论“精神”概念在黑格尔神学思想中的地位

在黑格尔的哲学体系中,基督教神学思想乃是一个不可分割的重要部分.由于黑格尔的哲学是依据"精神"而展开的,因此他的神学思想就可以称之为"精神神学”.在其中,基督教传统的神学主题,如三位一体、创造论、人论等都有着精彩的哲学式演绎,而黑格尔的神学思想则集中体现在他的宗教哲学之中.因此,本文将从黑格尔的哲学体系、尤其是他的宗教哲学入手,来分析"精神”是如何在其中起到灵魂式的构建作用的,并进而从精神的自我发展中来考察它是如何在黑格尔哲学中演绎出基督教神学思想的.     

论黑格尔的自然哲学

大家知道,黑格尔曾试图建立一个无所不包的哲学体系,他把这个体系的各个组成部分归结为一个基本原则。在这一体系中,人类思维第一次被看作一个从低级向高级发展的辩证过程。但这个重大的尝试未能取得完满成功。其原因是黑格尔打算建立一个能够最后揭示出某种绝对真理的完整无缺的体系。因此,人类精神史、人类理智的游荡,应在黑格尔哲学中找到自己的最后归宿。这原因应在这一哲学体系出发点中,即客观唯心主义中去找,而绝对精神和绝对观念就是在客观唯心主义基础上展示开和自我认识的。这种情况下,哲学的任务就被黑格尔归结成:     

黑格尔宗教哲学的理性基础与逻辑结构

关于黑格尔宗教哲学的研究在我国学术界目前尚处于刚刚起步的阶段,而黑格尔的绝对唯心主义哲学不仅是从其早年的神学思想中发展出来的①,而且在整个黑格尔思辨哲学体系中,宗教哲学占有非常重要的地位。黑格尔宗教哲学的最终使命就是要通过概念自身的辩证运动来论证理性与信仰、知识与宗教的同一性,从而把哲学与神学统一起来。本文将对黑格尔宗教哲学的理论起点、理性基础和逻辑结构进行分析     

黑格尔“逻辑学”中关于概念的“圆圈”式发展、关于“否定之否定”的思想

一否定之否定的规律,正如恩格斯所说,是黑格尔整个哲学体系构成的根本规律。本文只限于讲他哲学体系的第一部分——“逻辑学”中否定之否定的规律。黑格尔整个哲学体系依“绝对精神”发展的三大阶段而分为三个部分:即“逻辑学”、“自然哲学”和“精神哲学”。在逻辑学阶段中,“绝对精神”只是作为超时空以外的纯思维、纯概念而发展。自然界则“是不能在时间上发展的,它只能在空间上展开自己的多样性”。在精神哲学阶段中的东西则既在空间之中,也在时间之中。否定之否定的规律是“绝对精神”在其     

试论黑格尔对谢林哲学的批判

黑格尔和谢林都是德国古典唯心主义的主要代表。在德国古典哲学中,黑格尔和谢林的思想联系是不容忽视的。黑格尔起初还是一个谢林的追随者。黑格尔用自己的名字发表的第一篇作品就是为谢林辩护的,这篇作品题为《费希特哲学体系与谢林哲学体系的差异》。在这篇著作中,黑格尔完全站在谢林的客观唯心主义立场上,批判了主观唯心主义。不过,黑格尔很快就超出了谢林哲学,创立了自己的唯心辩证法的哲学体系。黑格尔同谢林哲学的彻底     

贺麟与黑格尔研究

贺麟先生很早就对黑格尔产生兴趣,开始研究黑格尔。他从1941年开始翻译和研究黑格尔的《小逻辑》,约十年后出版。该书影响了几代人,对中国的黑格尔研究、德国哲学研究乃至整个哲学研究,产生了极其重大的影响。贺先生认为,黑格尔哲学是一个整体,它可以分为三部分,其中最主要的是逻辑学,包括《逻辑学》《小逻辑》等著作,这部分是其哲学体系的核心,而自然哲学、法哲学、历史哲学等都是应用逻辑学。所以,贺先生推崇和强调《小逻辑》,体现了他对黑格尔哲学最核心部分的认识。而且,这不仅是贺先生对黑格尔哲学的认识,也是他对德国哲学的认识,是他对哲学本身的认识。     

