范畴直观与现象学的悖论——反思阿多诺对范畴直观的批判

阿多诺认为,胡塞尔的范畴直观理论由于陷入了感性图像化的悖论、范畴觉知与概念实证化的困境,最终错误地掩盖了范畴的辩证本性。本文认为,阿多诺尽管借助于对概念的辩证本性的洞察,在直观被给予性和觉知问题上揭示了描述心理学的内在缺陷,但由于他缺乏对胡塞尔现象学的内在视角的理解,在错失了质料的综合先天和觉知的多重含义的同时,也错失了描述心理学向先验现象学突破的内在必然性。     

阿多诺对胡塞尔现象学的马克思主义解读

阿多诺 1956年出版的《认识论的元批判: 胡塞尔和现象学二律背反研究》 (以下简称《元批判》)一书是现象学研究中的一部“另类经典”。国内有学者从马克思主义的正确立场出发, 开始对这一未被学界充分认识到其意义与价值的著作进行初步探索 (参见赵海峰 )。但是, 对阿多诺的理论得失进行正确的然而却非历史的评判, 其实并不能够真正继承这份当代遗产。真正重要的问题不是阿多诺在字面上已经说了些什么, 而是: 第一, 他为什么会在延搁多年之后重新回到胡塞尔这个论题上来, 在学派的其他成员更多地走向社会科学的同时重新展开哲学批判? 第二, …     

完全还原的不可能性——兼论梅洛-庞蒂与胡塞尔现象学的差异

在梅洛-庞蒂的现象学中,对世界本身而非认识本质的关注,使他并未追随胡塞尔寻求认识的彻底性。他援用胡塞尔的现象学方法进一步追问,提出完全还原的不可能性问题。因为还原使他发现的不是胡塞尔所言的"明证性",而是本源的"两间性"。这看似是对胡塞尔现象学的否定,其实却是秉持现象学严格追问起源的精神,对胡塞尔现象学所做的改造。因而,梅洛-庞蒂的现象学不仅是胡塞尔现象学的开放性所允许的,也是对胡塞尔现象学的丰富和拓展。     

感知的透视性与动感——从事物感知出发探察胡塞尔动感概念

在1907年的"事物讲座"中,胡塞尔第一次较大篇幅地使用和分析动感概念。经过现象学还原,事物感知分析呈现一个根本性难题,即如何由诸侧面的显现序列构造意识显现相关项上的空间性显现流形,胡塞尔引入动感来解决这个问题。因此,从胡塞尔考察事物感知问题的思路历程,以及从其思想逻辑上探明动感与感知的透视性的根本性关联,成为探察胡塞尔整个意识现象学分析的核心问题之一。本文试图围绕胡塞尔通过动感所要解决感知现象学中的空间性构造难题来阐明感知的透视性与动感的关联,借此表明动感的现象学意涵,分析动感概念的提出对于胡塞尔感知现象学的重要意义。     

现象学技术哲学:从本体走向经验

一、探讨技术根本问题的本体论现象学技术哲学现象学首先是指胡塞尔现象学。从胡塞尔到海德格尔,现象学经历了一个从先验现象学到基础本体论现象学的转变。海德格尔与胡塞尔对现象学的理解有重大区别,主要表现在胡塞尔不仅仅把现象学理解为一种方法,更重要的是把它理解为一种认     

海德格的现象学起点

海德格数次在其著作中谈到胡塞尔的现象学对于他的思想形成所起的关键作用。但又在更多的地方申明他所理解的现象学从一开始就与胡塞尔的不同。理解这两点——海德格如何从胡塞尔那里得到解决“在的原义”问题的重要启发,以及他的“现象学存在论”在什么意义上不同于胡塞尔的现象学——是理解海德格的思想、尤其是其“严格性”的绝对必要的一步。本文旨在讲明第一点,即胡塞尔的现象学怎样激发了青年海德格关于“在”的思路。     

现象学与实在论--与索科拉夫斯基教授的对话

索科拉夫斯基(Sokolovsky),美国天主教大学哲学教授,卢汶大学博士,英语世界著名现象学家。主要著作有:《现象学导论》(2000)、《胡塞尔构造观念的构成》(1970)、《胡塞尔与现象学传统》(1988)、《胡塞尔的沉思:语言如何呈现事物》(1974)、《胡塞尔逻辑研究的结构与内容》以及《胡塞尔与弗雷格》。我于2004年在华盛顿做访问学者时,多次拜访了索科拉夫斯基教授,现将这些对话整理成文刊发,供读者参考。高:现象学是否属于现代主体主义传统,或者是反对主体主义传统而属于古代的实在论传统,仍然是一个需要澄清的问题。你曾说,胡塞尔的某些论证和…     

