关于开战正义观的批判性分析

在对战争伦理的研究中,开战正义的标准通常由六项原则组成,包括正当理由、合法权威、正当动机、成功前景、适当比例和最后手段.然而,除了正当理由与适当比例外,其他原则或是可以合并到这两项之中,或是有害无益,或者只不过是历史陈迹.因此,应当仅仅保留正当理由和适当比例原则,以此作为界定开战正义的标准.这两项原则还可以进一步推广,从而包含交战正义和战后正义的领域,从而发展出能涵盖不同战争阶段的道德理论.     

论正义产生的条件——从休谟到罗尔斯

休谟认为,正义只有在一定的条件(中等匮乏,自私的人性和大致相等的力量)下才会产生,在缺乏这些条件的地方,正义既不会产生也不会发挥任何作用.本文通过对休谟提出的三个条件的分析,认为休谟对正义条件的探讨有其合理之处,但也存在巨大的缺陷.     

马克思与罗尔斯论资本主义及市场的正义

马克思和罗尔斯似乎有着十分不同的正义观。马克思主张,正义概念的功能,在意识形态上表现为以主导生产模式所要求的操行,作为具有普遍约束性的律令。罗尔斯则主张,正义是社会制度的第一美德,它的法则可能被所有这样的人所认可:他们公正、合理地商讨的问题,是如何公平划分彼此之间在社会合作中的负担和利益。尽管体现在马克思和罗尔斯立场之间的种种重要不同仍然存在,但笔者认为,这两种正义观上显然不同的立场,是能够调和的。尽管受到黑格尔和康德的不同影响,马克思和罗尔斯的观点还是能显示出一致之处。在提出明确的正义政治概念时,罗尔斯认为,可以接受的正义原则,必须是在社会体制中能够实行的。这导致他的“康德式构成主义”,向黑格尔的观点靠近,在这一点上,马克思奠定了他对普遍的、社会先验的正义原则的拒斥。笔者认为,马克思和罗尔斯两人所追问的,都可以被看作是何种社会制度能够实现作为公平的正义原则。不过,其间仍有两点重要不同。首先,马克思憧憬的,似乎是一种超越休谟和罗尔斯所谓“正义环境”的社会,而对罗尔斯(2001,P177)来说,超越正义环境的社会则是乌托邦。其次,马克思认为,作为社会基础的市场关系应该被超越,因为这些市场关系天然地包含着生产者与生产的社会过程以及社会劳动产品的异化。虽然在超越正义环境的社会里,市场的消亡也许可能,罗尔斯却宣称,在要求必须公正解决竞争的任何社会里,市场消亡均不可能。笔者认为,如果将马克思对市场的拒绝,看作是从根本上拒绝“商品拜物教”,那么马克思和罗尔斯的立场就能调和。笔者的结论是,除了马克思关于未来无阶级社会概念中含有理想成分外,在资本主义及市场的正义观上,马克思和罗尔斯的立场相当接近。     

罗尔斯的正义战争观:一个批判性考察

罗尔斯的正义战争观,一是并未为其\"民主的和平观\"提供一种比较令人信服的证明,同时,他在证成其民主的和平观的过程中,在经验层面的论证方法和规范层面的论证方法之间进行较为随意的取舍,取舍的标准在于哪种论证方法有利于自己的论证;二是所使用的\"法外国家\"这一概念不甚恰当,对法外国家提出的战争理由并不是充分的;三是非常关注开战正义和作战正义,但是并未给予战后正义应有的重视,这也是当今关于正义战争观研究的一个普遍缺陷。     

正义与人性——休谟与罗尔斯的正义论的一种比较

休谟和罗尔斯拒斥形而上学,都认为可以从正义的主客观环境导引出正义原则。他们对人性的看法基本相同,这种相同成为理解他们的正义论的重要线索。休谟认为自利是建立正义的原初动机,以同情为基础的道德情感构成人们遵从正义的道德约束力;罗尔斯设想无知之幕中的代表者以追求最大基本善为动力寻求最合理的正义原则,以理性化的道德情感解释正义原则的稳定性。虽然这两种正义论对人性的具体解释存在不一致,但都采用了类似的自利-道德情感的思维框架。实际上,他们都是通过既定客观条件下的人性分析得出规范性的正义原则,简单化地处理影响人性和正义的客观因素,导致了两种正义论的共同的局限性。     