卡西尔哲学的奠基逻辑及其形而上学意蕴

卡西尔以符号形式哲学作为体系在现代西方哲学中独树一帜。但是，由于他对这个体系据以奠基的思想逻辑的论证尚未完成，这个体系的性质和意义难以明现，因而制约了我们对其哲学思维方向的把握。本文将证明，他以不同方式或策略展开的对这个体系的基础的论证，是对有效地实现的意向性心理学的无限接近。只有将他的思想中隐而不显的这个基础明确地主题化，才能澄清其哲学体系的性质和意义。通过与其他主要哲学体系如康德批判哲学、黑格尔精神现象学、胡塞尔现象学等的比较，本文将揭示他关于形而上学不是作为“物理学之后”、而只能作为“心理学之后”的理解方向。     

黑格尔历史哲学研究

历史哲学在黑格尔哲学体系中占有重要的地位,它不仅是客观精神的重要内容,而且是黑格尔毕生关注的焦点。奥伊则尔曼指出:“黑格尔注意的中心始终是人类历史的辩证法。”R·S·哈特曼甚至说:“历史哲学是黑格尔体系的顶点。”R·J·兹伯特认为:“黑格尔是文明社会所造就的最伟大的历史哲学家,现代所有关于社会变化的哲学和社会学都打上     

“目的性”范畴在黑格尔逻辑学中的地位

长期以来,人们比较注意研究黑格尔逻辑学中的辨证法问题,把“矛盾”范畴置于核心地位。笔者认为,黑格尔的逻辑学同时也是认识论,从这个角度来看,“目的性”范畴则是一个贯串全书的核心范畴。为了说明这一点,就首先要说明一下黑格尔哲学体系的精神实质及逻辑学著作的根本特点。所谓黑格尔哲学体系,就是绝对精神由于其内在的否定性,沿着正、反、合途径,最后回归到自身的概念逻辑体系。作为其哲学的最高对象的绝对精神,实质是从个体的感性的人抽象出来的人的理性,被独立化为一种普遍的绝对实体。绝对精神的“根本任务是回顾既往     

辩证唯物主义与黑格尔的历史-哲学理论(续完)

黑格尔的《逻辑学》一书乃是哲学发展史的理论再现。这不就是说,黑格尔体系无非是历史-哲学过程研究的总结吗?但是为了做出这种总结,必须要有一种能在某种程度上预见以后研究结果的哲学观点做主线。显然,这种哲学观点不可能是总结哲学史的结果,即使总结可以证明哲学观点是正确的。因此,孰先孰后,是黑格尔体系先于他的历史-哲学研究还是     

On the misadventures of the sophists: Hegel's tropological appropriation of rhetoric

The author examines Hegel's incorporation of the Sophists into the history of philosophy. The basic argument is that Hegel's history of the Sophists operates along tropological lines, the exact same lines that the truth claims of his philosophy oppose. Using the tropes of metaphor, metonymy and prolepsis, the author shows that when Hegel places the Sophists in the process of the teleological unfolding of reason he employs the very rhetorical mechanisms he denounces.     

Hegel and Derrida on the problem of reason and repression

In this paper I attempt to question central assumptions of Derrida's strategy of deconstruction by analyzing his critique of Hegel's notion of Aufhebung. Hegel's dialectics claims to sublate conflicting difference between not individuals in reconciled communal relations. Deconstruction exposes, however, how Hegel's dialectics leads not to reconciliation but the violent internment of différance; traces of repression reveal the limits of Hegelian reason. Yet by grasping Hegelian dialectics as a restricting economy involving repression, Derrida has difficulties accounting for the difference Hegel introduces between repressive and productive power. In his early philosophy of ethical life (1801-1803), Hegel differentiates between moral and legal coercion (Zwang) and ethical subjugation (Bezwingen). In Glas, as I seek to show, Derrida reduces the difference between these two economies of power without proper justification. Derrida's deconstructive interpretation of Hegelian dialectics thus takes part in the repressive relève it criticizes by limiting a difference in Hegel's discourse on power. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Bacchanalian revel: Hegel and deconstruction

This text argues that Hegel's Concept, insofar as it has already deconstructed all opposed and fixed standpoints, supersedes deconstruction. Reducing the Logic and Phenomenology to the same kind of schematic formalism for which Hegel criticized his predecessors (Fichte and Schelling), Derrida misses the ways in which Absolute Spirit shows itself as the bacchanalian revel wherein no member is not drunk. Thus, this article defends Hegel against Derrida on Derrida's terms.     