意识的“统一”与“同一”——再思胡塞尔的“纯粹自我”问题

胡塞尔在1901年明确拒斥"纯粹自我"概念,而在1913年却又重谈之。现象学界对此一直存在着争议。实际上,胡塞尔明确区分了意识流的"统一性"原则和"同一性"原则。按照前一个原则,无论是在1901年还是在1913年以后,胡塞尔都将拒绝该概念。因为藉由内时间意识现象学,胡塞尔已经表明,意识流的"统一性"是由意识流的内时间意识结构本身,即由纵意向性来保证的。然而,随着其对交互主体性现象学以及注意意识现象学的研究之展开,胡塞尔重新对"纯粹自我"予以关注并对其进行了现象学的描述,但这时的"纯粹自我"所要表达的恰恰是"意识的同一化原则",即一种"与格的我"。在此意义上,胡塞尔在1901年所拒斥的"纯粹自我"与1913年所迎回的"纯粹自我"并非同一个。     

经验现象学心理学:乔治对胡塞尔现象学的继承与发展

美国现象学心理学家阿米多·乔治基于科学和心理学视角所提出的经验现象学心理学是对胡塞尔现象学的继承和发展。这表现为:在批判对象上,从胡塞尔的反二元论细化为反自然科学心理学;在出发点和基本原则上,将胡塞尔的生活世界、意向性、还原等概念从超验层面放置到经验层面;在研究方法上,从胡塞尔的描述还原过程转向具体的描述现象学心理学方法。本质上,乔治的经验现象学心理学与胡塞尔的现象学一脉相承,不仅完美地展示了后者的基本原理,更在具体概念和操作应用上充实且超越了后者。     

尼采的道德形而上学及其现象学奠基

尼采的形而上学侧重于人的自我实现,他将这种自我实现视为真正的道德。尼采的形而上学从目的上看是道德的;从性质上看是思辨的;从方式上看则是隐喻性的。其中,道德是核心,思辨与隐喻是必要手段。然而这三者都需要以胡塞尔现象学的某种理论为奠基:道德的主体本身必须是主体间性的,这需要胡塞尔现象学的主体间性理论为其奠基;思辨则隐含着对现象学还原方法的诉求;隐喻作为一种想象力活动、联想活动,则需要胡塞尔现象学中想象力的自由变更、同质性联想、异质性联想等理论作为理论基础。因此,尼采的道德形而上学需要胡塞尔现象学为其奠基。     

Zur geschichtlichen Wende der genetischen Phänomenologie. Eine Interpretation der Beilage III der <Emphasis Type="Italic">Krisis</Emphasis>

The paper addresses the methodological tensions between Husserl’s phenomenology and history by reinterpreting the Addendum III of the Krisis-work in view of genetic phenomenology. Thus, the paper starts out by retracing the traditional criticism against the unhistorical character of Husserl’s phenomenology as voiced by Heidegger, Adorno and others. Afterwards, it moves on to analyse the troubled relationship between static and genetic phenomenology, on the one hand, and between genetic phenomenology and empirical genesis, on the other hand. Finally, it arrives at a step by step methodological reconstruction of Husserl’s considerations on the “origin of geometry”, which are regarded to be an application of the methods of genetic phenomenology to the field of history.     

Phenomenology as first philosophy

The paper interprets phenomenology as a mode of inquiry that addresses fundamental questions of first philosophy, beyond the limitation of the practice by its leading theorists to the study of mere appearances. I draw on Adorno's critique of phenomenology to show that it has typically functioned as a mode of first philosophy, but I part with Adorno to argue that it ought to be practiced as such, to address consciously a sceptical worry about the gap between appearance and reality that Husserl modestly claimed to have bracketed. Noting Husserl's and Adorno's shared worries about the project of first philosophy, to know the world beyond appearances, I draw on Nietzsche to argue phenomenology ought nonetheless to address real matters of concern.     

Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Theme,Point, and Methodological Status

Abstract

This paper provides a criticial interpretation of the theme, point, and methodological status of Adorno’s so‐called negative dialectic. The theme at issue, ‘non‐identity’, comes in several varieties; and the point of Adorno’s dialectic, namely reconciliation, is multifaceted. Exploration of those topics shows that negative dialectic seques into substantive doctrines, including a version of transcendentalism and a claim about deformation. The peculiar methodological status of negative dialectic explains that adumbration. In the appraisive register, my principal contentions include these: Adorno’s transcendentalism makes some sense of the aforementioned deformation claim; and negative dialectic qua method avoids mystery and metaphysical excess.     

Husserl’s motivation and method for phenomenological reconstruction

In this paper I present an account of Husserl’s approach to the phenomenological reconstruction of consciousness’s immemorial past, a problem, I suggest, that is quite pertinent for defenders of Lockean psychological continuity views of personal identity. To begin, I sketch the background of the problem facing the very project of a genetic phenomenology, within which the reconstructive analysis is situated. While the young Husserl took genetic matters to be irrelevant to the main task of phenomenology, he would later come to see their importance and, indeed, centrality as the precursor and subsoil for the rationality of consciousness. I then argue that there is a close connection between reconstruction and genetic phenomenology, such that reconstruction is a necessary component of the program of genetic phenomenology, and I set out Husserl’s argument that compels one to enter into reconstructive territory. With that impetus, I schematically lay out the main contours one finds in Husserl’s practice of reconstructive techniques. We find him taking two distinct approaches, that of the individual viewed egologically (through the abstract lens of a single individual’s consciousness) and as embedded in interpersonal relations. Husserl occasionally calls these the approach “from within” and “from without,” respectively. Ultimately, the two approaches are not only complementary, but require one another. In closing, I argue that these considerations lead to a blurring of lines between the genetic and generative phenomenological registers, which challenges the prevalent view that there is a sharp demarcation of the two.     

