Signal detection theory,the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness—Evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction?

Block [Block, N. (2005). Two neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 46–52] and Snodgrass (2006) claim that a signal detection theory (SDT) analysis of qualitative difference paradigms, in particular the exclusion failure paradigm, reveals cases of phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness. This claim is unwarranted on several grounds. First, partial cognitive access rather than a total lack of cognitive access can account for exclusion failure results. Second, Snodgrass’s Objective Threshold/Strategic (OT/S) model of perception relies on a problematic ‘enable’ approach to perception that denies the possibility of intentional control of unconscious perception and any effect of following different task instructions on the presence/absence of phenomenal consciousness. Many of Block’s purported examples of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access also rely on this problematic approach. Third, qualitative difference paradigms may index only a subset of access consciousness. Thus, qualitative difference paradigms like exclusion failure cannot be used to isolate phenomenal consciousness, any attempt to do so still faces serious methodological problems.     

Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience

How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We see the problem in stark form if we ask how we can tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: Find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases--when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their authority--and look to see whether those neural natural kinds exist within Fodorian modules. But a puzzle arises: Do we include the machinery underlying reportability within the neural natural kinds of the clear cases? If the answer is "Yes," then there can be no phenomenally conscious representations in Fodorian modules. But how can we know if the answer is "Yes"? The suggested methodology requires an answer to the question it was supposed to answer! This target article argues for an abstract solution to the problem and exhibits a source of empirical data that is relevant, data that show that in a certain sense phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility. I argue that we can find a neural realizer of this overflow if we assume that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness does not include the neural basis of cognitive accessibility and that this assumption is justified (other things being equal) by the explanations it allows.     

Evidence for global motion interactions between first-order and second-order stimuli

Recent research indicates that the early stages of visual-motion analysis involve two parallel neural pathways, one conveying information from luminance-defined (first-order) image features, the other conveying information from texture-defined (second-order) features. It is still not clear whether these two pathways converge during later stages of global motion integration. According to one account they remain segregated, and feed separate global analyses. In the alternative account, all responses feed a common stage of global analysis. Two perceptual phenomena are universally held to result from interactions between detector responses during global motion integration--direction repulsion and motion capture. We conducted two psychophysical experiments on these phenomena to test for segregation of first-order and second-order responses during integration. Stimuli contained two components, either two random-block patterns transparently drifting in different directions (repulsion measurements), or a drifting square-wave grating superimposed on an incoherent random-block pattern (capture measurements). Repulsion and capture effects were measured when both stimulus components were the same order, and when one component was first order and the other was second order. Both effects were obtained for all combinations of first-order and second-order patterns. Repulsion effects were stronger with first-order inducing patterns, and capture effects were stronger with second-order inducers. The presence of perceptual interactions regardless of stimulus order strongly suggests that responses in first-order and second-order pathways interact during global motion analysis.     

Motion aftereffect of combined first-order and second-order motion

When, after prolonged viewing of a moving stimulus, a stationary (test) pattern is presented to an observer, this results in an illusory movement in the direction opposite to the adapting motion. Typically, this motion aftereffect (MAE) does not occur after adaptation to a second-order motion stimulus (i.e. an equiluminous stimulus where the movement is defined by a contrast or texture border, not by a luminance border). However, a MAE of second-order motion is perceived when, instead of a static test pattern, a dynamic test pattern is used. Here, we investigate whether a second-order motion stimulus does affect the MAE on a static test pattern (sMAE), when second-order motion is presented in combination with first-order motion during adaptation. The results show that this is indeed the case. Although the second-order motion stimulus is too weak to produce a convincing sMAE on its own, its influence on the sMAE is of equal strength to that of the first-order motion component, when they are adapted to simultaneously. The results suggest that the perceptual appearance of the sMAE originates from the site where first-order and second-order motion are integrated.     

Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility

This article re-examines Ned Block??s (1997, 2007) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block??s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness.     

内隐学习意识性研究的两种理论取向:二分与渐进

传统的内隐学习研究范式大多致力于意识与无意识加工的操作性分离。随着学习任务和测量手段的改进,越来越多的研究发现量化渐变比二元分离能更好地兼容实验数据。本文对认知领域中与二分和渐进两种取向相关的理论框架和实证研究进行介绍和评价,指出意识的二分与渐进假设是源自不同的概念定义层次的理论框架,即功能性概念和解释性概念,因而对现象学数据具有不同的解释效力。它们的共存提供了不同的研究视角,丰富了我们对内隐学习活动的认识。     

The Consciousness (R)Evolution Paradigm

Consciousness represents the core of the new paradigm, the unitary, systemic vision, and comprehension that emerges in every field of science, culture, and spirituality. For centuries, consciousness has been divided from matter, the soul from the physical body. Now, in this historical beginning of globalization, we need a new holistic model, a global paradigm based on consciousness that can explain the unitary evolutionary process, the psychosomatic unity of human being, the neurophysiological roots of harmony between peoples and the way to personal and collective evolution of consciousness in order to realize a more conscious, peaceful, and sustainable planetary future. Consciousness is the key of human evolution.     

Property Dualism,Epistemic Normativity and the Limits of Naturalism*

This paper examines some consequences of the (quasi‐)epiphenomenalism implied by a property dualistic view of phenomenal consciousness. The focus is upon the variation of phenomenal content over time. A thought‐experiment is constructed to support two claims. The weaker claim exhibits an incompatibility which arises in certain logically possible situations between a conscious subject’s epistemic norms and the requirement that one be aware of one’s conscious experience. This could be interpreted as providing some epistemic grounds for the postulation of bridging laws between the physical/functional and phenomenal domains. The stronger claim has it that the ontology of property dualism is not properly able to account for the certainty I have of being phenomenally conscious. The problem is viewed as resulting from the neglect of the intensional context involved in a proper representation of the argument for property dualism. It is argued that only a transcendental move can do justice to this certainty I have.     

Against representationalism (about conscious sensory experience)

Abstract

It is very natural to suppose that conscious sensory experience is essentially representational. However this thought gives rise to any number of philosophical problems and confusions. I shall argue that it is quite mistaken. Conscious phenomena cannot be constructed out of representational materials.     

Fine-Grained Colour Discrimination without Fine-Grained Colour

René Jagnow [2012] argues that David Rosenthal's theory of consciousness cannot account for certain experiences that involve colours so fine-grained that we do not and cannot have concepts of them. Jagnow claims that an appeal to comparative concepts such as being slightly darker than cannot help Rosenthal, since, in order to apply such concepts, we would already need to be conscious of two distinct fine-grained colours. The present paper contests this claim. It appeals to the Cornsweet illusion and some other visual phenomena, in order to argue that our visual systems can and do represent brutely comparative matters.     

Self-regulation and the hypothesis of experience-based selection: Investigating indirect conscious control

The assumption that the contents of our conscious visual experience directly control our fine-tuned, real-time motor activity has been challenged by neurological and psychophysical evidence that suggest the two processes work semi-independently of each other. Clark [Clark, A. (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight? The Philosophical Review, 110, 495–519; Clark, A. (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 181–202; Clark, A. (2006). Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensori-motor contingency theory. PSYCHE, 12 (1). Available from http://www.psyche.cs.monash.edu.au] argues that such evidence implies a more indirect relationship between conscious visual experience and motor-control where the function of visual consciousness is not to control action but to select what actions are to be controlled. In this paper, I argue that this type of dynamic also exists at the wider level of self-regulation where conscious intent appears to indirectly control the enactment of the intended behaviour. I argue that by drawing parallels between Clark’s proposed dynamic and self-regulation, the former is not only bolstered by a previously unrecognised source of support but our understanding of the latter can help to further elucidate Clark’s proposed mechanism of indirect conscious control.     

What is it like to have type-2 blindsight? Drawing inferences from residual function in type-1 blindsight

Controversy surrounds the question of whether the experience sometimes elicited by visual stimuli in blindsight (type-2 blindsight) is visual in nature or whether it is some sort of non-visual experience. The suggestion that the experience is visual seems, at face value, to make sense. I argue here, however, that the residual abilities found in type-1 blindsight (blindsight in which stimuli elicit no conscious experience) are not aspects of normal vision with consciousness deleted, but are based fragments of visual processes that, in themselves, would not be intelligible as visual experiences. If type-2 blindsight is a conscious manifestation of this residual function then it is not obvious that type-2 blindsight would be phenomenally like vision.     

The neural correlates of conscious experience: an experimental framework

Demonstrating that neural activity ‘represents’ physical properties of the world such as the orientation of a line in the receptive field of a nerve cell is a standard procedure in neuroscience. However, not all such neural activity will be associated with the mental representations that form the contents of consciousness. In some cases, such as when patients with blindsight correctly ‘guess’ the location of a stimulus, neural activity is associated with physical stimulation and with appropriate behaviour, but not with awareness. To identify the neural correlates of conscious experience we need to identify patterns of neural activity that are specifically associated with awareness. Experiments aimed at making such identifications require that subjects report some aspect of their conscious experience either verbally or through some pre-arranged non-verbal report while neural activity is measured. If there is some characteristic neural signature of consciousness, then this should be distinguishable from the kinds of neural activity associated with stimulation and/or behaviour in the absence of awareness. It remains to be seen whether the neural signature of consciousness relates to the location of the neural activity, the temporal properties of the neural activity or the form of the interaction between activity in different brain regions.     

