The More You See It, the More You Know It: Memory Accessibility and Sexual Harassment Judgments

The influence of the availability of personally known and media known sexual harassment victims and harassers on perceptions of social sexual workplace conduct was examined. Male and female full-time workers evaluated two videotapes that depict sexual harassment in the workplace. Results indicated that perceived likelihood of harassment and discrimination increased as participants recalled more examples of harassment victims whom they personally knew. In some instances, recall of victims in the media had a similar influence. As predicted, the influence of availability was stronger for men than for women. Similar findings resulted from the analyses of the unwelcomeness, severity, and pervasiveness of the conduct; however, legal standard, gender, or case often moderated this relationship. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Performance on Video-Based Situational Judgment Test Items: Simulated Interracial Interactions

Individuals are known to categorize others into social groups based on cues like race and gender and to experience relative discomfort when interacting with “outgroup” members. Two experimental studies were used to examine whether actor demographic cues in situational judgment assessment items completed by test takers in a simulated employee selection context may lead to differences in their performance and reactions to the hiring organization. In both studies, test takers assumed the perspective of actors shown in video-based scenarios and indicated how they would respond to interaction partners (IPs) to whom they were racially similar or dissimilar. In Study 1, a given test taker responded to IPs of a constant gender; in Study 2, IPs’ gender varied across scenarios within each condition. In Study 1, Black test takers spent more time and scored better on two of the four scenarios when responding to racially similar IPs. These effects were not found in Study 2, but demographic cues showed new interactive effects on performance and reactions. We discuss the implications of different findings across the two studies.

     

Once a Utilitarian,Consistently a Utilitarian? Examining Principledness in Moral Judgment via the Robustness of Individual Differences

Although individual differences in the application of moral principles, such as utilitarianism, have been documented, so too have powerful context effects—effects that raise doubts about the durability of people's moral principles. In this article, we examine the robustness of individual differences in moral judgment by examining them across time and across different decision contexts. In Study 1, consistency in utilitarian judgment of 122 adult participants was examined over two different survey sessions. In Studies 2A and 2B, large samples (Ns = 130 and 327, respectively) of adult participants made a series of 32 moral judgments across eight different contexts that are known to affect utilitarian endorsement. Contrary to some contemporary theorizing, our results reveal a strong degree of consistency in moral judgment. Across time and experimental manipulations of context, individuals maintained their relative standing on utilitarianism, and aggregated moral decisions reached levels of near‐perfect consistency. Results support the view that on at least one dimension (utilitarianism), people's moral judgments are robustly consistent, with context effects tailoring the application of principles to the particulars of any given moral judgment.     

Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment

Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.     

An exploration of psychological and physical injury schemas in civil cases

Civil plaintiffs often seek compensation for their psychological injuries. Yet little is known about jurors' preconceived notions (or schemas) for a prospective plaintiff's pain and suffering. The present studies examined (a) whether jurors have psychological injury schemas (Studies 1 and 2), (b) whether their existence and development vary by the type of civil case (Studies 1 and 2) or its severity (Study 2), and (c) how psychological injury schemas compare with physical injury schemas on a number of theoretically and legally relevant judgments (e.g., injury severity, availability, and plaintiff credibility; Study 2). Study 1 (N = 233) presented undergraduate mock jurors with 2 negligence incidents (car accident and slip and fall) and 2 intentional tort incidents (sexual assault and kidnapping) and asked them to report the typical incident and injuries that would result from the defendant's conduct. Results supported the sparse existence of psychological injury schemas but found that they were more developed in the kidnapping and sexual assault incidents than in the car accident and slip and fall incidents. Study 2 (N = 288) additionally manipulated incident schema severity (mild vs. severe) while having participants separately report and rate their psychological and physical injury schemas on judgments of legal and theoretical interest. Results indicated that although mock jurors' psychological injury schemas contained fewer injuries than their physical injury schemas, the reported psychological injuries were rated as more severe than physical injuries. We discuss how schemas may underlie the disparate treatment of psychological and physical injuries by legal decision‐makers.     

Regulatory focus as a predictor of omission bias in moral judgment: Mediating role of anticipated regrets

Omission bias occurs when people are more reluctant to accept negative consequences caused by their actions than by their inaction. Recent research on omission bias in decision‐making has found evidence for individual differences, thus indicating that some people are more likely to show omission inclination than others. The present research aims to explore the role of regulatory focus as individual difference variables in omission bias. Moreover, we examine whether anticipated regret mediates the relationship between regulatory focus and moral judgement. Moral judgement tasks utilized include: (i) moral dilemma scenarios (Study 1); and (ii) ethical scenarios embracing apparent legal rule violations (Study 2). The results of both studies show that only prevention focus is significantly related to omission bias in moral judgement. Specifically, this relationship holds regardless of the nature of the ‘omission’ (whether they are deontological or utilitarian). In addition, anticipated regret/guilt for action was found to mediate the relationship between prevention focus and omission bias. Implications and limitations are discussed based on the results of the current study.     