The relevance of the theory of pseudo-culture

Continental Philosophy Review - Some 60&nbsp;years separate us from Theodor W. Adorno’s “Theory of pseudo-culture.” Yet Adorno’s analysis might never have been as...     

Adorno,Hegel, and Dialectic

This article explores critical theory's relations to German idealism by clarifying how Adorno's thought relates to Hegel's. Adorno's apparently mixed responses to Hegel centre on the dialectic and actually form a coherent whole. In his Logic, Hegel outlines the dialectical process by which categories – fundamental forms of thought and reality – necessarily follow one another in three stages: abstraction, dialectic proper, and the speculative (famously simplified as ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’). Adorno's allegiance to Hegel's dialectic emerges when he traces the dialectical process whereby enlightenment reverts to myth and human domination over nature reverts into our domination by nature. However, Adorno criticizes Hegel's dialectic as the ultimate form of ‘identity thinking’, subsuming unique, material objects under universal concepts by using dialectical reason to expand those concepts to cover objects utterly. These two responses cohere because Adorno shares Hegel's view that dialectical contradictions require reconciliation, but differs from Hegel on the nature of reconciliation. For Hegel, reconciliation unites differences into a whole; for Adorno, reconciled differences co-exist as differences. Finally, against Habermas who holds that Adorno cannot consistently criticize the enlightenment practice of critique, I show that Adorno can do so consistently because of how he reshapes Hegelian dialectic.     

Towards completeness: Husserl on theories of manifolds 1890–1901

Husserl’s notion of definiteness, i.e., completeness is crucial to understanding Husserl’s view of logic, and consequently several related philosophical views, such as his argument against psychologism, his notion of ideality, and his view of formal ontology. Initially Husserl developed the notion of definiteness to clarify Hermann Hankel’s ‘principle of permanence’. One of the first attempts at formulating definiteness can be found in the Philosophy of Arithmetic, where definiteness serves the purpose of the modern notion of ‘soundness’ and leads Husserl to a ‘computational’ view of logic. Inspired by Gauss and Grassmann Husserl then undertakes a further investigation of theories of manifolds. When Husserl subsequently renounces psychologism and changes his view of logic, his idea of definiteness also develops. The notion of definiteness is discussed most extensively in the pair of lectures Husserl gave in front of the mathematical society in Göttingen (1901). A detailed analysis of the lectures, together with an elaboration of Husserl’s lectures on logic beginning in 1895, shows that Husserl meant by definiteness what is today called ‘categoricity’. In so doing Husserl was not doing anything particularly original; since Dedekind’s ‘Was sind und sollen die Zahlen’ (1888) the notion was ‘in the air’. It also characterizes Hilbert’s (1900) notion of completeness. In the end, Husserl’s view of definiteness is discussed in light of Gödel’s (1931) incompleteness results.     

Husserl on Hume

ABSTRACT

This article offers an account of the development of Husserl’s assessment of Hume’s position in the history of philosophy. In Husserl’s early treatment of Hume, Husserl’s interpretation was shaped by the anti-Kantian views of his teacher Franz Brentano. Later, however, Husserl concentrated on those themes in Hume’s philosophy that were of relevance for the development of his own conception of phenomenology. His analysis into the a priori structures of intentionality led the Husserl of Logical Investigations (1900–1901) to reject Hume’s nominalism and sensualism, and to criticize Hume’s naturalistic psychologism and fictionalism. Already at this point, however, Husserl appreciated Hume’s metaphysical neutrality as well as his radical starting point in the immediate givenness of consciousness. In the period following Husserl’s transcendental turn in Ideas I (1913), Hume is gradually re-assessed in the context of Husserl’s engagement with Kant as a philosopher who offers important insights concerning concrete problems of transcendental philosophy. For Husserl, Hume ultimately offers the first outline of a pure phenomenology and, indeed, becomes one of the most important forerunners of transcendental philosophy as such.     

The Theoretical Reformer: on Husserl’s Plato (Husserl and the Figures of the History of Philosophy)

ABSTRACT

The present research contributes to the elucidation of an important aspect of Husserl’s interpretation of the history of philosophy, that is, his reading of the beginning of Western thought. In particular, it aims to clarify the sense in which Husserl deems Plato the father of the idea itself of philosophy as a science. As will be maintained, Husserl thinks of Socrates and Plato together as providing the first reform of philosophy, whose overall goal is to give reason (Vernunft) a universal method of self-justification against the general skepticism of the sophists. The analysis will be both systematically and historically oriented, for, it will try to both reconstruct Husserl’s interpretation of the background against which Plato first introduces the idea of philosophy as a science, and to show that what is truly at stake for Husserl is the nature of philosophy itself.