Nietzsche on conscious and unconscious thought

ABSTRACT

While much recent attention has been directed towards Nietzsche’s reflections on the mind, and on consciousness in particular, his often-suggestive comments about thinking have thus far avoided comparable scrutiny. Starting from Nietzsche’s claims that we ‘think constantly, but [do] not know it’, and that only our conscious thinking ‘takes place in words,’ I draw out the distinct strands that underpin such remarks. The opening half of the paper focuses upon Nietzsche’s understanding of unconscious thinking, and the role of affects therein. In what remains, I consider the difference (for Nietzsche) between conscious and unconscious thought, with a particular focus on two important readings. The first, put forward by Paul Katsafanas, claims that conscious states alone have conceptually-articulated content. The second, defended most prominently by Mattia Riccardi, argues that Nietzsche’s various claims evince a form of HOT (higher-order thought) theory. I argue that neither reading is quite right, and instead propose an alternative interpretation of conscious thinking ‘in words’, which draws on work on inner speech.     

Imagery and overflow: We see more than we report

The question of whether our conscious experience is rich or sparse remains an enduring controversy in philosophy. The “overflow” account argues that perceptual consciousness is far richer than cognitive access: when perceiving a complex scene, subjects see more than they can report. This paper draws on aphantasia (the condition of absent voluntary imagery) to propose a new argument in favor of overflow. First, it shows that opponents of overflow explain subjects’ performance in a change detection paradigm by appealing to a type of “internal imagery.” Second, it provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that aphantasics are incapable of generating this imagery. However, aphantasics perform equally well in this task; and so the no-overflow account fails to explain their performance. This means that proponents of this view are committed to an unsupported view of perception.     

The illusion of conscious will

Wegner (Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press) argues that conscious will is an illusion, citing a wide range of empirical evidence. I shall begin by surveying some of his arguments. Many are unsuccessful. But one—an argument from the ubiquity of self-interpretation—is more promising. Yet is suffers from an obvious lacuna, offered by so-called ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning and decision making (Evans, J., &; Over, D. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press; Stanovich, K. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Lawrence Erlbaum; Frankish, K. (2004). Mind and supermind. Cambridge University Press). I shall argue that this lacuna can be filled by a plausible a priori claim about the causal role of anything deserving to be called ‘a will.’ The result is that there is no such thing as conscious willing: conscious will is, indeed, an illusion.     

The consciousness of being conscious

Starting with the therapeutic advantage gained when insight acquires consciousness, an investigation of the nature and function of consciousness is undertaken. Consciousness is a state of awareness, having a range of higher mental functions serving a regulatory, controlling, and integrating role in mental activity. There are high levels of thinking, reality testing, experiencing, judging, anticipating; self-awareness and self-reflection enter into these controlling activities. Psychoanalysis has rightly been a science that studies the workings and contents of the unconscious portions of the mind. It has perhaps overlooked the important role that consciousness plays in ordinary life and in providing the levels of control and self-awareness individuals both experience and require. That pathology and disturbances of function may accompany normal states of consciousness as well as altered states of consciousness is a common clinical phenomenon. Psychoanalysis as a therapy widens the scope of the conscious control systems.     

The attentional blink unveils the interplay between conscious perception,spatial attention and working memory encoding

Our ability to perceive two events in close temporal succession is severely limited, a phenomenon known as the attentional blink. While the blink has served as a popular tool to prevent conscious perception, there is less research on its causes, and in particular on the role of conscious perception of the first event in triggering it. In three experiments, we disentangled the roles of spatial attention, conscious perception and working memory (WM) in causing the blink. We show that while allocating spatial attention to T1 is neither necessary nor sufficient for eliciting a blink, consciously perceiving it is necessary but not sufficient. When T1 was task irrelevant, consciously perceiving it triggered a blink only when it matched the attentional set for T2. We conclude that consciously perceiving a task-relevant event causes the blink, possibly because it triggers encoding of this event into WM. We discuss the implications of these findings for the relationship between spatial attention, conscious perception and WM, as well as for the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness.     

A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness

One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC), face is what we might call "the why question": why would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the cross-order integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the "general shape" of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations.