读心的比较研究：非人灵长类与人类在心理理论上的异同点及其解释

利用非人灵长类开展比较研究是探索心理理论本质、起源和进化动因的重要途经。大量实证研究显示非人灵长类可以表现出一些基础心理理论成分, 包括联合注意、意图理解和一级观点采择, 这表明心理理论在灵长类动物的进化谱系中具有进化连续性。然而, 非人灵长类无法像人类一样达成二级观点采择和错误信念理解, 潜心智化假说、替代表征假说、最小限度心理理论假说和意识关系假说试图对此差异进行解释。尽管视角与具体内容不同, 但这些假说都强调, 非人灵长类无法对其他个体关于外部世界的心理信念形成表征, 信念表征是非人灵长类与人类读心能力的重要分界点。未来研究需要重点澄清共享意图、语言机制以及社会生态环境因素与心理理论产生的相互影响作用。     

非人灵长类的抑制控制能力

抑制控制能力是指个体为实现特定目标对干扰性优势反应进行抑制的能力,是一种高级认知能力。该文综述了对非人灵长类抑制控制能力的研究,从抑制控制能力的行为表现,生理机制及其发生、发展几个方面进行了阐述,提供了一个从演化的角度理解人类的抑制控制能力的视角。     

人类数能力的演化基础——数能力比较研究的启示

人类的数能力可以发展到很高的抽象水平,但大量研究表明,人类婴儿和非人灵长类也具有基本的数表征和数推理能力。文章从表征内容和表征形式两个方面系统地比较了人类婴儿和非人灵长类的数能力,并对比了成人和非人灵长类数表征的生理基础。人类和非人灵长类在这三方面存在的相似性揭示了他们可能享有相同的数表征系统。在今后的研究中,进一步探讨这两者相似的数表征核心系统,可以加深我们对人类数能力起源和本质的理解     

儿童早期心理洞察力的发展─—关于儿童社会认知的又一个研究方向

关于儿童心理洞察力发展的研究开始于８０年代初期,心理学家将个体认识自己和他人心理状态的系统性知识结构统称为个体的“心态理论”（ｔｈｅｏｒｙｏｆｍｉｎｄ）模式。在这个模式中包含着人的各种社会心理因素,如思想、信念、愿望、意图、情感等,各因素间里逻辑性联系,该模式为人的行为提供一种因果性解释机制。“心态理论”模式的发展对儿童社会认知、适应性行为以及元认知等方面的发展都具有重要促进作用。该研究涉及许多具体方面,本文主要提及下述几方面的研究：儿童早期对情绪的理解、儿童早期对伪误言行的理解以及儿童孤独症的表现等。大部分研究发现,３—４岁是儿童早期心理洞察力发展的重要年龄。     

儿童对假装中的心理表征及意图的理解

心理表征和意图是假装中两种最重要的心理成分,关于年幼儿童是否能理解假装中的这两种心理成分,研究者们得出了不尽相同的结论。一种观点认为3岁儿童就能理解到假装中的心理层面(心理表征、意图);另一种观点则认为儿童到了6岁都仅仅把假装理解为一种外表上看起来像某物的行为,并不能理解到假装中的心理层面(心理表征、意图),而恰恰对假装中的心理层面的理解才是假装理解的关键方面。这些争论可能与测试问题的推论方向与提问方式、对抑制控制能力的要求、假装动作与心理状态的平衡、任务情景与现实生活情景的联系、实验材料呈现方式等方面的差异有关。未来研究可以从结合执行功能、区分假装主体和假装旁观者、采用内隐的测试方法、关注与假装相关的其他能力的发展等角度,对儿童理解假装中的心理表征和意图这一问题进行深入研究。     

自我-他人决策差异：问题、研究与思考

目前关于自我-他人决策差异的研究在采用的任务、得到的发现及理论解释上均存在诸多矛盾或不一致的地方, 且缺乏对此种现象深层心理机制的探讨。虽然一些研究者试图用心理距离假设来解释相关结果, 但由于对心理距离的实验操纵过于简单, 难以形成解释力较强的理论模型。近年来我们的一系列研究发现：得失情境下自我-他人决策差异存在不对称性; 直接操纵心理距离比操纵决策者角色和社会距离对诱发自我-他人决策差异更有效; 决策者个体的自尊水平影响自我-他人决策差异。未来的研究需要进一步探讨自我-他人心理距离的本质、决策者角色转换引起的心理距离变化及自我-他人决策差异的脑机制等问题。     

