Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning

The present studies investigate how the intentions of third parties influence judgments of moral responsibility for other agents who commit immoral acts. Using cases in which an agent acts under some situational constraint brought about by a third party, we ask whether the agent is blamed less for the immoral act when the third party intended for that act to occur. Study 1 demonstrates that third‐party intentions do influence judgments of blame. Study 2 finds that third‐party intentions only influence moral judgments when the agent's actions precisely match the third party's intention. Study 3 shows that this effect arises from changes in participants' causal perception that the third party was controlling the agent. Studies 4 and 5, respectively, show that the effect cannot be explained by changes in the distribution of blame or perceived differences in situational constraint faced by the agent.     

青少年网络不道德行为与父母教养方式的关系——道德脱离、责任心、道德同一性的中介作用

研究采用问卷法,对764名青少年进行测试,用结构方程模型检验了教养方式、责任心、道德同一性、道德脱离和网络不道德行为之间的关系模型。结果表明,拒绝型教养方式通过责任心、道德同一性和道德脱离的中介来间接影响网络不道德行为。责任心可以直接作用于网络不道德行为,也可以通过道德脱离的中介来影响网络不道德行为。道德同一性只能通过道德脱离来影响不道德行为。     

When actions speak volumes: The role of inferences about moral character in outrage over racial bigotry

Inferences about moral character may often drive outrage over symbolic acts of racial bigotry. Study 1 demonstrates a theoretically predicted dissociation between moral evaluations of an act and the person who carries out the act. Although Americans regarded the private use of a racial slur as a less blameworthy act than physical assault, use of a slur was perceived as a clearer indicator of poor moral character. Study 2 highlights the dynamic interplay between moral judgments of acts and persons, demonstrating that first making person judgments can bias subsequent act judgments. Privately defacing a picture of Martin Luther King, Jr. led to greater moral condemnation of the agent than of the act itself only when the behavior was evaluated first. When Americans first made character judgments, symbolically defacing a picture of the civil rights leader was significantly more likely to be perceived as an immoral act. These studies support a person‐centered account of outrage over bigotry and demonstrate that moral evaluations of acts and persons converge and diverge under theoretically meaningful circumstances. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

东方人在不道德行为之后会做些什么

道德情绪对个体的行为模式具有重要的影响。本文通过唤起个体的不道德情绪(或道德情绪),然后分别对其进行字词偏好、物品选择和颜色喜好等测验,来探讨东方人在不道德情绪状态下会产生什么行为。结果发现：处于不道德情绪状态下的个体,对含有掩饰意义的行为动作、物品具有心理和行为上的接近性,且经过掩饰行为(整理动作)之后,这些个体对白色就产生了一定程度的偏好,而无整理动作(休息)的个体则更偏爱黑色。这表明,不同于西方个体的道德洁净行为,东方人身上出现的是一种道德掩饰行为。     

道德“沾光”效应：道德评价对道德自我知觉及道德行为的影响

人们喜欢关注道德事件并表达自己的立场。以往研究发现回忆自己(而非他人)的道德行为能影响个体的道德自我知觉和道德行为。本研究关注参与道德评价是否会对个体的道德自我和道德行为产生影响。2个研究共同发现：(1)存在道德“沾光”效应：评价支持他人的道德事件，或反对他人的不道德事件，能提升个体的道德自我知觉；(2)道德评价通过提升道德自我知觉，进一步增加个体的道德行为。     

道德概念垂直空间隐喻的心理现实性及双向映射

研究以大学生为被试,通过三个实验考察道德概念垂直空间隐喻的心理现实性及双向映射。实验1采用面孔图片和道德词汇的匹配记忆任务发现,道德词出现在上方时,被试对词语和面孔的匹配再认率更高;不道德词出现在下方时,被试对词语和面孔的匹配再认正确率更高。结果证实了道德概念的垂直空间隐喻的心理现实性。实验2通过道德评价任务发现,被试倾向于把空间上方出现的面孔评价为更加道德,把在空间下方的面孔评价为更加不道德,证实了空间信息对道德评价的影响。实验3采用带有空间位置信息的词语记忆任务。结果表明,在位置判断任务中,被试更多地将道德词判断为在上方出现过,更多地将不道德词判断为在下方出现过。结果显示词语的道德色彩影响了空间信息判断。研究结论:传统道德概念垂直空间隐喻存在心理现实性;道德概念和空间概念之间存在双向映射。     

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.     

The automatic and co-occurring activation of multiple social inferences

People make a variety of automatic inferences when observing others' actions. These include inferences about stable dispositions as well as transitory goal states and social situations. However, models of social inference have rarely considered whether different types of automatic inferences can co-occur. We present three experiments in which participants were incidentally exposed to texts depicting behaviors that afforded inferences about actors' traits and the social situations these actors were experiencing. Results from lexical decision and probe-recognition tasks revealed heightened activation of both trait and situational inferences; furthermore, this co-occurring activation was spontaneous, unconscious, and independent of processing resources or specific impression-formation goals. A fourth experiment extended these findings by showing that when participants were asked to make deliberate attributional judgments of the same set of behaviors, typical goal-directed biases reflecting the selection of either trait or situational interpretations emerged. Implications for social inference processes are discussed.     

Gradual escalation: The role of continuous commitments in perceptions of guilt

Many immoral acts are the result of gradually escalating behaviors. The present work focuses on observers of immoral acts and the role of continuous commitments in shaping their perceptions of another person's guilt. Across four studies investigating how gradual escalations affect moral judgments, participants read a scenario describing an instance of immoral behavior that gradually built in severity. In Study 1, female participants perceived a perpetrator as less guilty when his behavior gradually escalated to rape after explicitly committing to the appropriateness his initial morally ambiguous behavior. The findings from Study 2 suggest that inducing a categorical mindset can counteract this reduction in perceptions of guilt. Study 3 illustrated the power of the categorical versus continuous mindset by examining how a categorical (versus a continuous mindset) impacts perceptions of guilt even in the absence of gradually escalating behavior. Finally, Study 4 extended the findings from the prior studies to a sample of both men and women and investigated the effect of the mindset manipulation on perceptions. Together, these studies demonstrate that the potency of gradual escalations to induce acquiescence to immoral behavior may inhere in their ability to create initial commitments to and continuous perceptions of morally ambiguous behavior.     

Benefiting from misfortune: when harmless actions are judged to be morally blameworthy

Dominant theories of moral blame require an individual to have caused or intended harm. However, the current four studies demonstrate cases where no harm is caused or intended, yet individuals are nonetheless deemed worthy of blame. Specifically, individuals are judged to be blameworthy when they engage in actions that enable them to benefit from another's misfortune (e.g., betting that a company's stock will decline or that a natural disaster will occur). Evidence is presented suggesting that perceptions of the actor's wicked desires are responsible for this phenomenon. It is argued that these results are consistent with a growing literature demonstrating that moral judgments are often the product of evaluations of character in addition to evaluations of acts.     

An investigation of the link between attributional judgments and stereotype‐based judgments

Three experiments investigated the relationship between the attributions made for stereotype‐relevant behavior and stereotype‐based judgments. In Experiment 1 participants were presented with a short scenario describing a single stereotypic behavior and were given either a situational or a dispositional explanation for the behavior, before evaluating both the target and the group as a whole on stereotype‐based dimensions. As predicted, participants given a situational explanation for the stereotypic behavior described in the target and the group in less stereotype‐based terms than did baseline participants. In Experiment 2 and 3 participants were presented with a short scenario describing either a single stereotypic or counter‐stereotypic behavior but were asked to provide an explanation for the behavior, rather than being given one. As predicted, stereotypic behavior was attributed more strongly to dispositional than situational factors and counter‐stereotypic behavior more strongly to situational than dispositional factors. No overall moderation of group‐based beliefs relative to baseline was seen in either experiment. Correlations between the attributions and stereotypic‐based judgments did, however, show a relationship between the strength of the attributions made for the behaviors and stereotype‐based judgements. Implications for the moderation of stereotype‐based judgments are discussed. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intervening causation and the mitigation of responsibility for harm doing II. The role of limited mental capacities

The present study investigated (i) the conditions under which the proximal cause of an event affects judgments of a distal cause, (ii) the capacities persons need to be held responsible for their actions, and (iii) the relationship between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution. Subjects read about situations in which an initial act, in combination with a later behavior by a second person, produced harm. The age and mental state of the second person were varied. It was found that cause and blame assigned to the initial action was greater when the second person was a child or mentally disturbed, as compared to a sane adult. Causal and moral responsibility were related to the understanding, reasoning capacity, and ability to control behavior of the person judged. Finally, support was obtained for an entailment model of the relations between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution.     

Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest

I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A second argument is based on the observation that even when a blameworthy wrongdoer could have responded to moral considerations, this is often not relevant to her blameworthiness. Finally, I argue against the view that because blame communicates moral demands, only agents who can be reached by such communication are properly blamed. I contend that a person victimized by a wrongdoer with an impaired capacity for moral understanding may protest her victimization in a way that counts as a form of moral blame even though it does not primarily express a moral demand or attempt to initiate moral dialogue.     

饥无食寒无衣则乱无治:社会保障感受与不道德行为的关系

从社会心理学的角度探索社会保障感受与不道德行为的关系,及焦虑在其中的作用。用三个实验对假设进行检验,实验1和实验2探索社会保障感受对不道德行为的影响; 实验3则进一步探索焦虑在其中的作用。回归分析表明,社会保障感受可显著预测人们的不道德行为,社会保障感受越低人们的不道德行为越多; 焦虑在其中起中介作用,低社会保障感受会促进焦虑的产生,继而增加不道德行为。研究从社会心理学角度探索并证实了社会保障感受引发不道德行为的微观心理机制,拓宽了社会保障的伦理道德价值研究视域,为未来从社会心理学的角度研究社会保障与伦理道德的关系提供了可资借鉴的思路。     

