信仰与理性:罗光的生命哲学

文章以罗光的《生命哲学》为文本依据,侧重中西文化比较,探源传统经典价值和追溯宗教本质,试图解决宗教神学、传统哲学与信仰价值之间何以平衡的问题.罗光的生命哲学体系是从建构本体论说和逻辑结构两方面对中国哲学进行古典理性和创造性的诠释,把“存有”带人中国传统哲学的关注视野,通过理性自觉,在天主神学和儒家伦理的比较视阈下,对传统哲学范式进行逻辑建构,从理性路向探寻中国的形而上学和与现代接续的契机.     

略论海德格尔与道家哲学思维之异同

海德格尔的哲学就是要把人复归母体(世界)，恢复人和世界的本源性存在关系。他的这种思维方式与道家“人法天，天法道，道法自然”思维方式颇接近，二者具有精神上的相通性、可阐释性，具有有效对话的基础。另外，二者又有很大的不同，海德格尔的哲学是西方哲学发展的自然结果，是对主体性哲学的矫正，有着浓厚的、深蕴的理性思辩背景，并非对中古哲学的简单复归。     

宗教哲学——俄罗斯哲学的一个新领域

宗教哲学这个极其古老而应受到敬重的哲学领域,尽管一系列毋庸置疑的信号使人相信它方兴未艾,趋于鼎盛,却被归人俄罗斯哲学最遭忽视的“处女地”之列,其原因何在？最重要的原因看来在于意识形态因素。如果说在沙俄时代,是为了保护宗教免受哲学的觊觎,那么在苏联时代则相反,旨在防止哲学受到宗教的任何影响。     

顺化与逆化--道教哲学的思维特征

道教作为宗教 ,有它的宗教哲学 ,道教作为本土宗教 ,它的哲学就有明显的中国气派和特色 ,其影响深远。在道教哲学中 ,“化”是一个重要的范畴 ,它既是道教哲学得以成立的杆杠 ,也是道教思维的基点。“化”包括顺化与逆化两个文面 ,所谓顺化 ,即顺道生人 (物 ) ,属正向思维 ;所谓逆化 ,即逆道成仙 ,属反向思维。顺化与逆化 ,作为矛盾运动存在的两种形式 ,是道教认识事物所表现出来的正向和反向两种思维方式 ,它贯穿于道教的教旨、教义和炼丹术之中 ,成为道教哲学特有的思维特征 ,也是道教哲学对中国哲学的重大贡献。“化”的概念与道教的摄用…     

以价值理性统领管理的人本之路——评《管理的人文之维》

哲学的力量在于它的理性思维。在当今组织所处环境复杂多变的情况下,管理者需要哲学来增强他们的理性思维和决策能力。理性有逻辑(形式)理性和价值(实质)理性两个方面。经典的科学管理依据形式理性而获得了很大的发展,形成了系统化的理论体系。但以人为目的的价值理性却被忽略了。中南大学冯周卓教授的新作《管理的人文之维》(江西教育出版社2005年),从管理哲学的视角,力图挖掘管理本身所应有的人文性质,彰显管理的人本目的。通读全书后,掩卷而思,我认为该书在以下几个方面很有新意,值得肯定:1.以人文范式整合管理理论。在当今知识经济和多…     

古代儒学精神及其发展

从逻辑发展和中西哲学观念比较的角度考察古代儒学,阐明了传统儒学精神的实质和特征。西方哲学把人的主体意识理智化,导致抽象分析的思维方法及哲学精神与宗教精神的对立。儒学则把人看作一个整体的存在。因而儒学是人学以实践理性为核心统摄理论理性,在对人的整体理解中确立道德至上的价值观念、直觉整体思维方式,把宗教建立人存在根据的功能内在地包容于哲学,并提升为哲学精神,这是儒学人学体系的总体特征。儒学体系的逻辑内容主要是“性与天道”。这两个方面在儒释道合流过程中逐步得到明确和澄清,宋明儒学对它作了系统发挥。宋明儒学的理论贡献是:把“气化”观念引入本体论,揭示了道作为道德形上学本体的整体性、创造性、超越性的意义;把气质观念引入人性论,确立了心、性为一的人性整体的概念。     

对葛瑞汉和陈汉生先秦哲学“理性”的考察

运用“理性”概念来诠释先秦哲学的确有助于揭示中国思想的特点,但同时也揭示不同学者对此概念运用的任意性。无论是葛瑞汉对中国古代哲学中存在理性论辩的宣称,还是陈汉生对中国古代哲学中没有“理性”概念的断言,都仅仅从两个不同角度说明西方对“理性”的传统定义并不能完全概括东西方的相应经验。这一解释模式所揭示的,不是中西方思维方式的差异,而恰恰是西方概念体系的局限。     

希伯来《圣经》哲学思想初探

这里的《圣经》指希伯来语《圣经》,在内容上相当于《新旧约全书》中的《旧约》。《圣经》不是典型的哲学著作,因为它在形式和内容上主要不是哲学的。从形式上看,《圣经》的表述方式主要是叙事和诗歌性描写,而不是逻辑论证;从内容上看,哲学的或逻辑的思维要求思维的一贯性和不矛盾性,而《圣经》中则矛盾丛生。但是,说《圣经》不是典型的哲学著作,并不减损其意义和价值。作为宗教经典,《圣经》的目的不是教人以哲学,而是教人以信仰和律法,让人知道应该做什么样的人、如何做人。它的对象是普通大众,不论男女老少、聪明愚昧。对于大众来说,至少…     

马克思对"本体思维方式"的历史性变革

传统本论在黑格尔哲学中达到了它的最高形态,同时暴露出严重问题。对此,马克思没有采取与他同时代的其他哲学家（如叔本华、尼采等）仅仅改变“本体论哲学”的某种理论形态的做法,而是从根本上否定了传统本体论借以立立论的那种“绝对化”的基本思想原则和思维方式,使哲学找回了具有双重生命本性的现实的人和由人参与开拓的现实生活世界。即使如此,也不宜把马克思的哲学归结为“实践本体论”。     

试论宗教与哲学的关系

宗教与哲学在内容和形式上是最具普遍性的观念形态,都具有世界观和人生观的性质,同属精神性的文化。从本质上讲,它们都是人对自然、社会和人生的一种认识、领悟和理解,试图解决的往往都是人们最为关注的人生中的根本性问题,如:生与死,祸与福,善与恶,今生与来世,现世与彼岸,世界上各种事物以至世界本身究竟如何形成,个人以至社会历史的命运为何种力量所支配和主宰等等,宗教和哲学都曾对此做出了自己的答案。正是由于关注的问题有着这种一致和重合的关系,宗教和哲学便在人类历史上结下了不解之缘。宗教里有哲学,哲学里也有宗教。宗教常使用哲学思维的方式和哲学的语言来论证其教义、确立其信仰;哲学则常把宗教视为神圣的教义信仰和哲学思考的对象,把它们放在理性审视台前进行考察和批判。     

Analytic philosophy, 1925–69: emergence,management and nature

ABSTRACT

This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925–69. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalize rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterizing this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925–69, a sectarian form of critical philosophy.     

On the emergence of American analytic philosophy

This paper is concerned with the reasons for the emergence and dominance of analytic philosophy in America. It closely examines the contents of, and changing editors at, The Philosophical Review, and provides a perspective on the contents of other leading philosophy journals. It suggests that analytic philosophy emerged prior to the 1950s in an environment characterized by a rich diversity of approaches to philosophy and that it came to dominate American philosophy at least in part due to its effective promotion by The Philosophical Review’s editors. Our picture of mid-twentieth-century American philosophy is different from existing ones, including those according to which the prominence of analytic philosophy in America was basically a matter of the natural affinity between American philosophy and analytic philosophy and those according to which the political climate at the time was hostile towards non-analytic approaches. Furthermore, our reconstruction suggests a new perspective on the nature of 1950s analytic philosophy.     

Is Science Neurotic?

Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition from which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B but represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C and, as a result, fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic." Natural science is neurotic in this sense insofar as its basic aim is represented as improving knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science itself does not suffer significantly from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences and academic inquiry more generally. freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far-reaching beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences.     

Studies in analytic philosophy in China

This essay explores the history of studies in analytical philosophy in China since the beginning of the last century, by dividing into three phases. It shows that, in these phases, analytic philosophy was always at a disadvantage in confronting serious challenges coming from both Chinese traditional philosophy and modern philosophical trends. The authors argue that Chinese philosophers have both done preliminary studies and offered their own analyses of various problems as well as some new applications of analytic philosophy especially in the latest period. Meanwhile, Chinese traditional philosophy was always trying to adjust its cultural mentality in the struggle with analytic philosophy, and accommodated in its own way the rationalistic spirit and scientific method represented in analytic philosophy.     

Why Talk about Chinese Metaphysics?

Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century has often been related to some sort of cultural or other particularism or some sort of philosophical universalism. By and large, these still seem to be the terms along which academic debates are carried out. The tension is particularly manifest in notions such as “Chinese philosophy,” “Daoist cosmology,” “Neo-Confucian idealism,” or “Chinese metaphysics.” For some, “Chinese metaphysics” may be a blatant contradictio in adiecto, while others may find it a most ordinary topic to be discussed at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In this article, I set out to examine two major discourses in which talk about “metaphysics” is frequent and popular and to which talk of “Chinese metaphysics” may wish to contribute: the history of philosophy and analytic philosophy. My contention is that it is usually far from obvious what reasons are behind putting “Chinese metaphysics” on the academic agenda and to what precise purpose this is done. What my discussion seeks to highlight is the as yet often largely unarticulated dimension of the politics of comparative philosophy—of which talk about “Chinese metaphysics” may but need not be an example.     

论马克思实践哲学的政治意蕴

In order to deepen the studies on the philosophy of practice, it is essential to explore the political significance of Marx's philosophy of practice. Marx's philosophy of practice is rooted in the problem of modernity and the separation between “individual subjectivity” and “societal community” in the modern context is the basic background of Marx's practical philosophy. It is the basic interest of Marx's philosophy of practice to find a way to end this separation via critique of civil society. Therefore, Marx's philosophy of practice has a clear significance, which manifests in the following aspects: one is “liberation politics,” and the other, “the regulatory mode of the socio-political institution.” Translated by Zhang Lin from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Research), 2007, (1): 3–10     

On experimental philosophy and the history of philosophy: a reply to Sorell

In this paper, we reply to Tom Sorell’s criticism of our engagement with the history of philosophy in our book, The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy. We explain why our uses of the history of philosophy are not undermined by Sorell’s criticism and why our position is not threatened by the dilemma Sorell advances. We argue that Sorell has mischaracterized the dialectical context of our discussion of the history of philosophy and that he has mistakenly treated our use of the history of philosophy as univocal, when in fact we called on the history of philosophy in several different ways in our text.     

Philosophy for Children and the Extrinsic Value of Academic Philosophy

External pressure on Higher Education Institutes in the United Kingdom has brought the question of the extrinsic value of academic philosophy into focus. One line of research into questions about the extrinsic value of philosophy comes from the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement. There is a large body of literature about the benefits of P4C. This paper argues that the distinctive nature of the P4C pedagogy limits the claims made by the P4C literature about the extrinsic value of philosophy to claims about the value of P4C. While this is not a problem within the P4C literature that recognises these limitations, the paper makes three claims about why it is sometimes inappropriate to extend claims from research into the value of P4C to claims about the value of non-P4C philosophy. It argues that more research is needed to investigate the value of non-P4C philosophy.     

WHY IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY WORTH OUR STUDY?

Abstract: Assume for the sake of argument that doing philosophy is intrinsically valuable, where “doing philosophy” refers to the practice of forging arguments for and against the truth of theses in the domains of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and so on. The practice of the history of philosophy is devoted instead to discovering arguments for and against the truth of “authorial” propositions, that is, propositions that state the belief of some historical figure about a philosophical proposition. I explore arguments for thinking that doing history of philosophy is valuable—specifically, valuable in such a way that its value does not reduce to the value of doing philosophy. Most such arguments proffered by historians of philosophy fail, as I show. I then offer a proposal about what makes doing history of philosophy uniquely valuable, but it is one that many historians will not find agreeable.