"共同善"与分配正义论——社群主义的社会福利思想及其对社会政策研究的启示

社群主义关于社会平等和社会正义的论述,对人类关系模式的多样性与社会正义原则适用范围、以社会物品多样性为基础的多元主义分配正义论和复合平等观进行了系统的理论分析。它将正义问题的哲学分析与社会政策联系起来,不仅深化了对分配正义的认识,为当代社会分配的复杂性和可能的对策思考,提供了有重要思想价值和现实意义的论证。对我们澄清以社会福利的实施为目的的社会政策研究中存在的价值观与方法论问题,也有重要的启示作用。     

论大卫·哈维的环境正义思想

如何面对与处理环境危机,探讨环境恶化根源,哈维基于“历史一地理唯物主义”方法,以“空间生产”为视角,分析社会、环境和正义的关系,指出侵害环境正义的根本原因是资本积累和新自由主义思想的广泛传播,阐明实现环境正义的路径在于生产方式的替代、社会正义的复苏和寻求新的革命主体.哈维的环境正义思想体现出差异性、过程性和对快速城市化发展地区居民、边缘性和被忽视的族群的特有关切.     

环境正义研究述评

“环境正义”理论与实践研究是当前环境伦理学研究的重要内容。国内外“环境正义”研究主要基于各自的环境状况与发展实践围绕着“环境正义”的含义、“环境正义”的向度、“环境正义”的原则、“环境正义”何以可能等问题进行各自的话语表达与理论建构,但这些研究存在着某些不足,如内容缺乏整体性和系统性,视角缺乏人类学视野与全球性视野,对“环境正义”实现机制和实现过程等问题研究不够。所以,深化“环境正义”研究就要求我们丰富研究内容,综合研究方法,扩展研究视角,提升研究价值,确证“环境正义”在当今世界发展中的价值合理性与现实可能性。     

大地伦理是环境法西斯主义吗?——克里考特的类型学分析与论证

大地伦理不但为环境伦理学研究提供了整体主义的理论视野,而且对于环境保护具有重要实践意义.但是,该思想受到诸多责难.其中,最大挑战是批判者称其为环境法西斯主义.如何回应环境法西斯主义的问题是坚持整体主义的环境伦理学必须面对的重大课题.克里考特以类型学的方法分析了大地伦理与仁慈的道德主义、伦理的人道主义三者之间关系,并通过二阶原则补充了整体主义的一阶原则,有力地捍卫了大地伦理.本文试图通过克里考特的类型学与二阶原则的研究,试图揭示大地伦理不是环境法西斯主义,以及整体主义的环境伦理如何获得合理性辩护.     

经济正义与环境正义——转型期我国城乡关系的伦理之维

转型期我国城乡关系出现了一系列新的矛盾和问题,突出表现在:城乡二元经济结构仍然存在,城乡环境也呈现出“城市环境好转,农村环境恶化”的二元趋势.马克思主义经典作家建立在唯物史观基础上的经济正义思想,功利主义以“最大多数人的最大幸福”为目标和尺度的经济正义观,以及罗尔斯以“作为公平的正义”为基本理念和原则的正义体系,为考察当前我国城乡经济正义问题提供了理论资源.城乡环境正义则主要体现为三个方面:城乡环保制度安排和环境资源分配问题中的程序正义;城乡环境补偿机制中的地理正义;城乡居民承受环境风险的实质正义.     

企业伦理的德性主义进路及其条件——以所罗门的亚里士多德方式为例

理解企业伦理的德性主义进路不可或缺。美国当代著名经济伦理学家罗伯特·C．所罗门成功地将亚里士多德德性论引入企业伦理学,为人们把握企业伦理提供了一条德性主义的诠释进路。而亚里士多德德性论强调实践、团体、人对幸福的追求和追求卓越等也为企业伦理的德性主义进路提供了思想资源。而美德自身也能够使人们正确地理解商业和商业伦理、使经济交易成为可能、使经济的运行更为成功。但德性主义进路不是没有条件的,它需要个体或企业具有良好的道德价值观念和良好的判断力,也需要规范伦理与之匹配,以及一个尊重美德的社会环境和相关的制度安排。     

科学发展观视野中的环境正义

科学发展观认为 ,环境正义是历史的、社会的、具体的。它追求的是“合理的发展”,关注的是发展的意义 ,即“为了什么发展”和“什么样的发展才是好的发展”,这一发展的核心问题。科学发展观强调 ,要实现环境保护与可持续发展的目标 ,就要同时处理和调节多重层面的正义问题 ,那种笼统的环境主张只能带来美好而不切实际的想象 ,恰当的环境理念才是人们保护环境的现实动力和精神支柱。     

恩格斯的居住正义思想及其启示

<正>恩格斯在《伍珀河谷的来信》、《英国工人阶级的状况》和《论住宅问题》等论著中,通过对资本主义居住隔离、居住空间极化、居住与人的身份和尊严的揭示与论述,表达了居住正义的思想。居住正义就是住宅的建造与规划与人们的需求相适应,与社会发展相协调,使居住与环境和谐,与主体需求相     