宽以待己，严于律人：道德伪善的双加工机制研究

道德伪善是指个体对同一道德违规行为进行评判时,对自己宽松而对他人严苛的现象。双加工理论认为道德伪善是个体对自身道德违规行为有意识辩护以维护道德自我形象的结果。为此,本研究通过两个行为实验考察直觉思维和分析思维对道德伪善的影响。结果发现,分析性思维可易化道德伪善,直觉性思维无此作用。实验果支持道德伪善的双加工机制模型,道德自利性行为并非自动化的反应,需要认知努力和分析推理的参与。     

道德失调的自我调节策略

个体因为自己或内群体成员的不道德行为而面临道德失调,为了维持积极的道德自我形象,不得不采取一系列道德自我调节策略以减少道德失调。在道德决策阶段,通过道德许可来缓冲预期的道德失调。在行为评价和责任归因阶段,通过道德规范的动机性遗忘来避免道德觉察,也可以通过道德切换、去道德化、道德推脱等认知策略将不道德行为合理化。在反馈调节阶段,通过道德补偿、道德清洗等行为策略以恢复道德自我形象或通过道德掩饰来避免道德形象损失。最后探讨了道德自我调节过程的系统性、灵活性特点及其不利后果,并提出了未来可能的研究方向。     

道德概念净脏隐喻及其对道德判断的影响

通过3个实验考察道德概念净脏隐喻的心理现实性以及道德概念净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻对道德判断的影响及其差异。结果表明：（1）道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,即被试在洁净背景上判断道德词的反应时更快,在肮脏背景上判断不道德词的反应时更快。（2）当将道德两难故事呈现在肮脏背景上时,相比于呈现在洁净背景上,被试更容易将故事主人公的行为判断为不道德,表现出隐喻一致性效应。（3）相比于肮脏自身启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事主人公的行为判断为更加不道德,表现出隐喻补偿性效应。（4）相比于洁净背景启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加严厉;相比于肮脏背景启动,被试在肮脏自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加宽松。研究结果证明,道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻均影响个体的道德判断,并且二者对道德判断的影响不同。     

Priming virtue: Forgiveness and justice elicit divergent moral judgments among religious individuals

Forgiveness and justice are related virtues but they may exert divergent effects on moral judgments. Participants were primed with either forgiveness or retributive justice and made moral judgments of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that religious participants recalling an experience of forgiveness reported more favorable attitudes toward moral transgressors than did those recalling an experience of retributive justice. Experiment 2 replicated the priming effect on moral judgments using a subtle prime of either forgiveness or justice (word search) and a different dependent measure. Experiment 3 employed a more religiously diverse sample and revealed the moderating role of religious commitment. These results suggest that salience of forgiveness leads to more favorable evaluations of moral transgressors compared to retributive justice for religious individuals.     

Using Insights from Applied Moral Psychology to Promote Ethical Behavior Among Engineering Students and Professional Engineers

In this essay I discuss a novel engineering ethics class that has the potential to significantly decrease the likelihood that students (and professionals) will inadvertently or unintentionally act unethically in the future. This class is different from standard engineering ethics classes in that it focuses on the issue of why people act unethically and how students (and professionals) can avoid a variety of hurdles to ethical behavior. I do not deny that it is important for students to develop cogent moral reasoning and ethical decision-making as taught in traditional college-level ethics classes, but as an educator, I aim to help students apply moral reasoning in specific, real-life situations so they are able to make ethical decisions and act ethically in their academic careers and after they graduate. Research in moral psychology provides evidence that many seemingly irrelevant situational factors affect the moral judgment of most moral agents and frequently lead agents to unintentionally or inadvertently act wrongly. I argue that, in addition to teaching college students moral reasoning and ethical decision-making, it is important to: 1. Teach students about psychological and situational factors that affect people’s ethical judgments/behaviors in the sometimes stressful, emotion-laden environment of the workplace; 2. Guide students to engage in critical reflection about the sorts of situations they personally might find ethically challenging before they encounter those situations; and 3. Provide students with strategies to help them avoid future unethical behavior when they encounter these situations in school and in the workplace.     

Testing Credit and Blame Attributions as Explanation for Choices under Ambiguity

People make decisions every day based on their estimates of the chances of various events occurring. By their very nature, these subjective estimates are less certain, and thus more ambiguous, than objective probabilities such as those associated with roulette wheels or lotteries. In two experimental studies, we investigate choices between bets on the decision maker′s knowledge versus bets on a lottery with the same chance of winning. In Study 1, we partially replicate the Heath and Tversky (1991) finding that subjects have an increasing preference for betting on their own knowledge over the matched-chance lottery as probability increases. We also discover a significant minority of subjects who exhibit the opposite pattern and prefer the lottery as probability increases. In addition, we explicitly test the subjects′ attributions about the credit they would feel for a win and the blame they would feel for a loss, and these attributions do provide some explanation for their choice behavior. In Study 2, we manipulate knowledge and accountability, in an attempt to heighten the attributions of credit and blame, and we replicate the findings.