儿童关于意图的二级心理状态的理解与归于权威人物的道德评价

用设置故事情境的方法研究了儿童关于意图的二级心理状态的理解与归于权威人物的道德评价的关系,结果表明:儿童关于意图的二级心理状态的理解影响儿童归于权威人物老师的道德评价,且存在年龄差异。5岁儿童已经能够认识到老师是否知道行为者的行为意图影响老师对行为者行为的道德评价,但5岁儿童的认识尚不够深刻,随着儿童年龄的增长,这种认识渐趋稳定成熟。权威人物的道德评价影响儿童关于意图的二级心理状态的理解,这种理解同时受到行为者行为结果的影响且存在年龄差异。     

生活事件对情感和行为的影响：理论比较与启示

关于生活事件对个体情感反应和行为选择的影响研究, 均试图从不同生活事件和行为决策关系的角度对个体的影响机制进行解释, 但不同理论之间存在争议。行为/经济理论认为人“绝对理性”, 而平均/累加模型、峰-终定律和心理账户认为人“有限理性”。详细比较发现, 各理论在解释的视角、研究方法的选择、生活事件的界定等方面均有不同。未来研究应围绕理论之间的鉴别与整合、生活事件属性与个体属性之间的交互影响以及研究方法的多元化等方面展开。     

儿童早期心理洞察力的发展:关于儿童社会认知的又一个研究方向

关于儿童心理洞察力发展的研究开始于８０年代初期,心理学家将个体认知自己的他人人心理状态的系统性知识结构统称为个体的“心理理论”模式。在这个模式中包含着人的各种社会心理因素,如思想,信念,愿意、意图,情感等,各因素间呈逻辑性联系,该模式为人的行为提供一种因果性解释机制。     

4岁儿童对他人记忆的评判与错误信念理解的关系

从观点采择的角度考察儿童对他人记忆的评判及其与错误信念理解的关系。与他人分享记忆时,个体需要同时处理自我与他人对过去的表征和看法;而要顺利完成错误信念任务,个体需要同时加工自我的真实信念与他人的错误信念。因此个体对他人记忆的评判能力可能会与其对错误信念的理解相关。40名4岁儿童完成一系列错误信念任务和评判他人记忆是否正确任务,情境包括视觉、意图解释和情绪解释。结果表明,控制年龄、语言和记忆能力等因素后,被试评判他人记忆的成绩仍然可以预测其对错误信念的理解。这些结果为幼儿在回忆叙述中谈及他人越多,其心理理论越好提供了进一步的证据和可能的解释     

The role of executive control in tool use

Comparing cognitive functions between humans and nonhuman primates is helpful for understanding human tool use. We comment on the latest insights from comparative research on executive control functions. Based on our own work, we discuss how even a mental function in which non-human primates outperform humans might have played a key role in the development of tool use.     

Tufted capuchin monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Cebus apella</Emphasis>) show understanding of human attentional states when requesting food held by a human

Researchers have investigated to what extent non-human primates understand others’ attentional states, as this ability is considered an important prerequisite for theory of mind. However, previous studies using food requesting tasks have failed to show that non-human primates attribute perception to others as a function of their attentional states. One possible reason is that food requesting tasks may require subjects not only to take into account an experimenter’s attentional state but also to direct it toward the food. The present study tested tufted capuchin monkeys’ (Cebus apella) understanding of others’ attentional states in a food requesting task. In the first situation, monkeys were required only to attract an experimenter’s attention. In the second situation, the monkeys were required to both attract the experimenter’s attention and direct it toward food on a table. The results revealed that capuchin monkeys showed evidence of understanding the experimenter’s attentional variations only in the former condition. This suggests that previous tasks, requiring referential gestures, lacking in most non-human primates, failed to reveal sensitivity to human attentional states because the subjects might not have understood the requesting situation. In conclusion, capuchin monkeys can understand variations in others’ attentional states, although this ability appears limited compared to what is seen in humans.     