Irrationality and egoism in Hegel’s account of right

ABSTRACT

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being.     

'Tarrying with the Negative': Bataille and Derrida's Reading of Negation in Hegel's Phenomenology

Central to Bataille's critique of Hegel is his reading in 'Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice' of 'negation' and of 'lordship and bondage' in the Phenomenology of Spirit . Whereas Hegel invokes negation as inclusive of death, Bataille points out (following his teacher Kojeve) that negation in the dynamic of lordship and bondage must of necessity be representational rather than actual. Derrida, in 'From Restricted to General Economy' sees in Bataille's perspective an undercutting of the overall Hegelian project consonant with his own ongoing deconstruction of Hegelian sublation. I argue that not only does Hegel fail to adequately pursue his own best advice to 'tarry with the negative,' but Bataille and Derrida's critique misconstrues the relation between sublation and dialectic in Hegel's work. I explicate Adorno's 'negative dialectic' by way of alternative both to Hegelian speculative dialectic and to its Bataillean–Derridean deconstruction.     

Annihilating the Nothing: Hegel and Nishitani on The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism

In Nishitani’s The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, Nishitani explores, among other related topics, the history of the problem of Nihilism in the West. Conspicuously absent from Nishitani’s historical analysis is the thought of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, who famously raised the charge of Nihilism against Fichte’s philosophy in 1799. As is evident from a variety of Hegel’s texts, Hegel explicitly responds to Jacobi’s charge against Speculative Idealism and designs his philosophy in part as a response to Jacobi’s charge of Nihilism. On the one hand, Nishitani fails to appreciate Hegel’s philosophy as a response to the problem of Nihilism because he has an incomplete possession of the history of the problem. On the other hand, Nishitani’s critique of Hegel begs the question. Nishitani’s dogmatic rejection of Hegel appears to be grounded in his methodological approach to the philosophy of history, which assumes the falsehood of Hegel’s account. Jacobi’s charge against Speculative Idealism consists in the Idealist’s failure to account for the very existence of the world. On his view, philosophy is Nihilism because the world disappears completely from philosophical speculation. Hegel attempts to overcome this charge of Nihilism by re-thinking the structure and content of reason.     

Why Is Being Nothing? An Apophatic Reading of Hegel’s Opening to the Science of Logic

The aim of this article is to analyze Hegel’s famous transition from being to nothing in the opening of the Science of Logic, to outline a variety of interpretations from commentators, and to defend what I call the “indirect apophatic interpretation” as support for the conclusion that Hegel is an ambiguously apophatic thinker. One benefit of the “indirect apophatic interpretation” is that it leads to a reassessment of Hegel’s conception of totality. The prevailing understanding of “totality” as exclusionary exhaustion, completion, and finitude has often been attributed to Hegel’s thought. But the “indirect apophatic interpretation” of the transition from being to nothing that I defend prepares the way for an alternative reading of totality in his work: not as the exhaustion of all positive content, but as the coincidence of being and nothing, as the contradiction A is -A, and as the exhaustion of form and content by way of a dialectic with the apophatic.     

Despair and the determinate negation of Brandom’s Hegel

In this paper, I contend that Brandom’s interpretive oversights leave his inferentialist program vulnerable to Hegelian critique. My target is Brandom’s notion of “conceptual realism,” or the thesis that the structure of mind-independent reality mimics the structure of thought. I show, first, that the conceptual realism at the heart of Brandom’s empiricism finds root in his interpretation of Hegel. I then argue that conceptual realism is incompatible with Hegel’s thought, since the Jena Phenomenology, understood as a “way of despair,” includes a critique of the philosophical framework upon which conceptual realism relies. Finally, I offer the Hegelian critique of Brandom that results from these textual infidelities.     

The Extended Mind Rehabilitates The Metaphysical Hegel

The nonmetaphysical interpretation of Hegel's philosophy asserts that the metaphysical reading is not credible and so his philosophy must be rationally reconstructed so as to elide its metaphysical aspects. This article shows that the thesis of the extended mind approaches the metaphysical reading, thereby undermining denials of its credibility and providing the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel's philosophy. This fully rehabilitates the metaphysical Hegel. The article does not argue for the truth of the metaphysical Hegel's claims. Rather, it defends the correctness of reading his philosophy as metaphysical.