between group‐based guilt and compensatory action tendencies, that is, financial compensation (study 4), approach and avoidance tendencies (study 5) and public apology (study 6). Together these studies show that causal and moral responsibility are psychologically distinct concepts from group‐based guilt and that moral responsibility plays an important role in shaping the effects of group‐based guilt on behavioral intentions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shame, guilt, and depressive symptoms: a meta-analytic review

Recent theoretical and empirical work has facilitated the drawing of sharp conceptual distinctions between shame and guilt. A clear view of these distinctions has permitted development of a research literature aimed at evaluating the differential associations of shame and guilt with depressive symptoms. This study quantitatively summarized the magnitude of associations of shame and guilt with depressive symptoms. Two hundred forty-two effect sizes were obtained from 108 studies employing 22,411 participants. Shame showed significantly stronger associations with depressive symptoms (r = .43) than guilt (r = .28). However, the association of shame and depressive symptoms was statistically indistinguishable from the associations of 2 maladaptive variants of guilt and depressive symptoms (contextual-maladaptive guilt, involving exaggerated responsibility for uncontrollable events, r = .39; generalized guilt, involving "free-floating" guilt divorced from specific contexts, r = .42). Other factors also moderated the effects. External shame, which involves negative views of self as seen through the eyes of others, was associated with larger effect sizes (r = .56) than internal shame (r = .42), which involves negative views of self as seen through one's own eyes. Depressive symptom measures that invoked the term guilt yielded stronger associations between guilt and depressive symptoms (r = .33) than depressive symptom measures that did not (r = .21). Age, sex, and ethnicity (proportion of Whites to Asians) did not moderate the effects. Although these correlational data are ambiguous with respect to their causal interpretation, results suggest that shame should figure more prominently in understandings of the emotional underpinnings of depressive symptoms.     

THE CHRISTIAN VIRTUE OF MERCY: AQUINAS' TRANSFORMATION OF ARISTOTELIAN PITY

In his discussion of the virtue of mercy (ST, II-II.30), Thomas Aquinas draws upon two seemingly opposed sources. On the one hand, Thomas takes Aristotle as an authority on the subject of compassion. Aristotle maintains in his discussion of pity in the Rhetoric that pity is felt for those who suffer undeservedly since we do not pity but rather blame those who suffer as a result of their own wicked actions. On the other hand, Jesus in Matthew's gospel feels pity for the crowds. 'At the sight of the crowds, his heart was moved with pity for them for they were troubled and abandoned, like sheep without a shepherd' (Matt.9:36). In his commentary on this text from Matthew, Thomas identifies two possible interpretations for the troubled and abandoned condition of the crowd. The crowd is said to be troubled in so far as it is vexed by demons and abandoned in so far as it lies prostrate because of infirmities. The crowd can also be said to be troubled in so far as it is vexed by errors and to be abandoned in so far as it is fallen because of sin. ¹ Jesus, then, according to Thomas and contrary to Aristotle's claim, feels pity for the crowds as a result of the crowd's misery brought on by their own sinful deeds.
In this paper, I examine how Thomas harmonizes these conflicting sources. More specifically, I hope to show both how Thomas uses Aristotle's observations on pity and at the same time transforms those observations in light of Christ's mercy on sinners. Thomas' use and transformation of Aristotle's account of pity provides an enlightening perspective from which to interpret Thomas' initially troubling claim that God feels no pity over the suffering of creatures, which we will consider briefly by way of a conclusion to this paper.     

游戏暴力合理性对攻击性的影响:一个有中介的调节模型

本研究基于道德推脱和道德自我调节理论,以62名大学生为被试,通过实验探讨了游戏暴力合理性对个体攻击性的影响,并考察了内疚感的中介作用以及游戏经验的调节作用。结果表明：游戏经验调节了游戏暴力合理性对内疚感和攻击性的影响。对无经验的被试来说,不合理暴力条件下的内疚感显著高于合理暴力条件,攻击性显著低于合理暴力条件;而对有经验的被试来说,合理与不合理暴力条件下的内疚感和攻击性均无显著差异。同时,研究还发现了有中介的调节作用模型,内疚感在暴力合理性对攻击性的影响中发挥中介作用,而游戏经验是有中介的调节变量。     

Collective guilt,moral outrage,and support for helping the poor: A matter of system versus in‐group responsibility framing

We examined how the framing of responsibility for reducing socio‐economic inequality affects individuals' emotional reactions towards the poor and the willingness to engage in prosocial actions. Attribution of responsibility to either the system (government and institutions), the less deprived in‐group, or the disadvantaged out‐group (poor) was measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2). Consistent with our hypotheses, moral outrage was higher than collective guilt when system responsibility for inequalities was put forth, but collective guilt arose to reach the level of moral outrage when in‐group responsibility was emphasized. Moreover, distinguishing between collective guilt for action and for inaction, we found guilt for inaction more difficult and thus less likely to arise, unless responsibility was put on the in‐group. Collective emotions were also found to be negatively linked to system justification motivation illustrating the palliative function of legitimization processes. Finally, moral outrage predicted the willingness to act upon socio‐economic inequalities both when the system's and in‐group's responsibility was emphasized, whereas collective guilt for action (but not for inaction) predicted support for prosocial actions only when the in‐group's responsibility was engaged. These findings suggest that the specific group‐based emotions in response to poverty depend on whether the system or the in‐group is held responsible and differentially predict individuals' commitment to act.     

Testing some attribution-emotion relations in the People's Republic of China

We conducted a questionnaire study to test the generality of attribution-emotion relations to individuals in the People's Republic of China. Replications of prior findings of studies conducted with American subjects were reported: (a) High effort and success enhanced interpersonal evaluations when ability, effort, and outcome information were provided; (b) affective communications of pity, anger, and guilt were respectively used to infer low ability, lack of effort, and teacher as causes of failure; (c) effort and ability levels were inferred from the presence or absence of anger reactions; and (d) controllable causes of a broken social contract were expected to result in anger from others. Chinese and American respondents also indicated what situations would arouse the affects of anger, guilt, pity, pride, and shame. We found no evidence for the characterization of Chinese as (a) emphasizing effort over ability as a cause of achievement outcomes or (b) de-emphasizing the importance of personal achievement and stressing group goals and accomplishments.     

Dealing with the past and facing the future: mediators of the effects of collective guilt and shame in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Two studies are reported which examined potential mediators of the effects of collective guilt and shame on reparation attitudes. Samples of young Bosnian Serbs (Ns = 173, 247) were asked to report their feelings of guilt and shame for what their group had done during the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia Herzegovina. They also reported their attitudes towards making reparation to Bosnian Muslims. Both collective guilt and shame positively predicted reparation attitudes, but these associations were differently mediated. The effects of guilt were mediated by empathy for the outgroup, while the effects of shame were mediated by self‐pity and empathy. The theoretical and applied implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The similarities between cognitive dissonance and guilt: Confession as a relief of dissonance

It is proposed that dissonance is similar to the feeling of guilt. If they are in fact analogous, and confession relieves guilt, then one implication is that confession would relieve dissonance. This experiment tested this prediction using a standard induced compliance paradigm. Forty-five undergraduate subjects were assigned to either a no-choice condition, a choice-confession condition, or a choice-no-confession condition. The results indicate that confession does relieve dissonance. Further, as predicted, a negative correlation was found between attitudinal shift and guilt. The implications of the findings concerning the mechanisms of confession are discussed.     

The similarities between cognitive dissonance and guilt: Confession as a relief of dissonance

It is proposed that dissonance is similar to the feeling of guilt. If they are in fact analogous, and confession relieves guilt, then one implication is that confession would relieve dissonance. This experiment tested this prediction using a standard induced compliance paradigm. Forty-five undergraduate subjects were assigned to either a no-choice condition, a choice-confession condition, or a choice-no-confession condition. The results indicate that confession does relieve dissonance. Further, as predicted, a negative correlation was found between attitudinal shift and guilt. The implications of the findings concerning the mechanisms of confession are discussed.     

Responsibility for damage and anger]

Anger about frustration or damage was assumed to depend on how much responsibility can be attributed to the perpetrator. This hypothesis was tested experimentally (N = 120). Drawing upon constituents of the action concept (e.g. free will), three everyday situations (e.g. being obstructed while driving) were varied with regard to responsibility. Twenty subjects each were asked to imagine the three situations from one of the six levels of responsibility and to indicate how angry they would feel. In addition to state anger, anger in, anger out, and anger control were assessed. When trait anger was controlled for, state anger as well as anger out increased as a function of the perpetrator's responsibility, whereas anger control decreased. These results were in line with theoretical expectations. They demonstrate that the expression of anger is subject to social norms and depends largely on the situation. This finding complements original assumptions on the trait-like nature of anger in, anger out, and anger control.     

Attributing Responsibility to Female Victims After Exposure to Sexually Violent Films1

We investigate the possibility that the degree to which female abuse victims are held accountable by other women who have been exposed to sexually violent mass media is primarily dependent upon 3 factors: situational relevance, personal similarity, and emotional arousal. Female subjects participated in an experiment. Factors were: film dose; film viewing/victim judgment time interval; victim-subject similarity; and situational relevance of the assault. The results showed less attribution of responsibility to similar victims and high attributions of responsibility to dissimilar victims in the personally relevant assault situation (rape). Women identified least with dissimilar rape victims and most with similar victims when they had not been desensitized. When subjects were desensitized, the defensive attribution effect failed to emerge. There was also a significant tendency among low film dose subjects to perceive more psychological injury and to attribute more distress to the victim than among high film dose subjects.     

Stimulus factors in the training of prepositional usage in three autistic children

Language deficient, autistic children were trained to use the prepositions "in" and "on". Three subjects were exposed to conditions of training that differed in the method of employment of stimulus objects used to train prepositional usage. Two subjects were trained first with "ambiguous" stimuli, that is, the same stimulus objects were used for training both prepositions. The two subjects were then switched to a training condition with "non-ambiguous" stimulus objects, that is, objects used for training "in" were different than those used for training "on". The two subjects were then switched to the ambiguous stimulus condition and finally returned again to training with non-ambiguous stimuli (four conditions). A third subject began with training on non-ambiguous stimuli, was switched to an ambiguous condition and was then switched back to non-ambiguous stimuli (three conditions). The results for two of the three subjects indicated that accurate usage of the two prepositions was obtained only under training conditions with non-ambiguous stimuli. Results for the third subject suggested that initial training with non-ambiguous stimuli might enhance subsequent accurate responding with ambiguous stimuli.     

Emotional Reactions to People With AIDS

Using survey data of a Dutch national sample, the present paper examines how people's willingness to engage in personal contact with persons with AIDS (PWAs) is influenced by different emotional reactions to PWAs. Results indicate that each of the three measured emotional reactions to PWAs (fear, irritation, and pity) independently predicts subjects' readiness to have personal contact with PWAs. Disconfirming the often assumed relationship between "homophobia" and fear of PWAs, it was found that attitudes toward homosexuals are unrelated to fear of PWAs. Instead, these attitudes are associated with emotions of a more aggressive nature (irritation). Risk perception seems to be related to the emotions of fear and irritation, whereas responsibility attribution seems to be negatively associated with pity.