7～11岁儿童失言理解及与母亲教养方式的关系

采用失言任务和改编后的教养方式问卷探讨7~11岁儿童心理理论的发展及其与母亲教养方式的相关。结果表明,在学龄期,儿童在不同层面上对失言的理解能力仍在提高,高年级时已超出单一维度。7岁儿童对包含意图的信念理解与母亲的"过度偏爱"显著负相关;8岁儿童对包含意图的信念理解与母亲的"惩罚和严厉"显著负相关。结果提示在某些年龄阶段,儿童心理理论的发展可能与母亲特定的教养方式有关。     

婴儿心理理论的发展:表现和机制

婴儿心理理论发展研究是探索人类社会认知起源、发生和发展的重要领域.从联合注意、情绪理解、意图理解、愿望理解和错误信念理解等方面分析了几个月至3岁左右的婴儿心理理论发生和发展的研究现状.为了探讨3岁以下婴儿心理理论的发展过程,研究者发展了一些适合婴儿语言和行为发展特征的非言语和言语测试任务,包括非言语自发—反应错误信念任务、言语自发—反应错误信念任务,同时也采用眼动技术和事件相关电位技术来考察心理理论发展水平和发展机制.婴儿心理理论的发生和发展在不同测试任务上表现出一定的年龄特征.这与认知功能(如语言、执行功能)的发展、环境因素(如家庭、同伴、文化)以及神经系统发育有关.也有一些最新研究从心理理论发生和发展的基因、激素水平进行了探讨.最后提出了该领域未来研究可以进一步探讨的问题.     

Sequential learning in non-human primates

Sequential learning plays a role in a variety of common tasks, such as human language processing, animal communication, and the learning of action sequences. In this article, we investigate sequential learning in non-human primates from a comparative perspective, focusing on three areas: the learning of arbitrary, fixed sequences; statistical learning; and the learning of hierarchical structure. Although primates exhibit many similarities to humans in their performance on sequence learning tasks, there are also important differences. Crucially, non-human primates appear to be limited in their ability to learn and represent the hierarchical structure of sequences. We consider the evolutionary implications of these differences and suggest that limitations in sequential learning may help explain why non-human primates lack human-like language.     

Theory of mind in nonhuman primates

Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?," it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as "want" and "know." Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distinguish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses conditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept "see." Commentators are invited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.     

‘Theory of mind’ in animals: ways to make progress

Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a ‘theory of mind’ in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between ‘mind readers’ and ‘behavior readers’, that results that seem to indicate ‘theory of mind’ may come from studies that are insufficiently controlled, and that our own intuitive biases may lead us to interpret behavior more ‘cognitively’ than is necessary. The merits of each claim and suggested solution are weighed. The conclusion is that while it is true that existing setups cannot conclusively demonstrate ‘theory of mind’ in non-human animals, focusing on this fact is unlikely to be productive. Instead, the more interesting question is how sophisticated their social reasoning can be, whether it is about ‘unobservable inner experiences’ or not. Therefore, it is important to address concerns about the setup and interpretation of specific experiments. To alleviate the impact of intuitive biases, various strategies have been proposed in the literature. These include a deeper understanding of associative learning, a better knowledge of the limited ‘theory of mind’ humans actually use, and thinking of animal cognition in an embodied, embedded way; that is, being aware that constraints outside of the brain, and outside of the body, may naturally predispose individuals to produce behavior that looks smart without requiring complex cognition. To enable this kind of thinking, a powerful methodological tool is advocated: Computational modeling, namely agent-based modeling and, particularly, cognitive modeling. By explicitly simulating the rules and representations that underlie animal performance on specific tasks, it becomes much easier to look past one’s own biases and to see what cognitive processes might actually be occurring.     

Origins of spatial, temporal and numerical cognition: Insights from comparative psychology

Contemporary comparative cognition has a large repertoire of animal models and methods, with concurrent theoretical advances that are providing initial answers to crucial questions about human cognition. What cognitive traits are uniquely human? What are the species-typical inherited predispositions of the human mind? What is the human mind capable of without certain types of specific experiences with the surrounding environment? Here, we review recent findings from the domains of space, time and number cognition. These findings are produced using different comparative methodologies relying on different animal species, namely birds and non-human great apes. The study of these species not only reveals the range of cognitive abilities across vertebrates, but also increases our understanding of human cognition in crucial ways.