Beliefs about emotion’s malleability influence state emotion regulation

The current study examined how manipulating information about whether emotions are fixed or malleable influences the extent to which individuals engage in different emotion regulation strategies. We hypothesized that fixed, compared to malleable, emotion beliefs would produce less effort invested in emotion regulation. Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions emphasizing that emotions are malleable or fixed, and then completed an autobiographical negative emotion induction. Participants reported seven different emotion regulation strategies they used during the recall task. Participants in the fixed emotion condition, compared to those in the malleable emotion condition, reported engaging significantly less in self-blame and perspective-taking. They engaged somewhat, but not significantly, less in all of the other strategies, except acceptance. These results suggest that emotion malleability beliefs can be experimentally manipulated and systematically influence subsequent emotion regulatory behavior. Implications for affective science and mental health are discussed.     

Is guilt an emotion?

Abstract

When unequivocal examples of emotion adjectives occur in the linguistic context of “being” (e.g. being angry) they can be seen to refer to emotions as readily as when they occur in the linguistic context of “feeling” (e.g. feeling angry). This is not true of poor 'or non-examples of emotion words. A psycholinguistic analysis of this phenomenon is proposed, in the light of which it is suggested that words such as “abandoned” and “guilty” do not refer to emotions. The possibility that the word “guilty” has a distinct emotional sense meaning “feeling guilty” is discussed, and the implications of this proposal for theories of emotions are examined. Also discussed are the implications of the inclusion of poor or non-examples of emotions in lists of “basic” emotions. Data are presented indicating that many of the states that emotion theorists have included as emotions, and in some cases as “basic” emotions, are not generally rated as such, and that they fail to exhibit the patterns using the feel-be test that characterise unequivocal examples. It is suggested that a problem in delimiting the domain of theories of emotions may reside in a confusion between emotions on the one hand, and their typical causes and concomitants on the other.     

Putting motion in emotion: Do dynamic presentations increase preschooler's recognition of emotion?

In prior research, preschoolers were surprisingly poor at naming the emotion purportedly signaled by prototypical facial expressions—when shown as static images. To determine whether this poor performance is due to the use of static stimuli, rather than dynamic, we presented preschoolers (3-5 years) with facial expressions as either static images or dynamic audiovisual clips. Dynamic clips presented face alone (Study 1, N = 48) or face, body movement, and vocal intonation (Study 2, N = 72). Contrary to expectations, dynamic presentation did not increase children's naming of the emotion in either study and decreased it in Study 1.     

Teachers’ emotions and emotion management: integrating emotion regulation theory with emotional labor research

While the similarities between emotion regulation (Gross in J Personal Soc Psychol 74:224–237, 1998a) and emotional labor (Hochschild in The managed heart: commercialization of human feeling. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983) have been theoretically discussed, empirical research on their relation is lacking. We examined the relations between the two constructs as well as their relations with teachers’ discrete emotions in a sample of 189 secondary school teachers. The results showed that reappraisal correlated positively with deep acting, whereas suppression correlated positively with surface acting. The findings further suggest that reappraisal and deep acting are linked to experiencing positive emotions, whereas suppression and surface acting are linked to experiencing negative emotions. However, there also were some differences in how emotion regulation and emotional labor were related to teachers’ discrete emotional experiences. Specifically, reappraisal and deep acting strategies were positively related to enjoyment; in addition, deep acting was negatively related to negative emotions such as anxiety, anger, and frustration. By contrast, suppression and surface acting strategies were positively associated with negative emotions (i.e., suppression with anxiety; surface acting with anxiety, anger, and frustration), and surface acting was negatively associated with the positive emotion enjoyment. Implications for integrating research on teachers’ emotion regulation and emotional labor are discussed.     

Is tenderness a basic emotion?

The article presents the case to consider tenderness a basic emotion, using the criteria proposed by Ekman (in Handbook of cognition and emotion, Wiley, England, 1999). The first part of the article reviews the relationship between tenderness and the related concepts of love and empathy. The next section reviews evidence concerning whether tenderness meets some of Ekman’s criteria. The last section reports an experiment testing whether tenderness meets Ekman’s criterion of distinct subjective experience. Participants watched scenes designed to induce different emotions. Results showed that a scene could induce high levels of tenderness and low levels of joy if that scene also induced high levels of sadness. These results suggest that the subjective experience of tenderness is distinct from that of joy.     

Is energy expenditure in emotion regulation dependent on individual differences and the specific emotion in question?

This study tested the hypothesis that the degree of self-control exerted in suppressing emotions would depend on the combination of personality (independence and dutifulness/self-discipline) and the specific type of emotion being suppressed (anger vs. appreciation). In a between-subjects design, 245 college students were induced to experience either anger or appreciation and were then instructed to suppress their emotional expression. Self-control strength was measured using a handgrip task. Exertion of self-control strength over two time points was differentially associated with levels of independence and dutifulness/self-discipline (conscientiousness) and emotion suppression condition. Specifically, individuals higher in dutifulness/self-discipline had a harder time if they were suppressing appreciation than if they were suppressing anger at others, whereas individuals higher in independence had a harder time if they were suppressing anger at others than if they were suppressing appreciation. Implications for understanding personality, self-control, and emotion regulation are discussed.     

Are emotion metaphors conceptual or lexical?

Abstract

A review of Metaphors of Anger, Pride and Love: A Lexical Approach to the Structure of Concepts by Z. Kövecses (1986). Philadelphid/Amsterdam: John Benjamins, p. vii, 147. ISBN 1-55619-009-3 (US); ISBN 90-272-2558-3 (Europe). $34     

What is an academic emotion? Insights from Filipino bilingual students’ emotion words associated with learning

We explored Filipino learners’ concept of academic emotions by studying the words they use to describe their emotional experiences associated with learning. Two main theoretical frames were used as reference in the analysis: Clore, Ortony, & Foss’ (1978) taxonomy of emotion words, and Pekrun’s (2006) dimensions of academic emotions. We asked Filipino learners to describe the positive and negative emotions that they associate with their learning experiences using an open ended questionnaire. The 676 students used 1337 words which were classified into root word categories; 38 categories which were mentioned by at least 1% of the participants were included in the analysis. The interpretive analysis suggested that Filipino learners’ concept of academic emotions includes appraisals of cognitive and even physical conditions, beyond the typical affective conditions assumed in theories of emotions and academic emotions. Moreover, Filipino learners’ concepts of academic emotions include a wider range of emotion concepts, and may require additional characteristic dimensions, compared to what is being studied in current academic emotions research.     

Is moral elevation an approach-oriented emotion?

Two studies were designed to test whether moral elevation should be conceptualized as an approach-oriented emotion. The studies examined the relationship between moral elevation and the behavioral activation and inhibition systems. Study 1 (N = 80) showed that individual differences in moral elevation were associated with individual differences in behavioral activation but not inhibition. Study 2 (N = 78) showed that an elevation-inducing video promoted equally high levels of approach orientation as an anger-inducing video and significantly higher levels of approach orientation than a control video. Furthermore, the elevation-inducing stimulus (vs. the control condition) significantly promoted prosocial motivation and this effect was sequentially mediated by feelings of moral elevation followed by an approach-oriented state. Overall the results show unambiguous support for the proposal that moral elevation is an approach-oriented emotion. Applied and theoretical implications are discussed.     

Is the startle reaction an emotion?

In this study, we examined startle reactions in which the subjects did and did not know when a blank pistol would be fired. In addition, we asked subjects to suppress their startle response and to simulate a startle when there was no gunshot. Detailed measurement of facial muscular actions supported most of the findings reported by Landis and Hunt (1939), but our findings suggested that startle be considered a reflex not an emotion. The findings are considered in terms of current disagreements about exactly what constitutes an emotion, including the argument between Zajonc (1980) and Lazarus (1984) about the role of appraisal.     

How does negative emotion cause false memories?

Remembering negative events can stimulate high levels of false memory, relative to remembering neutral events. In experiments in which the emotional valence of encoded materials was manipulated with their arousal levels controlled, valence produced a continuum of memory falsification. Falsification was highest for negative materials, intermediate for neutral materials, and lowest for positive materials. Conjoint-recognition analysis produced a simple process-level explanation: As one progresses from positive to neutral to negative valence, false memory increases because (a) the perceived meaning resemblance between false and true items increases and (b) subjects are less able to use verbatim memories of true items to suppress errors.     

Précis of The brain and emotion

The topics treated in The brain and emotion include the definition, nature, and functions of emotion (Ch. 3); the neural bases of emotion (Ch. 4); reward, punishment, and emotion in brain design (Ch. 10); a theory of consciousness and its application to understanding emotion and pleasure (Ch. 9); and neural networks and emotion-related learning (Appendix). The approach is that emotions can be considered as states elicited by reinforcers (rewards and punishers). This approach helps with understanding the functions of emotion, with classifying different emotions, and in understanding what information-processing systems in the brain are involved in emotion, and how they are involved. The hypothesis is developed that brains are designed around reward- and punishment-evaluation systems, because this is the way that genes can build a complex system that will produce appropriate but flexible behavior to increase fitness (Ch. 10). By specifying goals rather than particular behavioral patterns of responses, genes leave much more open the possible behavioral strategies that might be required to increase fitness. The importance of reward and punishment systems in brain design also provides a basis for understanding the brain mechanisms of motivation, as described in Chapters 2 for appetite and feeding, 5 for brain-stimulation reward, 6 for addiction, 7 for thirst, and 8 for sexual behavior.     

Freedom,emotion, and self‐subsistence

A set of basic static predicates, ‘in itself, ‘existing through itself, ‘free’, and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and ? of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (λαμβ?νω) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, ‘The road to freedom through active emotion’, introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including ‘being in itself, ‘freedom’, etc. Active emotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems.     

Is there an in-group advantage in emotion recognition?

H. A. Elfenbein and N. Ambady (2002) examined the evidence for an in-group advantage in emotion recognition, whereby recognition is generally more accurate for perceivers from the same cultural group as emotional expressors. D. Matsumoto's (2002) comment centered on 3 asserted methodological requirements. This response addresses the lack of consensus conceming these "requirements" and demonstrates that none alter the presence of the in-group advantage. His analyses had a serious flaw and, once corrected, replicated the original findings. Furthermore, he described results from his empirical work not meeting a literal interpretation of his own requirements. Overall, where Matsumoto considers subtle cross-cultural differences in emotional expression a methodological artifact in judgment studies, the present authors find a core phenomenon worthy of attention.     

How social is the social psychology of emotion?

Two classic studies published 50 years ago showed how other people provide information that shapes the activation and interpretation of emotions. The present paper traces development of the social psychology of emotions from this starting point. Subsequent research into group-based and social appraisal has advanced understanding of the impact of social information on emotions and suggested new ways of investigating associated phenomena. Although potential integrations of interpersonal and group-oriented approaches offer promise for the future, the continuing focus on emotions as cognitively mediated effects of social factors should broaden to encompass dynamic relational processes.     

Developmental differences in children’s interpersonal emotion regulation

Previous research on interpersonal emotion regulation (ER) in childhood has been rather unsystematic, focusing mainly on children’s prosocial behaviour, and has been conducted in the absence of an integrative emotion theoretical framework. The present research relied on the interpersonal affect classification proposed by Niven et al. (Emotion, 9:498–509, 2009) to investigate children’s use of different interpersonal ER strategies. The study drew on two samples: 180 parents of children aged between 3 and 8 years reported about a situation where their child was able to change what another person was feeling in order to make them feel better. In addition, 126 children between 3- and 8-years old answered two questions about how they could improve others’ mood. Results from both samples showed age differences in children’s use of interpersonal ER strategies. As expected, ‘affective engagement’ (i.e., focusing on the person or the problem) and ‘cognitive engagement’ (i.e., appraising the situation from a different perspective) were mainly used by 7–8 years-old, whereas ‘attention’ (i.e., distracting and valuing) was most used by 3–4 and 5–6 years-old. ‘Humor’ (i.e., laughing with the target) remained stable across the different age groups. The present research provides more information about the developmental patterns for each specific interpersonal emotion regulation strategy.