I feel you feel what I feel: Perceived perspective‐taking promotes victims' conciliatory attitudes because of inferred emotions in the offender

In the context of bullying in a nursing workplace, we test the argument that an offender's perspective‐taking promotes victim conciliation, mediated by perceived perspective‐taking, that is, the extent to which the victim perceives the offender as taking their perspective. Perceived perspective‐taking facilitates the attribution of moral emotions (remorse, etc.) to the offender, thereby promoting conciliatory victim responses. However, perceived perspective‐taking would be qualified by the extent to which the severity of consequences expressed in the offender's perspective‐taking matches or surpasses the severity for the victim. In Studies 1 and 2 (Ns = 141 and 122, respectively), victims indicated greater trust and/or forgiveness when the offender had taken the victim's perspective. This was sequentially mediated by perceived perspective‐taking and victim's inference that the offender had felt moral emotions. As predicted, in Study 2 (but not Study 1), severity of consequences qualified victims' perceived perspective‐taking. Study 3 (N = 138) examined three potential mechanisms for the moderation by severity. Victims attributed greater perspective‐taking to the offender when the consequences were less severe than voiced by the offender, suggesting victims' appreciation of the offender's generous appraisal. Attributions of perspective‐taking and of moral emotions to the offender may play an important role in reconciliation processes. Key outcome: To the extent that victims perceive the offender as taking their perspective (perceived perspective‐taking), they infer that the offender feels more moral emotions, prompting victims to be more conciliatory. Perceived perspective‐taking benefits from the offender over‐stating the consequences to the victim.     

In Defense of Israel Scheffler's Conception of Moral Education

Israel Scheffler views moral education as having two major objectives: inculcating minimum standards of decent conduct and developing rationality in moral deliberation and judgment. The latter is to be achieved by engaging students in discussions of moral issues in such a way that they come to appreciate and follow standards of rational deliberation and judgment – standards that Scheffler explicates primarily in terms of impartiality. This paper argues that the conception of rational moral deliberation and discussion underlying Scheffler's approach to moral education is inadequate, and suggests an alternative conception that gives far more prominence to the problem of interpreting the meaning of substantive moral concepts and determining how they apply to particular cases.     

产品类型对购物冲量效应的调节作用分析

基于享乐品-实用品有关研究及购物冲量效应, 考察产品类型对购物冲量效应的调节作用及其内在机制。实验一通过现场研究验证购买实用品提高后续购买概率, 购买享乐品降低其概率; 实验二为实验室实验, 再次验证该调节作用, 并验证内在原因：购买享乐品更可能激发内疚感、花钱的痛苦甚至负面自我形象和高层次目标, 导致理由性思维占主导, 前次购买引发的应用思维定式受到削弱。相比于实用品, 购买享乐品引发购物冲量效应的可能性更低。     

Genetic research,adolescents, and informed consent

The participation of adolescents in genetic research engenders unusual problems concerning the nature of their informed consent. In this study we analyze 70 consent documents collected from genetics investigators in the United States who conduct research with children and adolescents. We find that many consent documents do not reflect either the current or the developing ethical and legal standards for research with adolescents and that in many cases the documents are simply confusing or unclear. We make recommendations for change to reflect more adequately the changing perspective concerning the autonomous decision-making capacity of adolescents.     

Group commitment in the face of discrimination: The role of legitimacy appraisals

In contrast to everyday use of the term discrimination, we propose that discrimination can be appraised as either illegitimate or legitimate, and a comprehensive analysis of responses to discrimination needs to account for both ways of experiencing discrimination. We examine how perceived pervasiveness of discrimination and legitimacy appraisals affect group commitment among women in academia (Study 1) and tobacco smokers facing an upcoming smoking ban (Study 2). We found support for our hypothesis that legitimacy of discrimination appraisals moderates the effect of pervasiveness of discrimination. In both studies, group identification and collective action intentions were undermined most when the ingroup claimed that discrimination against them was legitimate and discrimination was perceived as pervasive. In both studies, group identification mediated the effects on collective action intentions. The results highlight the important role of legitimacy appraisals in understanding disadvantaged group members' responses to discriminatory treatment. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What constitutes torture?: psychological impediments to an objective evaluation of enhanced interrogation tactics

Torture is prohibited by statutes worldwide, yet the legal definition of torture is almost invariably based on an inherently subjective judgment involving pain severity. In four experiments, we demonstrate that judgments of whether specific interrogation tactics constitute torture are subject to an empathy gap: People who are experiencing even a mild version of the specific pain produced by an interrogation tactic are more likely to classify that tactic as torture or as unethical than are those who are not experiencing pain. This discrepancy could result from an overestimation of the pain of torture by people in pain, an underestimation of the pain of torture by those not in pain, or both. The fourth experiment shows that the discrepancy results from an underestimation of pain by people who are not experiencing it. Given that legal standards guiding torture are typically established by people who are not in pain, this research suggests that practices that do constitute torture are likely to not be classified as such.     

MINIMIZING THE PERVASIVENESS OF WOMEN'S PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION

Given the Rejection-Identification Model ( Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999 ), which shows that perceiving discrimination to be pervasive is a negative experience, it was suggested that there would be conditions under which women would instead minimize the pervasiveness of discrimination. Study 1 ( N = 91) showed that when women envisioned themselves in a situation of academic discrimination, they defined it as pervasive, but when they experienced a similar laboratory simulation of academic discrimination, its pervasiveness was minimized. Study 2 ( N = 159) showed that women who envisioned themselves experiencing discrimination minimized its pervasiveness more so than women reading about discrimination happening to someone else. Further, mediation analysis showed that minimizing the pervasiveness enhanced positive affect about personal discrimination. Implications for minimizing on both an individual and social level are discussed.     

Outcome Severity and Judgments of “Responsibility”: A Meta‐Analytic Review1

Research has provided mixed support for the hypothesis that when an incident results in a more severe outcome, more responsibility will be attributed to a potentially responsible actor. This paper uses the techniques of meta‐analysis to examine this literature. The results support the contention that people attribute greater responsibility for the outcome of a negative incident when that outcome is more severe than when the outcome is minor. The direction of this relationship is consistent across methodologies. However, the strength of the correlation varies depending on which type of judgment participants are asked to make. Because many of these variables are tied to legal concepts, the results are discussed in the context of the expectations of the legal system regarding the impact of outcome severity on each variable.     

The roles of retribution and utility in determining punishment

Three studies examined the motives underlying people’s desire to punish. In previous research, participants have read hypothetical criminal scenarios and assigned “fair” sentences to the perpetrators. Systematic manipulations within these scenarios revealed high sensitivity to factors associated with motives of retribution, but low sensitivity to utilitarian motives. This research identifies the types of information that people seek when punishing criminals, and explores how different types of information affect punishments and confidence ratings. Study 1 demonstrated that retribution information is more relevant to punishment than either deterrence or incapacitation information. Study 2 traced the information that people actually seek when punishing others and found a consistent preference for retribution information. Finally, Study 3 confirmed that retribution information increases participant confidence in assigned punishments. The results thus provide converging evidence that people punish primarily on the basis of retribution.     

Moral spillovers: The effect of moral violations on deviant behavior

Two experiments investigated whether outcomes that violate people’s moral standards increase their deviant behavior (the moral spillover effect). In Study 1, participants with and without a moral mandate (i.e., a strong attitude rooted in moral conviction) read about a legal trial in which the outcome supported, opposed or was unrelated to their moral mandate. Relative to when outcomes supported moral mandates, when outcomes opposed moral mandates people judged the outcome to be less fair, were more angry, were less willing to accept the outcome, and were more likely to take a borrowed pen. In Study 2, participants who recalled another person’s moral violation were more likely to cheat on an experimental task relative to angry or neutral condition participants. Taken together, results provide evidence for moral spillover: outcomes that violate moral standards increase deviant behavior.     

Stereotypes and the confirmability of trait concepts

Two studies tested the hypothesis that rules of trait inference may differ depending on trait stereotypicality and the social group membership of the target being judged. Specifically, traits that are stereotypic of a group were expected to instantiate lower evidentiary standards (require fewer behaviors to confirm), but only in members of that group. Study 1 focused on race and found that across 180 traits, trait stereotypicality was associated with fewer behaviors required to confirm and more to disconfirm in outgroup targets (in Black actors for White judges and in White actors for Black judges). Study 2 focused on gender and again found that stereotypic traits were tied to low evidentiary standards only when judging outgroup targets. The findings are discussed with reference to the literatures on trait inference, stereotyping, and shifting judgment standards.     

