陈·香——写在神学毕业季

正晚间,图书馆的阅览室里照旧只有我和勤工俭学的管理员两个人,但并不代表这里安静适合学习。尽管我们已经关闭了所有的窗户,甚至拉上了厚窗帘,但隔壁礼堂喧嚣的排练声响仍有力地穿透进来。我以老师的身份跑去表达了抗议,但收效甚微,不过几分钟礼貌性地减弱,随即又在亢奋的情绪中失控了。管理员无奈地对我说:"没用的,现在同学们都热衷于此。"这话我能理解:年轻人爱动、爱唱、爱展示是天性使然,本无可厚非,毕竟我也曾经历过热血躁动的青春时期。     

多么奇妙的更新

正"你是位奇妙的神,你是位奇妙的神,你创造了山林你创造大海,你使雀鸟在天空自由自在。你是位奇妙的神……"傍晚,疲惫的我点出手机里的这首赞美诗,合上眼睛,听着六岁的小孩子歌唱。这是他在主日学里学的第一首歌,旋律优美,宛如天籁。当时我录制下来,并且设了自动重复。听着听着,仿佛《诗篇》里的音律和叹息,渐渐拂     

先秦易学的"神明"概念与荀子的"神明"观

"神明"是<易传>关键概念之一,亦在先秦两汉思想范畴中被广泛使用.各家"神明"概念都与"天地"有关,并涉及天地自然造化之过程,古代"神明"不是作为某种祭祀对象而存在,也不表示神祇和鬼神的意义.笔者搜集归纳有关先秦两汉"神明"之资料,发现"神明"一词之用意牵涉天地万物之"德"概念.古人认为,天地万物之死生运行皆源自"德",皆由神明之安排,但"神明"并不具备造物主身份,而是天地合德概念."神明之德"被视为万物造化的原因,若以两个字来表达"神明"的本质,则应是"生机"一词.郭店<太一>阐明了"神明"体现天地的相辅,于是"神明"的作用即是天地之间的媒介、气化主宰者,故为"生机".荀子的"神明"观念,保留天地观的出发点,但同时集中于微观宇宙——"人"的核心概念.荀子对"神明"的定义近于黄老学派,既将"神明"视为"道"的唯一产物,又看作知"道"的唯一依据.只是黄老学派以神明论及天地观,而苟子藉此来探讨儒家的"君子养心"之议题.荀子之外,养生学派也将"心"视为"神明出"的器官,然而养生学派的观点是在表达"神明"是人中的"生机",而荀子藉此"神明"观,来探讨认识论的伦理问题.荀子的神明观,被宋明理学所继承.     

榕树神学——丁主教英文版《上帝是爱》读后感

我的身、心、灵都与丁光训主教在其新书《上帝是 爱》中表达的神学观点产生了共鸣。在阅读和反思丁光 训主教的文章时,我止不住又一次感叹,在人类历史如 此纷纷扰扰的时刻,上帝奇妙地带给中国和世界这样 一位深刻的、注重实践的神学家和教会领袖。借用旧约 《以斯帖记》中大家熟悉的一句话,"为现今的机会(for such a time as this)(ESther 4:14),"上帝在我们中 间真的兴起了一位有着特别学术造诣、高超教会领导 才干、以及光辉基督徒人格的信仰典范,上帝让他引领 着中国教会穿越二十世纪的风暴,迎接二十一世纪的 挑战。     

全国政协民宗委主任钮茂生、全国政协副秘书长蒋作君看望慰问中国道教协会负责人

2008年1月30日上午,中共中央统战部部长杜青林、副部长斯塔在二局局长周宁等人的陪同下,到北京白云观看望慰问中国道教协会负责人并与之进行了座谈.     

对"先天图与二进制关系"之争的考察与辨析

在11世纪,宋代易学家邵雍详细阐释了先天图;17世纪末18世纪初,德国数学家、哲学家莱布尼茨系统地提出了二进制.二者具有何种关系成为一个经久不衰的话题.本文首先认真地梳理和辨析了前人的研究成果,其次从反思先天图和二进制的文化意义出发,得出以下结论二进制是纯粹的数学方法,先天图是意蕴丰富的哲学符号,二者区别甚大,没有实质性的关系.     

一节阐明教内外关系的经文——中国基督教第八次代表会议闭幕礼拜的证道

我们感谢赞美天父的眷顾、救主耶稣基督的恩待和圣灵的引导,使我们中国基督教第八次代表会议圆满完成各项议程,胜利闭幕了.刚才我们所读的经文,可以作为会议所通过的工作报告和各项决议的圣经依据,证明会议所指明的方向、所坚持的原则、所提出的任务,都是正确的,天经地义的.     

诸恶莫作 众善奉行——中国道教界坚决反对打着宗教旗号大搞分裂祖国的罪恶行径

正当全国人民庆祝"两会"胜利召开和喜迎奥运之际,达赖集团却有组织、有预谋地精心策划和煽动极少数不法分子在拉萨等地进行打砸抢烧破坏活动,妄图把西藏从祖国分裂出去。对于这种政治图谋和罪恶行径,我们道教界表示强烈的愤慨和     

王重阳平等思想探析

全真道创始人王重阳,建立了以心性修炼为基础的道教内丹思想,力倡每个人都具有平等的心性本体,道性俱足,皆有成仙的可能.这一平等的思想体现在人与自然的关系上,就是万物平等,无有高下;体现在与其他教派的关系上,则是儒、释、道三家圆融平等;而在处世待人上,就要平等待人,不分人之贵贱高低,均须恭敬处之.本文试对这一思想的产生背景、内涵进行探析,进一步揭示其对于悟道、修道和传道的作用和影响.     

杨时承洛启闽的理学思想

程门弟子杨时承洛南传,开拓了洛学在南方的传播与发展,特别是为南宋朱熹闽学的诞生并上承二程洛学为儒学正脉提供了必要的学脉渊源.杨时的理学思想即是以洛学为宗,在洛学的论域内所作的阐释与发挥,他强调理本气化,重视分殊之用,主张反身格物,关注静中体验未发等,这些观点虽不为后学朱熹完全泥守,但却有开启闽学端绪之意义.杨时的理学思想在程朱理学的传衍中起上承下启的作用.     

Restrictions on Representationalism

Strong representationalism claims that the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states consists in the intentional content of such states. Although strong representationalism has greatly increased in popularity over the last decade, I find the view deeply implausible. In this paper, I attempt to argue against strong representationalism by a two-step argument. First, I suggest that strong representationalism must be unrestricted in order to serve as an adequate theory of qualia, i.e., it must apply to all qualitative mental states. Second, I present considerations – deriving largely from nonperceptual states – to show that an unrestricted form of strong representationalism is problematic.     

An exposition of Zhou Yi studies in modern Neo-Confucianism

The representatives of modern Neo-Confucianism all greatly value Yi Zhuan and regard it as one of their spiritual resources, and give their own creative interpretations and transformations. Xiong Shili’s ontological-cosmological theory takes “qian yuan” as its center; Ma Yifu has a theory of ontology-cultivation centered on “nature-principle”; Fang Dongmei has a metaphysics of production and reproduction; Mou Zongsan takes the view of “completely knowing the fathomless and understanding transformation” as a moral metaphysics; and in Tang Junyi there is a theory of the harmony of doctrines on Heaven and man in which “the knowledge of divine understanding” is its key concept. They employ modern philosophical concepts and thinking to illustrate the cosmology, ontology, theory of life, theory of human nature, theory of spiritual worlds, axiology and their connections in Zhou Yi. They affirm that the characteristics of Chinese philosophy that are different from Western philosophy consist in a naturalist view of vital life, a harmonious view of totality, an axiological view that values exist in natural universe and the world of fact, the pursuit of Good and Beauty, and intuitive experience of inner world. __________ Translated from Zhou Yi Yanjiu 周易研究 (Zhou Yi Studies), 2004 (4) by Hao Changchi     

Revival and significance of political philosophy at present time

Taking a panoramic view on the history of modern philosophy, we can learn that political philosophy, a new arena for modern philosophy, has become an important field in philosophical studies since the later half of the 20th century. As far as the problem domain of political philosophy is concerned, political philosophy is only a special form of philosophy. The revival of political philosophy, however, indicates that philosophical inspection of political matters has regained legitimacy, and also means the restaging of philosophy as a knowledge type at modern times. In one sense, we can view the newly-revived political philosophy as typical modern philosophy, because its problem domain, its unique angle of looking into the life world and its ideal concern about the actual world make it one of the best ways in which we can reflect the existence of mankind in modern times. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2005 (6) by Teng Jianhui     

Traditional Confucianism in modern China: Ma Yifu’s ethical thought

Modern neo-Confucianism is studied at two levels, one is at the historical level and the other at the academic level. Modern neo-Confucianism at the historical level was developed in the modern context, but its basic content belongs to the traditional Confucianism or the study of Confucian classics. Modern neo-Confucianism at the academic level recognizes both the deficiencies of the traditional Confucianism and rationality of western learning, and dedicates itself to the modernization of Confucianism. Though Ma Yifu’s moral philosophy is developed in the context of modern Chinese culture, it fails to deal with the problem of modern transformation of Confucian ethical values and its content still belongs to the traditional Confucianism. So it should be labeled as the modern neo-Confucianism in the historical sense. In this paper, the author makes a systematic exploration and an evaluation of Ma Yifu’s ethical thought. __________ Translated from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Studies in Ethics), Vol. 18, 2005 (4) by Yang Xu     

Erkenntnistheorie der Zahldefinition und philosophische Grundlegung der Arithmetik unter Bezugnahme auf einen Vergleich von Gottlob Freges Logizismus und platonischer Philosophie (Syrian, Theon von Smyrna u.a.)

The epistomology of the definition of number and the philosophical foundation of arithmetic based on a comparison between Gottlob Frege's logicism and Platonic philosophy (Syrianus, Theo Smyrnaeus, and others). The intention of this article is to provide arithmetic with a logically and methodologically valid definition of number for construing a consistent philosophical foundation of arithmetic. The – surely astonishing – main thesis is that instead of the modern and contemporary attempts, especially in Gottlob Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic, such a definition is found in the arithmetic in Euclid's Elements. To draw this conclusion a profound reflection on the role of epistemology for the foundation of mathematics, especially for the method of definition of number, is indispensable; a reflection not to be found in the contemporary debate (the predominate ‘pragmaticformalism’ in current mathematics just shirks from trying to solve the epistemological problems raised by the debate between logicism, intuitionism, and formalism). Frege's definition of number, ‘The number of the concept F is the extension of the concept ‘numerically equal to the concept F”, which is still substantial for contemporary mathematics, does not fulfil the requirements of logical and methodological correctness because the definiens in a double way (in the concepts ‘extension of a concept’ and ‘numerically equal’) implicitly presupposes the definiendum, i.e. number itself. Number itself, on the contrary, is defined adequately by Euclid as ‘multitude composed of units’, a definition which is even, though never mentioned, an implicit presupposition of the modern concept ofset. But Frege rejects this definition and construes his own - for epistemological reasons: Frege's definition exactly fits the needs of modern epistemology, namely that for to know something like the number of a concept one must become conscious of a multitude of acts of producing units of ‘given’ representations under the condition of a 1:1 relationship to obtain between the acts of counting and the counted ‘objects’. According to this view, which has existed at least since the Renaissance stoicism and is maintained not only by Frege but also by Descartes, Kant, Husserl, Dummett, and others, there is no such thing as a number of pure units itself because the intellect or pure reason, by itself empty, must become conscious of different units of representation in order to know a multitude, a condition not fulfilled by Euclid's conception. As this is Frege's main reason to reject Euclid's definition of number (others are discussed in detail), the paper shows that the epistemological reflection in Neoplatonic mathematical philosophy, which agrees with Euclid's definition of number, provides a consistent basement for it. Therefore it is not progress in the history of science which hasled to the a poretic contemporary state of affairs but an arbitrary change of epistemology in early modern times, which is of great influence even today. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Apophasis and the turn of philosophy to religion: From Neoplatonic negative theology to postmodern negation of theology

This essay represents part of an effort to rewrite the history metaphysics in terms of what philosophy never said, nor could say. It works from the Neoplatonic commentary tradition on Plato’s Parmenides as the matrix for a distinctively apophatic thinking that takes the truth of metaphysical doctrines as something other than anything that can be logically articulated. It focuses on Damascius in the 5–6th century AD as the culmination of this tradition in the ancient world and emphasizes that Neoplatonism represents the crisis of Greek metaphysics on account of the inability to give a rational account of foundations for knowing and of the ultimate principle of beings. Neoplatonism discovered how all such ultimate principles were necessarily beyond the reach of reason and speech. This apophatic insight is drawn out with the help of contemporary criticism of Neoplatonic philosophy, defining also some points of divergence. The essay then discusses the motives for thinking the unsayable in postmodern times on the basis of this parallel with Neoplatonic thought. Discourse’s becoming critical of itself to the point of self-subversion animates them both. However, the tendency in postmodern thought to totally reject theology, including negative theology, is a betrayal of its own deepest motivations. This tendency is debated through an examination of the thought of Jean-Luc Nancy. While any traditional discourse can be negated, the negating and self-negating capacity of discourse itself is infinite, and this is where a perennial negative theological philosophy of the unsayable is to be located. Language, eminently the language of philosophy, as infinitely open, points in a direction which becomes equally and ineluctably theological.     

Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology

According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.” According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, I show that Husserl would be opposed to strong representationalism, since he believes the cognitive content of a perceptual episode can vary despite constancy of sensory qualia. Second, I then show that Husserl would be opposed to weak representationalism, since he believes that sensory qualia—specifically, the sort that he calls “kinesthetic sensations”—can vary despite constancy in representational content.     

Exploring Subjective Representationalism

Representationalism is, roughly, the view that experiencing is to be analyzed wholly in terms of representing. But what sorts of properties are represented in experience? According to a prominent form of representationalism, objective representationalism, experiences represent only objective (i.e. suitably mind‐independent) properties. I explore subjective representationalism, the view that experiences represent at least some subjective (i.e. suitably mind‐dependent) properties. Subjective representationalists, but not objective representationalists, can accommodate cases of illusion‐free phenomenal inversion. Moreover, subjective representationalism captures the so‐called transparency of experience, as it is standardly articulated, just as well as objective representationalism.     

Discussions

Summary  In their paper, ‘When are thought experiments poor ones?’ (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are “poor” ones with “disastrous consequences” and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more “recherché” thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.

For I am convinced that we now find ourselves at an altogether decisive turning point in philosophy, and that we are objectively justified in considering that an end has come to the fruitless conflict of systems. We are already at the present time, in my opinion, in possession of methods which make any such conflict in principle unnecessary. What is now required is their resolute application. (Schlick, ‘The Turning Point in Philosophy’, 1930/1959, p. 54).

     

A new discourse on Xunzi��s philosophy of language

Xunzi’s philosophy of language was mainly unfolded through the “discrimination of ming 名 (names) and shi 实 (realities)” and the “discrimination of yan 言 (words) and yi 意 (meanings).” Particularly, the “discrimination of names and realities” was centered on the propositions that “realities are realized when their names are heard” and that “names are given to point up realities,” including the view on the essence of language such as “names expect to indicate realities” and “conventions established by usage,” the view of development of language such as “coming form the former usage and being newly established,” and the view of functions of language such as “discriminating superiority and inferiority and differentiating identities and differences”; while the “discrimination of words and meanings” mainly contained two aspects: One was that words could completely represent meanings while it could not do so on the other hand, and the other was that the Dao should be grasped through “an unoccupied, concentrated and quiet mind.” Xunzi’s philosophy of language stressed both language’s value attribute and its cognitive attribute, and it is the greatest achievement of pre-Qin dynasty’s philosophy of language.