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1.
Despite the importance of persistence in early learning, we know little about how children reason about outcomes that result from their efforts. Here we examined the role of effort type (i.e., physical vs. cognitive) and intensity (i.e., high vs. low effort) in shaping children's decision making about effort-based rewards. Five- to 7-year-olds (N = 133) were assigned to one of four conditions (High Physical Effort, Low Physical Effort, High Cognitive Effort, Low Cognitive Effort) and completed a series of tasks to construct a toy. Tasks varied in the type (physical/cognitive) and intensity (high/low) of effort required to complete them. After constructing their toy, children completed a series of tasks to probe how much they valued that toy. Across conditions, children preferred their toy and gave it a higher monetary value, relative to a stranger's. However, when choosing their toy came at a cost, children no longer preferred it. Only children who built their toy through either cognitive or low effort were willing to incur a cost for their toy. Older children, across conditions, were also more likely to incur a cost for their toy. These findings demonstrate that by age five, children are sensitive to variations in effort type and intensity, and these factors shape how they evaluate effort-based rewards. 相似文献
2.
It is important to better understand the decision‐making processes involved in student procrastination, in order to develop interventions that reduce this common problem. Students may procrastinate because studying produces delayed reinforcers; however, no task measuring delay discounting of academic outcomes currently exists. In Experiment 1, we developed and piloted a measure of academic discounting modeled on titrating‐amount tasks successfully used in the discounting literature. Participants made hypothetical choices between working for money (the smaller, sooner reinforcer) and working on an assignment that was due at various times (the larger, later reinforcer). Participants showed systematic decreases in the subjective value of the assignment as a function of delay, and the hyperbolic and hyperboloid models described the shape of this decrease in value well. In general, larger delayed rewards are discounted less steeply than smaller delayed rewards (the magnitude effect). In Experiment 2, we observed the magnitude effect in academic discounting: Participants discounted a “not important” assignment more steeply than an “important” assignment. In the hyperboloid model, this change was captured by an increase in the s parameter. Results provide support for the validity of the academic discounting task. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Social discounting was measured as the amount of money a participant was willing to forgo to give a fixed amount (usually $75) to another person. In the first experiment, amount forgone was a hyperbolic function of the social distance between the giver and receiver. In the second experiment, degree of social discounting was an increasing function of reward magnitude whereas degree of delay discounting was a decreasing function of reward magnitude. In the third experiment, the shape of the function relating delayed rewards to equally valued immediate rewards for another person was predicted from individual delay and social discount functions. All in all, the studies show that the social discount function, like delay and probability discount functions, is hyperbolic in form. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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Alexandra M. Mellis Alina E. Woodford Jeffrey S. Stein Warren K. Bickel 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2017,107(1):151-160
Basic research on delay discounting, examining preference for smaller–sooner or larger–later reinforcers, has demonstrated a variety of findings of considerable generality. One of these, the magnitude effect, is the observation that individuals tend to exhibit greater preference for the immediate with smaller magnitude reinforcers. Delay discounting has also proved to be a useful marker of addiction, as demonstrated by the highly replicated finding of greater discounting rates in substance users compared to controls. However, some research on delay discounting rates in substance users, particularly research examining discounting of small‐magnitude reinforcers, has not found significant differences compared to controls. Here, we hypothesize that the magnitude effect could produce ceiling effects at small magnitudes, thus obscuring differences in delay discounting between groups. We examined differences in discounting between high‐risk substance users and controls over a broad range of magnitudes of monetary amounts ($0.10, $1.00, $10.00, $100.00, and $1000.00) in 116 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. We found no significant differences in discounting rates between users and controls at the smallest reinforcer magnitudes ($0.10 and $1.00) and further found that differences became more pronounced as magnitudes increased. These results provide an understanding of a second form of the magnitude effect: That is, differences in discounting between populations can become more evident as a function of reinforcer magnitude. 相似文献
5.