戴维·米勒论环境善物

如何将对环境的关注与社会正义的要求相互融合,正成为当前环境正义研究的核心问题。尽管许多社会正义的研究者倾向于认为环境问题是一个"超越正义"的独立领域,英国政治哲学家戴维·米勒(David Miller)则指出,"如果我们想要在追求社会正义的同时,保护并改善我们的环境,就必须对指导我们的原则和我们为实现这一目标所要实行的制度进行深入的思考"[1]。而戴维·米勒的思考主要围     

应正确理解与阐释马克思分配正义思想

<正>一按照马克思主义唯物史观的理解,正义问题是一种社会历史性产物。伴随着人类社会私有制与阶级对立的出现,它逐渐成为人们无法回避的话题,也是长期纷争不断的焦点;不仅如此,只要社会中还存在非正义的现象,正义问题就不会从人们的视域中消失,人们关于"何谓正义"的争论也不会停歇与中断。一般而言,正义作为价值范畴,既具有规范性意义,也具有评价性意义。正义作为规范性概念表     

A Meditation on Hell: Lessons from Dante

This essay borrows Dante's inspiration in the Inferno to explore a theology of hell. The usual apologies for hell either bank on a retributive paradigm of justice or are content to have hell introduce a note of tragedy into the history of redemption. The theology that is culled from Dante, and especially from his handling of Virgil's place and authority in hell, is neither retributive in its justice nor tragic in its vision. Dante shows us how to make some sense of the idea that hell is originally a part of the created order and as such expresses divine wisdom, justice, and love.     

普遍的正义如何可能——柏拉图正义论及发微

柏拉图试图解决正义是什么、正义如何可能和正义是何种价值这样一些根本问题 ,其提问题的方式、解决路径都是柏拉图式的。有借鉴意义的是正义植根于心灵深处的土壤以及社会供给正义的途径。实现正义是一个艰难且复杂的社会历史过程 ,推进民主进程、使正义理念扎根于民众的日常生活深处 ,相对正义的社会才会被建立起来 ,基于此种理念之上的用以保证、体现和实现正义的制度才会被设计出来。     

Perceptions of Juvenile Offenders Who Were Abused as Children

Should a history of child abuse be taken into consideration when a juvenile offender is punished? Although some research shows that child abuse is used as a mitigating factor for juvenile offenders (i.e., elicits less punitive sentences), surveys of juvenile court officials reveal that it is considered an aggravating factor. Specifically, in controlled mock jury studies in which child abuse is experimentally manipulated, child abuse elicits less punitive sentences. In contrast, child abuse elicits more punitive sentences in a nonexperimentally controlled environment—the juvenile justice system. This article provides a comprehensive literature review to explain these conflicting bodies of research by considering factors that naturally covary with childhood abuse: chaotic family environment, mental health problems, behavioral problems, and school problems.     

Inviting affordances and agency

Recently several authors have suggested that affordances are not mere possibilities for action but can also invite behavior. This reconceptualization of affordances asks for a reconsideration of the ecological approach to agency. After a portrayal of the role of agency in ecological psychology, we draw upon phenomenology to reveal what it means for an agent to be invited by affordances. We sketch a dynamical model of the animal-environment relationship that aims to do justice to this analysis. In the model, agency is conceptualized as the capacity to modulate the coupling strength with the environment—the agent can influence to what extent he or she is influenced by the different invitations. This account of agency keeps us far from the Cartesian idea that the agent imposes behavior. Indeed, by modulating the coupling strength, the agent simply alters the dynamics of the animal-environment interactions and thus the behavior that emerges.     

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Social justice (which includes retributive and distributive justice) is most clearly satisfied by a system of Divine rewards and punishments: an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly just Being could determine in each case how much effort was made and effect the appropriate distribution of rewards and punishments. A correct understanding of social justice naturally leads us to suppose that there is an afterlife, a God, a free choice — though it is logically possible at least that social justice could be satisfied in some future (very advanced) human society. There will still be those who have their doubts about the correctness of any view according to which justice cannot be attained by fallible creatures who have an incomplete knowledge of one another's behaviour. But, surely, these doubts are not sufficient to discredit my view. There is no a priori reason for rejecting such a view. There is nothing about our use of the term ‘justice’ and its cognates which implies that such a view is mistaken. (Otherwise the statement “There is no justice in this world’ would be meaningless.) To the contrary, there are widely held religious views, Christian as well as non-Christian, which take this view quite seriously. If there is no a priori reason for rejecting this view, then there must be some independent reason for rejecting it. In other words, we need some independent reasons for believing that social justice can be attained by fallible creatures with limited knowledge. The mere fact that we might feel uncomfortable with my theory is not reason enough to reject it. Finally, those who do experience this discomfort might ask themselves whether such discomfort stems from their moral experience or whether they are simply intent on finding justice in imperfect human institutions.     

Procedural Justice and Culture

The past fifteen years have seen the development of a considerable research literature on the social psychology of procedural justice (see Lind & Tyler, 1988, for a review). Procedural justice research reveals some serious shortcomings in the exchange theories that have traditionally dominated Western analyses of the social psychology of groups, and in so doing, the procedural justice literature has important ramifications for cross-cultural psychology. Results from a number of studies conducted in the United States and Western Europe show that individualistic, self-interest based models of human behaviour are insufficient to explain procedural justice phenomena. Instead, procedural justice effects frequently reveal strong group-oriented concerns and motivations even in cultural contexts generally thought to be characterized by individualistic orientations. The research literature also shows that if a group's procedures are judged to be fair, people are more likely to show group-oriented behaviour and to hold more favourable attitudes toward the group and its leaders. These findings have led to the development of a theory of justice judgments—the Lind and Tyler group-value theory—which is based on group norms and relations rather than on social exchange theory. We describe a general model of social behaviour that integrates group- and individually-oriented behaviour, and we discuss the implications of the model for social and cross-cultural psychology.     

Framing cognition: Dewey’s potential contributions to some enactivist issues

It is well known that John Dewey was very far from embracing the traditional idea of cognition as something happening inside one’s own mind and consisting in a pictorial representation of the alleged purely external reality out there. His position was largely convergent with enactivist accounts of cognition as something based in life and consisting in human actions within a natural environment. The paper considers Dewey’s conception of cognition by focusing on its potential contributions to the current debate with enactivism. It claims that Dewey’s anti-substantial, continuistic, and emergentistic conception of the mind as a typically human conduct pulls the rug out of the idea of cognition as representation, as well as pushes the current discussion towards a serious reconsideration of representationalist assumptions about conceptuality and language. The paper emphasises that Dewey—differently from enactivists—frames the role of cognition within experience: he argues that cognition concerns those intermediate phases of our experiences of the world which are characterised by an indeterminate or troubled situation, because he claims that human beings’ interactions with their own environment are qualitatively richer and broader than cognition, including as they do many different and intertwined modes of experience. Finally, the author suggests that a coherent development of Dewey’s lines of thought should avoid rigid distinctions and hierarchies between lower and higher degrees of cognition in humans, which are still maintained in certain forms of radical enactivism. Differently, we should consider the impact of the cultural and broadly linguistic configuration of the human–environment even on perception, motor action, and affective sensibility.

     

Nature as Muslim: Applying a Qur'anic Concept to the Bible

Eco-sensitive readings of both the Bible and the Qur'an have become common in recent years as scholars have drawn upon insights and methods from environmental studies to inform their interpretations of biblical and qur'anic passages. This article attempts to put the two texts in conversation with one another on this topic to show how what one of them has to say about the natural world can have an effect on how we understand and interpret the other. Some have argued that the Qur'an's view of nature is that it is “muslim” because it submits and conforms itself to the divine will. This article applies that idea to selected biblical texts that refer to various elements of the natural world. Rereading these passages from the Bible through the lens of the Qur'an's concept of nature as muslim can enable us to see important aspects of the biblical view of the environment that we might otherwise miss.     

A liberal theory of externalities?

Unlike exploitative exchanges, exchanges featuring externalities have never seemed to pose particular problems to liberal theories of justice. State interference with exchanges featuring externalities seems permissible, like it is for coercive or deceptive exchanges. This is because exchanges featuring negative externalities seem to be clear cases of the two exchanging parties harming a third one via the exchange—and thus of conduct violating the harm principle. This essay aims to put this idea into question. I will argue that exchanges featuring negative externalities are not unjust in this straightforward way, i.e. because they would constitute an instance of wrongfully causing or risking a bodily or material harm. In fact, unless we are subscribing to particularly demanding variants of liberalism—e.g. perfectionist liberalism—or unless we are exclusively focusing on borderline cases of externalities—i.e. of effects of exchanges hardly to be called externalities—there is no liberal theory of how exchanges featuring externalities are unjust.     

Justice without Solidarity? Collective Identity and the Fate of the ‘Ethical’ in Habermas' Recent Political Theory

In past work, Habermas has claimed that justice and solidarity stand in a complementary relationship—that ‘ethical’ relations of solidarity are the ‘reverse side’ of justice. Yet in a recent address to the World Congress of Philosophy, he rejects this idea. This paper argues against this rejection. After explaining the idea, arguing for its centrality to Habermas' thought, and evaluating Habermas' scant reflections on this major transformation, I argue that his rejection of the idea is a result of a newfound skepticism about the power of secular reason, and should thus be understood in terms of his corresponding turn to religious traditions as alternative sources of solidarity. I argue against this ‘religious turn’ by developing an alternative advocated by Habermas himself in earlier reflections—attention to real sociopolitical movements. In particular, I analyze feminist and black liberation movements to demonstrate that Habermas' pessimism about secular sources of justice‐producing solidarity is unwarranted, and that, while ‘postsecular’ sources may provide one avenue for actionable solidarity, they are not the only one. I conclude by identifying a conceptual commonality in these two alternatives: an inclusive conception of what it means to be human.