分配正义:重新反思罗尔斯对密尔的批评

罗尔斯虽然认为密尔是一个伟大的功利主义者,但也指出他的功利主义像其他 形态的功利主义一样存在致命的缺陷:为了实现功利最大化而忽略分配正义,特别是为了实 现功利最大化而牺牲自由。实际上,作为密尔功利主义首要原则的功利原则蕴含着分配正义 的要素,即功利原则要求平等地对待每个人,或者说每个人对幸福都拥有平等的权利。不仅 如此,作为其功利主义次级原则的两个正义原则与罗尔斯的自由原则和差别原则也非常相近 。密尔的功利主义正义理论具有罗尔斯的正义理论所不具备的优势:明显的历史性优 势以及有效处理相互冲突的自由的优势。     

论人对动物的正义义务——以罗尔斯为中心的讨论

在《正义论》中,罗尔斯委婉地表示,他的正义论不适用于人与动物的关系。围绕罗尔斯的动物正义遗产,老年罗尔斯派与青年罗尔斯派展开了激烈的争论。老年罗尔斯派捍卫罗尔斯的结论,否认人对动物的正义义务;罗兰兹等青年罗尔斯派则紧紧抓住罗尔斯思想的方法论精髓,通过重新阐释或重构罗尔斯的正义论,论证了人对动物负有的正义义务,并激活了动物正义的话题,使之成为20世纪末以来西方学术界的研究热点之一。纳斯鲍姆的以可行能力为基础的动物正义论、唐纳森和金里卡的以公民身份为基础的动物正义论、加纳尔的以利益为基础的动物正义论提供了与罗尔斯式动物正义论不同的思路;它们各有自己的理论优势,构成了动物正义的辩护联盟。发展和完善罗尔斯式的动物正义论,倡导各种动物正义理论之间的建设性对话,不仅能够更好地为人对动物负有的正义义务提供辩护,而且还能有效地拓展生态文明的文化空间,实现人与动物的和谐共生。     

从实体正义到程序正义:卢梭与罗尔斯契约正义观之比较

卢梭的契约正义观与罗尔斯的契约正义观在形式上有其相似之处。但由于他们各自所处的时代背景不同,其正义观的价值内核、论证方式及其实现途径都存在着重大的差别。从卢梭的契约正义观到罗尔斯的契约正义观的嬗变代表了西方正义论从实体正义向程序正义的转变,把握这一转变的趋向及其内在精神实质,对于丰富和完善当代中国和谐社会建设的理论和实践是大有裨益的。     

康德的道德哲学对罗尔斯正义理论的影响

康德的道德哲学深深影响到罗尔斯的正义理论,这不仅表现在宏观的理论结构、方法和价值旨趣上,还表现在一些微观的概念上,比如自律与定言命令等。罗尔斯的正义理论在关键的地方依赖康德的一些假定,但他对康德的继承又是创造性的,也是对康德理论疑难的一种澄清和解决。     

Just War Theory and the IRA

ABSTRACT The Irish Republican Army (IRA) sometimes claim that their violent actions are sanctioned by traditional just war doctrine. To what extent is this true? To answer this question it is necessary to have a clear grasp of the principles of just war and of the situation in Northern Ireland to which they are to be applied. This is done in the first sections, and it is then argued that just war sanctions some kinds of violence in Northern Ireland but only those of direct self-defence. Violence outside the borders of Northern Ireland or for the sake of Irish Unity is not justifiable. Consequently the IRA must be viewed, in terms of just war theory at any rate, as in principle illegitimate, even though some of their actions are defensible. Finally it is suggested that non-violence, after the pattern of Gandhi, while not required by justice might nevertheless be preferable.     

