环境伦理学中的"生态化"人生观

从其实践要求和理论品性来看,一种完整的环境伦理学理论必然包含着一种关于人生观的理解。本文主要探讨罗尔斯顿环境伦理理论和深生态学关于人生观的主张和见解,从而指出环境伦理学理论包含着一种“生态化”人生观。相对于现代社会盛行的人生观来说,“生态化”人生观是基于人生之生命层面的,尊重自然的,后物质主义的人生观。它作为一种新的人生观理论具有重要现实意义。     

Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy

With the recent revival of moral intuitionism, the work of W. D. Ross has grown in stature. But if we look at some recent well-regarded histories, anthologies and companions of analytic philosophy, Ross is noticeably absent. This discrepancy of assessments raises the question of Ross’s place in the history of analytic philosophy. Hans-Johann Glock has recently claimed that Ross is not an analytic philosopher at all, but is instead a ‘traditional philosopher’. In this article, I will identify several undeniable features of analytic philosophy that Ross’s work bears: a focus on linguistic analysis, great respect for pre-theoretical thoughts, the conviction that philosophy is a collaborative, piecemeal enterprise and so on. Such an investigation, I claim, reveals two historically significant results: Ross was the first ethicist to fully draw from commonsense beliefs about morality in light of characteristic analytic considerations to secure his theory. Two, concerning the matter of whether the notions ‘right’ and ‘good’ are reducible to other notions, Ross appears to have been right: ‘right’ and ‘good’ are irreducible notions. The classical analytic metaethicists, who based their entire research programme on the promise of finding suitable reductive semantic analyses of ‘right’ and ‘good’, were wrong. These results, I believe, suffice to secure W. D. Ross a high place in the history of analytic philosophy.     

The Relatively Infinite Value of the Environment

Some environmental ethicists and economists argue that attributing infinite value to the environment is a good way to represent an absolute obligation to protect it. Others argue against modelling the value of the environment in this way: the assignment of infinite value leads to immense technical and philosophical difficulties that undermine the environmentalist project. First, there is a problem of discrimination: saving a large region of habitat is better than saving a small region; yet if both outcomes have infinite value, then decision theory prescribes indifference. Second, there is a problem of swamping probabilities: an act with a small but positive probability of saving an endangered species appears to be on par with an act that has a high probability of achieving this outcome, since both have infinite expected value. Our paper shows that a relative (rather than absolute) concept of infinite value can be meaningfully defined, and provides a good model for securing the priority of the natural environment while avoiding the failures noted by sceptics about infinite value. Our claim is not that the relative infinity utility model gets every detail correct, but rather that it provides a rigorous philosophical framework for thinking about decisions affecting the environment.     

Rolston, Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature

In recent metaethical debate over ways to justify the notion of intrinsic natural value, some neopragmatists have challenged realist conceptions of scientific and moral truth. Holmes Rolston defends a critical-realist epistemology as the basis for a metaphysics of projective nature and a cosmological narrative—both of which set up a historical ontology of objective natural value. Pure ecological science informs the wilderness experience of Rolston's ideal epistemic subject, the sensitive naturalist. The author argues that Rolston's account of the relation between knowing and valuing can be clarified and strengthened by appropriating Bernard Lonergan's transcendental method. Conversely, Lonergan's view of moral self-transcendence can be developed further in light of Rolston's virtue epistemology, which is embodied in the figure of the sensitive naturalist.     

Is There an Identity Crisis in Environmental Ethics?

Environmental ethics is both a moral philosophy and an applied ethics.This duality has led some people to feel confused about environmental ethics' identity and to cast doubts on its legitimacy.This paper,by distinguishing and exploding environmental ethics' two patterns of inquiry (the moral philosophy pattern and the applied ethics pattern) and their characteristics,tries to resolve the discipline's identity crisis and to argue for its legitimacy.     

论公共决策的优先性价值

公共决策关涉价值,且负荷优先性价值。在思想史的维度上,众多学者认同公平是公共决策的优先性价值。在学理层面上,公共决策的公共性和政府的服务性决定公平是公共决策的优先性价值。处于市场经济条件下的政府必须以公共决策的优先性价值为基础正确把握公平与效率的辩证关系。     

A Debate on the Ethics of Aging: Does the Concept of Autonomy Provide a Sufficient Framework for Aging Policy?

