Why We Walk the Way We Do

By using inverse dynamics and forceplate recordings, this study established the principle of oscillating systems and the influence of gravity and body parameters on the programming of the gait parameters, step frequency and length. Calculation of the ratio of the amplitude of the center of mass (CM) and the center of foot pressure (CP) oscillations yielded an equation and established a biomechanical constant, the natural body frequency (NBF). NBF appears to be an absolute invariant parameter, specific to human standing posture and gait in terrestrial gravity, which influences the relative positions of CM and CP and whose value separates the frequency bands of standing posture from those for gait. This equation was tested by using the experimental paradigm of stepping in place and then used in calculating the magnitude of CM oscillations during gait. The biomechanical analysis of the experimental observations allows one to establish the relationships between body parameters and gravity and the central programming of locomotor parameters.     

How We Hurt The Ones We Love

Paradoxically, the practical necessity of love seems to combine the personal character of psychological necessity with the inescapable and authoritative quality of moral necessity. Traditionally, philosophers have avoided this paradox by treating love as an amalgam of impersonal evaluative judgments and affective responses. On my account, love participates in a different form of practical necessity, one characterized by a non‐moral yet normative type of expectation. This expectation is best understood as a kind of second‐personal address that does not support derivative third‐personal demands. It is revealed when we react with hurt feelings instead of resentment upon its disappointment.     

Why We Do Not See What We Feel

Of all of Berkeley's claims about perception, perhaps the most unusual is his assertion that we do not see the numerically same objects we feel. Ideas are radically heterogeneous. The question I seek to answer is why Berkeley thought this thesis true. Traditional accounts hold that Berkeley was forced into accepting heterogeneity by his views concerning either distance or abstraction, but careful analysis reveals these to be mistaken. I conclude that how Berkeley thought of the ontic status of ideas finishes the incomplete picture provided by traditional accounts, and supplies us with a better under-standing of his views on perceptual heterogeneity.     

What We Deserve, and how We Reciprocate

Samuel Scheffler says, “none of the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism assigns a significant role to desert at the level of fundamental principle.” To the extent that this is true, the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism are mistaken. In particular, there is an aspect of what we do to make ourselves deserving that, although it has not been discussed in the literature, plays a central role in everyday moral life, and for good reason. As with desert, reciprocity inspires skepticism. What Allen Buchanan calls justice as reciprocity implies that duties of justice obtain only among those who can do each other favors. So characterized, justice as reciprocity is at best only a part of justice – a part that is silent on duties between people who have no favors to offer each other. Still, the more modest root idea of reciprocity – the idea that returning favors is at very least a good thing – remains compelling. What can we say on behalf of this root idea? This article is part of a larger work on the elements of justice. Both parts of it begin with and build on James Rachels’ seminal paper “What People Deserve.”     

On What We are and How We Persist

This article defends novel approaches to what we are and how we persist. First it is claimed that we have disjunctive persistence conditions: we can persist by way of either biological continuity or psychological continuity. Then it is claimed that we are neither human beings nor persons essentially. Rather, we are essentially bio‐psycho‐continuers, a concept to be explained along the way. A variety of objections are considered and found wanting.     

Odor Semantics and Visual Cues: What We Smell Impacts Where We Look,What We Remember,and What We Want to Buy

The current research uses eye‐tracking technology in a consumer context to explore the interactive effects of olfactory and visual cues on consumers' eye gaze patterns. We manipulate the semantic correspondence between pictorial objects depicted in print advertisements and odors smelled (or not) while looking at the ads. The results indicate that smelling a scent that shares learned semantic associations with an object in the advertisement diverts consumers' eye gazes to the semantically related object in the ad, with positive downstream effects on advertising recall and purchase intent. This is the first study we are aware of demonstrating multisensory integration of odors and pictures on consumer eye gaze patterns with clear implications for consumer choice. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Engaged in Engagement: We Are Delighted We Did It

We emphasize that science and practice issues are equally salient when pursuing thinking and research on employee engagement. We agree with much of what the commentaries have to say, especially that organizational competitive advantage is the relevant focus of engagement research and practice and that engagement is not a new construct but one that required clarification vis-a-vis existing constructs. We also agree that state engagement can be highly variable, that disengagement needs study, that negative situations can induce engagement behaviors, that engagement surveys should yield actionable data, and that people can be hired who are more likely to be engaged. We disagree with the idea that all employee attitudes are essentially equal and that existing conceptualizations of performance make engagement behavior a nonuseful construct.     

We are driven

Is metapsychology out-or in again? Is it a millstone tied around our necks-or is it an intriguing Freudian witch whom we can even dance with? Is the concept of drives an outmoded oddity-or an indispensable companion, inspiring our understanding of the patient's material and even opening new windows for further development? Can we proceed with the concept of structures and object relationships alone -or do we need the concept of drives in order to understand what these object relationships are all about? The author clearly opts for the second option in each of these pairs of alternatives. Musing on the sophisticated metapsychology debate that unsettled psychoanalysis in the United States for many years, she reviews some of the most frequently quoted objections to the concept of drives. Further, she offers an introduction to modern drive theory with the new duality of sexual and preservative drives, as well as a different concept of aggression, and explains how drives relate to structures-specifically, to the representations of self and object.     

We Have Failed

SUMMARY

This article explores the changing nature of the psy-chotherapeutic world in relationship to the values crisis evident in our lack of reaction to the Gulf War. It attempts to examine the underlying valuelessness of the new post-modem psychotherapeutic systems with special attention to the impact of that changing value structure on humanistic psychotherapy, the mental health community and the significance of this shifting as it relates to the Gulf War. The author examines these philosophic systems that underlie various post-modern approaches and their challenge to universal humanism and humanistic values. Finally the reader is encouraged to reassess the underlying value base of their therapeutic, methodological, and philosophical systems.