Hugo E. Reyes‐Huerta Cristiano V. dos Santos 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2016,106(2):117-133
Human delay discounting is usually studied with experimental protocols that use symbols to express delay and amount. In order to further understand discounting, we evaluated whether the absence of numbers to represent reward amounts affects discount rate in general, and whether the magnitude effect is generalized to nonsymbolic situations in particular. In Experiment 1, human participants were exposed to a delay‐discounting task in which rewards were presented using dots to represent monetary rewards (nonsymbolic); under this condition the magnitude effect did not occur. Nevertheless, the magnitude effect was observed when equivalent reward amounts were presented using numbers (symbolic). Moreover, in estimation tasks, magnitude increments produced underestimation of large amounts. In Experiment 2, participants were exposed only to the nonsymbolic discounting task and were required to estimate reward amounts in each trial. Consistent with Experiment 1, the absence of numbers representing reward amounts produced similar discount rates of small and large rewards. These results suggest that value of nonsymbolic rewards is a nonlinear function of amount and that value attribution depends on perceived difference between the immediate and the delayed nonsymbolic rewards. 相似文献
6.
Daniel D. Holt Matthew R. Wolf 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2019,111(3):436-448
The magnitude effect, where larger outcomes are discounted proportionally less than smaller outcomes, is a well‐established phenomenon in delay discounting by human participants. To this point in the literature magnitude effects have not been reliably evidenced in nonhuman animals. , however, used a concurrent‐chains arrangement with pigeon and found evidence for a magnitude effect. Grace et al. suggested that in many delay discounting experimental arrangements with nonhuman animals (e.g., adjusting amount, adjusting delay) the organism is not given the opportunity to directly compare outcomes of different sizes. They suggest that because of the lack of direct comparison it is difficult for the organism to determine the relative size of each outcome, which in turn mutes the effect of the amount differences between outcomes. As a test of this “comparison hypothesis,” the present experiment was conducted to assess whether the magnitude effect would be evidenced in pigeon when using an adjusting amount procedure where outcomes of different amounts were presented proximally. In the present arrangement, pigeons were presented two choice panels in an operant chamber where each panel was associated with an independent adjusting amount delay discounting task, but with differing outcome amounts (i.e., a 32‐food pellet panel and an 8‐food pellet panel). In this arrangement the choice panels alternated in their availability within a session from trial block to trial block. The present findings indicate no reliable effect of amount, even when the outcomes were proximal and thus readily comparable. This result suggests that the lack of magnitude effect is not driven by the organism's ability to compare the difference in amount between choice alternatives. 相似文献
7.
《心理科学进展》2024,33(1)
动机损害是抑郁症的常见特征, 患者常表现出异常的奖励评估或体验等行为。理解抑郁症患者努力奖赏动机活动中不愿意付出努力的类型——是不愿意付出身体努力还是不愿意付出认知努力, 对帮助患者恢复社会功能活动具有重要作用。然而, 当前缺少研究探讨努力类型(身体或认知努力)对研究认识的影响, 同时, 计算模型方法具有能够精细评估动机相关变量的优势, 这一方法在该领域中并未得到普及应用。通过实验方法区分评估抑郁症患者“认知努力”和“身体努力”这两种不同的努力决策, 并结合计算模型的数据分析方式, 从努力奖赏动机这一角度探索抑郁症动机损害行为, 对揭示这一损害潜在的认知神经基础具有促进作用。 相似文献
8.
Michael Harman Tiffany Kodak Todd McKerchar 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2020,114(2):193-202
The current study analyzed the effects of three frames of reward magnitude—quantity, volume, and duration—on the rate at which college students discounted hypothetical, delayed monetary rewards. Hypothetical scenarios were presented using the fill-in-the-blank discounting questionnaire and participants made choices between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards. Scenarios framed the monetary choices as (a) quantity of dollar bills, (b) height (inches) of a stack of dollar bills, and (c) duration of time spent in a hypothetical cash machine to collect dollar bills. For each scenario, participants' subjective values were used to calculate the area under the curve (AuC). Framing resulted in a moderate effect size: The duration frame yielded significantly smaller AuC values compared to the quantity and volume frames. Thus, the framing of reward magnitude was a significant variable in controlling discounting rates for hypothetical, delayed monetary rewards. Subsequent investigations should be aware of the independent effects of the reward magnitude frames on delay discounting rates. 相似文献
9.
Past studies of elections have shown that candidates whose names were listed at the beginning of a list on a ballot often received more votes by virtue of their position. This article tests speculations about the cognitive mechanisms that might be responsible for producing the effect. In an experiment embedded in a large national Internet survey, participants read about the issue positions of two hypothetical candidates and voted for one of them in a simulated election in which candidate name order was varied. The expected effect of position appeared and was strongest (1) when participants had less information about the candidates on which to base their choices, (2) when participants felt more ambivalent about their choices, (3) among participants with more limited cognitive skills, and (4) among participants who devoted less effort to the candidate evaluation process. The name‐order effect was greater among left‐handed people when the candidate names were arrayed horizontally, but there was no difference between left‐ and right‐handed people when the names were arrayed vertically. These results reinforce some broad theoretical accounts of the cognitive process that yield name‐order effects in elections. 相似文献
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Abstract: The relation between reformative self‐control and discounting of reward value by delay or effort was examined. Thirty‐two Japanese undergraduates were selected based on their scores on a standardized pencil and paper test of self‐control, the Redressive–Reformative Self‐Control Scale ( Sugiwaka, 1995 ). The subjects indicated their preference (i) between a hypothetical 100 000 yen reward available with various delays and a certain reward of variable amount available immediately; or (ii) between a hypothetical 100 000 yen reward available with various efforts and a certain reward of variable amount available without effort. The discounting of delayed reward value was described well by a hyperbolic function proposed by Mazur (1987 ). The slopes of the delayed discounting curves were steeper for subjects who scored low on the Reformative Self‐Control Scale, which is a measure of reformative self‐control and a subscale of the Redressive–Reformative Self‐Control Scale. The discounting by effort was also described well by the hyperbolic function. The slopes of the effortful discounting curves did not correlate to those of the delayed discounting curves. The slopes were not systematically different across the groups of subjects with different scores on the reformative self‐control scale. 相似文献
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Elise Frølich Furrebøe 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2020,113(3):626-643
The sign effect is the steeper discounting of gains compared to losses. However, we see a greater sign effect on an individual level compared to an aggregate level. In this experiment, we compare discounting of gains and losses on an individual and aggregate level, to explore further details about when and to what extent human adults discount. Thirty-one participants went through a computer-based choice-task procedure of hypothetical monetary gains and losses. The results show clear qualitative differences between discounting of gains and losses, adding empirical data to support the sign effect. The results also support previous findings that show that aggregate and individual results do not always correspond. Further, the within-subject details showing zero discounting or nonsystematic changes concerning losses, replicate earlier studies suggesting that discounting of gains and losses involve different reinforcing contingencies. The present study expands on this research area by including verbal reports, supplementing details about the unobserved reinforcing contingencies. Implications of research on discounting may indicate how to deal with decision-making challenges and might shed light on why predictions about complex decision making sometimes fail. 相似文献
15.
Andras Molnar;Russell Golman; 《决策行为杂志》2024,37(1):e2360
Based on the curiosity-as-drive theory and the theory of information gaps, we argue that curiosity—that is, the desire to seek out novel information for its own sake—is highly transient, and while people may be tempted by immediate answers, they may be less motivated when they need to wait for information. Contrary to standard economic models, we predict an immediacy effect (or present bias) for information even in those cases when waiting does not affect the objective value of information. Furthermore, we argue that this immediacy effect is independent from motivated emotion-management; that is, introducing delays makes people less willing to obtain information for its own sake even when information does not elicit strong anticipatory feelings. We test these hypotheses in two pre-registered experiments (N = 2406) featuring real effort and monetary incentives and find that introducing a delay in information provision significantly reduces participants' willingness to obtain information. In Study 1, we also show that people display a stronger immediacy effect for information than for monetary rewards. In Study 2, we demonstrate that people are impatient for information regardless of how they expect to feel after receiving the information, and even when the perceived instrumental value of information remains unaffected by the delay. The strong impatience for information in both studies is consistent with the notion that curiosity acts as a drive, and as such, is highly transient. 相似文献
16.
Humans discount larger delayed rewards less steeply than smaller rewards, whereas no such magnitude effect has been observed in rats (and pigeons). It remains possible that rats' discounting is sensitive to differences in the quality of the delayed reinforcer even though it is not sensitive to amount. To evaluate this possibility, Experiment 1 examined discounting of qualitatively different food reinforcers: highly preferred versus nonpreferred food pellets. Similarly, Experiment 2 examined discounting of highly preferred versus nonpreferred liquid reinforcers. In both experiments, an adjusting-amount procedure was used to determine the amount of immediate reinforcer that was judged to be of equal subjective value to the delayed reinforcer. The amount and quality of the delayed reinforcer were varied across conditions. Discounting was well described by a hyperbolic function, but no systematic effects of the quantity or the quality of the delayed reinforcer were observed. 相似文献
17.
