道德建设三十年概论

回顾中国道德建设30年,其逻辑起点即是关于道德建设的科学定位。社会主义道德建设的战略地位,决定了它必须是推动中国特色社会主义现代化建设的道德建设,必须是促进全面改革和实行对外开放的道德建设,必须是适应社会主义初级阶段的道德建设。在邓小平德治思想的指引下,我国道德建设呈现四大战略创新。一是提出“以德治国”方略。二是实施公民道德建设纲要。三是树立社会主义荣辱观。四是道德建设融入社会主义核心价值体系。2008年,我们夺取了抗震救灾的重大胜利,成功举办了第29届北京奥运会,形成了“抗震救灾精神”与“奥运精神”。这两大精神是社会主义道德建设30年的最新成果。     

权利概念与当代中国道德建设研究

“权利”和权利观念的凸现,已经并将继续对社会伦理关系和道德建设产生深刻的影响,同时也必然会对我国伦理学研究和发展以巨大的推动,公民道德建设必须坚持权利与义务相统一的方针原则。     

论公民道德建设中的"以人为本"思想

公民道德建设必须坚持"以人为本"的指导思想,即公民道德建设要以多数人的现实道德状况为出发点;以提高人的素质,促进人的全面发展为着眼点;以培养公民成为自觉的道德主体,充分发挥公民的道德主体性为落脚点,使公民道德建设顺应时代的发展和进步.     

公民道德建设机制探讨

加强公民道德建设既是贯彻落实“以德治国”的重要思想 ,保证社会主义市场经济健康有序运行的需要 ,也是实现人的全面发展的客观要求。为了使公民道德建设取得实效 ,我们应当建立和完善道德灌输机制、注错习俗机制和道德接受机制。     

浅谈“敬业与奉献”

“敬业”在我国古代《礼记·学记》中就以“敬业乐群”明确的提了出来。宋朝朱熹说：“敬业”就是“专心致志以事其业”。“敬业”是忠于职守、精益求精、德艺双馨、遵守职业道德,“奉献”为克己奉公、服务社会,助人为乐,造福于人类。在《公民道德建设实施纲要》中将“敬业”、“奉献”作为公民道德规范,用来规范公民与职业的道德关系,规范公民与社会的道德关系,并引出公民对待他人的道德责任。     

关于公民道德建设的几个理论问题

为加强公民道德建设需要在理论上探讨和澄清一些问题 :当前社会主义道德体系和长期革命斗争与建设中形成的优良传统道德的关系 ;公民道德建设应当建立在社会主义经济基础之上 ,而非人性基础之上 ;公民道德建设需要对我国改革开放以来的道德理论状况做出正确的评价 ,以利完善社会主义道德体系     

首都公民道德建设的现状及对策

根据2012年底至2013年初对3100位市民进行的“首都公民道德形象”问卷调查,首都市民道德理想与十八大倡导的社会主义核心价值观高度吻合,爱国爱首都、诚实守信、友善、敬业等成为首都市民的人生价值追求,体现正能量的各类道德模范和先进人物被首都市民广泛认同.但也有一些市民认为,道德领域仍然存在一些突出问题.进一步的公民道德建设需要从以下几个方面入手:(1)深入开展中国梦和社会主义核心价值观学习教育;(2)针对群众反映的突出问题,持续推进公共文明引导工程;(3)加强诚信体系建设;(4)发挥法律对道德建设的保障支持作用;(5)进一步扩大精神文明建设舆论宣传影响力和覆盖面.     

用社会主义荣辱观指导公民道德建设

以“八荣八耻”为主要内容的社会主义荣辱观,澄清了社会生活中模糊的价值观念,明确了我国经济社会发展中的主流价值导向;抓住了公民道德建设中的核心问题;从树立正确的荣辱观入手,指导公民道德建设活动。树立社会主义荣辱观重在实践,需要全体公民切实的道德努力,尤其是党员干部要真正发挥示范和表率作用。     

论公民道德建设的内在规律性

公民道德建设取得实效的关键在于认识和把握其内在规律性。道德内化是贯穿于公民道德建设全过程的一个不以人的意志为转移的客观规律 ,它支配着公民道德的形成和发展。道德内化规律发生作用的过程是一个他律和自律、受动性和主动性有机统一的过程 ,并呈现出阶段性的特点。所以 ,在公民道德建设的过程中 ,我们应当把他律机制和自律机制、灌输机制和接受机制、先进性要求和广泛性要求有机地结合起来。     

《公民道德建设实施纲要》颁布以来的理论与实践评析

《公民道德建设实施纲要》颁布实施十几年来,在实践上公民道德建设活动异彩纷呈,文明道德之花竞相开放;在理论上多学科联动,中国特色的公民道德建设理论体系正在形成。但无论在道德建设实践中还是理论研究上都还有很多问题和不足,它需要党和政府、各种社会组织和广大民众的广泛参与,其中学术理论界应着重从三个方面做出努力:进一步加强相关理论研究,为公民道德建设奠定良好的理论基础;进一步加强实践调研,增强推进公民道德建设的针对性;积极探索将道德建设制度化、法律化的途径和机制。     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Judgement and Moral Motivation

I criticize an important argument of Michael Smith, from his recent book The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith's argument, if sound, would undermine one form of moral externalism – that which insists that moral judgements only contingently motivate their authors. Smith claims that externalists must view good agents as always prompted by the motive of duty, and that possession of such a motive impugns the goodness of the agent. I argue (i) that externalists do not (ordinarily) need to assign moral agents such as a motive, and (ii) that possession of this motive, when properly understood, is morally admirable.     

Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth

People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.