群体心理现象--一种后现代的公共精神卫生问题

探讨以群体心理为基础的公共精神卫生问题的概念、重要性,以及发生的病理机制.认为当代公共精神卫生问题所具有定性模糊、文化边缘化等后现代的特点都与群体非理性心理的性质有关.     

青年心理需求与城市中小型公共空间设计探析

青年在城市中小型公共空间中的心理需求表现在感受户外空间、体验行为场景、参与活动项目及缓解情绪压力四个方面。我国城市中小型公共空间设计中的安全性、易识别性、适宜性与功能复合性问题,制约了共享城市的发展。文章研究纽约泪珠公园案例中空间建构、环境营造、景观设施和植物绿化内容,归纳空间、环境、设施及植物的设计策略,结合青年心理需求规律,营造情感、精神与文化融合的景观空间。依据青年群体心理需求,运用马斯洛需求理论与环境心理学、行为学概念,重视服务区域空间容量问题,可以营造出满足市民需求的城市生态共享场所。     

精神卫生服务的人文模式及改进

精神卫生服务有丰富的内涵,对于精神疾病是心理失调或是躯体(脑)疾病实质的争议,衍生出了不同的研究范式以及干预模式。现代精神卫生的功能是全方位、全周期地保障群体的心理健康,并通过不同的层面进行干预。在实践中,精神卫生的人文诉求日益增加,推动与改进心理健康服务中的人文精神具有重要的意义。从方法论角度来看,发展人文精神医学要兼顾理解和解释的心理学,用系统式思维可以更好地服务临床。在发展人文精神医学过程中,助人者的价值观和权力意识对临床过程有重要影响     

城市公共空间内适老性景观设计策略研究

基于我国社会城市化进程不断加快、老龄化现象不断加深的现状,对城市公共空间景观设计中出现的一些现象进行设计策略的分析研究。通过对现有的相关理论、政策以及研究成果进行分析探究,结合当下老年群体的实际需求,对老年群体的心理、生理及行为进行探究,从而通过适老性景观的设计,更好地提升老年群体在城市公共空间中的幸福感。     

灾难中的心理危机干预——精神病学的视角

灾难事件是一种特殊类型的生活事件,因其超出个体应对能力,因此灾难事件后常并发一系列的精神卫生问题。急性应激障碍、创伤后应激障碍、抑郁症、自杀是灾后常见精神卫生问题。本文回顾了近年来灾难事件相关精神障碍的研究,并总结了去年发生在我国的两次重大灾难性事件的相关研究结果,从精神病学视角对灾难事件后心理危机干预策略进行了探讨。     

司法警官群体中心理健康状况的研究

在司法行政系统工作的人民警察是法律的最终执行者,代表的是国家法律,工作的对象是服刑人员,工作地点是与正常社会基本隔绝的监管场所,而且"加强被监禁人群和强制性教育改造人群的精神卫生工作"又落在司法警官的肩上。因此,司法警官群体中的成员的心理健康状况又会直接关系到"被监禁人群"的精神卫生工作。所以,要想做好这项艰巨的工作,首先就必须在提高和加强司法警官群体中的成员的政治素质、思想道德建设及优化知识结构、提高执法业务水平的同时,更应该重视司法警官群体中的成员心理素质的培养和锻炼,改善他们精神卫生状态,解决好他们心理问题。     

从民族宗教心理发展的轨迹寻找历史统一的渊源

笔者结合民族宗教心理发展的轨迹来分析祖国的历史统一问题。第一，少数民族的图腾崇拜心理，神话传说与中华民族的大统一。第二，中华民族的群体心理与宗教信仰精神的统一。第三，是早期经验集体潜意识与历史的大融合。     

卫生政策走向与公共健康及其伦理思考

政府通过决策决定卫生政策,卫生政策对于公共健康具有导向和引领作用。卫生政策走向直接影响公共健康,决定公共健康的发展方向。卫生政策与公共健康的关系是因果关系,前者决定后者。卫生政策需要有伦理学基础和伦理学专家的伦理论证,坚持公正、公平、公益的原则。     

系统思维和人文精神在德国精神医学中的应用——中国年轻医护人员的学习考察见闻与心得

系统式精神医学将系统治疗的理念和实践整合到传统的治疗方法当中,成为更加符合生物心理社会医学模式的新型精神卫生服务模式。德国精神医学经过40多年的发展和改革,形成了以预防-治疗-康复为整体的精神卫生服务模式,尤其是服务中的系统思维和人文精神,是我们发展精神卫生服务非常值得借鉴和学习的地方。本文作者通过在德国精神卫生服务机构的学习考察,介绍系统思维和人文精神在德国精神医学中的具体运用和效果。     

卫生政策走向与公共健康及其伦理思考

政府通过决策决定卫生政策,卫生政策对于公共健康具有导向和引领作用.卫生政策走向直接影响公共健康,决定公共健康的发展方向.卫生政策与公共健康的关系是因果关系,前者决定后者.卫生政策需要有伦理学基础和伦理学专家的伦理论证,坚持公正、公平、公益的原则.     

LOT,CTM, and the Elephant in the Room

According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol.     

Curse of the qualia

In this paper I distinguish three alternatives to the functionalist account of qualitative states such as pain. The physicalist-functionalist₁ holds that (1) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states differed in their qualitative character from ours, (2) there could be subjects functionally equivalent to us whose mental states lacked qualitative character altogether and (3) there could not be subjects like us in all objective respects whose qualitative states differed from ours. The physicalist-functionalist₂ holds (1) and (3) but denies (2). The transcendentalist holds (1) and (2) and denies (3). I argue that both versions of physicalist-functionalism inherit the problem of property dualism which originally helped to motivate functionalist theories of mind. I also argue that neither version of physicalist-functionalism can distinguish in a principled way between those neurophysiological properties of a subject which are relevant to the qualitative character of that subject's mental states and those which are not. I conclude that the only alternative to a functionalist account of qualitative states is a transcendentalist account and that this alternative is not likely to appeal to the critics of functionalism.     

The ontology of character traits in Hume

This paper argues that Hume can account for character traits as lasting mental qualities without violating his reductionist account of the mind as a changing bundle of ideas and impressions. It argues that a trait is a disposition to act according to certain passions or motivations, explained entirely with reference to the ideas and impressions constituting one's current self. This account is consistent with Hume's view of the mind, and relies solely on his accounts of the association of impressions and ideas, and of the relationship between belief and passion, to establish relations that can properly be called lasting mental qualities.     

God and Contemporary Science: Philip Clayton's Defense of Panentheism

Philip Clayton's God and Contemporary Science is summarized and discussed. Clayton presents a theological reading of biblical texts. In my opinion, science-and-religion studies should deal more substantially with insights of secular studies on the situated character of these texts. Clayton uses the relationship between mind and brain as analogy for the relationship between God and the world. This runs the risk of understanding God as analogous to the mind and hence secondary and emergent relative to the world. Besides, Clayton's arguments for “mental causation” are wanting. But then, why should a defender of panentheism decouple the mental and the material?     

Consciousness in act and action

This paper develops an account of consciousness in action. Both consciousness and action are related to knowledge. A voluntary action is defined as a volition, or something intentionally effected by means of such volitions. Volitions are conscious mental acts whose proper function is to make their content true. A mental act is the exercise of a power of mind and a conscious mental act is identical with knowledge of its own phenomenal character. This set of definitions elucidates the relations between consciousness, action and knowledge.     

CAUSALITY, INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY: MIND BODY INTERACTION IN SPINOZA

According to Spinoza mental events and physical events are identical. What makes Spinoza's identity theory tempting is that it solves the problem of mind body interaction rather elegantly: mental events and physical events can be causally related to each other because mental events are physical events. However, Spinoza seems to deny that there is any causal interaction between mental and physical events. My aim is to show that Spinoza's apparent denial of mind body interaction can be reconciled with the identity theory. I argue that Spinoza had both an extensional and an intensional concept of cause and when Spinoza seems to deny mind body interaction he is having in mind the intensional concept of cause. This intensional concept of cause corresponds to that of causal explanation. I will argue that Spinoza anticipated Donald Davidson's view that even though mental events cannot be explained by referring to physical events and vice versa, mental and physical events are causally related to each other.     

Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder'

Current diagnostic manuals in psychiatry such as DSM and ICD offer definitions of mental disorder, though it is recognized that they are unsatisfactory. It is likely that philosophy can help in this problem of definition. I argue that philosophical theories of mind have always implied definitions of mental disorder. Contemporary theories of mind commonly take intentionality to be fundamental, and I consider to what extent mental disorder can be defined in terms of radical failures of intentionality. Dennett has suggested that breakdown of intentional systems is to be explained from the physical stance, but explanations of breakdown from the design stance and even from the intentional stance are possible. Evolutionary theory emphasizes the intentionality of mind and behaviour, and is increasingly applied in models of psychopathology. It is unlikely that these models support the concept of mental disorder at work in current psychiatry.     

公共卫生人才调查及培养的思考

对江苏省部分市、区、县级疾病预防控制中心和卫生监督所的公共卫生队伍现状、人才需求进行了调查分析,为我国公共卫生教育提供了科学的依据。认为江苏省公共卫生系统现有人员素质有待进一步提高,医学高等院校应该加强公共卫生人才的培养。     

Dual‐Aspect Monism

In this article, I am interested in dual‐aspect monism as a solution to the mind‐body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under‐represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual‐aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated (and interact) with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this (cor)relation. It fits well with our ordinary picture of the world, as well as with the scientific picture. It gives its rightful place to the phenomenal, qualitative, subjective character of experience, instead of reducing it or eliminating it. It does not unnecessarily multiply ontological categories. It can come in many versions, and is compatible with other interesting views, such as panpsychism.