Honoring Jonathan Edwards

In this response to the papers on Jonathan Edwards's ethical thought by Stephen A. Wilson, Gerald R. McDermott, William C. Spohn, and Roland A. Delattre, I comment on their efforts to show that ideas drawn from Edwards can be successfully appropriated for use in contemporary ethics. I conclude that the four authors build a strong cumulative case for the view that some elements of Edwards's thought can serve as resources for our ethical reflections. But I also argue for a deflationary view of how much of Edwards we will find it feasible to take on board when we engage in the task of working out a religious ethics we might accept.     

On Disability and Illness. A Reply to Edwards

This paper is a reply to an article by Steven Edwards in a previous issue of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. In this paper Edwards discusses two types of problems which he finds to be inherent in my theory of disability, mainly as presented in my On the Nature of Health, Kluwer 1995. First, Edwards discerns a tension in my basic definition of health, a tension between my “subjectivistic” and my “objectivistic” aspirations in the definition. Second, he finds that my theory of disability does not allow for a distinction between disability due to illness or injury and disability which has no such (at least not immediate) background. In my answer to Edwards's arguments I claim that his first criticism must be due to a misunderstanding of my intentions. I find his second criticism to be more to the point. It raises important issues in the theory of health which partly concern our interpretation of the notion of illness. Edwards introduces the notion of capacity in order to separate between disability due to illness or injury and disability without such a background. In the last part of my paper I argue that this distinction, however, will not fulfil its purpose. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Jonathan Edwards's Virtue: Diverse Sources, Multiple Meanings, and the Lessons of History for Ethics

The incompleteness of the task of integrating the influences made upon Jonathan Edwards by Calvinism and the moral sense leaves open a great many questions central to identifying his ethical position with any detail. This should worry ethicists, theologians, and church historians alike. For the puzzle of what Edwards meant by virtue is at the heart not only of his ethics but of a great many strands of his thought. It must be pieced together from diverse sources; and there are multiple meanings to be sifted through. But it is nevertheless possible to bring the concepts made available by the diverse moral traditions upon which Edwards drew into a generally coherent counterpoise. Such a counterpoise is not merely of antiquarian interest. Lacking a precise account of Edwards's ethical position, it is awkward to talk about applying it to the problems of the twenty-first, or any, century.     

A History of Western Astrology,volume II: The Medieval and Modern Worlds,by Nicholas Campion

Abstract

The text of the ‘Summary’ of 1523, which forms the basis of this article, has been exhaustively studied in biographies of Bucer, and its theological content has been analysed considerably. I would like to approach it with a question which can appear a little strange. In the years 1522-23, if a Christian layman or woman embraced or shaped themselves to the reforming message of the preacher Martin Bucer, what would that have meant for them in concrete terms in their everyday life? Such a questioning obviously carries with it the risk of too great a subjectivity. I admit this and I accept it. For, on occasions, the reformer himself uses the expression of the Christian life (pp. 100, 13), of life totally centred in Christ, ‘volkommen christlich Leben’ (pp. 116, 21). Here is the result of researches yet to be completed. This research also needs to be measured against texts from Bucer which stem from his mature years.¹     

Origin Stories: Same-Sex Sexuality and Christian Right Politics

In this paper, we examine dominant Christian conservative narratives of the origins of same-sex sexuality. Critics of the Christian right usually focus on a narrative of choice that Christian right organisations and activists use to explain the origins of same-sex sexuality. A choice narrative grounds a range of political positions and, in many contexts, effectively neutralises both claims of discrimination and public support for potential legal remedies. On the other hand, a narrative of development receives less attention from critics of the Christian right. Although it cannot be reduced to its political efficacy, the narrative of development has a political as well as therapeutic function. Indeed, this narrative circulates tacitly through a different set of public debates than those usually associated with the narrative of choice, including debates over programmes geared to eliminate antigay harassment in public schools. The two narratives create tensions within Christian conservative thought that can destabilise antigay social and political projects.     

Incarnation and Semiotics: A Theological and Anthropological Hypothesis Part 1: Incarnation and Peirce's Taxonomy of Signs

This is the first in a pair of articles in which we draw on C.S. Peirce's semiotics (theory of signs) to develop a new approach to the Christian concept of Incarnation. In this article (Part 1) we use Peirce's taxonomy of signs to explore what it means to understand the life of Jesus as the embodiment of the quality of the life of God within the fabric of the created order. In Part 2, we explore some ways in which this semiotic approach to the Incarnation offers constructive opportunities in theological anthropology and suggests some empirically testable hypotheses about human evolution.     

Discourses of Love,Compassion, and Belonging: Reframing Christianity for a Secular Audience

Religious plurality has implications for religious organisations active within the public realm. Using semi-structured interviews, I examine how Christians and Christian organisations are framing faith discourses so that they resonate with religiously neutral discourses dominant in the public sphere. There are indications of a shift towards the use of profane terms instead of sacred terms to explain aspects of the Christian faith and Christian teachings of love, compassion, and belonging are amplified to counter criticisms that Christianity is a threat to liberal rights and beliefs. This article conceptualises these discourses as two social action frames: the ‘Love Frame’ and the ‘Inclusivity Frame’. I do not refute claims that the social significance of religion is declining but argue that Christians and Christian organisations are working within the confines of secular discourses to disseminate their messages in order to build credibility as egalitarian public service providers.     

BRICOLAGE AND THE PURITY OF TRADITIONS: Engaging the Stoics for Contemporary Christian Ethics

This essay is a response to C. Kavin Rowe's critique of my 2011 argument that certain dimensions of Roman Stoic ethics are at work in Jonathan Edwards's moral thought. Rowe raises questions about the act of selectively retrieving ideas from a philosophical tradition to support constructive work in another tradition. I argue for the importance of acknowledging how Christian thought has been shaped by what Jeffrey Stout describes as moral bricolage, the selective retrieval of ideas from various traditions, and I contend that this bricolage can continue to be a fruitful means through which Christian ethics engages external traditions. Moreover, the importance of Stoicism's retrieval in early modern philosophy makes the work of eighteenth‐century theologians such as Edwards a particularly valuable resource for exploring the plausibility of Christian engagement with the Stoics.     

MARGARET THATCHER'S CHRISTIAN FAITH: A Case Study in Political Theology

Throughout the 1980s Margaret Thatcher dominated British and global politics. At the same time she maintained an active Christian faith, which she understood as shaping and informing her political choices and policies. In this article I argue that we can construct from Thatcher's key speeches, her memoirs, and her book on public policy a cultural “theo‐political” identity which guided her political decisions. Thatcher's identity was as an Anglo‐Saxon Nonconformist. This consisted of her belief in values such as thrift and hard work, care for the family and local neighbor, and charitable generosity; her belief in the renewal of the national British Christian spirit; and her notion of morality as the opportunity for free choice. Without a recognition of the centrality of her theo‐political identity, it is difficult to understand the values and beliefs which were central to her political life. The methodological issues raised by the construction of this theo‐political identity are examined in this article. The aim of the proposed methodology is to develop theological insights into a political phenomenon like Thatcher rather than make policy judgments or recommendations.     

Christian Ethics,Religious Ethics,and Secular Ethics: A Contemporary Reappraisal

In this essay, I argue that Christian ethicists should not think of themselves as religious ethicists. I defend this claim by arguing that the concept of religious ethics, as it has come to be understood as a discipline that is distinct from secular ethics, is incoherent. In part one, I describe the fraught attempts by theologians in the 20th century to identify the distinctiveness of Christian ethics. In part two, I argue that certain accounts of natural law unwittingly reinforce a problematic conception of secular ethics. Part three examines some trends in religious studies and comparative religious ethics to highlight problematic conceptions of religion. Drawing together these strands of inquiry, I contend that that the secular-religious dichotomy in contemporary ethics should be rejected, but by the same token, I suggest that comparative ethics remains a worthwhile enterprise.     

Coalition – creation – church*

Taking the recent UN Report about extreme poverty in the UK as a point of departure, this article analyses and assesses William Cavanaugh’s political ecclesiology. Drawing on the interpretation of Martin Luther’s concept of creation in Scandinavian Creation Theology, I argue that creation destabilises the distinction Cavanaugh draws between what he considers to be church and what he considers not to be church. I account for creation as a web of vulnerability in which all creatures are vulnerable to both creature and creator. In contrast to Cavanaugh’s strong and stable church, I advocate for what I call “coalitional church”: a church that can enter into coalitions with Christians and non-Christians in order to call for conditions under which vulnerable life is liveable. The public and political task of churches is not necessarily to fight the state, but to hold the state accountable to its citizens, whether they are Christian or non-Christian.     

Incarnation and Semiotics: A Theological and Anthropological Hypothesis Part 2: Semiotics,Anthropology, and Religious Transformation

This is the second in a pair of articles in which we draw on C.S. Peirce's semiotics (theory of signs) to develop a new approach to the Christian concept of Incarnation. In Part 1 we used Peirce's taxonomy of signs to explore what it means to understand the life of Jesus as the embodiment of the quality of God within the fabric of the created order. In this article (Part 2), we explore some ways in which this semiotic approach to the Incarnation offers constructive opportunities in theological anthropology, and suggests some empirically testable hypotheses about human evolution.     

Remarks about the Nietzschean dancing God

Nietzsche and (or beyond) Christianity: a worn-out and almost banal problem? In this article I argue that this topic goes far beyond a mere opposition between Christians and Nietzscheans. I want to show that the actual issue concerns Nietzsche's attempt to overcome the moral hegemony within Christianity. In this context, Nietzsche's project is not to eradicate religion but to define a new religious space. I have organised this discussion by conceiving the present article around a sentence extracted from Thus spoke Zarathustra. I first analyse the text in its syntactic and rhetorical composition. Nietzsche's very strategy (or trick?) resides in undermining the Christian discourse from the inside: he argues that Christian morality is not inspired by a cheerful affirmation of life but by its vindictive negation. I further show that Nietzsche puts at stake the Christian striving for a justification of life and consequently its incapacity of accepting the question-mark of existence. Within his radical critique, Nietzsche points to an authentic attitude towards life, an attitude which I have designated with the metaphor of the dancing God.     

Natural death and the work of perfection.

The historic or traditional Christian view of pain (suffering) and death, especially as preserved by the Christians East (i.e., the Orthodox), is radically opposed to the modern secular obsession with avoidance of pain. Everything about this life has its goal or aim in a mystical reality, the Kingdom of Heaven, for which earthly life is a preparation. While neither illness nor health are seen as ends in themselves, both are viewed as proceeding from the will of God for our benefit and have no ultimate meaning or purpose outside of eternal life. Death may be a relief or an ending of suffering, but in itself it is not "good" but evil. Because they are the embodiment of lived theology, saints' lives can be a sure guide to understanding how to die as a traditional Christian. To illustrate this, I have chosen some examples from the lives of relatively recent saints. I myself am from the Russian Orthodox spiritual tradition, so all but one of my examples come from pre-Revolutionary Russia. The question is not so much whether or not a traditional Christian can countenance physician-assisted suicide, but rather, what is the meaning or purpose of pain and suffering in general. Is it part of the "work of perfection" required of those who wish to enter the Kingdom of Heaven and therefore not to be completely denied?     

Christianity and Eudaimonia,Luck and Eudaimonism

I argue that Christians have at least two reasons to reject eudaimonism, interpreted as the view that attaining eudaimonia—or happiness—is what fulfills the moral life. First, I contend Christian conceptions of eudaimonia should encompass more than realized moral excellence and its requirements. Second, I claim Christians should construe the love at the heart of their moral life as fully realizable even if it is not evidently reciprocated. Both affirmations contradict eudaimonism by implying that eudaimonia depends on more than fulfilling the moral life—the former by rendering eudaimonia more subject to luck than eudaimonists can allow, the latter by depicting the moral life as less subject to luck than eudaimonists can accept. These affirmations also enable Christians to regard God’s love integral to eudaimonia apart from its role in realizing moral excellence and to deny all inability to attain eudaimonia manifests moral failure.     

Language, thinking and religious consciousness

Conclusion The opposition in which many phenomenologists of religion stand to the above remarks is clear. Religious consciousness of the world, in being tied to the language of a particular faith, requires conceptual mastery for its emergence. Linguistic and non-linguistic skills in the use of concepts must be developed through fledgling attempts and repeated practice. In noticing this, attention has been called to the fact that such consciousness is far from being man's natural inheritance. It is acquired through instruction and learning, and the concepts which generate Christian consciousness of the world make demands upon a person which go straight against his grain. Using the Christian concepts as tools in handling the various situations along life's way requires strenuous and repeatedly renewed effort. There remains a certain Christian distance from ordinary ways of doing commerce with the world. The way, after all, is said to be narrow. So to become conscious of the world in a Christian manner is to submit oneself to the rigors of the concepts. It is to permit one's life to be guided and ruled thereby in his regard for the world.In making these observations, it becomes clear, too, that the Christian life and consciousness is one in which a man chooses to be enmeshed. It is a matter of human decision. In so choosing, a man makes his life determinate; he gives it shape. The specificity or concreteness demanded in and with the language of faith should be contrasted with the rather diffuse and indeterminate character of the religious awareness thought to be so deep and abiding by phenomenologists. Because of its lack of particularity in contour, this notion of religious consciousness is virtually inconsequential. That which is increasingly common to all men begins to wane in significance within the life of the single individual. Comparatively speaking, the choice to reduplicate Christian avenues of thinking and acting is replete with ramifications and differences which are clearly discernible. By virtue of the specificity required, however, it is also the case that one must renew that decision daily, seek to nurture it, train and discipline himself in it. Making the faith one's own, abiding in it day and night--these lead down different pathways. But the distinctive patterns of living and thinking add up after a while with a cumulative effect. Through the acquisition and practice in exercising'Christian concepts, one earns a consciousness of the world which is Christian in scope and nature.     

Focus Introduction: Taking the Measure of Jonathan Edwards for Contemporary Religious Ethics

The Journal of Religious Ethics marks the tercentenary of Edwards's birth with the following collection of essays. In keeping with the overall mission of the journal, this tribute takes the form of historical and constructive reflection, in which diverse perspectives on Edwards's work and diverse forms of engagement with it supplement and correct one another. Our hope is that these essays will serve both to generate interest in Edwards's work among those who are unfamiliar with him, and to advance the discussion of central issues in theological and religious ethics. In this introductory essay, we will offer some reflections on Edwards's general significance for contemporary ethics, followed by a closer examination of his main texts and a brief summary of the essays collected here.     

Spirituality in Christian Transhumanism: Commentary on Cole-Turner,Green, and Cannon

Christian transhumanism is the growing movement in which Christians appropriate the transhumanist vision of human technological evolution in the twenty-first century for millennialist ends. In the April 2015 issue of Theology and Science, three Christian transhumanist theologians present their visions and arguments for why Christians should accept transhumanism. I draw upon the wisdom of age from the World War II generation. Their concerns about an erosion of trust that decreases quality of life guide my commentary on the theological papers. Identifying issues with vision, theology, values, character, messaging, and leadership, I present spirituality as potentially supporting future wisdom.     

Wittgenstein,Ethics and Basic Moral Certainty

Alice Crary claims that “the standard view of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics” is dominated by “inviolability interpretations”, which often underlie conservative readings of Wittgenstein. Crary says that such interpretations are “especially marked in connection with On Certainty”, where Wittgenstein is represented as holding that “our linguistic practices are immune to rational criticism, or inviolable”. Crary's own conception of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics, which I call the “intrinsically‐ethical reading”, derives from the influential New Wittgenstein school of exegesis, and is also espoused by James Edwards, Cora Diamond, and Stephen Mulhall. To my eyes, intrinsically‐ethical readings present a peculiar picture of ethics, which I endeavour to expose in Part I of the paper. In Part II I present a reading of On Certainty that Crary would call an “inviolability interpretation”, defend it against New Wittgensteinian critiques, and show that this kind of reading has nothing to do with ethical or political conservatism. I go on to show how Wittgenstein's observations on the manner in which we can neither question nor affirm certain states of affairs that are fundamental to our epistemic practices can be fruitfully extended to ethics. Doing so sheds light on the phenomenon that I call “basic moral certainty”, which constitutes the foundation of our ethical practices, and the scaffolding or framework of moral perception, inquiry, and judgement. The nature and significance of basic moral certainty will be illustrated through consideration of the strangeness of philosophers' attempts at explaining the wrongness of killing.     

理论和处境:汉语基督教伦理研究的基本思路探究

本文探究汉语基督教伦理研究的基本思路问题,特别关注具体处境中基督教价值的公共意义问题,论文包括:第一部分,考察1980年以来汉语基督教伦理研究的主要内容,总体上看,其中包括两大方面:一是对基本伦理概念(比如人性、爱的观念)及其与中国传统思想相关观念进行比照的研究,二是实践和具体社会处境的角度,包括从基督教角度对于中国基督徒的道德生活以及全球和本土范围的社会公共问题的研究;第二部分依据相关的基督教伦理研究成果,参照中国思想资源和当代社会的道德议题,反思汉语基督教研究的处境性问题并寻求重新阐释某些基督教教义的可能性.研究采用基督教伦理研究中的实在的和处境化的进路,将之放在一个特定的文化和社会背景下并考虑到其具体和当下的条件来展开对基督教伦理思想的论述.