This article presents a debate on the issue of autonomy in aging policy held at the 1994 annual meeting of the American Society on Aging held in San Francisco, California. Harry R. Moody, director of the Institute for Human Values in Aging at Hunter College, supports a reconceptualized notion of personal autonomy which focuses on issues of power, theory, and practice, and finds conflicts between autonomy and justice in the lived world of the elderly and disabled. In aging policy, he promotes an emphasis on social movements such as Hospice rather than on autonomy of individuals. He suggests alternatives to extreme paternalism or complete autonomy, such as a communicative ethics approach. Larry Polivka, director of the Florida Policy Exchange Center on Aging at the University of South Florida, affirms that policy for the aging and disabled should be based ona commitment to autonomy. He describes an integrated model for long-term care that places autonomy first and includes features of communicative ethics and the negotiated consent and virtues models of ethics.     

西方公共行政及其正义价值

公共行政本质上所具有的伦理特性以及公共行政理论和范式在不同发展时期所具有的不同特点和价值诉求,使得从伦理的角度对公共行政进行审视成为可能。公共行政正义价值既体现了民主社会自由、平等的价值追求,也蕴涵着公共行政本身所具有的对公共利益的价值取向,同时也是公共行政人员德性的体现。     

Engineering responsibilities in lesser-developed nations: The welfare requirement

Increasing numbers of engineers from developed countries are employed during some part of their careers in lesser-developed nations (LDN’s), or they may design products for use in LDN’s. Yet determining the implications of professional engineering codes for engineers’ conduct in such settings can be difficult. Conditions are often substantially different from those in developed countries, where the codes were formulated. In this paper I explore the implications of what I call the “welfare requirement” in engineering codes for professional engineering conduct in LDN’s. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Engineering Foundation Conference on “Ethics for Science and Engineering Based International Industries”, Durham, NC, USA, 14–17 September 1997.     

Sustainable development, engineering and multinational corporations: Ethical and public policy implications

This paper explores the concept of sustainable development and its ethical and public policy implications for engineering and multinational corporations. Sustainable development involves achieving objectives in three realms: ecological (sustainable scale), economic (efficient allocation) and social (just distribution). While movement toward a sustainable society is dependent upon satisfying all three objectives, questions of just distribution and other questions of equity are often left off the table or downplayed when engineers and corporate leaders consider sustainable development issues. Indeed, almost all the effort of engineers and engineering organizations on the issue of sustainable development has been focused on striking a balance between economic development and environmental protection. Similarly, corporate approaches rely on technological fixes to the challenges posed by sustainable development. While there have been some efforts aimed at incorporating environmental and social equity concepts into engineering codes of ethics, social concerns have been secondary to environmental issues. The incongruity between the ideal of sustainable development and the way in which it is typically characterized by the engineering and business communities has significant implications for engineering and public policy, engineering ethics, and the potential roles of engineers and multinational corporations as facilitators of a transition to a sustainable society. Presented at the Engineering Foundation Conference on “Ethics for Science and Engineering Based International Industries”, Durham, NC, USA, September 1997. An earlier version was presented at and appeared in the proceedings of the “1997 International Symposium on Technology and Society”, IEEE Society on Social Implications of Technology, Glasgow, Scotland, UK, June 1997. The author, an Assistant Prolessor of Multidisciplinary Studies, teaches in the Science, Technology and Society Program and is Director of the Benjamin Franklin Scholars Program, a dual-degree program in engineering and humanities/social sciences.     

RESPONSE TO CRITIQUES OF ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

Abstract. Both Roger Shinn and Robert Stivers ask whether technology has a momentum of its own that is difficult if not impossible to control (“autonomous technology” or “technological inevitability”). I reply that the difficulty in controlling technology is a product of economic and political institutions (such as corporate lobbying and campaign contributions) rather than of any inherent characteristics of technology. Against Stivers's assertion that the ecosystem should be the center of value in environmental ethics, I defend the process view that all beings are valuable, but they are not equally valuable in their richness of experience or their contribution to the experience of others. I also consider his caveats about ambiguities in the concept of sustainability. Two questions raised by Mary Gerhart are taken up: the difficulties of interdisciplinary writing and the role of theological ethics in discussions of public policy. In dialogue with Frederick Ferre I explore the role of alternative visions of the good life as a source of social change. In the face of diminished concern about social justice and environmental sustainability among citizens and in Congress since the book was written, I express long-range hope, but not optimism about the short-term prospects for change.     

Ethical Instrumentalism

The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as ‘ethical instrumentalism.’ My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as ‘Humeanism.’ A second, more general, aim is to make plausible the idea that, given the common basis, ethical instrumentalism provides a more compelling picture of the philosophy of value than Humeanism does.