Joshua Shepherd 《Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science》2023,14(2):e1629
Cognitive effort is thought to be familiar in everyday life, ubiquitous across multiple variations of task and circumstance, and integral to cost/benefit computations that are themselves central to the proper functioning of cognitive control. In particular, cognitive effort is thought to be closely related to the assessment of cognitive control's costs. I argue here that the construct of cognitive effort, as it is deployed in cognitive psychology and neuroscience, is problematically unclear. The result is that talk of cognitive effort may paper over significant disagreement regarding the nature of cognitive effort, and its key functions for cognitive control. I highlight key points of disagreement, and several open questions regarding what causes cognitive effort, what cognitive effort represents, cognitive effort's relationship to action, and cognitive effort's relationship to consciousness. I also suggest that pluralism about cognitive effort—that cognitive effort may manifest as a range of intentional or non-intentional actions the function of which is to promote greater success at paradigmatic cognitive control tasks—may be a fruitful and irenic way to conceive of cognitive effort. Finally, I suggest that recent trends in work on cognitive control suggests that we might fruitfully conceive of cognitive effort as one key node in a complex network of mental value, and that studying this complex network may illuminate the nature of cognitive control, and the role of consciousness in cognitive control's proper functioning. This article is categorized under:
- Philosophy > Consciousness
- Philosophy > Psychological Capacities
- Neuroscience > Cognition
18.
Choosing a larger–later reward over a smaller–sooner reward may be thought of as altruism toward one's future self. A question that arises in this connection is: What is the relation between delay and social discounting? To begin to answer this question, social and delay discount functions need to be comparable. Delay is ordinarily measured on a ratio scale (time), which allows for meaningful division and addition. Social distance is ordinarily measured on an ordinal scale (rank order of social closeness). To convert social distance to a ratio scale we use a psychophysical distance function obtained via magnitude estimation (Stevens, 1956). The distance functions obtained are well described by a power function (median exponent = 1.9); we show how they may be used to rescale ordinal to ratio social discount functions. 相似文献
19.
Green L Myerson J Holt DD Slevin JR Estle SJ 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2004,81(1):39-50
Temporal discounting refers to the decrease in the present, subjective value of a reward as the time to its receipt increases. Results from humans have shown that a hyperbola-like function describes the form of the discounting function when choices involve hypothetical monetary rewards. In addition, magnitude effects have been reported in which smaller reward amounts are discounted more steeply than larger amounts. The present research examines the cross-species generality of these findings using real rewards, namely food pellets, with both pigeons and rats. As with humans, an adjusting amount procedure was used to estimate the amount of immediate reward judged equal in value to a delayed reward. Different amounts of delayed food rewards (ranging from 5 to 32 pellets in pigeons and from 5 to 20 pellets in rats) were studied at delays varying from 1 s to 32 s. A simple hyperbola, similar to the hyperbola-like mathematical function that describes the discounting of hypothetical monetary rewards in humans, described the discounting of food rewards in both pigeons and rats. These results extend the generality of the mathematical model of discounting. Rates of discounting delayed food rewards were higher for pigeons than for rats. Unlike humans, however, neither pigeons nor rats showed a reliable magnitude effect: Rate of discounting did not vary systematically as a function of the amount of the delayed reward. 相似文献
20.
In everyday life, many probabilistic situations may be characterized as probabilistic waiting. A gambler, for example, bets repeatedly at the racetrack, the casino, or the card table. The gambler may not win on the first try, but if a gamble is repeated enough times, a win is almost certain to occur eventually. If repeated gambles are structured as strings of losses ending in a win (probabilistic waiting) and the amount won is discounted by the delay caused by the series of losses, then strings with many losses will be discounted more than those with fewer losses, thereby causing subjective value of the series of gambles as a whole to increase. The current study used the opposite effect that amount has on the degree of delay and probability discounting as a marker to determine whether people evaluate situations involving probabilistic waiting as they evaluate situations involving delayed outcomes or as situations involving probabilistic outcomes. We find that the more likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a gamble is repeated indefinitely until reward is obtained), the more that situation conforms to delay discounting; the less likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a fixed, small number of gambles), the more that situation conforms to probability discounting. We argue that the former situation is applicable to pathological gambling, and that people with steep delay discount functions would therefore be more likely to have gambling problems. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献