心理账户的认知标签与情绪标签对消费决策行为的影响

Mental accounting is the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities. Mental accounting proposes that people utilize a set of cognitive labels to evaluate their financial activities, each of which is associated with different preferences to consume (Levav & McGraw, 2009; Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Thaler 1985, 1990). Mental accounting researchers have shown that windfall gains are spent more readily and frivolously than ordinary income. Consumers prefer to spend their windfall gains on hedonic consumptions but spend their ordinary incomes on utilitarian consumptions. Levav and McGraw (2009) suggested that emotional accounting, including people’s feelings about money, also influences consumer choices. When people have negative feelings toward windfall, they opt to make utilitarian expenditures. However, the process of how cognitive (windfall or ordinary income) and affective (positive or negative emotion) tags interact in consumer behavior was not explored. This study proposes that both cognitive tag and affective tags in mental accounting affect consumer decision making. The objective of this study is to explore the interactive effect of cognitive and affective tags in mental accounting on consumer decision through four studies. In studies 1a and 1b, the effect of cognitive and affective tags in mental accounting on consumer decision making behavior was measured. Study 1a showed that the positive tag of windfall income is preferred for hedonic consumption, whereas the negative tag of windfall income is preferred for utilitarian consumption. Both positive and negative tags of ordinary income are preferred for utilitarian consumption. Study1b utilized a field study to examine actual consumption behavior. The results showed that when people received 15 Yuan RMB as ordinary income, they prefer to spend it on utilitarian consumption regardless of the positive or negative emotion they feel. However, they receive 15 Yuan RMB as windfall income, they prefer to use it for hedonic consumption in the positive emotion and for utilitarian consumption in the negative emotion. Studies 2a and 2b attempted to explore the reason of negative emotion can make windfall income turn from hedonic to utilitarian consumption. Study2a found that when people expect to feel guilty about spending windfall income on hedonic consumption, they would avoid hedonic consumption. Study2b found that when people felt guilty about windfall income, they tend to avoid hedonic consumption. Compared with the low guilt level group, the high guilt level group prefers to use windfall income for utilitarian consumption. These results suggest that cognitive and affective tags influence consumer behavior. The influence of cognitive tag on consumer decision presents the “cognition match effect”, whereas the influence of affective tag on consumer decision presents the “affect match effect”. Both tags also have an interaction effect on consumer decision. Guilt may be a mechanism that results in the negative tag of windfall being preferred for utilitarian consumption.     

The relation of moral orientation and moral judgment to prosocial and antisocial behaviour of Chinese adolescents

The present study investigated the relation of moral orientation and moral judgment to prosocial and antisocial behaviour from a first‐person perspective. The major findings support the following four hypotheses. (la) The moral orientation of girls is higher than that of boys, and (1b) boys are more delinquent than girls; (2) the moral orientation of prosocial adolescents is higher than that of delinquent adolescents; (3) the moral judgment of prosocial adolescents is higher than that of delinquent adolescents; and (4) the moral development of prosocial adolescents is higher than that of delinquent adolescents. Few researchers have attempted to investigate how moral orientation and moral judgment relate to prosocial and antisocial behaviour in a single study. The present study fills this research gap. Moreover, the study of moral judgment from a first‐person perspective appears to be a meaningful and useful approach. Future studies should be conducted to investigate whether moral judgment from a first‐person perspective is more predictive of moral behaviour than moral judgment from a third‐person perspective. It would also be meaningful to conduct a cross‐cultural study to investigate the relation of moral orientation and moral judgment to prosocial and antisocial behaviour in different cultures. The use of a self‐report method in a study of prosocial and antisocial behaviour has certain limitations; for example, respondents may not give honest responses. However, this method has been found to be useful and acceptable, especially for researching the correlations among a large number of variables.     

Am I Abnormal? Relative Rank and Social Norm Effects in Judgments of Anxiety and Depression Symptom Severity

Overdetection and underdetection of depression and anxiety in primary care are common and may partly reflect individuals' misperceptions of the severity of symptoms they experience. Here, we explore how people's judgments about the severity of their own symptoms are influenced by their beliefs about the distribution of symptoms experienced by the rest of the population. We apply the rank‐based decision by sampling cognitive model of judgment to symptom severity. The model proposes that judgments depend on the relative rank of an item within a mental sample of comparable items. It is predicted that judgments of symptom severity will be context dependent and more specifically that an individual's judgments will be invalid to the extent that the individual has inaccurate beliefs about the relevant social context. Two studies found that participants' assessments of symptom severity were rank based. Study 1 elicited participants' beliefs about the social distribution of symptoms and found that participants' judgments of whether they were depressed or anxious were mainly predicted not by their symptoms' objective severity but rather by where participants ranked the severity of their symptoms in comparison with the believed symptoms of others. Study 2 varied symptom distributions experimentally and again found relative rank effects as predicted. It is concluded that the real‐world application of contextual models of judgment requires investigation of individual differences in participants' background beliefs. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.