The Dualism of Modern Just War Theory

Philosophia - Conventional modern just war theory is fundamentally incoherent. On the one hand, the theory contains a theory of public war wherein ethical responsibility for the justice of war...     

The Metaethical Paradox of Just War Theory

The traditional requirements upon the waging of a just war are ostensibly independent, but in actual practice each tenet is subject ultimately to the interpretation of a legitimate authority, whose declaration becomes the necessary and sufficient condition. While just war theory presupposes that some acts are absolutely wrong, it also implies that the killing of innocents can be rendered permissible through human decree. Nations are conventionally delimited, and leaders are conventionally appointed. Any group of people could band together to form a nation, and any person could, in principle, be appointed the leader of any nation. Because the just war approach assumes absolutism while implying relativism, the stance is paradoxical and hence rationally untenable.     

The Logical Structure of Just War Theory

A survey of just war theory literature reveals the existence of quite different lists of principles. This apparent arbitrariness raises a number of questions: What is the relation between ad bellum and in bello principles? Why are there so many of the former and so few of the latter? What order is there among the various principles? To answer these questions, I first draw on some recent work by Jeff McMahan to show that ad bellum and in bello principles are not, as often portrayed, independent—the justice of conduct in war largely presupposes the justice of the recourse to war. Undermining this independence claim is one important step toward revealing the unified logical structure of just war theory. I then argue that we can see the dependence of the jus in bello upon the jus ad bellum, not just in the content of certain principles, but also in the structure of the two sets of principles: I construct a one-to-one mapping between ad bellum and in bello principles. In doing so, I argue also that the shared structure successfully finds place for the questions central to the evaluation of the morality of war: what is a sufficient provocation to use force, what objectives may be sought by force, why or for what ends, who has authority to decide to use force, and when or in what circumstances? Despite variations in expression, the theory allows for a coherent and comprehensive evaluation of morality in warfare.     

Proportionality, Just War Theory and Weapons Innovation

Just wars are supposed to be proportional responses to aggression: the costs of war must not greatly exceed the benefits. This proportionality principle raises a corresponding ‘interpretation problem’: what are the costs and benefits of war, how are they to be determined, and a ‘measurement problem’: how are costs and benefits to be balanced? And it raises a problem about scope: how far into the future do the states of affairs to be measured stretch? It is argued here that weapons innovation always introduces costs, and that these costs cannot be determined in advance of going to war. Three examples, the atomic bomb, the AK-47 and the ancient Greek catapult, are given as examples. It is therefore argued that the proportionality principle is inapplicable prospectively. Some replies to the argument are discussed and rejected. Some more general defences of the proportionality principle are considered and also rejected. Finally, the significance of the argument for Just War Theory as a whole is discussed.     

The Just War Theory and the Ethical Governance of Research

This article analyses current trends in and future expectations of nanotechnology and other key enabling technologies for security as well as dual use nanotechnology from the perspective of the ethical Just War Theory (JWT), interpreted as an instrument to increase the threshold for using armed force for solving conflicts. The aim is to investigate the relevance of the JWT to the ethical governance of research. The analysis gives rise to the following results. From the perspective of the JWT, military research should be evaluated with different criteria than research for civil or civil security applications. From a technological perspective, the boundaries between technologies for civil and military applications are fuzzy. Therefore the JWT offers theoretical grounds for making clear distinctions between research for military, civil security and other applications that are not obvious from a purely technological perspective. Different actors bear responsibility for development of the technology than for resorting to armed force for solving conflicts or for use of weapons and military technologies in combat. Different criteria should be used for moral judgment of decisions made by each type of actor in each context. In addition to evaluation of potential consequences of future use of the weapons or military technologies under development, the JWT also prescribes ethical evaluation of the inherent intent and other foreseeable consequences of the development itself of new military technologies.     

The Principle of Double Effect and Just War Theory

Philosophia - The paper explores the relationship between the Principle of Double Effect (PDE) and Just War Theory (JWT), with emphasis on their relationship in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas....