What are theories for? Concept use throughout the continuum of dinosaur expertise

Although it is now well established that object concepts are situated within broader systems of theoretical knowledge, it is less clear how theories influence the use of object concepts at various points throughout the continuum of expertise. Two studies were conducted to investigate the impact of specific theories (concerning dinosaurs) and overarching framework theories (of biology) on children's and adults' performance on categorization tasks involving familiar and less familiar concepts. Although expertise increased the quantity of deep feature knowledge possessed by children and increased their understanding of biologically adaptive relations among features, few aspects of children's performance generalized beyond highly familiar dinosaurs. Children's specific theories related to dinosaurs were empirically constrained and relatively dissociated from other types of biological knowledge. The interaction of specific concept knowledge with broader framework theories of biology throughout the continuum of expertise is considered.     

How 7-month-olds interpret ambiguous motion events: Category-based reasoning in infancy

This paper investigates the role of static and dynamic attributes for the animate-inanimate distinction in category-based reasoning of 7-month-olds. Three experiments tested infants’ responses to movement events involving an unfamiliar animal and a ball. When either the animal or the ball showed self-initiated irregular movements (Experiment 1), infants expected the previously active object to start moving again. When both objects were moving together in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 2), infants expected only the animal to start moving again. Initial looking preferences for each object did not influence results. When either the facial features of the animal were removed, or its furry body was replaced by a plastic spiral in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 3), infants formed no clear expectation regarding future movements. Based on this set of findings we conclude that 7-month-olds flexibly combine information about the static and dynamic properties of objects in order to reason about motion events.     

Ockham’s razor and reasoning about information flow

What is the minimal algebraic structure to reason about information flow? Do we really need the full power of Boolean algebras with co-closure and de Morgan dual operators? How much can we weaken and still be able to reason about multi-agent scenarios in a tidy compositional way? This paper provides some answers.     

Swimming and Speaking Spanish

The dominant view of the status of knowledge of language is that it is theoretical or what Gilbert Ryle called knowledge-that. Defenders of this thesis may differ among themselves over the precise nature of the knowledge which underlies language, as for example, Michael Dummett and Noam Chomsky differ over the issue of unconscious knowledge; however, they all agree that acquisition, understanding and use of language require that the speaker have access to a theory of language. In this paper, I argue that this view is mistaken. Knowledge of language is properly seen as practical knowledge, knowledge-how. My target is Michael Dummett’s treatment of theory of meaning in The Seas of Language. If my argument goes through, underlying assumptions about the nature of cognition as computational must be adjusted to allow for other forms of knowledge, which are arguably more basic, and which underlie knowledge-that.     

The Normativity of Meaning: Guidance and Justification

Abstract

The thesis that meaning is normative has come under much scrutiny of late. However, there are aspects of the view that have received comparatively little critical attention which centre on meaning’s capacity to guide and justify linguistic action. Call such a view ‘justification normativity’ (JN). I outline Zalabardo’s (1997) account of JN and his corresponding argument against reductive-naturalistic meaning-factualism and argue that the argument presents a genuine challenge to account for the guiding role of meaning in linguistic action. I then present a proposal regarding how this challenge may be met. This proposal is then compared to recent work by Ginsborg (2011; 2012), who has outlined an alternative view of the normativity of meaning that explicitly rejects the idea that meanings guide and justify linguistic use. I outline how Ginsborg utilises this notion of normativity in order to provide a positive account of what it is to mean something by an expression which is intended to serve as a response to Kripke’s semantic sceptic. Finally, I argue that Ginsborg’s response to the sceptic is unsatisfactory, and that, insofar as it is able to preserve our intuitive view of meaning’s capacity to guide linguistic action, my proposal is to be preferred.     

Motivational determinants of reasoning about social relations: The role of need for cognitive closure

The role of need for cognitive closure (NFCC) in reasoning about social relations was investigated. Participants learned pairwise liking/disliking relations between people who could also be categorised on the basis of nationality and then had to group them into social cliques. The social clique structures were either consistent or inconsistent with the nationality categorisation, and the diagnostic information that was necessary to determine the number of cliques appeared either early or late in the information sequence. We expected participants under conditions of high (vs low) NFCC to rely more on heuristic processing. As predicted, high (vs low) NFCC participants were less accurate in their representations of cliques when the clique structure was inconsistent with the nationality category (Study 1 and 2) and when the diagnostic information was presented late (Study 1). The implications regarding the influence of NFCC on reasoning and the role of specific NFCC manipulations are discussed.     

The Oneness of Objective Reality and Spiritual Truth

Spirituality and science discover that they are both motivated by the desire to know, and realize that mere sensory perception does not guarantee the truth of knowledge. The concepts that emerge in the new sciences show a striking similarity to the ideas that come to the mind of spiritually intuitive persons, giving rise to the hope that with the recognition that at the bottom objective reality and spiritual truth are one, the historic opposition (or feud) between science and spirituality can at last be overcome.     

Prolegomena to Concise Theories of Action

A new methodology for developing theories of action has recently emerged which provides means for formally evaluating the correctness of such theories. Yet, for a theory of action to qualify as a solution to the frame problem, not only does it need to produce correct inferences, but moreover, it needs to derive these inferences from a concise representation of the domain at hand. The new methodology however offers no means for assessing conciseness. Such a formal account of conciseness is developed in this paper. Combined with the existing criterion for correctness, our account of conciseness offers a framework where proposed solutions to the frame problem can be formally evaluated.     

Individualization,singularization and e-ducation (between indifference and responsibility)

It is commonly supposed that acting and judging ought to rest on a community-wide, binding definition of what is right and respectable, that is, a substantial consensus. Such consensus is thought possible only when we engage shared values and criteria, when we use knowledge and abilities appropriated through education. On this view, education deals with the reproduction of consensus and, hence, with the passing on of traditions and norms. On my view, we need to question the framework in which the debate over social erosion takes place. I take a cue from remarks of Hannah Arendt and question the presupposition that acting and judging in a right way requires both common values and the appropriation of what we call knowledge of criteria and principles. I do not suggest that knowledge has nothing to do with acting and judging. Rather, I wish to draw attention to (Arendt's concept of) thinking as a condition for acting and judging. Here, thinking has nothing to do with knowledge or with appropriation. Rather, it has to do with living-together with somebody. Educa-tion for thinking is, then, a public thinking which leads out of the serf and into communal responsibility. On this treatment, the educator is to be a faithful guardian of this calling out into responsibility.     

Levels of modality for BDI Logic

The use of rational agents for modelling real world problems has both been heavily investigated and become well accepted, with BDI (Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions) Logic being a widely used architecture to represent and reason about rational agency. However, in the real world, we often have to deal with different levels of confidence in the beliefs we hold, desires we have, and intentions that we commit to. This paper extends our previous framework that integrated qualitative levels of beliefs, desires, and intentions into BDI Logic. We describe an expanded set of axioms and properties of the extended logic. We present a modular structure for the semantics which involves a non-normal Kripke type semantics that may be used for other agent systems. Further, we demonstrate the usefulness of our framework with a scheduling task example.     

An overview of algorithmic approaches to compute optimum entropy distributions in the expert system shell MECore (extended version)

The expert system shell MECore provides a series of knowledge management operations to define probabilistic knowledge bases and to reason under uncertainty. To provide a reference work for MECore algorithmics, we bring together results from different sources that have been applied in MECore and explain their intuitive ideas. Additionally, we report on our ongoing work regarding further development of MECore's algorithms to compute optimum entropy distributions and provide some empirical results. Altogether this paper explains the intuition of important theoretical results and their practical implications, compares old and new algorithmic approaches and points out their benefits as well as possible limitations and pitfalls.     

Trauma and psychosis: A review and framework for psychoanalytic understanding

Empirical research substantiates Ferenczi's conception of the etiological importance of early neglect and abuse in the development of psychosis. Abuse can derail the development of language, identity, and social relationships that are intrinsic to schizophrenia, possibly through undermining secure attachment relationships. The Lacanian emphasis on language and early proto-dialogues with the Other can be useful in understanding this process. Some therapeutic implications for psychoanalytic approaches to the treatment of psychosis are proposed.     

Unconscious structural knowledge of form-meaning connections

We investigated the implicit learning of a linguistically relevant variable (animacy) in a natural language context (namely, the relation of forms of determiners to semantics). Trial by trial subjective measures indicated that exposure to a form–animacy regularity led to unconscious knowledge of that regularity. Under the same conditions, people did not learn about another form–meaning regularity when a linguistically arbitrary variable was used instead of animacy (size relative to a dog). Implicit learning is constrained to acquire unconscious knowledge about features with high prior probabilities of being relevant in that domain.     

Experience and inference: how far will science carry us?

This paper begins with a view of the remarkable understanding of infant and child development that has evolved from research and observation. The limitations of this contribution from science to the multi-dimensional context-based individuality of each human in his or her intersubjective realm are then considered. For a contemporary view we must recognize the influence of the variability of experiences and the inferences drawn from them. Inferences involve symbolization and culturally derived archetypes as illustrated in a clinical example.